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This work has been with me a labor of love. The gathering of materials
for it, and the writing of it, as carrying me into what I feel to be interest-
ing scenes, have afforded me great pleasure, which is the only reward I
am likely to get. I publish it, as the last, and to me the only remaining,
means of testifying my regard for my country—loved all the more be-
cause I am now far from it—and my country’s philosophy, which has
been the means of stimulating thought in so many of Scotland’s sons.
The English-speaking public, British and American, has of late been
listening to divers forms of philosophy,—to Coleridge, to Kant, to Cousin,
to Hegel, to Comte, to Berkeley,—and is now inclined to a materialistic
psychology. Not finding permanent satisfaction in any of these, it is
surely possible that it may grant a hearing to the sober philosophy of
Scotland.
M. Cousin has remarked that the philosophy of Scotland is part of
the history of the country. I have treated it as such; and I claim to have
one qualification for the work: I am in thorough sympathy with the
characteristic sentiments of my native land. I have farther tried to make
my work a contribution to what may be regarded as a new department
of science, the history of thought, which is quite as important as the
history of wars, of commerce, of literature, or of civilization.
Some of these articles have appeared in the “North British Review,”
the “British and Foreign Evangelical Review,” and the “Dublin Univer-
sity Magazine;” but the greater number are now given to the public for
the first time, and all of them have been rewritten.
J. McC. Princeton, New Jersey, October, 1874.6/James McCosh
I.  Characteristics of The School.
The Germans have histories without number of their philosophy from
Kant to Hegel, with not a few historical reviews of the later specula-
tions. The French, too, have numerous sketches of the philosophy of
their country generally, and of individual systems, such as that of
Descartes. It is no way to the credit of British thought, and least of all to
that of the Scotch metaphysicians, that we have not in our language a
history of the Scottish school of philosophy. There are valuable notices
of it, it is true, in Dugald Stewart’s Historical Dissertation, and in his
Eloges of Reid and Adam Smith; but Stewart is far too dignified and
general in his style to be able to give an articulate account of the special
doctrines of the different masters of the school, or a vivid picture of the
times, with many of the marked characteristics of which he had no sym-
pathy. The best history of the Scottish Philosophy is by a Frenchman,
and has not been translated into English. We look on “Philosophie
Ecossaise,” the volume in which M. Cousin treats of the Scottish school,
as containing upon the whole the most faultless of all his historical dis-
quisitions. In his other volumes he scarcely does justice to Locke, whom
he always judges from the evil consequences which have flowed from
his philosophy on the continent, and he is not able to wrestle success-
fully with the powerful logical intellect of Kant; but he has a thorough
appreciation of the excellencies of the Scottish metaphysicians, and,
when he finds fault, his criticisms are always worthy of being consid-
ered. But it could not be expected of a foreigner, that he should thor-
oughly comprehend the state of Scotland when its peculiar philosophy
arose, nor be able to estimate its relation to the national character; and
the account given by M. Cousin is fragmentary, and critical rather than
expository.
The Scottish Philosophy possesses a unity, not only in the circum-
stance that its expounders have been Scotchmen, but also and more
specially in its method, its doctrines, and its spirit. It is distinguished by
very marked and decided features, which we may represent as deter-
mined by the bones rather than the flesh or muscles.
1. It proceeds on the method of observation, professedly and really.
In this respect it is different from nearly all the philosophies which went
before, from many of those which were contemporary, and from some
of those which still linger among us. The method pursued in Eastern
countries, in ancient Greece and Rome, in the scholastic times, and in
the earlier ages of modern European speculation, had not been that ofThe Scottish Philosophy/7
induction, either avowedly or truly. No doubt, speculators have been
obliged in all ages and countries to make some use of facts, in the inves-
tigation of both mind and matter. But in the earlier theosophies, physi-
ologies, and philosophies, they looked at the phenomena of nature merely
as furnishing a starting-point to their systems, or a corroboration of
them; and their inquiries were conducted in the dogmatic, or deductive,
or analytic manner, explaining phenomena by assumed principles, or
bringing facts to support theories, or resolving the complexities of the
universe by refined mental distinctions. This spirit had been banished
from physical science, first, by the great realistic awakening of the six-
teenth century; then by the profound wisdom and far-sighted sagacity of
Bacon; and, finally, by the discoveries of Newton and the establishment
of the Royal Society of London. But it lingered for some ages longer in
material science, from which it has not even yet been finally expelled.
Bacon had declared, that his method was applicable to all other sciences
as well as to the investigation of the material universe. “Does any one
doubt (rather than object),” says he, “whether we speak merely of natu-
ral philosophy or of other sciences also, such as logics, ethics, politics,
as about to be perfected by our method?” “We certainly,” he replies,
“understand all these things which have been referred to; and like as the
vulgar logic, which regulates things by the syllogism, pertains not to the
natural but all sciences, so ours, which proceeds by induction, embraces
them all. For thus we would form a history and tables concerning anger,
fear, modesty, and the like, as also examples of civil affairs, not omit-
ting the mental emotions of memory, composition, division, judgment,
and the rest, just as we form such of heat and cold, of light, vegetation,
and such like.” Sir Isaac Newton had said in his Optics: “And if natural
philosophy in all its parts, by pursuing this method, shall at length be
perfected, the bounds of moral philosophy will also be enlarged.” But
the employment of the method of induction in the study of the human
mind was for ages slow, wavering, and uncertain. It has been asserted,
that Descartes proceeded on the method of induction; but the statement
has been made by metaphysicians who have never correctly apprehended
the mode of procedure recommended by Bacon. Descartes does indeed
appeal to profound ideas, which may be regarded as mental facts; but it
is not by them to arrive at laws by a gradual generalization; it is rather
to employ them as foundation-stones of his structure, which is reared
high above them by the joint dogmatic and deductive method, and on the
geometric and not the inductive plan. It has been averred that Hobbes8/James McCosh
proceeded on the method of his friend Bacon; but Hobbes nowhere pro-
fesses to do so: his doctrine of the origin of civil government is a mere
theory, and his system of the human mind and of morals is obtained by
a very defective analysis, and in fact, is mainly borrowed from Aristotle,
whose profounder principles he was incapable of appreciating. It can-
not be denied that Locke does proceed very largely in the way of obser-
vation; but it is a curious circumstance that he nowhere professes to
follow the method of induction; and his great work may be summarily
represented as an attempt to establish by internal facts the preconceived
theory, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection. To
the Scottish school belongs the merit of being the first, avowedly and
knowingly, to follow the inductive method, and to employ it systemati-
cally in psychological investigation. As the masters of the school were
the first to adopt it, so they, and those who have borrowed from them,
are almost the only persons who have studiously adhered to it. The school
of Condillac in France, and its followers in England and Germany, do
indeed profess to attend to observation, but it is after the manner of the
empiricists, described by Bacon as beginning with experience, but im-
mediately abandoning it for premature hypotheses. It will be seen, as we
advance, that Kant followed the critical and not the inductive method.
Hutcheson and Turnbull, and especially Reid and Stewart, have the credit
of announcing unambiguously, that the human mind is to be studied
exclusively by the method of observation, and of consistently employ-
ing this mode of procedure in all their investigations.
II. It employs self-consciousness as the instrument of observation.
It may thus be distinguished from some other schools with which it has
been confounded. Bacon, we have seen, did believe in the applicability
of his method to all the mental sciences. But he had no clear apprehen-
sion of the agency by which the observation is to be accomplished; he
supposed it to be by “the history and tables concerning anger, fear,
modesty, the memory, composition, division, judgment, and the like.” In
respect of the means of observation, philosophy is greatly indebted to
Descartes, who taught men, in studying the human mind, to seize on
great internal ideas. The questions started by Locke, and his mode of
settling them, tend towards the same issue; he dwells fondly on reflec-
tion as the alone source of the ideas which we have of the workings of
the human mind, and ever appeals to the internal sense as an arbiter in
discussions as to the origin of ideas. But the Scottish philosophers took
a step in advance of any of their predecessors, inasmuch as they pro-The Scottish Philosophy/9
fessed to draw all the laws of mental philosophy—indeed, their whole
systems—from the observations of consciousness.
By this feature they are at once distinguished from those who would
construct a science of the human mind from the observation of the brain
or nerves, or generally from animal physiology. Not indeed that the Scot-
tish philosophy is required, by its manner or its principles, to reject the
investigation of the functions of the bodily frame, as fitted to throw light
on mental action. Certain of the masters of the school, such as Reid,
Brown, and Hamilton, were well acquainted with physiology in its lat-
est discoveries in their day, and carefully employed their knowledge to
illustrate the operations of the human mind. There is nothing in the
method, or the spirit, or the cherished doctrines of the school tending to
discountenance or disparage a painstaking experimental investigation
of the parts of the bodily frame most intimately connected with mental
action. Possibly the next great addition may be made to psychology,
when internal observation of the thoughts and feelings, and external
observation of the brain and nerves and vital forces, are in circumstances
to combine their lights. But in the days of the great masters of the Scot-
tish school, physiology was not in a state, nor is it yet in a position, to
furnish much aid in explaining mental phenomena. The instrument em-
ployed by them was the internal sense; and they always maintained that
it is only by it that we can reach an acquaintance with mind proper and
its various operations, and that the knowledge acquired otherwise must
ever be regarded as subordinate and subsidiary. They might have admit-
ted that the occasion of the production, and the modifications of our
mental states, could so far be influenced by the cerebro-spinal mass, or
the forces operating in it; but they strenuously maintained that we can
know what our perceptions, and judgments, and feelings, and wishes,
and resolves, and moral appreciations are, not by the senses or the mi-
croscope, not by chemical analysis, or the estimation of the vital forces,
but solely through our inward experience revealed by consciousness.
But let us properly understand what the Scottish school intend when
they maintain that a science of the human mind can be constructed only
by immediate consciousness. They do not mean that the study of the
mind can be prosecuted in no other way than by looking in for ever on
the stream of thought as it flows on without interruption. The operation
of introspection is felt to be irksome in the extreme if continued for any
length of time, and will certainly be abandoned when thought is rapid or
feeling is intense; and those who trust to it exclusively are apt to fix their10/James McCosh
attention on a few favorite mental states, and omit many others no less
characteristic of the human mind. He who would obtain an adequate
and comprehensive view of our complex mental nature must not be sat-
isfied with occasional glances at the workings of his own soul: he must
take a survey of the thoughts and feelings of others so far as he can
gather them from their deeds and from their words; from the acts of
mankind generally, and of individual men, women, and children; from
universal language as the expression of human cogitation and senti-
ment; and from the commerce we hold with our fellow-men by conver-
sation, by writing, or by books. Reid in particular is ever appealing to
men’s actions and language, as a proof that there must be certain prin-
ciples, beliefs, and affections in the mind. Still this evidence ever carries
us back to consciousness, as after all both the primary witness and the
final judge of appeal; as it is only by it, and by what has passed through
our own minds, that we can come to discern and appreciate the feelings
of our brother men.1
III. By the observations of consciousness, principles are reached
which are prior to and independent of experience. This is another grand
characteristic of the school, distinguishing it, on the one hand, from
empiricism and sensationalism; and, on the other hand, from the dog-
matism and a priori speculation of all ages and countries. It agrees with
the former in holding that we can construct a science of mind only by
observation, and out of the facts of experience; but then it separates
from them, inasmuch as it resolutely maintains that we can discover
principles which are not the product of observation and experience, and
which are in the very constitution of the mind, and have there the sanc-
tion of the Author of our nature. These are somewhat differently appre-
hended and described by the masters of the school, some taking a deeper
and others a more superficial view of them. Hutcheson calls them senses,
and finds them in the very constitution of the mind. Reid designates
them principles of common sense, and represents them as being natural,
original, and necessary. Stewart characterizes them as fundamental laws
of human thought and belief. Brown makes them intuitions simple and
original. Hamilton views them under a great many aspects, but seems to
contemplate them most frequently and fondly after the manner of Kant,
as a priori forms or conditions. But whatever minor or major differ-
ences there may be in the fulness of their exposition, or in the favorite
views which they individually prefer, all who are truly of the Scottish
school agree in maintaining that there are laws, principles, or powers inThe Scottish Philosophy/11
the mind anterior to any reflex observation of them, and acting indepen-
dently of the philosophers’ classification or explanation of them. While
the Scottish school thus far agrees with the rational and a priori sys-
tems, it differs from them most essentially, in refusing to admit any
philosophic maxims except such laws or principles as can be shown by
self-inspection to be in the very constitution of the mind. It has always
looked with doubt, if not suspicion, on all purely abstract and rational
discussions, such as that by which Samuel Clarke demonstrated the
existence of God; and its adherents have commonly discountenanced or
opposed all ambitious a priori systems, such as those which were reared
in imposing forms in Germany in the end of last, and the beginning of
the present, century.
These three characters are found, in a more or less decided form, in
the works of the great masters of the school. I am not sure indeed whether
they have been formally announced by all, nor whether they have al-
ways been consistently followed out. I allow that the relation of the
three principles one to another, and their perfect congruity and consis-
tency, have not always been clearly discerned or accurately expressed.
In particular, I am convinced that most of the Scottish metaphysicians
have not clearly seen how it is that we must ever proceed in mental
science by observation, while there are at the same time in the mind
laws superior to and independent of observation; how it is that while
there are a priori principles in the mind, it is yet true that we cannot
construct a philosophy by a priori speculation. But with these explana-
tions and deductions, it may be maintained that the characters specified
are to be found, either announced or acted on, in the pages of all the
writers of the school, from Hutcheson to Hamilton. Whenever they are
discovered in the works of persons connected with Scotland, the writers
are to be placed among the adherents of the school. Wherever there is
the total absence of any one of them, we cannot allow the author a place
in the fraternity.
The Scottish metaphysicians and moralists have left their impres-
sion their own land, not only on the ministers of religion, and through
them upon the body of the people, but also on the whole thinking mind
of the country. The chairs of mental science in the Scottish colleges
have had more influence than any others in germinating thought in the
minds of Scottish youth, and in giving a permanent bias and direction to
their intellectual growth. We have the express testimony of a succession
of illustrious men for more than a century, to the effect that it was12/James McCosh
Hutcheson, or Smith, or Reid, or Beattie, or Stewart, or Jardine, or
Mylne, or Brown, or Chalmers, or Wilson, or Hamilton, who first made
them feel that they had a mind, and stimulated them to independent
thought. We owe it to the lectures and writings of the professors of
mental science, acting always along with the theological training and
preaching of the country, that men of ability in Scotland have com-
monly been more distinguished by their tendency to inward reflection
than inclination to sensuous observation. Nor is it to be omitted that the
Scottish metaphysicians have written the English language, if not with
absolute purity, yet with propriety and taste,—some of them, indeed,
with elegance and eloquence,—and have thus helped to advance the
literary cultivation of the country. All of them have not been men of
learning in the technical sense of the term, but they have all been well
informed in various branches of knowledge (it is to a Scottish metaphy-
sician we owe the “Wealth of Nations”); several of them have had very
accurate scholarship; and the last great man among them was not sur-
passed in erudition by any scholar of his age. Nor has the influence of
the Scottish philosophy been confined to its native soil. The Irish prov-
ince of Ulster has felt it quite as much as Scotland, in consequence of so
many youths from the north of Ireland having been educated at Glasgow
University. Though Scotch metaphysics are often spoken of with con-
tempt in the southern part of Great Britain, yet they have had their share
in fashioning the thought of England, and, in particular, did much good
in preserving it, for two or three ages towards the end of last century
and the beginning of this, from falling altogether into low materialistic
and utilitarian views; and in this last age Mr J.S. Mill got some of his
views through his father from Hume, Stewart, and Brown, and an active
philosophic school at Oxford has built on the foundation laid by Hamilton.
The United States of America especially the writers connected with the
Presbyterian and Congregational Churches, have felt pleasure in ac-
knowledging their obligations to the Scottish thinkers. It is a most inter-
esting circumstance, that when the higher metaphysicians of France un-
dertook, in the beginning of this century, the laborious work of throwing
back the tide of materialism, scepticism, and atheism which had swept
over the land, they called to their aid the sober and well-grounded phi-
losophy of Scotland. Nor is it an unimportant fact in the history of
philosophy, that the great German metaphysician, Emmanuel Kant, was
roused, as he acknowledges, from his dogmatic slumbers by the scepti-
cism of David Hume.The Scottish Philosophy/13
But the great merit of the Scottish philosophy lies in the large body
of truth which it has—if not discovered—at least settled on a founda-
tion which can never be moved. It has added very considerably to our
knowledge of the human mind, bringing out to view the characteristics
of mental as distinguished from material action; throwing light on per-
ception through the senses; offering valuable observations on the intel-
lectual powers, and on the association of ideas; furnishing, if not ulti-
mate, yet very useful provisional classifications of the mental faculties;
unfolding many of the peculiarities of man’s moral and emotional na-
ture, of his conscience, and of his taste for the beautiful; resolving many
complex mental phenomena into their elements; throwing aside by its
independent research a host of traditional errors which had been accu-
mulating for ages; and, above all, establishing certain primary truths as
a foundation on which to rear other truths, and as a breakwater to resist
the assaults of scepticism.
In comparing it with other schools, we find that the transcendental
speculators of Germany have started discussions which they cannot settle,
and followed out their principles to extravagant consequences, which
are a reductio ad absurdum of the whole method on which they proceed.
Again, the physiologists have failed to furnish any explanation of con-
sciousness, of thought, of moral approbation, or of any other peculiar
mental quality. Meanwhile, the philosophy of consciousness has coordi-
nated many facts, ascertained many mental laws, explained many curi-
ous phenomena of our inward experience, and established a body of
intuitive truths. By its method of careful observation, and by it alone,
can the problems agitated in the rival a priori schools be solved, so far
as they can be solved by the human faculties. Whatever aid physiologi-
cal research as it advances may furnish to psychology, it must always
be by the study, not of the brain, and nerves, and vital forces, but of our
conscious operations, that a philosophy of the human mind is to be
constructed. Whether the Scottish philosophy is to proceed exclusively
in its old method, and go on co-ordinating facts with ever-increasing
care, and expressing them with greater and greater precision, or whether
it is to borrow from other schools,—say to resolve in its own way the
questions started by Schelling and Hegel, or to call in physiology to
account for the rise of mental states,—it is at least desirable that we
should now have a combined view of what has been accomplished by
the philosophy of consciousness. This is what is attempted in this work.
It should be freely admitted that the Scottish school has not discov-14/James McCosh
ered all truth, nor even all discoverable truth, in philosophy; that it does
not pretend to have done so is one of its excellencies, proceeding from
the propriety of its method and the modesty of its character. Among the
writings of the Scottish school, it is only in those of Sir William Hamilton
that we find some of the profoundest problems of philosophy, such as
the conditions of human knowledge and the idea of the infinite discussed;
and the majority of the genuine adherents of the school are inclined to
think that on these subjects his conclusions are too bare and negative,
and that he has not reached the full truth. Reid and Stewart are ever
telling us that they have obtained only partial glimpses of truth, and that
a complete science of the human mind is to be achieved solely by a
succession of inquirers prosecuting the investigation through a series of
ages. Brown and Hamilton make greater pretensions to success in erect-
ing complete systems, but this is one of the defects of these great men,
arising, as we shall see, from their departing from the genuine Scottish
method, and adopting, so far, other and continental modes of philoso-
phizing, the one betaking himself to the empirical analysis of the French
sensational school, and the other adopting the critical method of Kant;
and it is to be said in behalf of Brown, that he never mounts into a region
of cloudy speculation; and in favor of Hamilton, that his most vigorous
efforts were employed in showing how little can be known by man. All
the great masters of the school not only admit, but are at pains to show,
that there are mysteries in the mind of man, and in every department of
human speculation, which they cannot clear up. This feature has tempted
some to speak of the whole school with contempt, as doing little because
attempting little. They have been charged with their country’s sin of
caution, and the national reproach of poverty has been unsparingly cast
upon them. Let them not deny, let them avow, that the charge is just. Let
them acknowledge that they have proceeded in time past in the patient
method of induction, and announce openly, and without shame, that
they mean to do so in time to come. Let it be their claim, that if they have
not discovered all truth, they have discovered and settled some truth—
while they have not promulgated much error, or wasted their strength in
rearing showy fabrics, admired in one age and taken down the next. It is
the true merit of Scotchmen that, without any natural advantages of soil
or climate, they have carefully cultivated their land, and made it yield a
liberal produce, and that they have been roused to activity, and stimu-
lated to industry, by their very poverty. Let it, in like manner, be the
boast of the Scottish philosophy, that it has made profitable use of theThe Scottish Philosophy/15
materials at its disposal, and that it has by patience and shrewdness
succeeded in establishing a body of fundamental truth, which can never
be shaken, but which shall stand as a bulwark in philosophy, morals,
and theology, as long as time endures.
II. State of Scotland
During the seventeenth century, the three kingdoms had passed through
a series of political and religious convulsions, and in the opening of the
following century the Protestant people were seeking to enjoy and im-
prove the seasonable—as they reckoned it the providential—rest which
was brought by the Revolution Settlement. The floods had swept over
the country, partly to destroy and partly to fertilize, and men are busily
employed in removing the evils (as they reckon them) which had been
left, and in sowing, planting, and building on the now dry and undis-
turbed territory. In particular, there is a strong desire on the part of the
great body of the people to make the best use of the peace which they
now possess, and to employ it to draw forth the material resources of
the country. As a consequence of the intellectual stimulus which had
been called forth mainly by the previous great contests, and of the lib-
erty achieved, and the industry in active exercise, the riches of the na-
tion are increasing, agriculture begins to make progress, great commer-
cial cities are aggregating, household and social elegance and comfort
are sought after and in a great measure secured, refinement of manners
is cultivated, and civilization is advancing. In the eager pursuit of these
worldly ends, the Generation then springing up scarcely set sufficient
value on the higher blessings which had been secured by the struggles of
their forefathers. By the profound discussions of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the great body of the people had been made to read their Bibles,
and to inquire into the foundation and functions of political government.
By the deeds done, by the sufferings endured, and the principles enunci-
ated, the great questions of civil and religious liberty had been started,
and opinions set afloat which were ultimately to settle them theoreti-
cally and practically. But the race now reared did not sufficiently appre-
ciate the advantages thence accruing. They were kept from doing so by
two impressions left by the terrible battles which had been fought on
their soil.
Every one who has read the history of the period knows that a large
amount of profligacy had prevailed among certain classes in the latter
reigns of the Stuarts. The rampant vice led naturally to religious infidel-16/James McCosh
ity, and the two continued to act and react on each other. Self-indulgent
men were little inclined to value the truths of spiritual religion, and lent
their ears to plausible systems of belief or unbelief which left them un-
disturbed in their worldly enjoyments; while youths who had broken
loose from the old religious trammels were often tempted to break through
moral restraints likewise, and to rush into vice, as exhibiting spirit and
courage. The great cavalier party, composed largely of the upper classes,
and of those who aspired to rise to them, had been all along in the habit
of ridiculing the fervor and strictness of the puritan movement, which
bad sprung up chiefly among the middle and better portion of the lower
classes, and of describing all who made solemn pretensions to religion
as being either knaves or fools. Many of those who had originally brought
the charge did not believe it in their hearts, as they had been constrained
to respect the great and good qualities of their opponents; but they suc-
ceeded in instilling their sentiments into the minds of their children, who
were taught to regard it as a mark of a gentleman to swear and to scoff
at all religion. From whatever causes it may have proceeded, it is cer-
tain that in the first half of the eighteenth century there is a frequent and
loud complaint on the part of theologians, both within and beyond the
Established Churches, of the rapid increase and wide prevalence of infi-
delity, and even of secret or avowed atheism.
The struggles of the seventeenth century had left another very deep
sentiment. The sects had contended so much about minor points, that
now, in the reaction, there was a strong disposition, both among the
professedly religious and irreligious, to set little or no value on doctrinal
differences, and to turn away with distaste from all disputes among
ecclesiastical bodies. The indifference thence ensuing tended, equally
with the mistaken zeal of the previous age, to prevent the principles of
toleration from being thoroughly carried out. Those who stood up for
what were esteemed small peculiarities were reckoned pragmatical and
obstinate. Their attempts to secure full liberty of worship and of propa-
gation met with little sympathy, and were supposed to be fitted to bring
back needlessly the battles and the sufferings of the previous ages. The
two sentiments combined, the desire to have a liberal or a loose creed,
and the aversion to the discussion of lesser differences, issued in a result
which it is more to our present purpose to contemplate. It led the great
thinkers of the age, such as Samuel Clarke, Berkeley, and Butler, to
spend their strength, not so much in discussing doctrines disputed among
Christians, as in defending religion in general, and in laying a deepThe Scottish Philosophy/17
foundation on which to rest the essential principles of morality and the
eternal truths of religion, natural and revealed. The first age of the eigh-
teenth century, as it was the period in which the first serious attacks
were made on Christianity, so it was also the time in which were pro-
duced the first great modern defences of religion, natural and super-
natural. Men of inferior philosophical breadth, but of eminent literary
power, such as Addison, were also employing their gifts and accom-
plishments and contributing to what they reckoned the same good end,
by writing apologies in behalf of religion, and laboring to make it ap-
pear amiable, reasonable, and refined. These same causes led preachers
of the new school to assume a sort of apologetic air in their discourses,
to cultivate a refined language, moulded on the French, and not the old
English model, to avoid all extravagance of statement and appeal, to
decline doctrinal controversy, and to dwell much on truths, such as the
immortality of the soul, common to Christianity and to natural religion,
and to enlarge on the loveliness of the Bible morality. The manner and
spirit were highly pleasing to many in the upper and refined classes
were acceptable to those who disliked earnest religion, as they had noth-
ing of “the offence of the cross;” and were commended by some who
valued religion, as it seemed to present piety in so attractive a light to
their young men, about whom they were so anxious in those times, and
of whom they hoped that they would thus be led to imbibe its elements,
and thereby acquire a taste for its higher truths. But all this was power-
less on the great body of the people, who were perfectly prepared to
believe the preacher when he told them that they were sinners, and that
God had provided a Saviour, but felt little interest in refined apologies
in behalf of God and Christ and duty; and they gradually slipped away
from a religion and a religious worship which had nothing to interest,
because they had nothing to move them. All this was offensive in the
extreme to those who had been taught to value a deeper doctrine and a
warmer piety. They complained that when they needed food they were
presented with flowers; and, discontented with the present state of things,
they were praying for a better era.
To complete the picture of the times, it should be added that there
was little vital piety among the clergy to counteract the tendency to
religious indifference. The appointments to the livings in England and
Ireland lay in the hands of the government and the upper classes, who
preferred men of refinement and prudence, inclined to political modera-
tion or subserviency, to men of spiritual warmth and religious indepen-18/James McCosh
dence. The Nonconformists themselves felt the somnolent influence creep-
ing over them, after the excitement of the battle in which they had been
engaged was over. Their pastors were restrained in their ministrations,
and consequently in their activities, by laws which were a plain viola-
tion of the principles of toleration, but which, as they did not issue in
any overt act of bitter persecution, were not resented with keenness by
the higher class of Dissenters, who, to tell the truth, after what they had
come through in the previous age, were not much inclined to provoke
anew the enmity from which they had suffered, but were rather dis-
posed, provided only their individual convictions were not interfered
with, to take advantage of what liberty they had, to proclaim peace with
others, and to embrace the opportunities thrown open to them in the—
rowing cities and manufactories, of promoting the temporal interests of
themselves and their families. In these circumstances, the younger min-
isters were often allured (as Butler was) to go over to the Established
Church; and those who remained were infected with the spirit which
prevailed around them, and sought to appear as elegant and as liberal as
the clergy of the church, who were beginning to steal from them the
more genteel portion of the younger members of their flocks. The design
of those who favored this movement was no doubt to make religion
attractive and respected. The result did not realize the expectation. The
upper classes were certainly not scandalized by a religion which was so
inoffensive, but they never thought of heartily embracing what they knew
had no earnestness; and, paying only a distant and respectful obeisance
to religion in the general, they gave themselves up to the fashionable
vices, or, at best, practised only the fashionable moralities of their times.
The common people, little cared for by the clergy, and caring nothing
for the refined emptiness presented to them instead of a living religion,
went through their daily toils with diligence, but in most districts, both
of town and country, viewed religion with indifference, and relieved
their manual labor with low indulgences. England is rapidly growing in
wealth and civilization, and even in industry, mainly from the intellec-
tual stimulus imparted by moral causes acting in the previous ages; but
it is fast descending to the most unbelieving, condition to which it has
ever been reduced. From this state of religious apathy it is roused, so far
as the masses of the people are concerned, in the next age, and ere the
life had altogether died out, by the trumpet voices of Whitfield and Wesley.
It was in a later age, and after the earthquake convulsions of the French
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were made to know and feel that when “the salt has lost its savor,” it is
good for nothing but to be cast out and trodden under foot of men, and
that a dead religion is of no use either to rich or poor, either for political
ends or for personal comfort.
An analogous, but by no means identical, process begins and goes
on, and is consummated in Scotland about half an age or an age later in
point of time. All throughout the seventeenth century, Scotland, like
England, had been ploughed by religious contests. But the penetrating
observer notices a difference between the shape taken by the struggle in
the two countries. In England, the war had been a purely internal one
between opposing principles, the prelatic and puritan; whereas, in Scot-
land, the battle had been mainly against an external foe, that is, an En-
glish power, which sought to impose a prelatic church on the people
contrary to their wishes. Again, in England the contest had been against
an ecclesiastical power, which sought to crush civil liberty; whereas, in
Scotland, the power of the Church of Scotland had been exerted in be-
half of the people, and against a foreign domination. This difference in
the struggle was followed by a difference in the state of feeling resulting
when the contest was terminated by the accession of William and Mary.
The great body of the people, at least in the Lowlands, acquiesced
in the Revolution Settlement, and clung round the Government and the
Presbyterian Church as by law established. But there soon arose an-
tagonisms, which, though they did not break out into open wars, as in
the previous century, did yet range the country into sections and parties
with widely differing sympathies and aims. In fact, Scotland was quite
as much divided in opinion and sentiment in the eighteenth, as it ever
was in the seventeenth century. In saying so, I do not refer to the strong
prelatic feeling which existed all over the north east coast of Scotland,
or to the attachment to the house of Stuart which prevailed in the High-
lands,—for these, though they led to the uprisings of 1715 and 1745,
were only the backward beatings of the retreating tide,—but to other
and stronger currents which have been flowing and coming into more or
less violent collision with one another from that day till ours.
At the close of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth cen-
tury, the Church of Scotland was composed of a somewhat heteroge-
neous mixture of covenanting ministers, who had lived in the times of
persecution; of prelatic clergy whose convictions in favor of Episco-
pacy were not sufficiently deep to induce them to abandon their livings,
and to suffer the annoyances and persecutions to which the more sincere20/James McCosh
non jurors were exposed and of a race of young men zealous for the
Presbyterian establishment, but “only half educated and superficially
accomplished.” The conforming “curates” were commonly indifferent
to religion of every kind, and it was hoped that they would soon die out,
and that the heritors and elders, with whom the election of pastors lay,
would fill the churches with a learned and zealous ministry. But, in
1711, the Jacobite government of Queen Anne took the power of elec-
tion from the parish authorities, and vested it in the ancient patrons,
being the Crown for above five hundred and fifty livings, and noblemen,
gentlemen of landed property, and town-councils, for the remaining four
hundred.2 The effect of this new law became visible in the course of
years, in the appointment of persons to the churches who, for good rea-
sons or bad, were acceptable to the government of the day, or were able
to secure the favor of the private patrons.
Forced upon the people in the first instance, there was a public
feeling ready to gather round this law of patronage. From bad motives
and from good—like those which we have traced in England—there
was a desire among the upper, and a portion of the middle and educated,
classes to have a clergy suited to the new age which had come in. As the
result, there was formed a type of ministers which has continued till
nearly our time in Scotland, called “New light” by the people, and des-
ignating themselves “moderates,” as claiming the virtue of being mod-
erate in all things, though, as Witherspoon charges them, they became
very immoderate for moderation, when they rose to be the dominant
party. Most of them refrained in their preaching from uttering a very
decided sound on disputed doctrinal points; some of them were sus-
pected of Arianism or Socinianism, which, however, they kept to them-
selves out of respect for, or fear of, the Confession of Faith, which they
had sworn to adhere to; the more highly educated of them cultivated a
refinement and elegance of diction, and dwelt much on the truths com-
mon to both natural and revealed religion; and all of them were fond of
depicting the high morality of the New Testament, and of recommend-
ing the example of Jesus. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that this
style of preaching did not gain, as it did not warm, the hearts of the
common people, who either became callous to all religion, without any
zealous efforts being made to stir them up, or longed and prayed for a
better state of things. The enforcement of the law of patronage, and the
settlement of ministers against the wishes of the people, led to the sepa-
ration of the Erskines and the Secession Body in 1733, and of GillespieThe Scottish Philosophy/21
and the Relief Body in 1753. In the Established Church there still re-
mained a number of men of evangelical views and popular sympathies,
such as Willison and Boston, who hoped that they might stem and ulti-
mately turn the tide which was for the time against them. The boast of
the moderate party was, that they were introducing into Scotland a greater
liberality of sentiment on religious topics, and a greater refinement of
taste. The charge against them is, that they abandoned the peculiar doc-
trines of the gospel, that they could not draw towards them the affec-
tions of the people who, in rural districts, sank into a stupid ignorance
of religious truth, and, in the crowded lanes of the rising cities, into utter
ungodliness and criminality,—except, indeed, in so far as they were
drawn out by the rapidly increasing dissenters, or by the evangelical
minority within the Established Church.
The collisions of the century took various forms. After the Union
with England, dancing assemblies, theatres, and wandering players (with
Allan Ramsay to patronize them), dancing on the tight-rope, cock-fight-
ing, gambling, and horse-racing make their appearance, and receive
considerable countenance and patronage from various classes, upper
and lower; while ineffectual attempts are made to put them down by
civil penalties inflicted by burgher magistrates, and by public ecclesias-
tical censures, which the zealous clergy rigidly enforce, but which the
new-light clergy are anxious to relax. In the turmoil of opinions which
sprang up in this new state of things, there are rumors of deism, and
even of atheism, being secretly entertained or openly avowed, and of the
establishment here and there, in town and country, of “hell-fire clubs,”
where bold men met to discuss new opinions, and even, it is said, to act
mock ceremonies, intended to ridicule the sacraments, and all that is
awful in religion. Worse than all, and without being Much noticed, or
meeting with much opposition on the part of the clergy of either party,
there is the commencement of those drinking customs, which have ever
since exercised so prejudicial an influence on the Scottish character.
If we look to the common people in the first quarter of the century,
we find them in a state of great rudeness in respect of the comforts and
elegancies of life. In the Highlands, they are scarcely removed above the
lowest state of barbarism; and in the borders between the Highlands and
Lowlands, the Celts are lifting cattle and exacting black-mail from the
Lowlanders. Even in the more favored districts in the south of Scotland,
the ground is unfenced; roads are very rare; and goods are carried on the
backs of horses. The clothing of the people in the same region is of22/James McCosh
undyed black and white plaiding, and neither men nor women have shoes
or stockings. Their ordinary food is oatmeal, pease, or beer, with kail
groats and milk, and they rarely partake of flesh meat. The houses have
only the bare ground as floors, with a fireplace in the midst, and the
smoke escaping out of a hole in the roof, and with seats and the very
beds of turf; even in the dwellings of the farmers there are seldom more
than two apartments; not unfrequently, however, in the south-west of
Scotland, there is in addition a closet, to which the head of the house
would retire at set times for devotion.
Superstitious beliefs are still entertained in all ranks of life, and are
only beginning to disappear among the educated classes. In the High-
lands and Islands, second-sight is as firmly believed by the chieftain as
by the clansmen. In the Lowlands, mysterious diseases, arising from a
deranged nervous system, are ascribed to demoniacal possessions; and
witches, supposed to have sold themselves to the Evil One, and accom-
plishing his purposes in inflicting direful evils on the persons and prop-
erties of neighbors, are being punished by the magistrates, who are al-
ways incited on by the people, and often by the more zealous ministers
of religion. Toleration is not understood or acknowledged by any of the
great parties, political or religious.
What, it may be asked, is there in the condition of this people fitted
to raise any hope that they are ever to occupy a high place among the
nations of the earth? I am sure that a worldly-minded traveller, or an
admirer of mere refinement and art, in visiting the country at those times,
and comparing it with France or Italy, would have discovered nothing in
it to lead him to think that it was to have a glorious future before it. But
a deeper and more spiritually-minded observer might have discovered
already the seeds of its coming intelligence and love of freedom:—in the
schools and colleges planted throughout the land in the love of educa-
tion instilled into the minds of the people and, above all, in their ac-
quaintance with the Bible, and in their determined adherence to what
they believed to be the truth of God.3
Before the first age of the century has passed, there are unmistak-
able signs of industrial and intellectual activity. The Union has con-
nected the upper classes with the metropolis and the Court of England,
from which they are receiving a new refinement and some mental stimu-
lus. The middle classes, and even the lower orders, are obtaining in-
struction from a very different quarter, from their parochial schools and
churches, from their burgh academies and their universities. The townsThe Scottish Philosophy/23
are hastening to take advantage of the new channels of trade and com-
merce; manufactures are springing up in various places, and already
there is a considerable trading intercourse between the west of Scotland
and America. The proprietors of the soil, in need of money to support
their English life and to buy luxuries, are beginning to subdivide and
enclose their lands, and to grant better dwellings and leases to their
tenantry, who, being thereby placed in circumstances fitted to encour-
age and reward industry, are prepared to reclaim waste lands, to manure
their grounds, to improve their stock of sheep and cattle, and introduce
improved agricultural implements.
This imperfect sketch may help the reader to comprehend the cir-
cumstances in which the Scottish philosophy sprang up and grew to
maturity, and the part which its expounders acted in the national history.
It could have appeared only in a time of peace and temporal prosperity,
but there had been a preparation for it in the prior struggles. The stream
which had risen in a higher region, and long pursued its course in rug-
gedness,—like the rivers of the country,—is now flowing through more
level ground, and raising up plenty on its banks. It is a collegiate, and
therefore a somewhat isolated, element among the agencies which were
forming the national character and directing the national destiny; but it
had its sphere. Through the students at the universities, it fostered a
taste for literature and art; it promoted a spirit of toleration, and soft-
ened the national asperities in religious and other discussions; it is iden-
tified with the liberalism of Scotland, and through Adam Smith, D.
Stewart, Mackintosh, Horner, Brougham, Jeffrey, Sydney Smith, Lord
John Russell, and Palmerston, with the liberalism of the three king-
doms; and, above all, it has trained the educated portion of the inhabit-
ants of North Britain to habits of reflection and of independent thought.
The Scottish metaphysicians, with the exception of Chalmers, have never
identified themselves very deeply with the more earnest spiritual life of
the country; but they defended the fundamental truths of natural reli-
gion, and they ever spoke respectfully of the Bible. The Scottish phi-
losophy, so far as it is a co-ordination of the facts of consciousness,
never can be antagonistic to a true theology; I believe indeed it may help
to establish some of the vital truths of religion, by means, for instance,
of the moral faculty, the existence of which has been so resolutely main-
tained by the Scottish school. Some of the moderate clergy did at times
preach the Scottish moral philosophy instead of scriptural truth; but
they did so in opposition to the counsel of the metaphysicians, at least of24/James McCosh
Hutcheson, who recommended his students to avoid the discussion of
philosophic topics in the pulpit. Some of those who have been the most
influential expounders of the Scottish theology, such as Chalmers and
Welsh, have also been supporters of the Scottish philosophy, and have
drawn from its established doctrines arguments in favor of evangelical
religion.
III. Precursors of the School
In the Libraries of some of the Scotch Colleges are collected a number
of the theses which had been defended in the Scottish Universities in the
seventeenth century. These seem to fall under the heads of Theses Logicae,
Theses Ethicae, Theses Physicae, Theses Sphericae. Aristotle still rules
both in logic and ethics. In logic, there is much abstract enunciation,
and there are many acute distinctions in regard to Ens and unity, singulars
and universals; and in ethics, the discussions are about virtue and vice,
and choice. In physics, there are rational and deductive investigations of
the nature of motion and resistance. During the century, the courses of
study differ somewhat in the different universities, but still there is a
general correspondence. In the course of Philosophy the Regents use
Aristotle De Anima, Porphyry’s Introduction, the Categories of Aristotle,
the Dialectics of Ramus, and the Rhetoric of Vossius, with the works of
such writers as Crassotus, Reas, Burgersdicius, Ariaga, Oviedo, etc.
The ethics include politics and economics, and there are discussions
about the nature of habits. It is scarcely necessary to say that all topics
are treated in a logical and rational, and not in an observational, manner
and spirit.
The Parliamentary Commission for visiting the universities, ap-
pointed in 1690, and following years, directed, in 1695, the professors
of philosophy in St. Andrews to prepare the heads of a system of logic,
and the corresponding professors in Edinburgh to prepare a course of
metaphysics. The compends drawn up in consequence were passed from
one college to another for revision there is no evidence that they were
finally sanctioned, but they may be accepted as giving a fair idea of the
instructions in philosophy conveyed in the universities of Scotland at
the close of the eighteenth century,—at the very time when Locke’s Es-
say was finding its way so rapidly over the three kingdoms.4 Logic is
called the instrument to acquire other sciences, inasmuch as it prescribes
rules for rightly apprehending, judging, and arguing. It is said to be
defined by others as the science which directs the operations of the mindThe Scottish Philosophy/25
for finding out truth in every other science. It is represented as treating
of the three operations of apprehension, judgment, and discourse, to
which some add a fourth part, on method, under which analysis and
synthesis are explained. In all this there is nothing but the commonplace
of by-gone ages. But in this same text-book of logic we have the distinc-
tion drawn in the Port Royal Logic, between the extension and compre-
hension of the notion, adopted and stated. “We must distinguish betwixt
the extension and comprehension of an idea. All the essential attributes
of an idea are called its comprehension, as being, substance, vegetative,
sensitive, and rational are the comprehension of man; but Peter, Paul,
etc., contained under man, are called the extent of man.” It can be shown
that this distinction comes down in an unbroken historical chain in
Glasgow to Sir W. Hamilton, who has so profitably amplified and ap-
plied it. It is found in the Introduction to Logic by Carmichael, and in
the Logical Compend of Hutcheson; and the latter continued to be used
in Glasgow till towards the time when Hamilton was a student there.
Metaphysics are said to be defined by some, as a science of being as
being; by others as a speculative science, which considers being in gen-
eral, and its properties and kinds, as abstracted from matter. The ben-
efits arising from the study of metaphysics are said to be, that treating
of undoubted truths and axioms, we are enabled by their assistance the
better to discover truths generally, and avoid errors; that as dividing
beings into classes it keeps us from confusion; that giving general names
to common and abstracted beings, it aids the understanding in every
kind of learning, and specially in theology, in which use is made of
metaphysical terms. The first part of metaphysics treats of the prin-
ciples of being, and of the various species of beings. The second part
treats of the properties of being, such as unity, verity, goodness; and
under this head we have abstract discussions as to the finite and infinite,
the necessary and contingent, the absolute and relative, cause and ef-
fect, means and end, substance and quality. Such was the pabulum on
which college youths fed during the century. This was the learning which
helped to sharpen the intellects of such men as Henderson, Rutherford,
Leighton, Gillespie, Baillie, Dickson, Burnet (Bishop), Stair (Lord), and
Carstairs, who acted so important a part in the affairs of their country.
But in order to appreciate fully the philosophic tastes and capacities
of Scotchmen, we must follow them into France. From a very old date,
certainly from the thirteenth century, there had been a close connection
between that country and Scotland, arising from the jealousy entertained26/James McCosh
by both nations of the power and ambition of England. The Scottish
youth who had a love of adventure, or a thirst for military glory, had a
splendid opening provided for them in the Scottish Guard, which pro-
tected the person of the king of France, while those who had a taste for
letters found means of instruction and employment in the numerous
French colleges.5 The Scotch scholars who returned to their own land
brought back the French learning with them. Bishop Elphinston, who
was the founder, and Hector Boece, who was the first principal of King’s
College, Aberdeen, had both taught in the University of Paris; and they
set up the Scottish University on the model of the French one. John
Major or Mair, who taught scholastic theology in Glasgow and St.
Andrews, and who was the preceptor of Knox and Buchanan, had been
for some time in the University of Paris. During the sixteenth, and the
early part of the seventeenth century, there was a perpetual stream of
Scottish scholars flowing into France. Some of these were Catholics, to
whom toleration was denied at home, and who betook themselves to a
country where they had scope for the free exercise of their gifts. But
quite as many were Protestants, who finding (as Scotchmen in later
ages have done) their own land too narrow, or thirsting for farther knowl-
edge or learned employment, connected themselves with one or other of
the reformed colleges of Saumur, Montauban, Sedan, Montpellier, and
Nismes, where some of them remained all their lives, while others re-
turned to their own country. Some of these emigrants were lawyers or
physicians; but by far the greater number of them were devoted to lit-
erature, philosophy, or theology. George Buchanan, Thomas Ricalton,
three Blackwoods, Thomas Dempster, two Barclays, Andrew Melville,
John Cameron, Walter Donaldson, and William Chalmers are only a
few of the Scotchmen who occupied important offices in France. Two
deserve to be specially named, as they wrote able logical works,—the
one, Robert Balfour, a Catholic, and Principal of Guienne College,
Bourdeaux, and an erudite commentator on Aristotle; and the other,
Mark Duncan, a Protestant, and Principal of the University of Saumur,
and author of Institutes of Logic. There must have been some reality as
the ground of the extravagant statement of Sir Thomas Urquhart in his
“Discovery of a Most Exquisite jewel,” that “the most of the Scottish
nation, never having restricted themselves so much to the propriety of
words as to the knowledge of things, where there was one preceptor of
languages among them, there was above forty professors of philoso-
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matter of their subtlety in philosophical disputations, that there have not
been till of late for these several years together any lord, gentleman, or
other in all that country, who, being desirous to have his son instructed
in the principles of philosophy, would entrust him to the discipline of
any other than a Scottish master.” He adds, that “if a Frenchman en-
tered into competition, a Scotchman would be preferred.”
By such teaching at home, and by such foreign intercourse, a con-
siderable amount of narrow but intense intellectual life was produced
and fostered in Scotland. But youths were beginning to feel that the air
was too close, too confined, and too monastic for them, and were long-
ing for greater freedom and expansion. While Aristotle and the scholas-
tic method still hold their place in the cloisters of the colleges, there is a
more bracing atmosphere in the regions without and beyond; and this is
now to rush into Scotland.
From the time of the revival of letters in the sixteenth century, al-
most every great and original thinker had thought it necessary to protest
against the authority of Aristotle and the schoolmen. Bacon left Cam-
bridge with a thorough contempt for the scholastic studies pursued there;
and the grand end aimed at in his “Novum Organum,” was to carry
away men’s regards from words and notions, to which they had paid too
exclusive attention, and to fix them on things. In respect of a disposition
to rebel against Aristotle and the schoolmen, Descartes was of the same
spirit as Bacon; and Gassendi and Hobbes agreed with Descartes, with
whom they differed in almost every thing else. It would be easy to pro-
duce a succession of strong testimonies against the Stagyrite and the
Mediaevals, spread over the whole of the seventeenth century. The ris-
ing sentiment is graphically expressed by Glanvil in his “Scepsis
Scientifica,” published in 1665. He declares that the “ingenious world
is grown quite weary of qualities and forms,” he declaims against “dry
spinosities, lean notions, endless altercations about things of nothing;”
and he recommends a “knowledge of nature, without which our hypoth-
eses are but dreams and romances, and our science mere conjecture and
opinion; for, while we have schemes of things without consulting the
phenomena, we do but build in the air, and describe an imaginary world
of our own making, that is but little akin to the real one that God made.”
The realistic reaction took two different but not totally divergent
directions in the seventeenth century, and both the streams reached Scot-
land in the following century. In the works of Grotius and Puffendorf,
an elaborate attempt was made to determine the laws of nature in regard28/James McCosh
to man’s political and social conditions, and apply the same to the ex-
amination and rectification of national and international laws. This was
thought by many to be a more profitable and promising theme than the
perpetual discussion of the nature of being and universals. This school
had undoubtedly its influence in Scotland, where Carmichael, in 1718,
edited and annotated Puffendorf, and where Hutcheson, and Hume, and
A. Smith, and Ferguson, and D. Stewart, combined juridical and politi-
cal with moral inquiries, and became the most influential writers of the
century on all questions of what has since been called social science.
But a stronger and deeper current was setting in about the same
time,—a determination to have the experimental mode of investigation
applied to every department of knowledge. This method had already
been applied to physical science with brilliant results. And now there
was a strong desire felt to have the new manner adopted in the investiga-
tion of the human mind. In 1670, John Locke and five or six friends are
conversing in his chamber in Oxford on a knotty topic, and quickly they
find themselves at a stand; and it occurred to Locke that, before entering
“on inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abili-
ties, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to
deal with.” He pondered and wrote on this subject for twenty years, at
the close of which (in 1690) he published his immortal “Essay on the
Human Understanding.” In this work he would banish for ever those
innate ideas which had offered such obstacles to the progress of thought;
and, by an inquiry into the actual operations of the human mind, he
would trace the ways in which mankind attain ideas and knowledge, and
settle the bounds imposed on the human understanding. Locke’s Essay
was hailed with acclamation by all who were wearied of the old scholas-
tic abstractions and distinctions, and who had caught the new spirit that
was abroad.
Still Locke’s Essay was not allowed to take possession of the think-
ing minds of the country without a vigorous opposition. Locke was met
in his own day by Stillingfleet, the Bishop of Worcester, who argued
resolutely that the view given in the Essay of our idea of substance was
not sufficiently deep to enable it to bear up the great truths of religion,
especially the doctrine of the Trinity. The great Leibnitz severely blamed
Locke for overlooking necessary truth, and reviewed his work, ‘book by
book and chapter by chapter, in his “Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement
Humain;” which, however, in consequence of Locke’s death taking place
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many otherwise favorable to the new spirit, that Locke had not laid a
sufficiently deep foundation for morality in his account of our idea of
virtue, which he derived from mere sensations of pleasure and pain,
with the law of God superadded in utter inconsistency with his theory.
There were still in England adherents of the great English moralists,
More and Cudworth, who had opposed Hobbes with learning and abil-
ity; and these maintained that there was need of deeper principles than
those laid down by Locke to oppose the all-devouring pantheistic fatal-
ism of Spinoza on the one hand, and the rising materialistic spirit on the
other.
In the early part of the eighteenth century, there appeared several
works which were not conceived at least wholly in the spirit of Locke. I
do not refer to such works as Norris’s “Ideal World,” in which we have
an able defence of the Aristotelian analysis of reasoning, and an exposi-
tion of Platonism, more ideal far than that presented in Plato’s own
dialectic; nor to Collier’s “Clavis,” “being a demonstration of the non-
existence or impossibility of an external world:” I allude to works which
left a far deeper impression on their age. Samuel Clarke, with vast eru-
dition and great logical power, was establishing, in a mathematical man-
ner, the existence and attributes of God, giving virtue a place among the
eternal relations of things perceived by reason, and defending the doc-
trine of human freedom and responsibility against those who were re-
ducing men to the condition of brutes or machines. Berkeley did adopt
the theory of Locke as to the mind being percipient only of ideas, but the
view which he took of human knowledge was very different; for while
Locke, consistently or inconsistently, was a sober realist, Berkeley la-
bored to show that there was no substantial reality except spirit, and
thought in this way to arrest the swelling tide of materialism and scepti-
cism. A more accurate thinker than either, Bishop Butler, was establish-
ing the supremacy of conscience, and showing that there was a moral
government in the world; and that revealed religion was suited to the
constitution of the mind, and to the position in which man is placed.
It was while philosophic thought was in this state that the Scottish
Philosophy sprang up. The Scottish metaphysicians largely imbibed the
spirit of Locke; all of them speak of him with profound respect; and
they never differ from him without expressing a regret or offering an
apology. Still the Scottish school never adopted the full theory of Locke;
on the contrary, they opposed it in some of its most essential points; and
this while they never gave in to the mathematical method of Clarke, and30/James McCosh
while they opposed the ingenuities of Berkeley. Hutcheson, the founder
of the Scottish school, was a rather earlier author than Butler, to whom
therefore he was not indebted for the peculiarities of his method and
system. But there was a writer to whom both Butler and Hutcheson, and
the early Scottish school generally, were under deeper obligation than to
any other author, or all other authors, and who deserves in consequence
a more special notice.
IV. Shaftesbury
The author who exercised the most influence on the earlier philosophic
school of Scotland was not Locke, but Lord Shaftesbury (born 1671,
died 1713), the grandson of the Lord Chancellor Shaftesbury, who bad
been the friend of Locke. “Peace,” says he, “be with the soul of that
charitable and courteous author, who, for the common benefit of his
fellow-authors, introduced the way of miscellaneous writing.” He fol-
lows this miscellaneous method. The pieces which were afterwards com-
bined in his “Characteristics of Men, Manners, and Times,” were writ-
ten at various times, from 1707 to 1712. They consist of a “Letter Con-
cerning Enthusiasm,” “Sensus Communis, an Essay on the Freedom of
Wit and Humor,” “Soliloquy, or, Advice to an Author,” “An Inquiry
Concerning Virtue and Merit,” “The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhap-
sody,” “Miscellaneous Reflections on the said Treatises, and other Critical
Subjects,” “A Notion of the Historical Draught or Tablature of the judg-
ment of Hercules, with a Letter concerning Design.” He tells us that the
miscellaneous manner was in the highest esteem in his day, that the old
plan of subdividing into firsts and seconds had grown out of fashion,
and that the “elegant court divine exhorts in miscellany, and is ashamed
to bring his twos and threes before a fashionable assembly.” “Ragouts
and fricassees are the reigning dishes; so authors, in order to become
fashionable, have run into the more savory way of learned ragout and
medley.” His style is evidently after the French, and not the old English,
model. It has the jaunty air of one who affects to be a man of elegance
and fashion. Undoubtedly he was extensively read in the Greek and
Roman philosophy, especially in Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and the Ro-
man Stoics, and he has many just and profound views, but these are
ever made to appear as the ornaments of a modern nobleman, who stud-
ies philosophy as an accomplishment.
His “Characteristics” open with remarks on “Enthusiasm,” and on
“Wit and Humor.” He tells us that “vapors naturally rise,” and he wouldThe Scottish Philosophy/31
dispel them by ridicule. “The melancholy way of treating religion is that
which, according to my apprehension, renders it so tragical, and is the
occasion of its acting in reality such dismal tragedies in the world.” He
would “recommend wisdom and virtue in the way of pleasantry and
mirth,” and tells us that “good-humor is not only the best security against
enthusiasm, but the best foundation of piety and true religion.” It does
not appear very clearly what is the nature of the piety and religion which
he would recommend. Sometimes he seems to scoff at the Scriptures,
and at all their spiritual verities and holy mysteries; at other times he
would make it appear as if he wished to be thought a believer in Chris-
tianity. There is, I suspect, much of latent levity in the profession he
makes: “We may in a proper sense be said faithfully and dutifully to
embrace those holy mysteries even in their minutest particulars, and
without the least exception on account of their amazing depth,” “be-
ing,” he adds, “fully assured of our own steady orthodoxy, resignation,
and entire submission to the truly Christian and catholic doctrines of
our holy church, as by law established.”
But he reckons these pleasantries merely as an introduction to graver
subjects. He has largely caught the spirit of Locke, but he by no means
follows him, especially in his rejection of innate ideas. “No one,” says
he, “has done more than Locke towards recalling of true philosophy
from barbarity into the use and practice of the world, and into the com-
pany of the better and politer sort, who might well be ashamed of it in its
other dress. No one has opened a better and clearer way to reason.” But
he qualifies his praise. “‘Twas Mr Locke that struck at all fundamen-
tals, threw all order and virtue Out Of the world, and made the ideas of
these, which are the same with those of God, unnatural, and without
foundation in our minds. Innate is a word he poorly plays upon: the
right word, though less used, is connatural.” He shows that there are
many of our mental qualities natural to us. “Life, and the sensations
which accompany life, come when they will, are from mere nature and
nothing else. Therefore, if you dislike the word innate, let us change it,
if you will, for instinct, and call instinct that which nature teaches, ex-
clusive of art, culture, or discipline.” Beginning with these lower affec-
tions, he goes on to show that preconceptions of a higher kind have
place in human kind, preconceptions of the ‘fair and beautiful.’”6
He reviews the famous argument of Descartes, “We think, therefore
we are.” “Nothing more certain: for the Ego or I being established in the
first part of the proposition, the Ergo, no doubt, must hold it good in the32/James McCosh
latter.” “For my own part,” he adds, “I take my being upon trust” He
everywhere appeals to the “Sensus Communis,” or Common Sense. His
general doctrine is thus expressed: “Some moral and philosophical truths
there are withal so evident in themselves, that it would be easier to imagine
half mankind to have run mad, and joined precisely in one and the same
species of folly, than to admit any thing as truth which should be ad-
vanced against such natural knowledge, fundamental reason, and com-
mon sense.”7 He allows that what is natural to us may require labor and
pains to bring it out. “Whatever materials or principles of this kind we
may possibly bring with us, whatever good faculties, senses, or antici-
pating sensations and imaginations may be of nature’s growth, and arise
properly of themselves without our art, promotion, or assistance, the
general idea which is formed of all this management, and the clear no-
tion we attain of what is preferable and principal in all these subjects of
choice and estimation, will not, as I imagine, by any person be taken for
innate. Use, practice, and culture must precede the under standing and
wit of such an advanced size and growth as this.” These surely are the
very views which were developed more fully and articulately by Reid,
in his opposition to the scepticism of Hume.
The object of his works is to carry out these principles to taste and
morals. “Nor do I ask more when I undertake to prove the reality of
virtue and morals. If I be certain that I am, it is certain and demon-
strable who and what I should be.” Should one who had the counte-
nance of a gentleman ask me why I would avoid being nasty when no-
body was present?’ in the first place, I should be fully satisfied that he
himself was a very nasty gentleman who could ask this question, and
that it would be a hard matter for me to make him ever conceive what
true cleanliness was. However, I might, notwithstanding this, be con-
tented to give him a slight answer, and say, I It was because I had a
nose.’ Should he trouble me further, and ask again, ‘What if I had a
cold? or what if naturally I had no such nice smell?’ I might answer
perhaps, ‘That I cared as little to see myself nasty as that others should
see me in that condition.’ ‘But what if it were in the dark?’ ‘Why, even
then, though I had neither nose nor eyes, my sense of the matter would
still be the same: my nature would rise at the thought of what was sor-
did.”’ He thus reaches a sense of beauty. “Much in the same manner
have I heard it asked, ‘Why should a man be honest in the dark?”’ The
answer to this question brings him to a moral sense.
He speaks of nature in general, and human nature in particular, asThe Scottish Philosophy/33
an “economy,” and as having a “constitution” and a “frame.” In exam-
ining the nature of the soul, he finds (1) self-affections, which lead only
to “the good of the private.” He enumerates, as belonging to this class,
“love of life, resentment of injury, pleasure, or appetite towards nour-
ishment and the means of generation; interest, or the desire of those
conveniences by which we are well provided for or maintained; emula-
tion, or love of praise and honor; indolence, or love of ease and rest.”
But he finds also (2) natural affections, which lead to the good of the
public. He takes great pains to establish the existence of disinterested
affections, and opposes the views of those who, like Rochefoucauld,
would resolve all human action into a refined selfishness. Referring to
the common saying, that interest governs the world, he remarks shrewdly:
“Whoever looks narrowly into the affairs of it, will find that passion,
humor, caprice, zeal, faction, and a thousand other springs which are
counter to self-interest, have as considerable a part in the movements of
this machine. There are more wheels and counterpoises in this engine
than are easily imagined.” With such affections, “man is naturally so-
cial, and society is natural to him;” and in illustrating this position, he
sets himself vigorously against the social theory of Hobbes, who repre-
sents the original state of man as one of war.
Virtue consists in the proper exercise of these two classes of affec-
tions. Vice arises when the public affections are weak and deficient,
when the private affections are too strong, or affections spring up which
do not tend to the support of the public or private system. He shows that
virtue, as consisting in these affections, is natural to man, and that he
who practises it is obeying the ancient Stoic maxim, and living accord-
ing to nature. The virtues which he recommends fall far beneath the
stern standard of the Stoics, and leave out all the peculiar graces of
Christianity: they consist of,—“a mind subordinate to reason, a temper
humanized and fitted to all natural affection, an exercise of friendship
uninterrupted, thorough candor, benignity, and good-nature, with con-
stant security, tranquillity, equanimity.”
He would establish a morality on grounds independent of religion.
“Whoever thinks that there is a God, and pretends formally to believe
that he is just and good, must suppose that there is, independently, such
a thing as justice, truth, and falsehood, right and wrong, according to
which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true.” “If virtue be
not really estimable in itself, I can see nothing estimable in following it
for the sake of a bargain;” and he complains of those who “speak so34/James McCosh
much of the rewards and punishments, and so little of the worth or value
of the thing itself.” He remarks very justly: “By building a future state
on the ruins of virtue, religion in general, and the cause of a deity, is
betrayed; and by making rewards and punishments the principal mo-
tives to duty, the Christian religion in particular is overthrown, and its
greatest principle, that of love, rejected and exposed.” He admits, how
ever, that a good God, as a model, has an effect on our views of morals
and conduct; and allows that “fear of future punishment and hope of
future reward, how mercenary and servile however it may be accounted,
is yet, in many circumstances, a great advantage, security, and support
to virtue.”
Such is his view of the nature of virtue. But Shaftesbury is quite
aware that the question of the character of the virtuous act is not the
same as that of the mental faculty which looks at it and appreciates it.
This faculty he represents as being of the nature of a sense. Locke had
allowed the existence of two senses, an external and an internal; and had
labored in vain to derive all men’s ideas from these two sources.
Hutcheson, perceiving that the inlets to the mind were too few according
to the theory of Locke, calls in other senses. These senses become very
numerous in the systems of some of the Scottish metaphysicians, such
as Gerard. In the writings of Shaftesbury, two occupy an important
place,—the sense of beauty and the moral sense.
“No sooner,” he says, “does the eye open upon figures, the ear to
sounds, than straight the Beautiful results, and grace and harmony are
known and acknowledged. No sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the
human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them as
soon discerned as felt), than straight an inward eye distinguishes and
sees the fair and shapely, the amiable and admirable, apart from the
deformed, the foul, the odious, or the despicable.” Though in all this
advancing quite beyond the “Essay on the Human Understanding,” yet
he seems to be anxious to connect his view of the moral sense with the
reflection or inward sense of Locke. “In a creature capable of forming
general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer them-
selves to the sense are the objects of the affections, but the very actions
themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their con-
traries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So
that by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affec-
tion towards these very affections themselves, which have been already
felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike.” Con-The Scottish Philosophy/35
science is represented by him “as the reflection in the mind of any unjust
action or behavior, which he knows to be naturally odious and ill-de-
serving. No creature can maliciously and intentionally do ill, without
being sensible, at the same time, that he deserves ill. And in this respect,
every sensible creature may be said to have a conscience.”8
He has evidently been smitten with some of the Platonic views of
beauty. “We have,” he says, “a sense of order and proportion; and hav-
ing, a sensation, reason can give this account of it, that whatever things
have order, the same have unity of design and concur in one, are parts
constituent of one whole, or are in themselves one system. Such is a tree
with all its branches, an animal with all its members, an edifice with all
exterior and interior ornaments.” He is fond of connecting or identifying
the beautiful and the good; in fact, virtue is represented by him as a
higher kind of beauty. “It is, I must own, on certain relations or respec-
tive proportions, that all natural affection does in some measure de-
pend.” “The same numbers, harmony, and proportions have a place in
morals.” He evidently clings fondly to the idea that “beauty and good
are one and the same.”
We have given so full an account of the philosophy of Shaftesbury,
because of the influence which it exercised on the Scottish Philosophy.
Francis Hutcheson did little more than expound these views, with less
versatility, but in a more equable, thorough, and systematic manner.
Turnbull, who founded the Aberdeen branch of the school, and influ-
enced greatly the mind of Reid, avowedly drew largely from Hutcheson
in his theories of taste and virtue. Reid and Beattie got their favorite
phrase, “common sense,” I have no doubt, directly or indirectly from
the treatise so entitled in the “Characteristics.” Hume was evidently
well acquainted with the writings of Shaftesbury; and I am inclined to
think that they may have helped to form his style, and to suggest some
of his essays. We have an anticipation of the spirit of Hume in the mis-
cellany entitled, “Philocles to Palemon:” “You know that in this Aca-
demic Philosophy I am to present you with, there is a certain way of
questioning and doubting, which in no way suits the genius of our age.
Men love to take party instantly. They can’t bear being kept in sus-
pense. The examination torments them.” Theocles observes, that “if there
be so much disorder in the present state of things, he would not be
disposed to think better of the future.” Lord Monboddo declares that
“Shaftesbury’s Inquiry is the best book in English on the subject of
morals.” His Draught or Tablature of the judgment of Hercules, and his36/James McCosh
Disquisitions on Taste, originated the theories of Beauty which formed
an essential part of Scottish metaphysics for more than a century.
V. Gershom Carmichael
Sir William Hamilton says that Gershom Carmichael “may be regarded,
on good grounds, as the real founder of the Scottish school of philoso-
phy.” (“Reid’s Works,” p. 30) I am disposed to retain the honor for
Francis Hutcheson, to whom it is usually ascribed. Carmichael does not
possess the full characteristics of the school. He seems to me to be the
bond which connects the old philosophy with the new in Scotland.
He was descended from a genuine covenanting stock. His father
was Alexander Carmichael, the son of Frederick Carmichael, who had
been minister in various places in Fifeshire, and who died in 1667; his
mother was relict (she had been the second wife) of Fraser of Bray.
Alexander was minister at Pittenain, and had at one time been attached
to prelacy, but abandoned it to join the suffering ministers. Early in
1672, he is in the tolbooth of Edinburgh. On February 22, he is before
the Council, charged with keeping conventicles, and is ordered to depart
the kingdom, never to return without license; and February 26, he is
transported in a ship to London, where he was useful as a minister, and
died about the year 1676 or 1677. In 1677, shortly after his death, there
was published, from the copy which he had left, a treatise, entitled,
“The Believer’s Mortification of Sin by the Spirit,” edited by Thomas
Lye, who says in the preface, “As for that flesh of his flesh, and the fruit
of his loins, as for that Ruth and Gershom he hath left behind him, I
question not but as long as the saints among you continue to bear your
old name, Philadelphia (so the old Puritans of England have used to
style you), you will not, you cannot, forget to show kindness to
Mephibosheth for Jonathan’s sake.” Gershom, so called by his father
because he was “a stranger in a strange land,” seems to have been born
in London about 1672. It may be supposed that the family returned to
Scotland after the father’s death. We certainly find Gershom enrolled a
Master of Arts in the University of Edinburgh, July 31, 1691. He after-
wards became Regent at St. Andrews, where he took the oath of alle-
giance, and subscribed the Assurance. On November 22, 1694, he is
elected and admitted Master in the University of Glasgow, having been
brought in by public dispute, that is, by disputation on comparative
trial, through the influence of Lord Carmichael, afterwards the first Earl
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good woman, the daughter of Mr John Inglis.” Wodrow, who tells us
this (“Letters”), was his pupil, and describes him as at that time pos-
sessed of little reading, as dictating several sheets of peripatetic physics
de materia prima, as teaching Rohault, and being very much a Carte-
sian,—this seven years after the publication of Newton’s “Principia.”
Afterwards he made himself master of the mathematics and the new
philosophy, and Wodrow used to jest with him on this matter of his
juvenile teaching. From these notices it appears that, by parentage and
birth and training and ancestral prepossessions, he belongs to the seven-
teenth, but catches the spirit of the eighteenth century. He exhibits in his
own personal history the transition from the old to the new thought of
Scotland.
He is represented as a hard student, a thinking, poring man, his
favorite study being moral philosophy. At the commencement of his
professorial life, a Master took up the batch of students as they entered
on the study of philosophy, and carried them in successive years through
all the branches, including logic, pneumatology, moral philosophy, and
natural philosophy. This system required the teacher to be a well-in-
formed man in various departments, but was a hindrance to eminence in
any one branch of learning. But from 1727 the Masters are restricted to
their several classes, and to Carmichael is consigned moral philosophy.
It appears that, in 1726, there were thirty-six students in the third year’s
class, and nineteen in that of the fourth year; in the latter days of
Carmichael the numbers were larger. The classes were swelled by non-
conforming students from England, who, shut out from the English uni-
versities by their tests and their churchified influence, betook themselves
to the Scottish colleges. Many of these were attracted to Glasgow by the
fame of Carmichael. The college session lasted from the beginning of
November to the end of May. On the Lord’s day, the Masters met with
their classes, to take an account of the sermons, and this was a work in
which Carmichael felt a special interest.
Carmichael was a most affectionate, friendly man, but withal a little
warm in his temper, and became involved in consequence in scenes which
seem somewhat inconsistent with the supposed calm of an academic
life. The college corporation was evidently much agitated by internal
feuds, and Carmichael takes his part in them, commonly siding with the
party of independence against the Principal. In 1704, joined by Mr
Loudon, he protests that several things minuted as Acts of Faculty were
written and signed privately by the Principal. The Faculty finds the charge38/James McCosh
unfounded, and suspends the two from their functions. Subsequently
they ask forgiveness, and are restored. In 1705, Mr Law, one of the
Regents, complains that some expressions had been uttered against him
by Mr Carmichael, who is gravely admonished, and exhorted to avoid
every thing irritating towards his colleagues in time to come. In 1717,
there are hot disputes as to who should elect the Rector. The Masters
combine against the Principal, call the students to the common hall, and
choose their man. But, in 1718, the Commission for the Visitation of the
College finds some of the Masters, including Carmichael, guilty of great
disorder in the election of the Rector; and they are discharged for a time
from exercising any part of their office (such as choosing professors),
except the ordinary discipline in the class. In 1722, a bonfire was kindled
by the students on a decision in favor of the election of Lord Molesworth
(we shall meet with him again in these articles) to Parliament, and
Carmichael rushes into the heart of the mob, and gets into trouble in
extinguishing the flames. In November, 1728, we find him joining in a
protest against the claim of the Chancellor to sit and vote. It was by
such disputes that the constitution of the Scottish colleges came to be
settled.
Patriotic exertions helped to relieve the sameness of the college life,
and in these the collegiate body in Glasgow (it was different in Aber-
deen) are of one mind. In 1708, the kingdom is threatened with “an
invasion of French and Irish papists,” and the Masters agree each to
maintain a number of foot soldiers; and Carmichael signs for five men.
In September, 1715, the rising in the north of Scotland in favor of the
pretender becomes known. The Faculty agrees to raise fifty men at six-
pence a day; the Principal provides eight, the professor of divinity five,
and Carmichael subscribes for four. It was by such active exertions in
the south of Scotland that the progress of the Rebellion was so speedily
arrested.
In his later years, as he became known, Carmichael carried on a
correspondence with Barbeyrac and other learned men. He had a nu-
merous family, “who were all a comfort to him, except one, who was a
cause of great distress.” Wodrow says, that “in his advanced years he
was singularly religious. I know he was under great depths of soul exer-
cise, and much the worse that he did not communicate his distress to
anybody almost.” This is the only record we have of a Scottish meta-
physician having had his” soul exercises;” but surely there must have
been others who had their conflicts as they dived into the depths of theThe Scottish Philosophy/39
human soul. For the last two or three years of his life, he had a cancer-
ous wart, which spread over one eye and across his nose to the other
eye, and at last carried him off. During all his illness he remained a hard
student and serious Christian. He died, November 25, 1729. On his
death the English students leave the university, the attendance at which
is reported by Wodrow as very thin in December; and it does not seem to
improve till Hutcheson commences his lectures in the following Octo-
ber.
Carmichael published “Breviuscula Introductio ad Logicam,” which
reached a second edition in 1722. He defines logic as the science which
shows the method of discovering truth, and of expounding it to others.
He represents it as having to do with judgment, but then it also treats of
apprehension as necessary to judgment. Under apprehension he speaks
of the doctrine of the difference of the comprehension and extension of a
notion, and of the former being evolved by definition, and the latter by
division, as being quite commonplace. He distinguishes between imme-
diate and mediate judgment. Immediate is between two ideas immedi-
ately compared; mediate, in which the comparison is by means of a
third judgment, is called discourse. He says all knowledge may ulti-
mately be resolved into immediate judgments, known in their own light;
and he divides immediate judgments into two classes: one abstract, in
which there is no direction of the mind to the thing itself as really exist-
ing, e.g., the whole is greater than a part; and the other intuitive, when
the mind has a consciousness of the thing as present, as, for example,
the proposition, Ego cogitaits existo. Coming to mediate judgment, he
gives as the supreme rule of affirmative syllogism the axiom, “Things
which are the same with one and the same third are the same with one
another;” and of negative syllogisms the axiom, “Things of which one is
the same with a third, and the other not the same, are not the same with
one another.” These statements show a “thinking, poring,” man, and
will be valued most by those who have thought longest on these sub-
jects. We see a new historical step in the transmission of the distinction
between the extension and comprehension of a notion; we see that the
difference between immediate and mediate judgments was known in these
times; and that there was an attempt to find a supreme rule of mediate
reasoning in the sameness (here lies the looseness) of two things with a
third. Carmichael is aware that there are propositions seen to be true in
their own light; and that there is an intuitive apprehension, in which the
thing is known as present; and many will think that the ego cogitaiis40/James McCosh
existo is a preferable form to the cogito ergo sum of Descartes.
Carmichael published an edition of Puffendorf, “De Officio Hominis
et Civis,” with Notes and Supplements, for the use of students, described
by Hutcheson as more valuable than the original work. In the notes he
offers many acute observations, and gives extracts from De Vries, Titius,
and Grotius. In the first supplement he speaks of a divine law, to which
all morality has reference, which alone obliges, and to which all obliga-
tion of human laws is ultimately to be referred. The law may be made
known either by means of signs, oral or written, or by the constitution of
human nature, and other things which offer themselves to the observa-
tion of men. What is known by the latter is called natural law, which
has two meanings,—one the faculty of reason itself as given to man by
God, and the other such a power of intelligence as can discover what is
in nature by ordinary diligence. He takes far higher grounds of religion
than those adopted by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. He declares that no
one can be said to obey the law who does not know what the law en-
joins, or who acts without reference to God and his law. At the same
time, he seems to be a eudaimonist, and inclined to look on God as
having an ultimate respect to happiness in his law. He has a second
supplement, calm, moderate, and sensible, on the “Duties of Man to-
wards his own Mind,” and a third on “Quasi-Contracts.”
His latest work, published in 1729, shortly before his death, is “Syn-
opsis Theologiae Naturalis.” In his preface he tells us that, in teaching
pneumatology, he had used two Belgian textbooks. He advises that the
forms of the Aristotelian school be avoided, as obscure and artificial,
but declares at the same time that the doctrines of the scholastics, at
least of the older, are more agreeable to reason and holy Scripture than
those opposed to them in his day, especially in their finding a foundation
for morality and obligation in God; and he denounces some who, of late
years, with a showy appearance of genius and eloquence, would sepa-
rate morality from religion, referring, I should suppose, to the school of
Shaftesbury, against which, therefore, he thus gives his dying testimony,
as it were in the name of. the old philosophy.
In establishing the existence and perfections of God, he draws argu-
ments from a variety of sources. He would call in metaphysical prin-
ciples. Thus he urges that there must be ens aliquod independens, oth-
erwise we are landed in an infinite series of causes, which he declares
(with Aristotle) self-evidently impossible. He appeals, with the French
theologian Abbadie, to universal consent. But he reckons the argumentsThe Scottish Philosophy/41
of Descartes and De Vries, and that by Samuel Clarke, as unsatisfac-
tory. He maintains that we can argue that what we attribute to a thing in
idea exists, only after we have shown that the thing exists. He maintains
that the existence of God as an existing being is to be established, not a
priori, but a posteriori, and appeals to the traces of order, beauty, and
design in the universe, and to the illustrations to be found in the writings
of Ray, Pelling, Cheyne, Derham, Niewentite, and in Pitcairn on the
Circulation of the Blood. He refers to the properties of matter, as estab-
lished by Newton; and argues, as Baxter did so resolutely afterwards,
that matter cannot move of itself, but needs a new force impressed on it.
In regard to the dependence of creature on created power, he holds that
things spiritual and corporeal exist so long as they have being from the
creative efficacy of God, and speaks of the need of a divine precursus or
concursus. He admits, however, that created spirits have efficacy in
themselves. He refers to Leibnitz, and shows that he was well acquainted
with his theory of possible worlds. It is surely interesting to observe a
modest and retiring Scottish writer so thoroughly acquainted with the
highest philosophy of his time, British and Continental, and yet retain-
ing his own independence in the midst of his learning. If he cannot be
regarded as the founder of the new school, he has the credit of judi-
ciously combining some of the best properties of the old and new phi-
losophy.
VI. Andrew Baxter
Baxter cannot be justly described as a leader or a follower of the Scot-
tish school. His method is not really nor professedly that of inductive
observation. He belongs rather to the school of Samuel Clarke, to whom
he often refers, and always with admiration. But be was a Scotchman,
and an independent thinker: he does not belong to the old philosophy;
but he was a contemporary of the men who founded the Scottish school,
and treated of many of the same topics. He had readers both in England
and Scotland in his own day, and for some years after his death; and he
deserves a passing notice as the representative of a style of thought
which met with considerable favor in his time, but had to give way
before the new school.
We have a life of him in Kippis’s “Biographia Britannica,” drawn
up from materials supplied by his son. He was the son of a merchant in
Old Aberdeen, where he was born in 1686 or 1687. His mother was
Elizabeth Frazer, descended from a considerable family in the north. He42/James McCosh
was educated at King’s College, Aberdeen, where, at the beginning of
last century, he would be trained in the old logic and metaphysics. But,
as we shall see more fully in future articles, a considerable amount of a
fresh literary taste, and of a spirit of philosophical inquiry, began to
spring up in Aberdeen in connection with the two Universities pretty
early in that century. Baxter, besides being a good mathematician, was
well acquainted with the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton, and with the
theories of Leibnitz as to matter and motion. He was familiar with the
Essay on the Human Understanding, but had a deeper appreciation of
the speculations of Clarke.
The chief professional employment of his life was that of tutor to
young men of good family. The boys who, in our days, would be sent to
the great public schools of England taught by Oxford or Cambridge
masters, were very often, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
put under tutors, who went about with them to the colleges at home, or
travelled with them abroad. The occupation of teaching and travelling
tutor was one coveted by young men of limited means and of a reading
taste, who did not wish officially to enter the church, and had no other
office open to them than that referred to, fitted to furnish them with
means of study. When the tutor had trained and travelled with the heir of
a good estate, the family felt bound to make provision for him for life. It
was thus that, in the seventeenth century, Hobbes had been tutor to two
successive Earls of Devonshire; that, in the eighteenth century, Thomson
the poet became tutor to the Lord Chancellor Talbot’s son on the Grand
Tour; that Hume coveted the office of travelling tutor to Murray of
Broughton; and Turnbull and A. Smith gave up chairs in the Scottish
colleges to become tutors,—the one to the Wauchopes of Niddrie (?)
and the other to the Duke of Buccleuch Baxter was tutor, among others,
to Lord John Gray, Lord Blantyre, and Mr Hay of Drummelzier.
In the spring of 1741, he went abroad with Mr Hay, having also
Lord Blantyre under his care. He resided some years at Utrecht, and
thence made excursions into Flanders, France, and Germany. Carlyle
met him—“ Immateriality Baxter,” as he calls him—at Utrecht in 1745,
and says of him, ‘though he was a profound philosopher and a hard
student, he was at the same time a man of the world, and of such pleas-
ing conversation as attracted the young.” His son bad described him as
being at polite assemblies in Holland, and a favorite of ladies; but a
writer in the Corrigenda of the following volume of the “Biographia,”
after mentioning that he saw him daily for more than two years at Utrecht,The Scottish Philosophy/43
declares: “His dress was plain and simple,—not that of a priggish French
man, but of a mathematician who was not a sloven. I am pretty well
persuaded that while in the Low Countries, he never had any conversa-
tion with women of higher or lower degree, unless it were to ask for the
bill at an ordinary, or desire the servant maid to bring up the turf for his
chimney.” The same writer describes him as a “plain, decent, good hu-
mored man, who passed all his time, but what was bestowed at his
meals, in meditation and study.” His son describes him as social and
cheerful, and extremely studious, sometimes’ sitting up whole nights
reading and writing.
In 1724, he had married the daughter of Mr Mebane, a minister in
Berwickshire; and, while he was abroad, his wife and family seem to
have resided at Berwick-on-Tweed. In 1747, he returned to Scotland,
and resided till his death at Whittingham, in East Lothian, where he
employed himself in country affairs, and in his philosophic studies. In
his latter years, he was much afflicted with gout and gravel. In January
29, 1750, he wrote to (the afterwards notorious) John Wilkes, with whom
he bad formed a friendship in Holland, “I am a trouble to all about me,
especially my poor wife, who has the life of a slave night and day in
helping to take care of a diseased carcass.” He had long, be states, con-
sidered the advantages of a separate state, but “I shall soon know more
than all men I leave behind me.” He died April 13, 1750, and was buried
in the family vault of Mr Hay at Whittingham.
He wrote a book in two volumes entitled “Matho,” being a compend
of the universal scientific knowledge of the day. He published his prin-
cipal work, “An Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul,” in 1733,9
and it reached a second edition in 1737. In 1750, shortly after his death,
was published, “An Appendix to his Inquiry into the Nature of the Hu-
man Soul.” He had taken a great body of manuscripts with him to Hol-
land; in the letter referred to, he speaks fondly of his unfinished manu-
scripts, in which he had discussed “a great many miscellaneous subjects
in philosophy of a very serious nature, few of them ever considered
before, as I know of.” In 1779, the Rev. Dr. Duncan of South
Warnborough published from his manuscripts, after correcting the style,
“The Evidence of Reason in proof of the Immortality of the Soul,” and
at the close is his letter to Wilkes. Another work of his, entitled “Histor,”
discussing, on the English side, the controversy between the British and
Continental writers as to force, and on the side of Clarke, the contro-
versy between Clarke and Leibnitz, was offered to Millar the book-44/James McCosh
seller; but the new generation did not appreciate his life-labors; his day
was over, and the offer was declined.
The avowed design of Baxter, in all his works, is to establish the
existence of an immaterial power. Such a defence seemed to him to be
required, in consequence of the new views of the powers of matter founded
on the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton; by the equivocal language of
Locke, frequently quoted about our not being “able to know whether
any material being thinks or not;” and by the materialistic spirit abroad.
The new doctrine of all matter attracting other matter seemed to show
that we must be prepared to modify the old doctrine, that body is alto-
gether passive. Leibnitz, on metaphysical grounds, and in opposition to
the accepted Cartesian doctrine, had maintained that matter has an es-
sential potency. Baxter proceeds on the doctrine of Clarke, the friend of
Newton, and quotes his language. “All things that are done in the world
are done either immediately by God himself, or by created intelligent
beings; matter being evidently not at all capable of any laws or powers
whatsoever, any more than it is capable of intelligence, excepting only
this one negative power, that every part of it will always and necessarily
continue in that state, whether of rest or motion, wherein it at present is.
So that all those things which we commonly say are the effects of the
natural powers of matter and laws of motion, of gravitation, attraction,
or the like, are indeed (if one will speak strictly and properly) the effects
of God’s acting continually and every moment, either immediately by
himself, or mediately by some created intelligent being,” The first vol-
ume of Baxter’s work on the “Nature of the Soul,” his “Appendix” and
a large part of his “Evidence,” are mainly occupied with a full elucida-
tion and elaborate defence of the views summarily expressed in this
passage.
He labors to prove that a vis inertiae, or resistance to a change of
present state of rest or motion, is essential to matter; that matter hath
this and nothing else; that it cannot have any sort of active power; that
what are called the powers of matter is force impressed upon it ab extra.
He maintains that matter is “liable to but one change or casualty, viz., to
be annihilated, or to be destroyed by a Being to whose power that effect
is competent,” and he denies that Infinite Power may “superadd a prop-
erty to a substance incapable of receiving it.” He maintains this doctrine
as resolutely as if it were the foundation of religion, which must stand or
fall with it. The questions which he has taken up had been discussed in
a profound manner by Descartes and Leibnitz, and they cannot be re-The Scottish Philosophy/45
garded as settled at this day. But from his dogma of the impotency of
matter he argues the necessity of an immaterial powerful being who
first made the dead substance, matter, who originally impressed, and
still continues to impress, motion upon it. “I am of opinion, and think it
would be easy to show it, if one bad leisure to run through the several
particulars, that unless an immaterial power continually re-excited mo-
tion in the material universe, all would stop in it in a very short time,
perhaps in half an hour, except that the planets would run out in straight-
lined directions”!! “To say that Deity interposes when he sees that mat-
ter would go wrong, is the same thing, in other words, as owning that
He interposes always if that were proper. Every particle of matter re-
sists a change of its present state, and therefore could not effect a change
of state in itself nor in other particles.” He would thus establish his
conclusion, that the “Deity, who can be excluded from no place, but is
active and present everywhere, acts immediately on all the parts of mat-
ter,” and that his governing is only his creating power constantly re-
peated. “Our philosophy can only be consistent when we take in the
immediate power of the Creator as the efficient cause in all the works of
nature.” He looks on his own position as being very much superior, in
its religious aspects, to the doctrines which had been entertained by
many others. “Low and pitiful are the shifts we are put to when we
would remove the Deity to the head of nature, and the head of nature out
of sight.” “It is not right to exalt the Deity in words and derogate from
his perfections in facts. This is only paying him a compliment, and then
setting aside his government in whole or in part,—a state artifice. Cicero
objects this low cunning to Epicurus, when he says, it is “verbis ponere
re tollere.” “Descartes, before Spinoza, had given the government of the
universe to matter and motion; and Leibnitz, under a pretence of extol-
ling the original contrivance of things, leaves the execution of all this to
dead substance. According to all these schemes, we see nothing that the
Deity does now: we behold only the operations of matter. This fills the
mind with anxious doubts. If matter performs all that is wonderful, it
catches our first admiration; and we know not where to search for the
being who contrived that which we see matter executes with such dex-
terity.” Much may be said in favor of the doctrine, that God acts in all
physical action; but it is wiser not to found it on the peculiar dogma of
Baxter, that matter is inactive.
But the grand aim of Baxter, in depriving matter of its powers, is to
establish the immateriality, and consequent immortality, of the soul. It is46/James McCosh
a fundamental position with him, that “a power always belongs to some-
thing living.” He is thus able to establish the existence of a human soul
active and immortal. He maintains that “no substance or being can have
a natural tendency to annihilation or become nothing,” and argues that
the soul must endlessly abide an active perceptive substance, without
either fear or hopes of dying, through all eternity.” When we find such
positions coolly assumed, one almost feels justified in rejoicing that in
that very age David Hume rose up to dispute all such dogmas; and that
in the following age Emmanuel Kant examined narrowly the founda-
tions both of rational theology and of rational psychology. We are cer-
tainly warranted in feeling a high gratification that Thomas Reid, a wiser
man than any of these, did immediately after the time of Hume, and
before the time of Kant, set about establishing natural religion and phi-
losophy upon a safer foundation.
Baxter is prepared to follow out his principles to all their conse-
quences, however preposterous they might appear. The phenomena of
dreaming came in his way, and he gives an explanation of them. He
cannot refer these dreams to dead matter, nor can it be the soul that
forms the scenes present to it. His theory is, that separate immaterial
beings act upon the matter of our bodies, and produce on the sensory a
phantasma or vision, which is perceived by the active and recipient mind.
He acknowledges that he knows nothing of the conditions and circum-
stances of these separate agencies, but he evidently clings to the idea
that there is no scarcity of living immaterial beings, and asks trium-
phantly: “Why so much dead matter, without living immaterial sub-
stance in proportion?” “Hath not the most despicable reptile animalcule
an immaterial soul joined to it?”
It ought to be added, that in his “Evidence” be adduces stronger
arguments, than those derived from his favorite view of matter, in favor
of the soul’s immortality. He shows that if there be no state beyond the
grave, our existence is incomplete, without design, irrelative; and he
calls in the divine perfections as furnishing ‘a certain ground of confi-
dence that our existence will not be finally broken off in the midst of
divine purposes thus visibly unfinished here,” and securing that beings
“becoming good for something should not instantly become nothing.” In
arguing thus, be shows his besetting tendency to take up extreme posi-
tions; for he maintains that in our world pain is much more extensive in
its nature than pleasure, and that all bodily pleasures are merely instiga-
tions of pains. He argues that as in this world reason may often beThe Scottish Philosophy/47
disobeyed with no evil consequences and obeyed without any good ones,
so there must be a future world to make every thing consistent with
reason. He shows that the prepossessions of mankind are in favor of this
tenet. “In the very dawnings of reason, let a child be told what is death,
having no idea of any way of existing beside the present, amazement
seizes him: he is perplexed, uneasy, dismayed.” He is met, as so many
others have been, by the objection, that most of these arguments would
prove that brutes are immortal. In answering it, he is obliged to allow
that immortality does not depend solely on immateriality, and to throw
himself on the moral argument, which does not apply to brutes, which,
not being moral agents, are not capable of rewards and punishments.
But it is clear that he cherishes the idea that the immaterial part of
brutes, while not constituting the same conscious being, may not perish
ultimately when separated from the material frame.
In treating of these favorite topics, he discusses a great many im-
portant philosophic questions, and always gives a clear and decided
opinion. He evidently favors the arguments derived from “abstract rea-
son and the nature of things” in behalf of the divine existence. He argues
the necessity of an infinitely perfect intelligent being,—not only from
space and time, as Clarke did, but from the necessity of eternal truth in
geometry or in other abstract sciences.” Truth is not a being existing by
itself, and therefore the immutable necessary nature of truth must be
referred to some being existing of itself, and existing immutably and
eternally.” We have only to define truth as the conformity of our ideas to
things, to see the fallacy lurking in this argument.
His view of space and time is taken from Newton and Clarke. He
represents them as not beings, but the affections of beings: “And as time
and space are not existences, so their correlate infinites (if I may say
so), that is, eternity and immensity, are not existences, but the properties
of necessary existence.” In some other of his statements, be goes back to
some of the mystic statements of the schoolmen, and anticipates some of
the doctrines of Kant. “God’s existence is unsuccessive.” He says, “Nunc
stans implies opposite ideas, if applied to our existence; but if we allow
an eternal and immutable mind, the distinction of past and future van-
ishes with respect to such a mind, and the phrase has propriety.” But
surely there is an inconsistency in first arguing the divine existence from
our ideas of space and time, and then declaring that our ideas in regard
to space and time do not apply to Deity.
In maintaining that mind is ever active, he has to consider its seem-48/James McCosh
ing dormancy in sleep. “The soul in sleep seems to suffer something like
what happens to a live coal covered up under ashes; which is alive all
the while, but only appears so when disencumbered and exposed to open
air.” As to what has since been called unconscious mental action, his
theory of it is the same as that defended in after years by D. Stewart; he
supposes that the mind was conscious of its action at the time, but that
the memory could not recall it. “There is certainly a great deal of our
past consciousness which we retain no memory of afterwards. It is a
particular part of our finite and imperfect nature, that we cannot be-
come conscious of all our past consciousness at pleasure. But no man at
night would infer that he was not in a state of consciousness and think-
ing at such a certain minute, about twelve o’clock of the day, because
now perhaps he hath no memory what particular thought be had at that
minute. And it is no better argument, considered in itself, that a man
was not conscious at such a minute in his sleep because next morning he
hath no memory of what ideas were in his mind then.”
Baxter was most earnest in restricting the properties of matter, but
he was equally resolute in maintaining its existence. In his work on the
soul he has a long section on “Dean Berkeley’s scheme.” He was one of
the first who examined systematically the new theory. He takes the ob-
vious and vulgar view of it, and not the refined one ascribed to the
ingenious author by his admirers: for those who have opposed Berkeley
have usually given one account of his system, while those who have
defended him have usually given another; and some have thence come to
the conclusion, that his whole theory is so ethereal that it is not capable
of definite expression. Baxter maintains that “we perceive, besides our
sensations themselves, the objects of them” that “we are conscious not
only of sensation excited, but that it is excited by some cause beside
ourselves,” and that “such objects as rivers, houses, mountains, are the
very things we perceive by sense.” He endeavors to prove that the sys-
tem of Berkeley carried out consistently would land us in a solitary
egoism, for “we only collect concerning the souls of other men from the
spontaneous motions and actions of their bodies; these, according to
him, belong to nothing.” Berkeley had boasted that, by expelling matter
out of nature, he had dragged with it so many sceptical and impious
notions; Baxter replies that this “puts us into a way of denying all things,
that we may get rid of the absurdity of those who deny some things,”—
“as if one should advance that the best way for a woman who may
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He thinks that the doctrine may tend to remove the checks to immoral-
ity; for “he who thinks theft, murder, or adultery nothing real beyond
bare idea, and that for aught we know be injures nobody, will be surely
under less restraint to satisfy his Declinations of any kind.” The math-
ematician is evidently annoyed and vexed at the attacks which Berkeley
bad made on his science, and shows “that if there be no such thing as
quantity, we have a large body of immutable truths conversant about an
impossible object.”
In examining Berkeley he gives his views of sense-perception, which
are not so clear and satisfactory as those of Reid; but are vastly juster
than those of his contemporaries. He distinctly separates himself from
those who hold that the mind can perceive nothing but its own states. “If
our ideas have no parts, and yet if we perceive parts, it is plain we
perceive something more than our own perceptions.” He adds “We are
conscious that we perceive parts as that we have perceptions at all.”
The existence of matter in general, or at least of material sensories to
which the soul is united, seems to me to be nearer intuitive than demon-
strative knowledge.” He declares that the “same perception of parts proves
to us both the spirit and a material agency.” This is so far an anticipa-
tion of the doctrine of Hamilton as an advance upon that of Reid. As to
the manner of the action of matter on spirit, and spirit on matter, he
says, in the very spirit of Reid. “We are certain this is matter of fact in
many instances, whether we conceive it or not.” He adds, in his own
manner: “The Deity himself moves matter in almost all the phenomena
of nature, and the soul of man perhaps moves some matter of the body,
though in an infinitely less degree.”
VII. Francis Hutcheson10
During the greater part of the seventeenth century there was a constant
immigration into the north-east of Ireland of Scotch men, who carried
with them their hardy mode of life and persevering habits; their love of
education and their anxiety to have an educated ministry; their attach-
ment to the Bible and the simple Presbyterian worship. This movement
commenced with the attempt of the first James of England to civilize
Ireland by the Plantation of Ulster, and was continued during the period
of the prelatic persecution in Scotland, whereby not a few sturdy adher-
ents of the Solemn League and Covenant were driven for refuge to the
sister isle. The Scottish Church kept a watchful guardianship over her
scattered children, and sent after them a succession of ministers to preach50/James McCosh
the gospel, for a time in the Established Church, and, when churchmen
from England (such as Jeremy Taylor) would not tolerate this any longer,
to set up a Presbyterian organization. Among these was the Rev.
Alexander Hutcheson, the second son of an old and respectable family
at Monkwood, in Ayrshire, who became minister at Saintfield, in the
heart of county Down, and purchased the townland of Drumalig. His
second son, John, was settled at Ballyrea, within two miles of Artnagh,
and ministered to a Presbyterian congregation in the archiepis opal city,
where he was known by his church as a man of retiring habits and of
superior abilities, and a firm supporter of Calvinistic doctrine. His sec-
ond son, Francis, was born Aug. 8, 1694, it is said in his grandfather’s
house in Drumalig.11 When about eight years of age, he (with his elder
brother, Hans) was put under the care of the same grandfather, and
attended a classical school kept by Mr Hamilton in the “meeting house”
at Saintfield. He was afterwards sent to Killyleagh, in the same county,
to an academy kept by the Rev. James Macalpin, said to be a man of
virtue and ability, and who taught the future metaphysician the scholas-
tic philosophy. We have it on record, that the Presbyterian Church of
Ireland—seeking now, after coming through a long period of harass-
ment and trouble, to work out its full educational system—did about
this time set up several such schools for philosophy and theology. How-
ever, the great body of the young men intending for the ministry did
then, and for more than a century after, resort to the University of Glasgow
for their higher education. Of this college Hutcheson became a student
about 1710 (he does not seem to have matriculated till 1711). During
his residence with his grandfather he became such a favorite with the
old man, that when he died in 1711, it was found that he bad altered a
prior settlement of his family affairs, and, passing by the older grand-
son, had left all his landed property to the second. Francis, though a
cautious, was a generous youth: he had all along taken pains, even by
means of innocent artifices, to uphold his brother in the old man’s es-
teem; and now he refused to accept the bequest, while Hans, with equal
liberality, declined to receive what had been destined for another; and
the friendly dispute had at last to be settled by a partition of the lands,
which again became united when Hans, dying without issue, left his
share to the son of Francis.
Francis Hutcheson thus sprang, like Gershom Carmichael (and we
shall afterwards see George Turnbull), from the old orthodox Presbyte-
rian Church and its educated pastors; and both were early nurtured inThe Scottish Philosophy/51
the scholastic logic, from which they received much benefit. But
Hutcheson comes an age later than Carmichael, and falls more thor-
oughly under the new spirit which has gone abroad.
At Glasgow the youth followed the usual course of study in the
classical languages and philosophy, and enjoyed the privilege of sitting
under the prelections of Carmichael. In after years, when called back to
be a professor in the college, he gives in his Introductory Lecture a
glimpse of the books and branches in which he felt most interest in his
student life. After referring to the pleasure which he experienced in see-
ing once more the buildings, gardens, fields, suburbs, and rivers’ banks
(more pleasant then than now), which had been so dear to him, he ex-
presses the peculiar gratification which he felt in revisiting the place
where he had drunk the first elements of the quest for truth; where Homer
and Virgil, where Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Terence, where the phi-
losophy of Cicero and the discussions of the Fathers, had been opened
to him; and where be had first been taught to inquire into the nature and
reasons (rationes) of virtue, the eternal relations of number and figures,
and the character of God. Having taken the Master’s degree in 1712, he
entered, the following year, on the study of theology under Professor
John Simson. This professor was at that time, and, indeed, for the greater
part of the period from 1712 to 1729, under prosecution before the
ecclesiastical courts for teaching doctrines inconsistent with the Con-
fession of Faith. It appears from the charges brought against him, and
from his shuffling and vacillating explanations (he was often in a shat-
tered state of health), that he took a favorable view of the state of the
heathen; that he was inclined to the doctrine of free-will; he maintained
that punishment for original sin alone was not just; he held that rational
creatures must necessarily seek their chief good,—always under sub-
serviency to the glory of God, who cannot impose a law contrary to his
own nature and to theirs, and who cannot condemn any except those
who seek their chief good in something else, and in a different way than
God has prescribed: but the special charge against him was, that he
denied that Jesus Christ is a necessarily existent being in the same sense
as the Father is. The lengthened process concluded with the General
Assembly declaring, in 1729, that Mr Simson was not fit to be intrusted
with the training of students for the ministry. It does not appear that
young Mr Hutcheson ever threw himself into this agitation on the one
side or other, but it doubtless left its impression on his mind; and this, I
rather think, was to lead him to adopt, if not the doctrine, at least some52/James McCosh
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of the liberal sentiments of Simson; to keep him from engaging in reli-
gious controversy, and to throw him back for certainty on the funda-
mental truths of natural theology and the lofty morality of the New
Testament.
To the teaching of Simson the historians of the Church of Scotland
are accustomed to trace the introduction of the “New Light” theology
into the pulpits both of Scotland and Ulster. But there were other and
deeper causes also at work, producing simultaneously very much the
same results all over the Protestant Continent of Europe, and in En-
gland both in the Church and among Non-conformists. It was a period
of growing liberality of opinion, according to the view of the rising
literary men of the country. It was a time of doctrinal deterioration,
followed rapidly by a declension of living piety, and in the age after of a
high morality, according to the view of the great body of earnest Chris-
tians. In the preceding age, Milton, Newton, and Locke had abandoned
the belief in the divinity of Christ, and the great Church of England
divine of that age, Samuel Clarke, was defending the Arian creed, and
setting aside the Reformation doctrine of grace. Francis Hutcheson, by
this time a preacher, writes from Ireland to a friend in Scot land, in
1718, Of the younger ministers in Ulster: “I find by the conversation I
have had with some ministers and comrades, that there is a perfect
Hoadley mania among our younger ministers in the north; and, what is
really ridiculous, it does not serve them to be of his opinions, but their
pulpits are ringing with them, as if their hearers were all absolute princes
going to impose tests and confessions in their several territories, and not
a set of people entirely excluded from the smallest hand in the govern-
ment anywhere, and entirely incapable of bearing any other part in the
prosecution but as sufferers. I have reason however, to apprehend that
the antipathy to confessions is upon other grounds than a new spirit of
charity. Dr. Clarke’s work (on the Trinity), I’m sufficiently informed,
has made several unfixed in their old principles, if not entirely altered
them.” Hutcheson never utters any more certain sound than this on the
religious controversies of his day. It is evident that his mind is all along
more inclined towards ethical philosophy and natural theology.
It is interesting to notice that, in 1717, he wrote a letter to S. Clarke
stating objections to his famous “Demonstration of the Being and At-
tributes of God,” and that he received a reply, both of which are lost. We
are reminded that, about four years before this, Joseph Butler, then a
youth of twenty-one, at a dissenting academy, had written Clarke, tak-54/James McCosh
ing exception to certain points in his “Demonstration,” and had received
answers to his letters. The objections of Hutcheson must have been more
fundamental as to method than those of Butler. He was convinced that,
as some subjects from their nature are capable of demonstration, so
others admit only of probable proof, and he had great doubts of the
validity of all metaphysical arguments in behalf of the existence of De-
ity. Dr. Leechman tells us: “This opinion of the various degrees of evi-
dence adapted to various subjects first led Dr. Hutcheson to treat morals
as a matter of fact, and not as founded on the abstract relation of things.”
During his student life he was tutor for a time to the Earl of
Kilmarnock. Leaving college about 1716, he was licensed to preach the
gospel by the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. His preaching does not
seem to have been acceptable to the people, who were alarmed at the
New Light doctrine which was creeping in among them, and felt that the
young preacher’s discourses were scarcely in the spirit of the Scrip-
tures, as they were not after the model of the ministers and divines whom
they reverenced.12 However, he received a call from a country congre-
gation at Magherally, in his native county, but was easily persuaded to
accept instead an invitation to open an academy in Dublin, to give in-
struction in the higher branches. About the time he settled there the
Protestant Non-conformists, aided by the government, but after a keen
opposition from the Irish bishops, had succeeded in obtaining a parlia-
mentary repeal of the Acts which required all persons to resort to their
parish church every Sunday, and imposed a fine of £100 upon the dis-
senting minister who officiated in any congregation. But the young teacher
had to suffer two prosecutions in the Archbishop’s court for daring to
teach youth without subscribing the canons and obtaining a license.
These attacks upon him came to nothing, as they were discouraged by
the Archbishop. Dr. King, author of the metaphysical work on the “Ori-
gin of Evil,” who, though he had been a determined opponent of the
relaxation allowed by law to dissenters, was unwilling to oppress so
accomplished a man and well-disposed a citizen as Hutcheson. In Dublin
he had laborious duties to discharge, which left him, he complained,
little time for literature and mental culture; but he seems to have met
with congenial society. The Presbyterians and Independents were the
representatives of the English Non-conformists, who had been a consid-
erable body there when Henry Cromwell was vice-regent, and when
Winter and Charnock preached to them in Christ’s Church Cathedral;
and they had among them families of standing and influence. His liter-The Scottish Philosophy/55
ary accomplishments opened other circles to him. There seems to have
been at that time a considerable taste for learning and philosophy in the
metropolis of Ireland. From a very early date after its publication, the
“Essay on the Human Understanding,” had been most enthusiastically
welcomed by Molyneux, who corresponded with Locke, and expressed
his excessive admiration of him. Berkeley, the tutor of Molyneux’s son,
began in 1707 to give to the world his ingenious speculations on math-
ematical and philosophical subjects. It does not appear that Hutcheson
was acquainted with Berkeley, who, we rather think, would not appreci-
ate the views of Hutcheson: be has certainly condemned the opinions of
Shaftesbury. But he enjoyed the friendship of a number of eminent men,
including Viscount Molesworth and Dr. Synge afterwards Bishop of
Elphin; both of whom encouraged him to publish his first work, and
assisted him in preparing it for the press. The former connects him his-
torically with Shaftesbury, who had written letters to Molesworth, which
were published in 1721. When in Dublin, Hutcheson and some others
formed a club in which papers were read by the members on philo-
sophic themes. It is an interesting circumstance, that in the next age
some of the more important works of Gerard, Reid, Beattie, and Campbell
sprang out of a similar society in Aberdeen.
It was in 1725 that he published in London his first work, “An
Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.” The trea-
tise was published anonymously, as (so he tells us in the second edition)
he had so little confidence of success that he was unwilling to own it.
The subject, the thoughts, and the style were suited to the age; and the
work was favorably received from the first. Lord Granville (afterwards
Lord Carteret), the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, sent his private secre-
tary to inquire at the bookseller’s for the author; and when he could not
learn his name he left a letter to be conveyed to him, in consequence of
which Hutcheson became acquainted with his Excellency and was treated
by him with distinguished marks of esteem. A second edition, corrected
and enlarged, was called for in 1726.
This was the age of serial literary essays which had commenced in
England with the “Tatler” and “Spectator.” There was such a periodcal
set up in the metropolis of Ireland called the “Dublin Journal” con-
ducted by Hibernicus (Dr. Arbucle), and to this paper Hutcheson sent
two letters, of date June 5th and June 12th, 1725, on “Laughter,” in
opposition to the views of Hobbes, who attributed men’s actions to self-
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arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by
comparison with the infirmity of others or our own formerly. He char-
acterizes Hobbes as “having fallen into a way of speaking which was
much more intelligible than that of the School men,” and “so becoming
agreeable to many wits of his age;” and as “assuming positive, solemn
airs, which he uses most when he is going to assert some solemn absur-
dity or some ill natured nonsense.” He finds it difficult to treat the sub-
ject of laughter “gravely,” but gives his theory of the cause of laughter,
which is “the bringing together of images which have contrary addi-
tional ideas, as well as some resemblance in the principal idea; this
contrast between ideas of grandeur, dignity, sanctity, perfection, and
ideas of meanness, baseness, profanity, seems to be the very spirit of
burlesque, and the greater part of our raillery and jest are founded on
it.” Some such view as this has ever since been given of wit. Samuel
Johnson describes it as a sort of concordia discors or concors discordia.
Hutcheson ventures to specify the use of laughter: “Our passions are
apt to lead us into foolish apprehensions of objects both in the way of
admiration and honor, and ridicule comes in to temper our minds.” This
moderate view falls considerably short of that given by Shaftesbury,
who represents ridicule as a test of truth.
Mandeville, in “The Fable of the Bees,” had advanced some curi-
ous and doubtful speculations as to private vices being public benefits;
showing that the power and grandeur of any nation depend much upon
the number of people and their industry, which cannot be procured un-
less there be consumption of manufactures; and that the intemperance,
luxury, and pride of men consume manufactures, and promote industry.
The author has here caught hold of a positive and important truth, the
explanation of which carries us into some of the deepest mysteries of
Providence, in which we see good springing out of vice, and God ruling
this world in spite of its wickedness, and by means of its wickedness,
but without identifying himself with it. But Mandeville was not able to
solve the profound problem, and in dealing with it he uses expressions
which look as if he intended to justify, or at least to palliate vice.
Hutcheson hastens to save morality, and writes letters on the subject to
Hibernicus, and easily shows that virtue tends to private and public
happiness, and vice to private and public misery; and that there “would
be an equal consumption of manufactures without these vices and the
evils which flow from them.”
Hutcheson had now tasted the draught of authorship, and must drinkThe Scottish Philosophy/57
on. In the “London Journal” for 1725 there appeared some Letters signed
“Philaretus,” containing objections to the doctrine of the “Inquiry into
the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,” which is represented as not giving a
sufficiently deep view of virtue as founded on the nature of things and
perceived by reason. Hutcheson replies in the same journal. In that same
year he published his second great work, being “An Essay on the Nature
and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with illustrations of the
Moral Sense.” In the Preface he says, “Some Letters in the ‘London
Journal,’ in 1728, subscribed ‘Philaretus,’ gave occasion to the Fourth
Treatise (on the Moral Sense); the answer given to them in these weekly
papers bore too visible marks of the hurry in which they were wrote,
and therefore the author declined to continue the debate that way, choosing
to send a private letter to Philaretus to desire a more private correspon-
dence on the subject of our debate. He was soon after informed that his
death disappointed the author’s great expectations from so ingenious a
correspondent.” Philaretus turned out to be Gilbert Burnet (second son,
I believe, of the bishop), and the correspondence was published in 1735,
with a postscript written by Burnet shortly before his death. Burnet
examines Hutcheson from the stand-point of Clarke, and fixes on some
of the weak points of the new theory.
At this time there was a keen controversy in Ulster as to whether the
Presbyterian Church should require an implicit subscription to the
Westminster Confession of Faith, and this issued in those who refused
to subscribe forming themselves into a separate body called the Antrim
Presbytery, the members of which published a “Narrative of the Pro-
ceedings of the Seven Synods,” which led to their separation. The work
of replying to this document was committed to Mr Hutcheson, of Armagh,
whose paper, however, was not published till after his decease, which
took place in February, 1729. The old man had anxieties about his son,
lest he should be tempted by the flattering attentions paid him in Dublin
to conform to the Established Church, and wrote a letter expressing his
fears. We have the reply of the son, of date Aug. 4, 1726. In this he
avows that he did not regard the “government or externals of worship so
determined in the gospel as to oblige men to one particular way in ei-
ther:” that he looks upon the established form as an “inconvenient one;”
that he reckons the dissenters’ cause “in most disputed points the bet-
ter;” that he believes the original of both civil and ecclesiastical power
is from God; he denounces those religious penal laws which “no magis-
trate can have a right to make;” but he would not blame any man of his58/James McCosh
own principles who did conform, if the “ends proposed were such as
would over-balance the damage which the more just cause would sus-
tain by his leaving, particularly if he had any prospect of an unjust
establishment being altered,” of which, he confesses, he does not see the
least probability. He says, that both Lord Cathcart and the Bishop of
Elphin had professed their desire to have him brought over “to the Church,
to a good living;” that he kept his mind “very much to him self in these
matters, and resolved to do,” but that he had no intention whatever to
depart from his present position, and that he would feel it his duty con-
tinually to promote the cause of dissenters. I rather think that this frank
but expediency letter would not altogether satisfy the good old father,
who had stood firm on principle in trying times. I have referred to these
transactions, because they exhibit the struggles which were passing in
many a bosom in those times of transition from one state of things to
another. Hutcheson never conformed, as his contemporary Butler did,
to the Church. His Presbyterian friends were soon relieved from all anxi-
eties in this direction by his being appointed, after be had been seven or
eight years in Dublin, to an office altogether congenial to his tastes, in
Glasgow University, where, however, he exercised a religious influence
which his father, provided he had been spared to witness it, would have
viewed with apprehension and disapproval.
He was chosen to succeed Carmichael, Dec. 19, 1729, by a major-
ity of the Faculty, over Mr Warner, favored at first by the principal, and
over Mr Frederick Carmichael, son of Gershom, supported by five of
the professors. His appointment could be justified on the ground of merit;
but he owed it mainly to family connections, who gained Lord Isla, the
great government patron of the day, before whom the principal had to
give way.13 In October, 1730, twenty English students have come to the
college, expecting Mr Hutcheson—whose “Inquiry” and work on the
“Passions”  were already well known—to “teach morality Professor
Loudon, however, insisted that he had a right to take the chair of Moral
Philosophy, whereupon the English students gave in a paper declaring
that, if Mr Hutcheson, who had not yet come over from Ireland, did not
teach them morality, they would set off to Edinburgh, and Mr Loudon
had to yield. On November 30, he was publicly admitted, and delivered,
in a low tone and hurried manner, as if awed and bashful, an inaugural
discourse, “De Naturali Hominum Socialitate,” in which he expounds,
in a clear and pleasant manner, and in good Latin, his favorite doctrine
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opposition to the “very celebrated” Locke, that man has something natu-
ral, but admits that it requires time and circumstances to bring it forth;
and in opposition to Hobbes and Puffendorff, that man can be swayed
by other motives than self-love. He represents the conscience as the tÕ
¹gemonicÒn to which all our nature ought to be subjected, and to which
it had been subjected in our entire state; but admits that our nature is
fallen, weakened, and corrupted, in many ways. Hutcheson lectured five
days a week on his proper course, which embraced Natural Religion,
Morals, jurisprudence, and Government; and at another hour he read
three days of the week, with his students, some of the finest writers of
antiquity, Greek and Latin, on the subject of morals; interpreting both
the language and sentiment. This practice of combining reading with
lectures was followed by his successors in the moral chair in Glasgow,
and is vastly superior to the plan of the Edinburgh professors of a later
date, who instructed their pupils only by reading lectures. His prelections
were at first, after the manner of the times, in Latin; but he had the
courage to break off from the ancient custom, and to speak in the En-
glish tongue, no doubt to the great joy and benefit of the students, who
might lose somewhat in not being familiarized with the ancient learned
language; but would gain vastly more in being brought into close sym-
pathy with the speaker, in listening from day to day to elegant English,
and in the mastery which they would thereby acquire over their own
tongue. Dr. Carlyle has left us a picture of the lecturer: “I attended
Hutcheson’s class this year (1743–44) with great satisfaction and im-
provement. He was a good-looking man, of engaging countenance. He
delivered his lectures without notes, walking backwards and forwards
in the area of his room. As his elocution was good, and his voice and
manner pleasing, he raised the attention of his hearers at all times; and
when the subject led him to explain and enforce the moral virtues, he
displayed a fervent and persuasive eloquence which was irresistible.” A
like account is given of him by his professed biographer Leechman: “A
stature above middle size, a gesture and manner negligent and easy, but
decent and manly, gave a dignity to his appearance. His complexion
was fair and sanguine, and his features regular. His countenance and
look bespoke sense, spirit, kindness and joy of heart,” It may be added
that this is the very impression left as we gaze on his portrait, with wig
and gown, with florid face, and easy but dignified air, in the common
hall of Glasgow College. Leechman represents him as dwelling in his
lectures in a more diffuse manner on such moral considerations as are60/James McCosh
suited to touch the heart, and excite a relish for what is truthful and
noble; and by his vivacity of thought, and sensibility of temper, com-
manding the attention of his students, and leaving strong impressions on
their minds.
In the college he had an eminent colleague in Mr Robert Simson
(nephew of the theological professor), and a congenial one in Mr
Alexander Dunlop, the professor of Greek. Mr Simson was an eccentric
man, who spent his time between severe geometrical studies in the morn-
ing, and social meetings in the tavern at which he lived, or in his club, in
the evening. Hutcheson and Dunlop—who was a man of strong sense
and capacity for business—got the credit of managing all the affairs of
the university, and both exerted themselves to maintain the discipline of
the college and foster its literary tastes. In particular, Hutcheson had
great success in reviving the study of ancient literature, particularly the
Greek, which had been much neglected in the university before his time.
At a later date, he had associates of a kindred spirit in the elegant and
grave Dr. Leechman, professor of theology (afterwards principal); in
the lively and learned Dr. Moor, first the librarian of the college, and in
1746 made professor of Greek; and in the two eminent printers, Robert
and Andrew Foulis, who published a multitude of learned works, in-
cluding many of Hutcheson’s. With such a spirit reigning in the college,
and a great thirst for education on the part of the Scottish youth, fos-
tered by the parish and burgh schools, the class-rooms were filled with
students. Carlyle, who had just come in 1743 to Glasgow, after having
been at Edinburgh College, describes the spirit that reigned among the
youths: “Although at the time there appeared to be a marked superiority
in the best scholars and most diligent students of Edinburgh, yet in
Glasgow learning seemed to be an object of more importance, and the
habit of application was much more general,”—a description which
applies equally to Glasgow in after years. He mentions that among the
students there were sundry young gentlemen from Ireland, with their
tutors; and he names, among young men of station attending, Walter
Lord Blantyre, Sir—Kennedy and his brother David, afterwards Lord
Cassilis. Walter Scott of Harden, James Murray of Broughton, and
Dunbar Hamilton, afterwards Earl of Selkirk. The Scotch colleges were
quite competent at that time to educate the nobility of the country, who
had not yet fallen into the way of going to the great English schools and
colleges, there to lose their national predilections and become separated,
as they did in succeeding ages, from the sympathies, social, political,The Scottish Philosophy/61
and religious, of the middle classes and common people of Scotland, to
the great injury of the church and the nation generally.
Hutcheson exercised a special influence in drawing students, Scot-
tish, Irish Presbyterian, and English Non- conformist, to the college.
His own class was so large that he had to employ an assistant. The
Calvinistic creed of the south-west of Scotland, the theological preach-
ing of the old-school ministers, and the training of the young in the
Shorter Catechism, all inclined the students to mental philosophy; and
in Hutcheson they had much to attract, and little to offend. When he set
before them wide fields of knowledge; when, in his lectures on natural
theology, he pointed out evidences of the wisest contrivance and most
beneficent intention; when he led them from the external world into the
still greater wonders of the internal, and traced the parts of man’s moral
constitution, and described the virtues in their loveliest form, and en-
larged on the elevated enjoyments furnished by them; when he quoted,
with glowing zest, the noblest passages of Greek and Roman literature;
when he inculcated, with immense enthusiasm, the importance of civil
and religious liberty,—the students felt as if a new world were thrown
open to them, and a new life kindled within them. Following the custom
of his predecessor, he lectured on the sabbath evenings on the truth and
excellence of Christianity, and the students of all the classes eagerly
rushed to his prelections. The conversation of the youths in their social
walks and visits often turned on the literary and philosophic themes
which he discussed, and some of them chose to attend his lectures for
four or five successive years. Among his pupils were Mr Millar, after-
wards President of the Court of Session; Archibald Maclaine, who in
future years translated Mosheim’s “Ecclesiastical History;” Matthew
Stewart, famous for his Mathematical Tracts, and father of Dugald
Stewart; and a youth, specially appreciated by Hutcheson, with a vast
capacity for learning of every kind, and destined in future years to be so
famous in Hutcheson’s own department,—Adam Smith, author of “The
Theory of Moral Sentiments,” and of “The Wealth of Nations.” All of
these ever spoke of Hutcheson in terms of high admiration and grati-
tude.
Defoe describes the city of Glasgow, with its four principal streets
meeting in a cruciform manner at a point, as being, in 1726, one of the
cleanliest, most beautiful, and best built cities in Great Britain. On the
street that ran toward the north stood the college, completed in 1656,
with quadrangles, arcade, and spire, built after the style of Louis XIII62/James McCosh
and Louis XIV. The population, when Hutcheson was a professor, might
be upwards of twenty thousand. At the summit of the social scale were
the foreign merchants engaged in the American trade, in which they
carried out linen and brought back tobacco “the tobacco merchants,
with their scarlet cloaks and gold-headed canes, and cocked hats, perched
on powdered hair or wig, with dangling clubtie or pigtail.” Next to them,
but at a considerable distance, were the ordinary shopkeepers; and far-
ther down, the tradesmen and servants; while at the base were the
Highlandmen, with their tartan jacket and kilts, driven from their native
hills by starvation, and ready to perform the most servile work. All
classes made a solemn religious profession; but Wodrow mourns over
degenerate customs which wealth and luxury were introducing. The better
citizens dined early in their own homes, without show; and many of
them spent their evenings in social meetings at taverns,—a practice which
gendered those drinking customs which, beginning with the upper classes
about this time, went down to the peasant class in the days of Burns,
and by the end of the century infected the whole of Scottish society,
which has not yet recovered from the evil influence. But Hutcheson
does not seem to have been much mixed up with the citizen life of
Glasgow; we do not hear of his spending his evenings in the tavern, or
being a member of any of the social clubs which began to spring up in
Glasgow at this time. He had experience of the evil effects of the new
habits (which were coming in with the new theology), in the lives of
some of the Irish students who were committed to his care, and over
whom he watched with the most friendly interest. “The wretched turn
their minds take is to the silly manliness of taverns.” He satisfies him-
self with keeping personally free from the evil. He presses his friend
Tom Drennan, from Belfast, to pay him a visit for a month or six weeks,
and promises: “Robert Simson, with you and Charles Moor, would be
wondrous happy till three in the morning; I would be with you from five
to ten.”
His sphere was within the walls of the college; whence, how ever,
his influence spread over the educated mind of the south west of Scot-
land and of Ulster, and over not a few of the Non-conformists in En-
gland. Carlyle tells us that he was believed by the students to be a
Socinian. There is no evidence of this, nor of his expressing any positive
opinion on any doctrinal subject. Even in his Sabbath evening lectures
he kept to Grotius “De Veritate Christianae Religionis,” and avoided,
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ages.” He seems to have maintained a friendly communication with the
non- subscribing Presbyterian ministers in Ireland, some of whom (such
as Abernethy and Leland, and Bruce and Boyce) were as accomplished
men as any theologians of their age, and of whom it may be said to their
credit, that they suffered in their temporal interests rather than sub-
scribe articles which they did not believe. In particular, Hutcheson car-
ried on a very genial correspondence with the Rev. Thomas Drennan, a
non-subscribing minister at Belfast.14 The ministers of this communion,
more especially as they were often abandoned by the people when their
views became known, were at times in very poor circumstances. On
hearing this, Hutcheson writes to his friend (May 31, 1742) am con-
cerned that in my prosperous circumstances I did not think of it sooner.
If you have any little contributions made towards such as are more dis-
tressed than the rest, you may mark me as a subscriber for £5 per an-
num, and take the above ten pounds as my payment for two years past.
. . . I think it altogether proper you should not mention my name to your
brethren, but conceal it. I am already called New Light here. I don’t
value it for myself, but I see it hurts some ministers who are most inti-
mate with me. I have been these ten days in great hurry and perplexity,
as I have for that time foreseen the death of our professor, who died last
Wednesday, and some of my colleagues join me in laboring for Mr
Leechman to succeed. We are not yet certain of the event, but have good
hopes. If he succeed, it will put a new face upon theology in Scotland.”
This was no doubt one of the ends for which Hutcheson lived and
labored, “to put a new face upon theology in Scotland.”15 Discouraging
all doctrinal exposition, and all rousing appeals to the conscience, he
would have the preachers recommend the Christian religion as embrac-
ing a pure morality, and holding out the hope of a blessed immortality;
but meanwhile providing no pardon to the poor sinner anxious about the
past, nor gracious aid to help him in his struggles to deliver himself
from sin in the future. Never avowing any doctrinal belief, his students
looked upon him as a Socinian, and so his influence went in that direc-
tion. The crop that sprang up may be taken as represented by such men
as Carlyle, elegant and accommodating but dreadfully rankled by a
Calvinistic creed which they had to swear, and by the opposition of the
people, who could not be made to feel that the New Light was suited to
them, or to believe that it had any title to be called a religion. But all this
was in the future, and was not the precise result expected by Hutcheson.
Meanwhile he rejoices in Leechman, and describes him as one “who64/James McCosh
sees all I do.” It seems that the Scotch divine received a call from a non-
subscribing congregation in Belfast, and Hutcheson is rather inclined
that he should go; he is so anxious to have him out of “that obscure
place where he was so much lost,” and where he was “preaching to a
pack of horse-copers and smugglers of the rudest sort,” who, we ven-
ture to say, would not profit much by that calm, abstract, elegant style
which so pleased the professor of moral philosophy. Hutcheson uses
every means to secure Leechman’s appointment to the chair of theology
in Glasgow, and brings influence of a very unscrupulous character (as I
reckon it) to carry his point. He writes Mr Mure of Caldwell (Nov. 23,
1743) that he wants a letter from the Duke of Montrose, the Chancellor
of the University, in behalf of Leechman to Morthland, professor of
Oriental languages, to be shown to others, and he malignantly mentions
that Professor Anderson, the chief opponent of Leechman, “made him-
self ridiculous to all men of sense by dangling after Whitefield and
M’Cullogh” (“Caldwell Papers”); and he wants this to be specially known
to Tweeddale, who was Secretary of State for Scotland, and to Andrew
Mitchell, his private secretary’ It seems that the advocates of liberality
could not tolerate that a man should be favorable to a revival of religion.
It was by such means that “a new face was to be put upon the theology
of Scotland.” He writes to his Belfast friend (Feb. 20, 1743–44): I could
tell you a good deal of news upon the unexpected election of a professor
of divinity, and the furious indignation of our zealots.” He had written
previously (March 5, 1738–39): “I hope Jack Smith has sent down to
your town a ‘Serious Address to the Kirk of Scotland,’ lately published
in London; it has run like lightning here, and is producing some effect;
the author is unknown; ‘tis wrote with anger and contempt of the Kirk
and Confession, but it has a set of objections against the Confession
which I imagine few will have the brow to answer.” The moderate party
in the Church of Scotland is being crystallized by coldness out of the
floating elements; and already there is a felt polar antipathy between
them and those whom they choose to call “zealots.” Hutcheson writes
(April 16, 1746), “I would as soon speak to the Roman conclave as our
presbytery.”
The professor of theology introduced by him to the college, had
signed the Confession of Faith, and professed his willingness to sign it
at any time. He accomplished the end of Hutcheson. The subjects repre-
sented by him as suitable to be dwelt on by the preacher from the pulpit,
were the perfections of God; the excellence of virtue, and the perfectionThe Scottish Philosophy/65
of the divine law; the truth of the Christian religion, and the important
purposes for which Jesus came into the world; the great doctrines he
taught the interesting scenes of providence he has displayed to men the
dignity and immortality of the soul, and the inconceivable happiness of
the heavenly state. In the social circle he was grave and silent, but is
represented by Carlyle as having a lively wife, who entertained the stu-
dents that came to his house in the evening, and was anxious to hear
about the new plays and novels which were coming into Scot land. He
set out a body of young preachers, who unfortunately lost the common
people, and the pious of all ranks, without gaining the worldly and un-
believing. He published a sermon in which he thought to recommend
prayer as fitted to have an influence on the mind of the person praying,
and submitted a copy to Hume, who told him plainly that the person
praying must believe that his prayers have an influence on God and
bring an answer.
It should be allowed that Hutcheson was most anxious to impart a
taste for learning and refinement to the ministers of the Church of Scot-
land. He was deeply impressed with the evils which were springing from
the law of patronage being now put in operation with a high hand. In
1735, he published “Considerations on Patronage, addressed to the
Gentlemen of Scotland.” In this pamphlet he predicts that, “instead of
studying sobriety of manners, piety, diligence, or literature, one or other
of which qualities are now necessary to recommend the candidates to
the favor of heritors, elders or presbytery, the candidate’s sole study will
be to stand right in politics, to make his zeal for the ministry of state
conspicuous; or by all servile compliance with the humor of some great
lord who has many churches in his gift, whether that humor be virtuous
or vicious, to secure a presentation.” He fears the mischiefs of patron-
age were but beginning to appear, and that gentlemen’s sons will no
longer devote themselves to the ministerial office, which will be sought
by lads of mean parentage and circumstances. It is quite certain that,
owing to the law of patronage, combined with the smallness of the liv-
ings, estimated by Hutcheson as at that time about £80 a year, and the
influence of London court life, the upper classes (from which so many
ministers had sprung in the previous century) ceased from this time to
encourage their sons to enter the sacred office.
The recorded incidents of his person and family life are not numer-
ous. He seems to have been engrossed in lecturing to his students, in
managing college matters, and in preparing text-books. He published a66/James McCosh
“Compend of Logic,” a “Synopsis of Metaphysics,” and “Institutes of
Philosophy,” all in clear and graceful Latin (referred to with commen-
dation by Dr. Parr in his “Spital Sermon”). He joined Dr. Moor in pub-
lishing a translation of the “Meditations” of Antoninus, with a life of
Antoninus, an introduction and notes in English, the last showing a con-
siderable acquaintance with the Stoic philosophy.
When in Dublin, he had married Mary Wilson, daughter of Francis
Wilson, a gentleman of property, and belonging to a Presbyterian fam-
ily in Longford.’ In a letter to a friend, Feb. 12, 1740, he speaks of
himself as “having been married now fifteen years and having only one
boy surviving, of seven children borne to me by a very agreeable woman.
I bless God for the one he has spared to me, and that he has no bad
genius. If he proves a wise and good man, I am very well in this world.
Since my settlement in this college I have had an agreeable and I hope
not an useless life, pretty much hurried with study and business, but
such as is not unpleasant. I hope I am contributing to promote the more
moderate and charitable sentiments in religious matters in this country,
where yet there remains too much warmth, and commonly about mat-
ters of no great consequence to real religion. We must make allowance
for the power of education in all places, and have indulgence to the
weakness of our brethren.”16
So early, as June, 1741, he writes to his Belfast friend: “In short,
Tom, I find old age, not in gray hairs and other trifles, but in an incapac-
ity of mind for such close thinking and composition as I once had, and
have pretty much dropped the thoughts of some great designs I had once
sketched out.” On April 3, 1745, he was nominated to the chair of moral
philosophy in Edinburgh by the Town Council, but declined the honor,
in consequence of not feeling strong enough to engage in new labors. He
writes, April 16, 1746: “I am in a great deal of private distresses about
Jo. Wilson and his sister, the latter in the utmost danger, the other scarce
recovered from death; my wife, too, very tender; but, by a set of most
intricate business, upon which the soul of this college depends, and all
may be ruined by the want of one vote, I cannot leave this till after 26th
June, and we go to Dublin first.” He had been for some months in an
uncertain state of health: he went to Dublin about the time mentioned in
the letter quoted; and there, after a few days’ fever, he was cut off, Aug.
8, 1746. His remains were buried in the old graveyard of Knockmark,
East Meath, among his wife’s kindred, the Wilsons and Stanhopes. He
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istry in Dublin College. That son published, in 1754, his “System of
Moral Philosophy,” to which is prefixed an account of the father’s life
by Dr. Leechman.
Hutcheson has nowhere explained very fully or formally the method
on which he proceeds. But he everywhere appeals to facts; he brings all
theories to the test of the actual operations of the human mind as dis-
closed to consciousness (a word frequently employed by him); he sets
no value on speculations built up in any other way; and he everywhere
speaks doubtfully or disparagingly of the logical distinctions and verbal
subtleties of the schoolmen, and of the rational deductions of Descartes
and Samuel Clarke. Proceeding on the method of observation, he dis-
covers certain cognitive powers, which he calls, perhaps unhappily,
senses, which have a place in our very nature and constitution, and
operate independent of any notice we may take of them. These features
show that he belongs to the Scottish school, of which he is entitled to be
regarded as the founder, inasmuch as no philosopher connected with
North Britain had previously combined these characters, and as he in
fact gave the modern stimulus to philosophic speculation in Scotland.
He does not dwell at great length, nor very minutely, on the intellec-
tual powers. He says that “late inquiries have been very much employed
about our understanding. and the several methods of obtaining truth and
so he would rather investigate “the various pleasures which human na-
ture is capable of receiving,” and our various internal senses, percep-
tions, and affections, specially the sense of beauty and the moral sense.
Still he intimates very clearly what views he takes of man’s intellectual
nature. And first, as to the senses, he says, “It is not easy to divide
distinctly our several sensations into classes. The division of our exter-
nal senses into the five common classes seems very imperfect. Some
sensations received without any previous idea, can either be reduced to
none of them, such as the sensations of hunger, thirst, weariness, sick-
ness; or, if we reduce them to the sense of feeling, they are perceptions
as different from the other ideas of touch, such as cold, heat, hardness,
softness, as the ideas of taste or smell. Others have hinted at an external
sense different from all of these. The following general account may
possibly be useful: (1) That certain motions raised in our bodies are by
a general law constituted the occasion of perceptions in the mind. (2)
These perceptions never come alone, but have some other perceptions
joined with them. Thus every sensation is accompanied with the idea of
duration, and yet duration is not a sensible idea, since it also accompa-68/James McCosh
nies ideas of internal consciousness or reflection; so the idea of number
may accompany any sensible ideas, and yet may also accompany any
other ideas as well as external senses. Brutes, when several objects are
before them, have probably all the proper ideas of sight which we have
without the idea of number. (3) Some ideas are found accompanying the
most different sensations, which yet are not to be perceived separately
from some sensible quality, such as extension, figure, motion, and rest,
accompany the ideas of sight or colors, and yet may be perceived with-
out them, as in the ideas of touch, at least if we move our organs along
the parts of the body touched. Extension, figure, motion, or rest, seem
therefore to be more properly called ideas accompanying the sensations
of sight and touch than the sensations of either of these senses, since
they can be received sometimes without the ideas of color, and some-
times without those of touching, though never without the one or other.
The perceptions which are purely sensible, received each by its proper
sense, are tastes, smells, colors, sound, cold, heat, etc. The universal
concomitant ideas which may attend any idea whatsoever are duration
and number. The ideas which accompany the most different sensations
are extension, figure, motion, rest. These all arise without any previous
ideas assembled or compared; the concomitant ideas are reputed images
of something external. From all these we may justly distinguish those
pleasures perceived upon the previous reception and comparison of vari-
ous sensible perceptions with their concomitant ideas, or intellectual
ideas, when we find uniformity or resemblance among them. These are
meant by the perceptions of the internal sense.” (“Nature and Conduct
of the Passions,” Sect. I.)
This note comprises the result and the sum of much reading and
much reflection. The principal thoughts, more especially as to the sepa-
ration of the ideas of number and duration, and of extension, figure,
motion, and rest from our common sensations, are taken, directly or
indirectly, from Aristotle’s “Psyche,” B. II. c. vi. (which is not referred
to, however), where there is a distinction drawn between common and
proper percepts. But he seems to take a step beyond Aristotle when he
tells us here, and still more expressly in his “Logic,” that number and
duration can be perceived both by the external and internal sense. It has
been felt by all profound thinkers, that in order to account for the phe-
nomena, and to save the senses from deceiving us, there must be distinc-
tions of some sort drawn between different kinds of sensations or per-
ceptions. Adopting the distinction of Aristotle, we find him in his “Logic”The Scottish Philosophy/69
identifying it with that of Locke, between the primary and secondary
qualities of bodies. It may be doubted whether we can so absolutely
divide, as Aristotle and Hutcheson did, the accompanying ideas from
the sensations or perceptions. The sensations and ideas are in every case
wrapped up in one concrete cognitive act, while, however, the may come
up in a different concretion in our next experience, and may be sepa-
rated into elements by an analytic process. I rather think, too, that the
perception of extension (as has been shown by Hamilton) is involved in
all our sense-perceptions, for we seem to know our organism as in space
and localized by every one of the senses. The language about the mo-
tions of bodies constituting the occasion of the perceptions in the mind,
proceeds upon the inadequate distinction between efficient and occa-
sional cause, drawn by the disciples of Descartes,—a distinction adopted
by Reid as well as Hutcheson. I suspect that it still remains true, that the
common division of our external senses is very imperfect, and that it is
not easy to arrange our sensations into classes.
In regard to the question started in the next age by Reid, as to whether
we perceive by the senses the external object, or an idea of it, it is cer-
tain that he accepts the view and the language of the great body of
philosophers prior to his time, and he speaks of our perceiving by ideas
“as images of something external.”
Formal logic has been taught, I believe, in Glasgow University from
its establishment in 1451 to this present time. Hutcheson has a “Logical
Compendium” which was used as a text-book in Glasgow and else-
where. In this treatise, after a meagre dissertation on the rise of philoso-
phy, he defines logic as “the art of guiding the mind in the knowledge of
things; adding, that it may also be considered a science, and that others
define it “the art of discovering and declaring truth.” These definitions
will be regarded as too loose and vague by the rigid logicians of our
time. In treating of the concept, notion, or idea, he represents ideas as
being divided into sensations, imaginations, and pure intellections,—a
theory adopted by Gassendi, and favorably received by not a few for an
age or two after the time of Descartes and Gassendi, as seeming to
reconcile these two eminent men. Hutcheson had previously represented
all sensation as external and internal, and declared, with Locke, that all
our ideas arise either from the external sense or from reflection. The
intellections he defines as “any ideas not reached or comprehended by
any bodily sense;” they are chiefly “suggested by the internal sense, and
include our actions, passions, judgments, doubts, and the like, and also70/James McCosh
abstract ideas.” There is an incongruous mixture here of the Lockian
with an older theory. The ideas derived from reflection, which are all
singular and concrete, should not be put in the same class with those
abstract and general ideas which are formed by the intellect from the
materials got from sensation and reflection, and, we may add, from
those furnished by the faculties of the mind in their exercise, such as
those we have of the beautiful and the good. This confusion long lin-
gered in the Scottish psychology from which it has scarcely yet been
expelled.
Hutcheson represents complex (concrete would be the better phrase)
ideas as having comprehension, and universal ideas as having exten-
sion; and announces the rule that extension and comprehension stand to
each other in a reverse order. He distinguishes between a logical whole,
which is a universal in respect of its species, which are spread out in
division; and a metaphysical whole, which is the comprehension of a
complex idea, and is declared by definition. He distinguishes between
noetic and dianoetic judgment, in the former of which the two ideas are
compared immediately (proxime), and in the latter by means of a third.
The subject, predicate, and copula are said to be in the proposition ei-
ther expressed or suppressed and involved. He does give the dictum of
Aristotle as the regulating principle of reasoning, but derives all the
force of syllogism from these three axioms, in which, we think, there is
a very unsatisfactory vagueness in the phrase agree: “(1) Things which
agree in one third agree with one another; (2) Things of which the one
agrees and the other does not agree with one and the same third do not
agree with one another; (3) Things which agree in no third do not agree
with each other; (4) Things which disagree in no third do not disagree
among them selves. Hence are deduced the general rules of syllogisms.”
This “Compend” continued to be printed and used down to at least the
close of the third quarter of the eighteenth century. One is inclined to
think that these phrases and distinctions must have been introduced to
the notice, and inscribed on the memory, of William Hamilton during
his collegiate life at Glasgow, and that they may have helped as they
recurred, consciously or unconsciously, to suggest to him certain of the
essential principles of the “New Analytic of Logical Forms.”
He has a separate treatise on metaphysics (“Metaphysical Synop-
sis,” 1742) which he divides into ontology, or the science of being, and
pneumatology, or the science of spirit (divine and human). “It appears
from his treatise on metaphysics,” says his admiring biographer, “thatThe Scottish Philosophy/71
he was well acquainted with the logomachies, meaningless questions,
and trivial debates of the old scholastics, which had thrown a thick dark-
ness on that part of philosophy: he has set that branch of knowledge in
a clear light, and rendered it instructive and entertaining.” The sneer at
the scholastics is a symptom of the age. The alleged “meaningless ques-
tions” are still put, and must be put, by profound thinkers who would go
down to the foundations of truth. Even Hutcheson was obliged to put
them and to answer them. The answers which he gives, if not so pro-
found in fact or in appearance as those given by the ancient Greek phi-
losophers, by the scholastics, or by Descartes and Leibnitz, are always
clear and sensible, and often just and satisfactory. He discusses, and
this by no means in a superficial manner, topics which the Scottish meta-
physicians between him and Hamilton carefully avoided. His scholastic
training at Killyleagh, and the spirit of the older teaching, had still a
hold upon him for good.
He treats of being, declaring it to be undefinable, and showing that
it involves existence and essence, and that potency and action are the
principles of being. He refers the conviction of our identity of being to
consciousness. As to the much agitated question of the principle of indi-
viduation he comes to the sound conclusion that it is to be ascribed to
the nature of the thing existing.
He discusses the question whether metaphysical axioms are innate.
He denies that they are innate in the sense of their being known or ob-
served by the mind from its birth, and affirms that in their general form
they are not reached till after many comparisons of singular ideas. He
shows that the mind assents to them in their singular form, even when a
sensible object is presented. He stands up for axioms, self-evident and
immutable,—with him, as with Locke, self-evidence being their promi-
nent feature and their mark but he also declares them to be eternal and
unchangeable,—the mind perceiving at once the agreement or disagree-
ment of the subject or predicate. He denies that there is any principle
entitled to be regarded as the first of all, and maintains that it is vain to
seek any other criterion of truth than the faculty of reason itself, and the
native power of the mind. These views are surely more profound than
those of Locke, less extravagant than those of Descartes, Leibnitz, or
Wolf (he refers to Wolf). They do not exhaust the subject; in particular,
while he says truly (with Aristotle) that the singulars and the less gen-
eral are first known, he does not enter on the question, which neither the
Scottish nor any other metaphysicians have yet settled, of the relation of72/James McCosh
self-evident truths in their singular to their generalized form.
In regard to space and time, he avoids the extreme positions both of
Clarke, who represents them as modes of the divine being, and of Leibnitz,
who describes them as mere relations perceived by the mind. He repre-
sents them as things or realities, and declares modestly and truly that we
are ignorant of the relation in which they stand towards the divine na-
ture. These judicious views were followed by the Scottish metaphysi-
cians generally down to the time of Hamilton.
This leads him into the investigation of the infinite. He regards the
following propositions as probable: that it is scarcely possible that there
should be a number of infinite things of the same kind , that the infinite,
because it is infinite, cannot be greater; that infinites, so far as infinites,
cannot be multiplied; nor can have any finite relation (rationem) to fi-
nite parts, although things by one reason infinite and by another finite
may be divided and multiplied, if only there are other things of the same
description. But after enunciating these bold propositions he cautiously
adds that these questions may well be held to surpass human capacity.
He declares that, properly speaking, there is only one sort of cause,
the efficient. He says that in the impulse and motion of bodies, and in
the effort to change the idea in our minds, and to produce motions in our
bodily members, we not only see change, but perceive some energy or
efficacy. This view is not thoroughly carried out; it certainly is the truth
so far as it goes. He cautions us, in the very spirit of Reid, against
dogmatizing too minutely as to the power of the mind over the body.
Substance is that which remains when the affections change. He
agrees with Locke that the nature of substance is unknown, except that
we have an obscure idea of something as the substratum of qualities.
His views on this whole subject are meagre and unsatisfactory.
Still it is in the discussion of these questions that he passes beyond
Shaftesbury, and shows the clearness, the judiciousness, and the inde-
pendence of his thinking. I am not sure whether these metaphysical top-
ics have been discussed in a profounder manner by any thinker of the
Scottish school except Sir W. Hamilton; and he has not shown the same
amount of speculative caution and good sense as Hutcheson.
But Hutcheson dwells far more on the motive and moral parts of
man’s nature than on logical and metaphysical subjects. We have seen
that he brings in many other senses besides the external ones. He defines
sense, “every determination of our minds to receive ideas independently
on our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain.” The follow-The Scottish Philosophy/73
ing is his classification of them: “(1) In the first class are the external
senses, universally known. (2) In the second, the pleasant perceptions
arising from regular harmonious uniform objects, as also from gran-
deur and novelty. These we may call, after Mr Addison, the ‘pleasures
of the imagination,’ or we may call the power of receiving them an
internal sense. Whoever dislikes this name may substitute another. (3)
The next class of perceptions we may call a public sense; viz., our de-
termination to be pleased with the happiness of others, and to be uneasy
at their misery. This is found in some degree in all men, and was some-
times called KoinonohmosÚnh, or sensus communis, by the ancients;
this inward pain or compassion cannot be called a sensation of sight. It
solely arises from an opinion of misery felt by another, and not immedi-
ately from a visible form. The same form presented to the eye by the
exactest painting, or the action of a player, gives no pain to those who
remember that’ there is no misery felt. When men by imagination con-
ceive real pain felt by an actor, without recollecting that it is merely
feigned, or when they think of the real story represented, then, as there is
a confused opinion of real misery, there is also pain in compassion. (4)
The fourth class we may call the moral sense, by which we perceive
virtue or vice in ourselves or others. This is plainly distinct from the
former class of perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the
fortunes of others who seldom reflect upon virtue or vice in themselves
or others as an object; as we may find in natural affection, compassion,
friendship, or even general benevolence to mankind, which connect our
happiness or pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflect-
ing upon our own temper, nor delighted with the perception of our own
virtue. (5) The fifth class is a sense of honor which makes the approba-
tion or gratitude of others, for any good actions we have done, the nec-
essary occasion of pleasure, and then dislike, condemnation, or resent-
ment of injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy sensation called
shame, even when we fear no further evil from them.” He adds that this
enumeration may not be sufficient, and says that “there may be others,
such as some ideas of decency, dignity, suitableness to human nature in
certain actions and circumstances.”
He then shows that the objects gratifying these senses call forth
desires, which fall into five corresponding classes, those of the bodily
senses, of the imagination or internal sense, of public happiness, of vir-
tue, and honor. We are yet (so I am inclined to think) without a thor-
oughly exhaustive classification of the natural appetencies which lead74/James McCosh
to emotion, and desire, and action. That of Hutcheson is one of the best
which we yet have, and should be looked to by those who would draw
out a scheme of the categories of man’s motive principles. I am disposed
to think, however, that the sense of honor may be resolved into the moral
sense combined with some other principles. (“Moral Philosophy,” Book
I.)
He shows how secondary grow upon these original desires. “Since
we are capable of reflection, memory, observation, and reasoning about
the distant tendencies of objects and actions, and not confined to things
present, there must arise, in consequence of our original desires, sec-
ondary desires of every thing imagined useful to gratify any of the pri-
mary desires, and that with strength proportioned to the several original
desires and the imagined usefulness or necessity of the advantageous
object. Thus, as soon as we come to apprehend the use of wealth or
power to gratify any of our original desires we must also desire them.
Hence arises the universality of these desires of wealth and power, since
they are the means of gratifying all other desires.” Mackintosh says,
“He seems to have been the first who entertained just nations of the
formation of the secondary desires which had been overlooked by But-
ler.” (“Passions,” Sect. I. Mackintosh’s “Diss.,” Sect. V.)
He also shows how the association of ideas, which he characterizes
as the “disposition in our nature to associate any ideas together for the
future which once presented themselves jointly,” has an influence upon
our desires, primary and secondary, and specially on our sense of beauty.
“Some objects which, of themselves, are indifferent to any sense, yet by
reason of some additional grateful idea may become very desirable, or
by like addition of an ungrateful idea may raise the strongest aversion.
When any circumstance, dress, state, posture, is constituted as a mark
of infamy, it may become, in like manner, the object of aversion, though
in itself most inoffensive to our senses. If a certain way of living, of
receiving company, of showing courtesy, is once received among those
who are honored, they who cannot bear the expense of all this may be
made uneasy at their condition, though much freer from trouble than
that of higher stations. Thus dress, retinue, equipage, furniture, behav-
ior, and diversions, are made matters of considerable importance by
additional ideas.” “The beauty of trees, their cool shades and their apt-
ness to conceal from observation, have made groves and woods the usual
retreat to those who love solitude, especially to the religious, the pen-
sive, the melancholy, and the amorous. And do not we find that we haveThe Scottish Philosophy/75
so joined the ideas of these dispositions of mind with those external
objects, that they always recur to us along with them.” He thus started
those views regarding the influence of association of ideas on our per-
ceptions of beauty and moral good which were prosecuted by Turnbull,
Beattie, and others, till they culminated in the ingenious but extravagant
theories of Alison and Jeffrey in regard to the beautiful, and of Adam
Smith and Mackintosh as to virtue. Hutcheson certainly has not devel-
oped the full influence of association of ideas, but the account which he
gives is just, so far as it goes.17
He dwells at great length on the sense of beauty. The feeling is
raised at once on the perception of certain objects. He does not stand up
for beauty supposed to be in the nature of things without relation to any
mind perceiving it. On the contrary, all beauty implies the perception of
some mind. Still there may be a distinction drawn between original or
absolute beauty on the one hand, and relative or comparative beauty on
the other. By the former he understands the beauty which we perceive in
objects without comparison with any thing external, such as that ob-
served in the works of nature, artificial forms, figures, theorems; by the
latter, the beauty founded on uniformity, or a kind of unity between the
original and the copy. In determining what the beautiful is, he propounds
the theory that it is a compound ratio of uniformity and variety, so that
where the uniformity of bodies is equal, the beauty is as the variety; and
where the variety is equal, the beauty is as the uniformity. He seeks to
establish this view by examples, dwelling on beautiful objects in nature
and art, showing how there is in all of them uniformity or unity, propor-
tion or harmony. This doctrine may not be the full theory of beauty; but
there must surely be some truth in it; for in some modification or other
it has cast up among profound thinkers in all ages, from Plato and Au-
gustine in ancient times, to Cousin, Macvicar, and Ruskin in our day.
He stands up resolutely for the existence of disinterested and social
affections. He earnestly opposes those who, like the Cyrenaics, and prob-
ably the Epicureans, would make pleasure the end of existence, and
who would make us desire the good of others or of societies merely as
the means of our own safety and prosperity, or as the means of some
subtler pleasures of our own by sympathy with others in their happi-
ness; or who would make our end to be the pleasure we enjoy in being
honored, or some reward we expect for our services, and these either
from God or man. He opposes also that more refined system which
makes our aim the joys proceeding from generous motions and moral76/James McCosh
approbation. He shows, with great acuteness, that in all our desires,
whether benevolent or selfish, there is some motive, some end intended
distinct from the joy of success, or the removal of the pain of desire; and
that there is first the motive operating, and then the joy or pain follow-
ing, according as the motive is gratified or thwarted. He proves that men
have affections, such as the love of offspring and of relatives, which fit
them for a state of society; he takes pains to show that in this respect he
differs from Puffendorf, who constructs his theory of society on the
principle that self-love is the spring of all our actions; and he offers a
most determined opposition to Hobbes when he makes the natural state
of man to be one of war.
A considerable portion of all his works is occupied in demonstrat-
ing that man is possessed of a moral sense. In his “Inquiry,” published
before Butler’s “Sermons on Human Nature,” he declares, “that from
the very frame of our nature we are determined to perceive pleasure in
the practice of virtue, and to approve of it when practised by ourselves
or others.” He declares that the vast diversity of moral principles in
various ages and nations “is indeed a good argument against innate
ideas or principles, but will not evidence mankind to be void of a moral
sense to perceive virtue or vice in actions.” He ever kindles into a gentle
warmth when he speaks of the joys derived from this sense, which he
represents as purer and more elevated than those which can be had from
any other source. The conscience, though often unable to govern our
inferior nature, is yet in its own nature born for government; it is the
ruling principle (tÕ ºgemonicÒn) to which all things had been subjected
in the entire (integro) state of our nature, and to which they ought to be
subjected. His views on the subject of the supremacy of conscience are
not so thoroughly wrought out as those of Butler; but they are explicitly
stated, and become more decisive in his later works.
But what is the quality in actions looked at, appreciated, and ap-
proved by the moral sense? To this question Hutcheson gives, if not a
satisfactory, a very decisive reply. He represents this quality as good-
will or benevolence. “All those kind affections which incline us to make
others happy, and all actions which flow from such affections, appear
morally good, if while they are benevolent towards some persons they
be not pernicious to others.” Advancing, a step farther, he discovers that
“the several affections which are approved, though in very different
degrees, yet all agree in one general character of tendency to the happi-
ness of others,” and the most perfectly virtuous actions are such “asThe Scottish Philosophy/77
appear to have the most unlimited tendency to the greatest and most
extensive happiness of all the rational agents to whom our influence can
reach.” He is evidently inclined to reckon the moral sense as planted in
our nature to lead us to commend at once those actions which tend to-
wards the general happiness. His theory of virtue thus comes to be an
exalted kind of eudaimonism, with God giving us a moral sense to ap-
prove of the promotion of happiness without our discovering the conse-
quences of actions. Hume required only to leave out the divine sanction
(he retained some sort of moral sense) in order to reach his theory of
virtue consisting in the useful and agreeable. Hutcheson opposes very
resolutely all those moralists who seek to give morality a deeper foun-
dation in the nature of things. The function of reason in morals is simply
to show what external actions are laudable or censurable, according as
they evidence good or evil affections of soul.18
Proceeding on these principles, derived mainly from Shaftesbury,
but more systematically expounded, he builds up a system of moral
philosophy. He gives a division of the virtues, and treats of the duties we
owe toward God, toward mankind, and toward ourselves. In proving the
existence of God, he appeals to the structure of the world. He reaches
the divine perfections by a set of metaphysical principles surreptitiously
introduced, and scarcely consistent with his philosophy. He answers the
objections derived from the existence of evil in a commonplace way, by
showing how particular evils are necessary to superior good. He seeks
to establish the immortality of the soul by an appeal to the nature of the
soul as being different from the body, and to the hopes of a future state.
He enters at great length into the discussion of the ages which pre-
ceded him, as to the law of nature. He shows that there are rights ante-
cedent to the institution of civil government. He establishes the right of
property, first, on the principle that “things fit for present use the first
occupier should enjoy undisturbed;” and on the farther principle, that
each has a right to the fruits of his own labor, and that it is the common
interest of society, and tends towards the furtherance of industry, that
mankind should be secured in their possessions.
He says that “civil power is most naturally founded by these three
different acts of a whole people: (1) An agreement or contract of each
one with all the rest, that they will unite into one society or body, to be
governed in all their common interests by one council; (2) A decree or
designation made by the whole people of the form or plan of power and
of the persons to be intrusted with it; (3) A mutual agreement or con-78/James McCosh
tract between the governors thus constituted and the people, the former
obliging themselves to a faithful administration of the powers vested in
them for the common interest, and the latter obliging themselves to obe-
dience. Though it is not probable that, in the constitution of the several
states, men have generally taken these three regular steps; yet it is plain
that, in every just constitution of power, there is some such transaction
as implicitly contains the whole force of all the three.” He argues that
the people have a right of resistance, and of dethroning a prince who is
grossly perfidious to his trust.
He thinks that the senate of the country should create a censorial
power, “that by it the manners of the people may be regulated, and
luxury, voluptuous debauchery, and other private vices prevented or
made infamous.” He holds that the “magistrate should provide proper
instruction for all, especially for young minds, about the existence, good-
ness, and providence of God, and all the social duties of life and motives
to them.” But he particularly maintains that “every rational creature has
a right to judge for itself in these matters.” While an earnest supporter
of liberty of thought and action, he yet holds “as to those who support
atheism, or deny a moral providence, or the obligation of the moral law,
or social virtues, that the state may justly restrain them by force, as
hurting,, it in its most important interests.”
When Calamy heard of Hutcheson’s call to Glasgow, he smiled,
and said he was not for Scotland, and that he would be reckoned there as
unorthodox as Simson. But Hutcheson lived an age later than Simson;
he was much more prudent, and was personally liked; he was professor
of philosophy and not of theology; and so he passed through life with
very little public opposition. Still the stone which he had set a-moving
could not go on without meeting with some little ruffling. About the
beginning of the session 1737–38, a paper was printed and published
anonymously by one who professed to have been lately in the college,
charging Hutcheson with teaching dangerous views. I have not seen this
attack; but the reply prepared by a body of his favorite students is pre-
served. There seems to be force in some of the objections taken; others
entirely fail. It is objected to him that he taught that we could have the
knowledge of moral good and evil, although we knew nothing of the
being of a God; it is replied that Hutcheson’s doctrine was that we might
have knowledge of some virtues, though we had not known God, and
that a notion of moral good must come prior to any notion of the will or
law of God. It is objected that he taught that the tendency to promote theThe Scottish Philosophy/79
happiness of others is the standard of moral goodness; it is acknowl-
edged in the answer that benevolent affections towards others are our
primary notion of moral goodness, and the primary object of our appro-
bation. It is objected that he taught that it is sometimes lawful to tell a
lie; it is answered that Hutcheson’s doctrine was very much against
lying, but did imply that there might be cases in which lying was justifi-
able.
Throughout Scotland there was an impression among the scholars
who had been trained in the previous generation that he was sensualiz-
ing and degrading the old philosophy. The friends of evangelical truth
perceived that the young preachers who admired him addressed them in
a very different speech from that of their old divines and from that of the
inspired writers. The description given of the new style of preaching by
the clerical satirist Witherspoon, in his “Characteristics,” was found to
have point and edge: “It is quite necessary in a moderate man, because
his moderation teaches him, to avoid all the high flights of evangelic
enthusiasm and the mysteries of grace of which the common people are
so fond. It may be observed, nay, it is observed, that all our stamp avoid
the word grace as much as possible, and have agreed to substitute the
‘moral virtues’ in the room of the ‘graces of the Spirit.’ Where an old.
preacher would have said a great decree of sanctification, a man of
moderation and politeness will say a high pitch of virtue.” In the advice
to a good preacher the following counsels are given: “(1) His subjects
must be confined to the social duties. (2) He must recommend them only
from rational considerations; viz., the beauty and comely proportions of
virtue, and its advantages in the present life, without any regard to a
future state of more extended self-interest. (3) His authorities must be
drawn from heathen writers; none, or as few as possible, from Scrip-
ture. (4) He must be very unacceptable to the common people.” “The
scattering a few phrases in their sermons, as harmony, order, propor-
tion, taste, sense of beauty, balance of the affections, will easily per-
suade the people that they are learned; and this persuasion is to all in-
tents and purposes the same thing as if it were true. It is one of those
deceitful feelings which Mr H—— in his essays has shown to be beau-
tiful and useful.” In illustrating the third counsel he says: “It is well
known there are multitudes in our island who reckon Socrates and Plato
to have been much greater men than any of the apostles, although (as
the moderate preacher I mentioned lately told his hearers) the apostle
Paul had a university education and was instructed in logic by Gamaliel.80/James McCosh
Therefore let religion be constantly and uniformly called virtue, and let
the heathen philosophers be set up as great patterns and promoters of it.
Upon this head most particularly recommend M. Antoninus by name,
because an eminent person of the moderate character says his ‘Medita-
tions’ are the best book that ever was written for forming the heart.”
The effect of this accommodation of religion to the world is graphically
and truly described: “The necessity of such a conduct cannot be denied
when it is considered what effect the length and frequency of public
devotion have had in driving most of the fashionable gentry from our
churches altogether.” “Now the only way to regain them to the church is
to accommodate the worship as much as may be to their taste.” “I con-
fess there has sometimes been an ugly objection thrown up against this
part of my argument; viz., that this desertion of public worship by those
in high life seems, in fact, to be contemporary with, and to increase in a
pretty exact proportion to, the attempts that have been made and are
made to suit it to their taste.”
Hutcheson’s works got fit audience in his own day, but did not con-
tinue to be much read after his death. In his mode and manner of writing
he is evidently indebted to the wits of Queen Anne, such as Shaftesbury,
Bolingbroke, Pope, and Swift, who were Frenchifying the English tongue,
polishing away at once its roughness and its vigor, introducing the French
clearness of expression, and, we may add, the French morals. Hutcheson
has their clearness, but is without their liveliness and wit. His style is
like a well-fenced, level country, in which we weary walking for any
length of time; it is not relished by those who prefer elevations and
depressions, and is disliked by those who have a passion for mountains
and passes. He ever maintains a high moral tone but it is doubtful whether
he has retained for morality a sufficiently deep foundation.
His philosophy is undoubtedly an advance upon that of Locke, and
rises immeasurably above that of those professed followers of Locke in
England and France, who in the days of Hutcheson were leaving out
Locke’s reflection, and deriving all man’s ideas from sensation, and all
his motives from pleasures and pains. His view of the moral faculty is
correct so far as it goes. He represents it as natural to man, and in his
very constitution and nature. There may even be a propriety in calling it
a sense with the qualifying phrase moral, inasmuch as, like the senses, it
is a source of knowledge, revealing to us certain qualities of voluntary
acts or agents, and inasmuch as it has always feeling or sensibility at-
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But, on the other hand, his view of the moral power falls greatly
beneath that of the great English moralists of the previous century, and
below that of the school of Clarke in his own day. The word sense allies
the conscience too much with the animal organism, and the whole ac-
count given of it separates it from the reason or higher intelligence. On
this point he was met, immediately on the publication of his views, by
Gilbert Burnet, who maintains that moral good and evil are discerned
by reason; that there is first reason, or an internal sense of truth and
falsehood, moral good and evil, right and wrong, which is accompanied
by another succeeding internal sense of beauty and pleasure; and that
reason is the judge of the goodness and badness of our affections and of
the moral sense itself. Hutcheson does speak of the moral sense as being
superior in its nature to the other senses, but he does not bring out so
prominently and decisively as Butler did its supremacy and its right to
govern.
If his theory of the moral power is superficial and defective, his
account of that to which the conscience looks is positively erroneous.
He represents virtue as consisting in benevolence, by which he means
good-will. This view cannot be made to embrace love to God, except by
stretching it so wide as to make it another doctrine altogether; for surely
it is not as a mere exercise of good-will that to love God can be de-
scribed as excellent. His theory is especially faulty in that it overlooks
justice, which has ever been regarded by our higher moralists as among
the most essential of the virtues. Nor is it to be omitted that his moral
system is self-righteous in its injunctions, and pagan in its spirit. No
doubt he speaks everywhere with deep admiration of the morality of the
New Testament; but the precepts which he inculcates, are derived fully
as much from Antoninus and the Stoics as from the discourses of our
Lord, and the epistles of the apostles; and we look in vain for a recom-
mendation of such graces as repentance and humility, meekness and
long-suffering.
By bringing down morality from the height at which the great ethi-
cal writers, of ancient and modern times, had placed it, he prepared the
way for the system of Adam Smith, and even for that of Hume. Smith
was a pupil of his own, and Hutcheson was brought into contact with
Hume. Hume submitted to Hutcheson in manuscript the “Third Part of
his Treatise of Human Nature,” that on morals, before giving it to the
world. The remarks which Hutcheson offered have been lost, but we
can gather what they were from the letter which Hume sent him on82/James McCosh
receiving them, and which has been preserved. Hutcheson most charac-
teristically objects to Hume, that he had not expressed a sufficient warmth
in the cause of virtue, and that he was defective in point of prudence.
Was this all that the high moralist Hutcheson had to object to the founder
of modern utilitarianism? On the publication of his “Institutes of Moral
Philosophy,” Hutcheson sends a copy of it to Hume, who remarks upon
it, specially objecting to it as adopting Butler’s opinion, that our moral
sense has an authority distinct from its force and desirableness; but
confessing his delight “to see such just philosophy, and such instructive
morals, to have once set their foot in the schools. I hope they will next
get into the world, and then into the churches.” Yes, this was what the
rationalists wished in that day, and what they wish in ours, to get their
views into the churches. Hutcheson, though disapproving of the phi-
losophy of Hume, and refusing to support him as a candidate for the
chair of moral philosophy in Edinburgh, which he himself declined, had
not retained sufficiently deep principles to enable him successfully to
resist the great sceptic who had now appeared. Error has been commit-
ted, God’s law has been lowered, and the avenger has come.
VIII. Religious Conflicts—Ralph Erskine
We are now in the heart of the Scottish conflicts of the century. It is the
crisis of the contest between Cavalier and Whig. On one point the phi-
losophers and the evangelicals agree: they are defenders of the House of
Hanover and opponents of the Pretender and the Stuarts, of whom they
could not expect that they would be supporters of culture on the one
hand, or of Protestantism on the other. The last formidable contest be-
tween Jacobite and Whig, was decided in behalf of the latter in 1746, at
Culloden; and henceforth the former. is sinking into a state of complain-
ing and garrulous, though often lively, old age. The religious conflicts
are deeper, and continue for a longer period. From the time of Hutcheson,
there is a felt and known feud, not always avowed, between the new
philosophy and the old theology. It would have been greatly for the
benefit of both, had there been one to reconcile and unite them. In the
absence of such, each ran its own course and did its own work, being
good so far as it went, and evil only in its narrowness and exclusiveness,
in what it overlooked or denied. The philosophers were laudably en-
gaged when they were unfolding man’s intellectual, esthetic, and moral
nature; but they missed the deepest properties of human nature, when,
in the fear of the ghosts of fanaticism, they took no notice of man’sThe Scottish Philosophy/83
feelings of want, his sense of sin, and his longing after God and immor-
tality; and the views of theologians would have been more just and pro-
found, had they observed—always in the inductive manner of the Scot-
tish school—those nascent ideas of good and evil and infinity which are
at the basis of all religious knowledge and belief. The evangelical preach-
ers were only faithful to their great Master when they declined to allow
the doctrines of grace to sink out of sight; but they erred so far as they
opposed the refinement and liberal sentiments which the moral philoso-
phers were introducing, and showed that they were incapable of fully
appreciating the apostolic command, “Whatsoever things are true, what-
soever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things
are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good
report, if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these
things.” Pity it is that it should be so, but it is only by vibrations that the
world moves on, only by breezes that its atmosphere is kept pure; and
when the church errs by cowardice, it has to be rebuked by the unbeliev-
ing as—an old Covenanter might have said—the father of the faithful
was rebuked by a pagan Egyptian. It was only in a later age, and mainly
through the influence of Chalmers, that the church was prepared heart-
ily to accept what was true in the Scottish philosophy, and to acknowl-
edge its compatibility with the doctrine of salvation by grace.
Three distinct religious parties are being formed in Scotland, not
including the covenanting “remnant,” who never submitted to the Revo-
lution settlement, and whose vocation was on the mountains, rather than
the colleges of their country. First, in the Church of Scotland there is the
“Moderate” type of minister crystallized by coldness out of the floating
elements. He is or be affects to be elegant and tolerant, and he is terribly
afraid of a zealous religious life. He wishes to produce among the people
a morality without religion, or at least without any of the peculiar dog-
mas of Christianity. As yet he himself is a moral man, and the people are
moral, for they believe in the old theology; in the next age both pastors
and people, retaining little faith, become considerably immoral, show-
ing that, if we would have the fruit good, we must make the tree good.
This party, preaching moral sermons without doctrine, is the genuine
product of the Scottish philosophy in the Church of Scotland.
Secondly, the Evangelical party, called by their opponents ‘zealots’
and ‘highflyers,’ were placed in an ambiguous position and shorn of
much of their strength since the enforcement of the law of patronage.
They are fast becoming a minority, and a small minority, in the church;84/James McCosh
and they have to submit to much that they abhor, as, for example, to the
settlement of pastors contrary to the will of the people. But they labor
earnestly to keep alive the fire all through the dark and wild night; they
cherish fellowship with other evangelical churches, and anticipate the
missionary spirit of a later age by countenancing the “Society for the
Propagation of Christian Knowledge.” They come into collision with
the philosophic moralists by maintaining so resolutely the doctrines of
grace; and they carry their antagonism to the “legal” system to the very
verge of Antinomianism, as shown in their favor for the “Marrow of
Divinity,” this by a reaction prompting the moral divines to preach a
morality without an atonement for immorality.
Thirdly, beyond the Established Church, the Seceding body, encom-
passed with hardships as fierce as the storms, but breathing a spirit as
free as the air of their country, are rallying around them the old-fash-
ioned and more determined religious life of Scotland. At this stage of its
history it serves itself heir to the Covenants of the previous century,
blames the Church of Scotland for being too indulgent, is intolerant of
toleration, and has little sympathy with other churches. This body is
beneath the notice of the philosophers; and in return it shows its utter
distrust of them by declining to allow its students to attend the classes of
moral philosophy, and appointing a professor of its own to give instruc-
tion in that branch, on which, as on other high departments of learning,
it continued to set a high value.
The event of that period which agitated lowland Scotland more than
even the inroad of the Pretender was the preaching of Whitefield, which
moved the common people as the winds do the trees of the forest. The
moderate party affected to despise and actually hated the preacher and
his doctrine. The evangelicals in the Established Church rejoiced in his
labors and their fruits. The seceders might have triumphed in his suc-
cess; but they expected him to identify himself with their peculiar eccle-
siastical constitution, and stand by them in the fight for the old cause of
the Covenant. Upon Whitefield declining to do this, they became jealous
of his influence, and were in doubts about the sound character of the
revivals which he was the means of awakening. Out of this arose a very
curious controversy, forgotten by all but a few antiquarians, but not
unworthy of being noticed.
Mr Robe, belonging to the evangelical party in the Church of Scot-
land, and a promoter of revivals and of the lively feeling manifested in
them, declared that “our senses and imagination are greatly helpful toThe Scottish Philosophy/85
bring us to the knowledge of the divine nature and perfections;” and in
defending this he asked: “Can you or any man else think upon Christ
really as he is, God-man, without an imaginary idea of it?” To this
Ralph Erskine, the seceder, replies in a treatise Of 372 closely printed
pages, entitled “Faith no Fancy; or a Treatise of Mental Images, discov-
ering the Vain Philosophy and Vile Divinity of a late Pamphlet entitled
‘Mr Robe’s Fourth Letter to Mr Fisher,’ and showing that an Imaginary
Idea of Christ as Man (when supposed to belong to Saving Faith, whether
in its Act or Object) imports nothing but Ignorance, Atheism, Idolatry,
great Falsehood, or gross Delusion” (1745). He says of Mr Robe: “This
way of speaking appears indeed new and strange divinity to me, and
makes the object of faith truly a sensible object; not the object of faith,
but of sense.” This leads him to criticise various philosophies. He refers
to Tertuilian (as quoted by Jerome), who in regard to Platonic ideas
said, “Haereticorum patriarchae philosophi.” He shows him that the
learned De Vries, Mastricht, and other eminent doctors and divines
abroad, had noticed how the ideal doctrine of Cartesius and his follow-
ers had led to imagery and idolatry. He also criticises Locke with con-
siderable skill. “There seems nothing more common in the experience of
mankind than that a man who hath the greatest stock of habitual knowl-
edge and understanding relating to many truths, yet while his body sleeps,
or his mind is in a muse about other things, he perceives none of theme
truths.” So “I see no greater absurdity in saying one may leave a stock
of seminal or habitual knowledge, though he leave no actual knowledge,
than to say one may have a stock of senses, though be hath no actual
sensation, or consciousness of the acts or exercise of any of his senses,
as a child not born or a man in a deep sleep; or a natural store of affec-
tions subjectively in him, and yet affected with nothing till occasions
and objects appear. One may have a good pair of eyes, and yet see
nothing till light be given and objects be presented. Nor is it an improper
way of speaking to say a man hath not his eyes or sight, though he be
not actually seeing. And as little is it improper to say a man hath under-
standing and knowledge, though he be not actually knowing or perceiv-
ing the truths he has the impress of in his understanding.” This is a
wonderfully clear statement of the distinctions between the seminal ca-
pacity and the actual ideas, between a laid-up stock and occasions, by
which philosophers have sought to overthrow the theory of Locke. In
regard to the special question discussed, Mr Robe had quoted the re-
ceived rule, “Oportet intelligentem phantasmata speculari.” Erskine86/James McCosh
quotes against him Hieroboord, “Mens non indiget semper phantasmata
ad suas perceptiones.” “The object of that idea is only corporeal things
as corporeal; but the object of rational knowledge is not only corporeal
things, but spiritual and corporeal things, not as corporeal, but as intel-
ligible.” “It is reason, and not sense, that is the only help to attain the
natural knowledge of God and his perfections.” Above reason he places
faith. “True faith differs as much from, and is as far above, mere intel-
lectual ideas as intellectual ideas are above corporeal and imaginary
ideas; yea, much farther than human reason is above sense; even as far
as what is above human and supernatural, is above merely natural.” It
is evident that there are curious questions started, though not precisely
settled, as to the place which the phantasm has in thought, and the imagi-
nation in religion. We feel that we are in the society of men of reflection
and of reading. The evangelical and the seceding ministers of these days
are quite as erudite as the academic men who despised them, and are
holding firmly by old truths which the new philosophy is overlooking.
IX Archibald Campbell
He was a pupil of Professor Simson’s, in Glasgow, and became minister
of Tarbert in Stirlingshire. I have been able to collect few notices of
him. He is worthy of being mentioned, as having had played upon him
one of the basest tricks mentioned in literary history. He wrote a treatise
on “Moral Virtue,” and sent it up to London to his friend, Alexander
Innes, D.D., assistant at St. Margaret’s, Westminster, to have it pub-
lished; and Innes published it in his own name, with the date, Tothill
Fields, Jan. 20, 1727–28. In 1730, Campbell went to London and ex-
posed Innes’s imposture. It seems that the Lord Chancellor, believing
that Innes was the author of the work, presented him to a living. The
Chancellor, being convinced of the deceit, sought to male amends by
offering a living to Campbell, who declined the offer, saying that he
preferred his own country; and he becomes professor of ecclesiastical
history in St. Andrews. In 1733, he published the work in his own name,
dating it St. Andrews, and disowning the “Prefatory Introduction” and
“some little marginal notes of Innes.” “An Inquiry into the Original of
Moral Virtue, wherein is shown, against the Author of the Fable of the
Bees, that Virtue is founded in the Nature of Things, is unalterable and
eternal, and the great Means of Private and Public Happiness, with some
Reflections on a late Book entitled ‘An Inquiry into the Original of our
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.’ “Hutcheson, whom he thus assailed, spokeThe Scottish Philosophy/87
of him as no better than a disciple of Epicurus. His system is the boldest
form of self-love. “Human nature is originally formed to pleasure and
pain.” “There is, indeed, a. distinction of goodness into natural and moral,
but the latter as well as the former lies wholly in pleasure.” ‘God and all
mankind are governed by one common principle, viz., self-love.” “They
can favor or esteem no other beings but as they gratify this principle.”
“The affections and actions that correspond to the self-love of our own
species are likewise agreeable to the self-love of the Deity.” “From self-
love we desire the love and esteem of other intelligent beings.” There is
a passage in which there is an anticipation of Smith’s theory of sympa-
thy: “Whatever tenderness we conceive in favor of other people, it comes
from putting ourselves in their circumstances, and must therefore be
resolved into self- love.” He also wrote a treatise on the “Necessity of
Revelation,” 1739; and another, “Oratio de Vanitate Luminis Naturae.”
He thinks it impossible that man kind, left to themselves, should ‘dis-
cover’ the great truths and articles of natural religion, or should be
capable of giving a system to natural religion.” He died in April, 1756.
A posthumous work, “The Authenticity of the Gospel History,” was
published 1759. He was opposed by
X. Alexander Moncrieff19
Alexander Moncrieff of Culfergie in the parish of Abernethy was edu-
cated at the grammar school of Perth and St. Andrews University, and
became minister of his native parish. He was favorable to the Marrow
school of divinity, and took part with the Erskines in defending the popular
rights and in seceding from the Church of Scotland, being one of the
four fathers of the secession. In 1724, he was made their professor of
divinity. He died in 1761. He wrote “An Inquiry into the Principle, Rule,
and End of Moral Actions, wherein the Scheme of Selfish Love laid
down by Mr Archibald Campbell . . . is examined, and the received
Doctrine vindicated.” To quote the summary supplied by his biogra-
phers, he establishes the following propositions: “(1) To show that self-
love is not, or ought not to be, the leading principle of moral virtue; (2)
That self-interest or pleasure is not the only standard by which we can
and should judge of the virtue of our own and others’ actions, or that
actions are not to be called virtuous on account of their correspondency
to self-interest; (3) That self-love, as it exerts itself in the desire of uni-
versal, unlimited esteem, ought not to be the great remaining motive to
virtuous actions,” etc.88/James McCosh
XI Rise of The Aberdeen Branch
The north-east of Scotland,—embracing Aberdeen, Banff, Murray,
Mearns, and a large portion of Angus,—though now very much amal-
gamated with the rest of Scotland, had a character of its own in the
seventeenth century. The people had a large Scandinavian element in
their composition, had a shrill intonation, and a marked idiom, and a
harder aspect (though probably with quite as much feeling within) than
the people of the south and west. When Samuel Johnson lumbered through
the region in 1773, and visited Lord Monboddo, he found it miserably
bare of trees; but, had he travelled a century or two earlier, he would
have had to pass through wide-spread forests. These were cut down in
the seventeenth century; and in the stead of the deer and wild animals a
more industrious people substituted sheep and cattle, ranging over high
mountains and large undulating plains, on which you would have seen
patches of oats or bear here and there around the clay or turf dwellings
of the tenants, but few fences or enclosures of any kind, except in the
immediate neighborhood of the proprietors, whose castles and gardens,
on the French model, relieved the wildness of the scene. On to the eigh-
teenth century the rural population consisted of landlords, with rather
small farmers absolutely dependent on them, and who paid their rent in
the service, on certain occasions, of men and horses, and in such articles
as oats, bear, mutton, salmon, geese, poultry, and peats. In these regions
the peasantry had not been taught to think and act for themselves, as
they had been in the south-west by the ploughing up of the soil effected
by the great covenanting movement. But in some of the towns, particu-
larly in Aberdeen, which was looked up to as a capital by a consider-
ably wide district, there was not a little refinement, which spread its
influence over the landlords, the ministers of religion, and the other pro-
fessional men: in particular, there had been in the city named a gifted
painter, Jameson, a disciple of Rubens; and a very superior printer,
Raban, who put in type the works of the Aberdeen doctors. The two
universities, King’s and Marischial’s, trained and sent forth a large body
of educated men, some of whom found their proper field on the Conti-
nent; while the great body of them remaining at home, were the special
instruments—as teachers, clergymen, doctors, lawyers, or country gentle-
men—of spreading a civilizing influence in these regions. For ten years
after the Restoration, seventy students entered annually at King’s, and a
considerable number, though not so large, at Marischal some of theseThe Scottish Philosophy/89
rose to eminence, and all of them helped to create a taste for learning
and an appreciation for it, on the southern slope of the Grampians, and
in the wide region lying north of that range of mountains, which was
never crossed by the Roman legions, but was now conquered by the
Roman literature.
The Calvinistic and covenanting principles which had determined
the Scottish character in the south and west, and so far north as Fife,
Perth, and some parts of Angus, had not generally permeated the region
beyond. No doubt, the common people in the northern counties gladly
listened to the evangelical preachers from the west, when they had the
opportunity; and some of the covenanting ministers, banished in the
times of persecution from their own people in the south, gathered around
them in the places of their exile—as Samuel Rutherford in Aberdeen,
David Dickson in Turriff—bodies of devoted adherents attached to the
Presbyterian preaching and organization. Still these were as yet merely
fermenting, but leavening, centres in the midst of influences which were
resisting their extension. In the wide country held by the Gordon family,
the Roman Catholic religion still held its sway. In the other parts, the
landlords, the college regents, and the clergy were mostly Cavalier in
politics and High Church in religion; and the mass of the people bad not
learned to claim the prerogative of thinking and acting for themselves.
When a deputation from the General Assembly of the Presbyterian
Church of Scotland—consisting of Alexander Henderson, Samuel Ru-
therford, and Andrew Cant—went north to Aberdeen to proclaim the
Covenant in 1638, they were met by “Replies and Duplies” on the part
of the Aberdeen doctors, and the landlords discouraged their tenantry
from following the new zeal imported from the south. The divines of
Aberdeen, during that century, such as Baron and John Forbes (author
of “Irenicum”), were adherents of Episcopacy; their studies were in the
later fathers of the church, and their sympathies with the Laudean di-
vines of England; and like them they wrote against Popery on the one
hand, and Puritanism on the other. It was years after the Revolution
before the Presbyterian Church could put its legal rights in execution in
the north-east of Scotland. Almost all the old Presbyterian ministers had
disappeared; and, in 1694, the Synod of Aberdeen consisted of six cleri-
cal members, most of them brought from the south. It was not till 1703
that John Willison was settled as first Presbyterian minister at Brechin
in Angus; it was not till 1708 that he was in a position to dispense the
sacrament of the Lord’s Supper. When he intimated that he was to do so90/James McCosh
next Lord’s day, Mr Skinner, the Episcopalian minister who preached in
the same church in the after part of the day, announced that he would
dispense the communion on the same day in the afternoon to his sup-
porters; and the ecclesiastical records report that 1500 communicated
with Mr Skinner. When Mr Gray was appointed minister of Edzell, in
the same district, the Presbytery had to conduct the services at his ordi-
nation in a neighboring parish; and they then passed into the parish to
“lay hands on him” and return immediately; and, on the following sab-
bath when he rode to Edzell for the purpose of preaching, the people,
hounded on by the landlords, took him off his horse, flung him into the
West Water, and kept him there till he was nearly drowned, “to their
eternal disgrace,” as he causes it to be written in the parish records.
During the Rebellion of 1715 the Presbyterian ministers were rabbled
from their churches, which were occupied by the non-juring clergy pray-
ing for the Pretender. A considerable body of the students in both the
Aberdeen colleges sympathized with the banished king; and, after the
battle of Sheriffmuir, several of the professors had to retire in conse-
quence of the part which they had taken against the government. It was
not till after the suppression of the Rebellion of 1715,—indeed, not fully
till after the crushing of the chieftain power after 1745,—that the north-
east of Scotland became one with the south of Scotland in religion and
in national feeling.
In the universities, both tinder Prelatic and Presbyterian domina-
tion, the philosophy taught had been to a great extent Aristotelian and
scholastic. The university commissioners appointed, in 1643, a cursus
for Aberdeen; and in it the student is required, after taking Greek the
first year, to go on the second year to the dialectics of Ramus, to
Aristotle’s categories, interpretation, and prior analytics, and in the third
year to the rest of logics and portions of the ethics of Aristotle, etc. In
the “Metaphysics” of Robert Baron, who lectured in Marischal College
in the first half of the seventeenth century, he treats of being, unity, and
goodness; enters fully into the controversy between the Thomists and
Scotists; gives the divisions of ens and of cause, and treats of necessity
and contingency, of sameness and diversity, of absolute and relative, of
whole and parts. In the university library of Aberdeen we have theses
occupying 121 pages by Andrew Cant, the younger, of date 1658; in
these he shows that he knew the Copernican theory of the heavens and
Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood: but the whole discus-
sions are conducted in a formal manner; and he dwells fondly on theThe Scottish Philosophy/91
scholastic logic, in the treatment of which he shows some independence
of thought. In 1710 there was published a work by Thomas Blackwell,
who had come from Paisley, in 1700, to be minister at Aberdeen in the
Presbyterian interest, and who was made professor in 1711, and princi-
pal in 1717: his work is entitled “Schema Sacrum, or a Sacred Scheme
of Natural and Revealed Religion;” and in it the common orthodox the-
ology is defended by the old distinctions, and there are no traces of a
new spirit or a new school.
But, after the year 1715, Aberdeen was prepared for a new style of
thought. The High Church theology was no longer encouraged, except
among a scattered non-juring clergy subjected to poverty and privation.
The Calvinistic divinity had never struck its roots deep into the soil; but
the literature and physical science of England were known to and rel-
ished by the educated classes, and there must be a fresh philosophy to
meet the awakened intelligence and new tastes of the country. The first
to gratify this feeling was a young graduate of Edinburgh, appointed as
one of the rectors in Marischal by the Crown, which had seized the
patronage of the college, vacated by the attainder of Earl Marischal,
who had been out in the rebellion.
XII George Turnbull 20
The celebrated Hogarth, in his “Beer Street,” has a graphic picture of a
porter drinking barley wine, after depositing on the ground a load, di-
rected to the trunk-maker, of five enormous folios; one of which has on
the back, “Turnbull on Ancient Paintings.” Turnbull was one of the
most voluminous writers of his age. I have read many thousand pages
written by him; but I fear the greater part of the copies of his works have
gone to the destiny indicated by Hogarth. It is disappointing to find that
this author, who was both an able and a graceful writer, has passed
away from the public view so effectively that it is difficult now to pro-
cure materials for his biography, or even to get a sight of most of his
works. It may be doubted whether any one, except the writer of this
history, has been at pains to peruse his works as a whole, for the last
hundred years. Dugald Stewart, so well informed on British philosophy,
had only looked into one of his volumes; and Sir William Hamilton, in
his multifarious researches among obscure writers, does not seem to
have thought it worth his while making any inquiries about him. Yet it
can be shown that he exercised a greater influence than all other masters
and writers put together on his pupil Thomas Reid,—the true represen-92/James McCosh
tative of the Scottish philosophy. He seems to have been the son of the
Rev. George Turnbull (his mother’s name was Elizabeth Glass), of whom
we can gather a few scattered notices: as that he was born about 1656;
that he graduated in Edinburgh University in 1675; that he became min-
ister of Alloa in 1689, when the Episcopal clergyman was ejected; that
he was translated to Tyningham in 1699; that he was nominated but not
carried as moderator of the General Assembly in 1711; that he preached
before that body in 1713; that his name appears among the members of
“The Society for Propagating Christian Knowledge,” in 1720 and that
he died in June, 1744, at the age of eighty-eight. His son was born in
1698 (he was baptized July 15) graduated in Edinburgh in April, 1721
and in November of the same year he was appointed, by a presentation
from the Crown, regent of Marischal College; and is taken on trial in
philosophy and the Greek Language, and declares his willingness to
sign the Confession of Faith. He comes to have among his colleagues
Thomas Blackwell, son of the principal, admitted regent in 1723, who
did much to create a taste for Greek in the college, and who is still
known to antiquarian scholars by his learned but uninteresting works,
“Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer,” “Letters concerning
Mythology,” and “Memoirs of the Court of Augustus.” In Aberdeen at
that time there was—as we have seen there was in Glasgow—a principal’s
party and an opposition party; and there were disputes about the elec-
tion of the rector. The majority of the masters, including Mr Turnbull,
in opposition to the principal, Blackwell the elder, wish the society to
make up a list of persons recommended for the office of rector, to be
submitted to the procurators chosen by the students in their nations;
and, upon the principal refusing, they elect a preses in his room, and
choose a rector, who holds a court and summons the principal to appear
before them; but they are stayed in their career by a suit from “the Lords
of Council and Session.” On April 14, 1726, he has carried a batch of
thirty-nine students through a course of philosophy on to graduation;
and the last name on the list is Thomas Reid. As having to preside on
this occasion, he prepares a thesis, afterwards published, to be discussed
by the candidates,—“De Pulcherrima Mundi Materialis turn Rationalis
Constitutione,”—in which the new physics are employed to furnish proofs
of the existence of God, and in which he declares that natural science
(physiology) is to be taught before moral philosophy, and inclines to
censure Socrates because he discouraged inquiries into the structure of
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of Natural and Moral Philosophy.” In his lectures on pneumatology he
delivered to his students those views which, after being rewritten, were
given to the world in his treatise on moral philosophy. In his later writ-
ings he frequently quotes Hutcheson and Butler; but his own philosophic
opinions seem to have been formed, and delivered in lectures, before
either of these influential writers had published any of their works.
In 1726, he published “A Philosophical Inquiry concerning the Con-
nection between the Doctrines and Miracles of Jesus Christ.” In it he
treats of subjects in which there is a revived interest and which are
anxiously discussed in our day, and advances principles which would
be favorably received by many in these times. He argues that the works
of Jesus were natural proper samples of his doctrines. That he had aban-
doned the old theology of Scotland is evident, from his declaring that the
Scripture way of talking about the Spirit of God and his operations
means simply assistance to the virtuous. It is interesting to notice, that
in this treatise he refers once and again to common-sense as settling
certain moral questions; in this, as in other matters, anticipating and
probably guiding Dr. Reid.
In the spring of 1727, Turnbull resigned his office in Marischal
College; and for the next twelve years we have little record of him.
There is reason to believe that he became a travelling tutor,—it is said,
to the family of the Wauchopes, of Niddry, near Edinburgh. It is certain
that he must have travelled extensively on the Continent, and made him-
self conversant with the treasures of art in Italy. In 1732, he received the
honorary degree of doctor of laws from the University of Edinburgh. He
seems to have mingled in the literary circles of London,’21 and acquired
friends among persons of eminence. During these years he prepared an
immense store of literary works, which were issued in rapid succes-
sion,—more rapidly, I suspect, than the public were prepared to receive
them. In October, 1739, he advertises, at four guineas, in sheets, his
“Treatise on Ancient Painting;” in which he has observations on the
rise, progress, and decline of that art among the Greeks and Romans,
comments on the genius of Raphael, Michael Angelo, Nicholas Poussin,
and others, and illustrates the work will) engravings of fifty pieces of
ancient painting. It will be remembered that Shaftesbury had “Disquisi-
tions on Taste;” and we shall see most of the Scottish metaphysicians
speculate on taste and beauty. The work was not of such an original or
daring character as to recommend it to the genius of Hogarth; yet it
seems to have had a considerable roll of subscribers. His style is pleas-94/James McCosh
ant, and the remarks judicious and highly appreciative of the classical
painters. In February, 1740, there appeared his most important work,
and the only one that continues to be read, “The Principles of Moral
Philosophy.” At the close he promises, as soon as his health admits, a
work on “Christian Philosophy,” which was actually published before
the close of the year; and in it he treats of the Christian doctrines con-
cerning God, providence, virtue, and a future state, and recommends the
Word of God because it embraces and illustrates such doctrines. He
dates October, 1740, a preface and appendix to Heineccius’s “Methodi-
cal System of Universal Law.”22 In 1742, he published “Observations
upon Liberal Education; and in it he speaks as having long been en-
gaged in the work of education. He subscribes himself as Chaplain to
the Prince of Wales, and dedicates the treatise to the “Right Reverend
Father in God,” Thomas, Lord Bishop of Derry; in whose esteem, he
says, “he had long had a share.”23 It appears that before this time be had
left the communion of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and entered
into orders in the Episcopal Church of England, which was doubtless
more congenial to his tastes. Through the bishop, to whom he dedicated
his work, he was appointed Rector of Drumachose, in the diocese of
Derry. I cannot find that he left any mark behind him in that parish:
there is no remembrance of him in the popular tradition of the district,
and no record of him in the diocese. In consequence of failing health, he
went to the Continent, and died at the Hague, Jan. 31, 1748.24
Turnbull was the first metaphysician of the Scottish—I believe of
any—school to announce unambiguously and categorically that we ought
to proceed in the method of induction in investigating the human mind.
He takes as the motto of his “Moral Philosophy” the passage from New-
ton about the method of natural philosophy being applicable to moral
subjects, and the line of Pope, “Account for moral as for natural things.”
His enunciations on this subject are as clear and decided as those of
Reid and Stewart in after ages. “If a fact be certain, there is no reason-
ing against it; but every reasoning, however specious it may be,—or
rather however subtle and confounding,—if it be repugnant to fact, must
be sophistical.” It must have been from Turnbull that Reid learned, even
as it was from Reid that Stewart learned, to appeal to common language
as built on fact or universal feeling. “Language not being invented by
philosophers, but contrived to express common sentiments or what ev-
ery one perceives, we may be morally sure that where universally all
languages make a distinction there is really in nature a difference.” ReidThe Scottish Philosophy/95
only catches the spirit of his old master, who speaks of “philosophers
who, seeking the knowledge of human nature not from experience, but
from I know not what subtle theories of their own invention, depart
from common language, and therefore are not understood by others,
and sadly perplex and involve them selves.” In some respects, his expo-
sition of the method is more comprehensive and correct (so I believe)
than that given by Reid and Stewart; inasmuch as he avows distinctly
that, having got facts and ideas from experience, we may reason deduc-
tively from them, in what Mr J. S. Mill calls the deductive method, but
which is in fact a joint inductive and deductive method. He sees clearly
that in natural philosophy there is a mixture of experiments with reason-
ings from experiments; and he asserts that reasonings from experiments
may have the same relation to moral philosophy that mathematical truths
have to natural philosophy. “In both cases equally, as soon as certain
powers or laws of nature are inferred from experience, we may consider
them, reason about them, and compare them with other properties, pow-
ers, or laws.” He instances among the moral ideas which we may com-
pare, and from which we may draw deductions, those of intelligence,
volition, affection, and habit. Moral philosophy is described by him as a
mixed science of observations, and reasoning from principles known by
experience to take place in or to belong, to human nature. In his preface
to Heineccius, he says that the appended “discourse upon the nature and
origin of laws is an attempt to introduce the experimental way of rea-
soning into morals, or to deduce human duties from internal principles
and dispositions in the human mind.” In following this method, he claims
to be superior to Puffendorf, to Grotius, and the older jurists.
Proceeding in this method he discovers, both in matter and mind, an
established order and excellent general laws, and on this subject quotes
largely from his contemporaries Berkeley and Pope. He constantly ap-
peals to these laws as illustrating the divine wisdom; and to the excel-
lence of laws as justifying the divine procedure, despite certain inciden-
tal acts which may flow from them. As inquirers discover these laws,
science is advanced; and he dwells as fondly on the progressiveness of
knowledge as Bacon had done and as Stewart has done.
In particular, he shows that if we look at human nature as a whole,
and at its several parts, we shall find beneficent general laws. He dis-
covers in our constitution means to moral ends, and the science of these
means and ends is properly called moral philosophy. He shows that by
such a study we can discover what are natural laws; and that, in all96/James McCosh
well-regulated states, the sum and substance of what is called its civil
laws are really laws of natural and universal obligation adding that “civil
law adopts only those laws of nature on which the quiet of mankind
entirely depends, and that there are other duties to which men must
attend out of reverence to their Creator and sincere love to mankind,
without regard to the fear of human penalties.” He shows that mankind
are not left indifferent to virtue and to beauty: “As we are capable of
distinguishing truth from falsehood, so we are capable of distinguishing
good and approvable actions, affections, and characters, from bad and
disapprovable ones.” He would call this capacity moral sense, moral
taste, moral discernment, or moral conscience. Like Shaftesbury (“who
must live forever in the esteem of all who delight in moral inquiries”),
and Hutcheson, whom he often approvingly quotes, he represents the
virtues as capable of being reduced into benevolence.
In unfolding the elements of human nature, he dwells with evident
fondness on the “association of ideas.” He does not seem to attempt an
ultimate resolution of the laws; but he considers association as “a league
or cohesion formed by frequent conjunction in the mind,” and says that
“any appearance immediately suggests its concomitants and consequents
to us.” He adds, that association is more easily engendered between
ideas that have some affinity or likeness.” It may be doubted whether we
have a better account at this day of the law of association as a whole. In
regard to what Brown calls “secondary laws,” and Hamilton the “law of
preference,” he prescribes two rules from Cicero for helping the memory:
one is to attend to the things we would wish to recall; and the other is to
consider its analogies, relations, and oppositions to other objects which
will thus call it up. He accounts (as Stewart does) by the association of
ideas for the law of habit, which he represents as a “propension to do,
and a facility and readiness in doing, what we have often done.” He
shows truly and ingeniously how association influences the senses, by
connecting the qualities perceived by one sense with those perceived by
the others (a subject much dwelt on in a later age by Brown); and, in
particular, how, according to the theory of Berkeley, it aids the eye in
discovering distance, not itself an idea of sight. He shows how our ideas
have other ideas so associated with them that they make one perception,
and how difficult it is to separate ideas that have thus been associated,
and to find out precisely and philosophically what is involved in any
particular idea, and how apt we are in consequence to confound quali-
ties that are different. He is particularly successful in showing that de-The Scottish Philosophy/97
sires and volitions are prompted by associations. “Ideas, as often as
they return, must excite certain affections; and the affections which lead
to action must, as often as they are revived, dispose and excite to act, or,
in other words, produce will to act.” He remarks that “very few, if any,
of the ideas which excite our warmest and keenest affections are quite
free from associated parts.” He insists that “various associations must
produce various tempers and dispositions of mind; since every idea, as
often as it is repeated, must move the affection it naturally tends to
excite, and ideas with their correspondent affections often returning must
naturally form inclinations, propensions, and tempers.” He would ac-
count in this way for much of our feeling of beauty, and for propensity
to imitate passing into custom. His exposition of the association of ideas
is more satisfactory and accurate than the one, so much commended,
published by Hume at the same time; and is far more philosophical than
that given by Reid, who, in this respect, fell behind his master. I am
acquainted with no exposition of this part of our constitution published
prior to his time which seems to me so full and correct.
His ideas on education are liberal and advanced. He is opposed to
corporal punishment, and declares that the grand aim of education should
be to foster good habits. Giving a high place to the study of the mind, he
maintains, as did all the great masters of the Aberdeen school who came
after him, that mental science should not be taught to young men till
their minds have been other-wise well furnished. He gives logic a some-
what large and wide field;, in this respect, too, like the Scottish meta-
physicians who came after him. Its province is to “examine the power
and faculties of our minds (favorite phrases of Reid’s), their objects,
and operations; to inquire into the foundations, the causes of error, de-
ceit, and false taste; and, for that effect, to compare the several arts and
sciences with one another, and to observe how each of them may derive
light and assistance from all the rest. Its business is to give a full view of
the natural union, connection, and dependence of all the sciences.” Like
Reid, and Stewart after him, he sets a high value on the study of “the
nature and degrees of moral, probable, or historical evidence,” and com-
plains that it is left out in the logical treatises. The teacher should aim to
make his pupil look at things, instead of words. At the same time, he
recommends the study of languages with the study of things employing
language in an enlarged sense, as embracing the different methods of
expressing, embellishing, or enforcing and recommending truth, such as
oratory, poetry, design, sculpture, and painting. He complains that in98/James McCosh
education the arts of design are quite severed, not only from philosophy,
but from classical studies. The object contemplated by him in his work
on “Painting “was to bring these various branches into union: he thinks
that paintings may teach moral philosophy. The essential elements of
painting are represented by him as being truth, beauty, unity, greatness,
and grace, in composition. He dwells fondly on the analogy between the
sense of beauty and moral sense; and on the inseparable connection
between beauty and truth. His works on “education” and on the fine arts
are clear and judicious, written in a pleasant and equable, but at the
same time a commonplace style; and they seem never to have attracted
the attention which they deserved, and which would have been freely
given to works of greater pretension, eccentricity, or extravagance.
But, after all, we are most interested in noticing the points in which
Turnbull seems to have influenced Reid. We have already had some of
these before us. We have seen that Turnbull announces as clearly as
Reid that the human mind is to be studied by careful observation. Both
are averse to abstruse scholastic distinctions and recondite ratiocina-
tions on moral subjects. Turnbull ever appeals, as Reid did after him, to
consciousness as the instrument of observation. Both are fond of desig-
nating mental attributes by the terms “powers” and “faculties.” Both
would give a wide, and I may add a loose, field to logic, and include in
it the inquiry into the nature of probable evidence. In proceeding in the
way of observation, both discover natural laws or principles, and both
call them by the name of “common-sense.” “Common-sense is certainly
sufficient to teach those who think of the matter with tolerable serious-
ness and attention, all the duties and offices of human life; all our obli-
gations to God and our fellow-creatures; all that is morally fit and bind-
ing. And there is no need of words to prove that to be morally fit and
obligatory, which common-sense and reason clearly show to be so.”
Reid holds that all active power implies mind. This was the expressed
doctrine of Turnbull before him. “It is, therefore, will alone that pro-
duces both power and productive energy.” “To speak of any other activ-
ity and power, is to Speak without any meaning at all; because experi-
ence, the only source of all our ideas (and of the materials of our knowl-
edge), does not lead us to any other conception or idea of power.” Nor
should it be omitted that both—in this respect, however, like all the
other Scotch metaphysicians—ever speak with profound reverence of
Scripture; ever, however, dwelling most fondly on those doctrines of the
word which are also truths of natural religion; such as the existence ofThe Scottish Philosophy/99
God, the obligations of morality, and the immortality of the soul.
I have been at pains to trace these agreements, not with the view of
depreciating the originality and still less the independence of Reid, who
may have had some of these views suggested to him by his teacher, but
who may have afterwards found them in other writers, and who no doubt
thought them all for himself, and adopted them because they seemed to
him to be sound.25 We have seen that in one or two points, Reid fell
behind his master, who had clearer apprehensions than his pupil of min-
gling deductive with inductive observation, and of the laws of the asso-
ciation of ideas. But in other and more important philosophic doctrines,
Reid passed far beyond his teacher. Reid claims to be original in reject-
ing the ideal theory of sense perception; which had been the received
one for two thousand years, which had been adopted by Locke, and
pursued to its logical consequences by Berkeley. But Turnbull evidently
adheres to the old view. “Properly speaking, what we call matter and
space are but certain orders of sensible ideas produced in us, according
to established rules of nature, by some external cause; for when we
speak of material effects and of space, we only mean, and can indeed
only mean, certain sensible perceptions excited in our mind according to
a certain order, which are experienced to be absolutely inert and pas-
sive, and to have no productive force.” He speaks of the “external mate-
rial world” as unperceived by us, and in itself absolutely unperceivable,
as all philosophers acknowledged When, in speaking of the material
world, he says it may be called the “external cause or occasion of those
sensible ideas, and their connections, which make to each of us what we
call the sensible world,” we see that this is the doctrine which Reid set
aside; and yet we may notice that the phrase “occasion” is used by
Turnbull, as by Reid, to designate the relation of the external action to
the internal perception. In another point, Reid made a more important
advance upon Turnbull. Living at a later age, Reid had to meet the
objections of the great modern revolutionist, and had in consequence to
dive down into profounder depths of the human constitution. The scep-
ticism of Hume brought out to view the superficialities of the philoso-
phy of Shaftesbury, partly by following its principles to their legitimate
consequences, but mainly by making all men feel that it is nothing where-
with to meet the assaults of the new and formidable enemy. Shaftesbury,
Hutcheson, and Turnbull had all appealed to common-sense; but Reid
behoved to take a deeper and more searching view of the principles
which constitute common-sense, in order to meet the exigencies of the100/James McCosh
new era.
Turnbull’s works had no great circulation in their own day, and they
speedily disappeared from public view. It might have been different had
he continued in Aberdeen, and gathered around him a body of young
men ready to receive and to propagate the lessons he taught them. But
he departed into other fields,—into the literary circle of England, and a
church which set more value on liturgy than on abstract doctrine,—and
there he met with few to appreciate his gifts. A Presbyterian Scot might
have urged, with some plausibility, that his name has perished because
he forsook the country and the church in which his philosophic labors
would have been valued. It might even have been different, had he pub-
lished his metaphysical treatises a dozen of years earlier; for then they
might have run their course with those of Hutcheson and Butler. But at
the very time that Turnbull advertised his work on “Moral Philosophy,”
Hume published his “Treatise of Human Nature,” which, as it forced its
way to the front, required philosophy to deepen its foundations and give
a new facing to its buttresses. Turnbull is remembered because he had,
for three years, when he was himself a very young man, a diligent and
thoughtful pupil, who in due time wrestled with the great sceptic, and is
acknowledged by Scotland as the representative of its native philoso-
phy.
XIII David Fordyce 26
He was born in Aberdeen in 1711, entered Marischal College in 1742,
and was drowned at sea, as he was returning from travel, in September,
1751. During that age and the next there was a strong disposition to-
wards the study of mental philosophy. In 1748, R. Dodsley began the
publication of the “Preceptor,” in London, and Fordyce wrote the ar-
ticle on “Moral Philosophy.” He was appointed professor of moral phi-
losophy in the college in which he bad been educated, in 1742. In 1745,
he published “Dialogues concerning Education,” a very pleasantly writ-
ten book. He discusses the question whether nature or training does
most, and inquires whether the Socratic method is fitted to bring forth
what is in our nature. He dwells fondly, like most of the philosophers of
the Scottish school, on the influence of the association of ideas. The
religion he recommends was evidently the moderate type: “As the reli-
gion of Christ was designed as a plain, consistent rule of life, and not a
system of abstracted reasonings and speculations,—to influence the heart
more than fill the head,—I would endeavor above all things a high spiritThe Scottish Philosophy/101
of disinterested and extensive virtue.” He was author also of an essay on
“Action of the Pulpit.” After his death there was published a work of
his, “Theodorus, a Dialogue concerning the Art of Preaching,” to which
was added “A discourse on the Eloquence of the Pulpit, by James
Fordyce.” His “Elements of Moral Philosophy” was published in 1754.
There is little that is original in his works, but much that is judicious and
useful. It is evident that he was acquainted with the works of Butler and
Hutcheson. “Moral philosophy contemplates human nature, its moral
powers and connections, and deduces the laws of action.” “Moral phi-
losophy has this in common with natural philosophy that it appeals to
nature or to fact.” He finds passions or affections, some private, some
public, and above these; (1) reason or reflection; (2) conscience, by
which we denominate some actions and principles of conduct honest
and good, and others wrong, dishonest, or ill.” “We came by the idea of
moral obligation or duty in the same way as our other original and pri-
mary perceptions: we receive them from the Author of our nature.” We
employ reason in moral cases, in “examining the condition, relations,
and other circumstances of the agent, and patient.” “Therefore, when
we use these terms, obligation, duty, ought, and the like, they stand for
a simple idea.” He opposes those who establish morals on the divine
will, and those who place it in the natures and reasons, truths and fitnesses,
of things.”
XIV William Duncan27
He was born in Aberdeen, July, 1717, and was the son of a respectable
tradesman. He received his education partly at Aberdeen and partly at
Foveran. He entered Marischal College in 1733, and took his degree in
1737. Originally, he was designed for the gospel ministry; but not find-
ing an inclination for the work, he went, as so many Scottish youths
have done in like circumstances, to London (in 1739), and devoted him-
self to literature; translating “Select Orations of Cicero” and “Caesar’s
Commentaries,” which were long found useful by youths averse to turn
over the leaves of a dictionary. He wrote for Dodsley’s “Preceptor” the
article on “Logic and this was afterwards published in a separate vol-
ume, and continued for an age or two to furnish, not very philosophical
but very useful, instruction to Scottish and other youths. The work is
partly psychological partly logical. In Book First he treats of the origin
and division of ideas, and of language; in the Second, of judgment, self-
evident and demonstrable; in the Third, of reasoning and demonstra-102/James McCosh
tion; and in the Fourth, of invention, science, and the parts, of knowl-
edge. He was appointed professor of philosophy in Marischal College,
May 18, 1752, and entered the professorship, Aug. 21, 1753. He was
drowned when bathing, May, 1760.
XV  John Stevenson 28
From the date at which we have now arrived, we have a succession of
distinguished men testifying to the benefit they received from the in-
struction imparted in the departments of logic and moral philosophy in
the Scotch colleges. As being among the eminently successful teachers
of his age, we have to give a place to John Stevenson, professor of Logic
or “Rational and Instrumental philosophy” in the University of
Edinburgh. Dugald Stewart says of him that to his valuable prelections,
particularly to his illustrations of Aristotle’s “Poetics,” and of Longinus
on the “Sublime,” Dr. Robertson has been often heard to say, that he
considered himself as more deeply indebted than to any other circum-
stance in his academic studies.” “I derived,” says Dr. Somerville, “more
substantial benefit from these exercises and lectures than from all the
public classes I attended at the university.” Similar testimony is borne
by the famous leader of the evangelical party in the Church of Scotland,
Dr. Erskine (see Life by Sir Henry W. Moncreiff). The course of in-
struction followed by Stevenson is given in the Scots Magazine, and is
well worthy of being quoted as an exhibition of the highest style of
education imparted in the age. He gives lectures upon “Heineccii Elementa
Philosopliae Rationalis,” and Wynne’s abridgment of Locke’s “Essay
upon the Human Understanding:” in which he explains all the different
forms of reasoning, the nature of certainty both mathematical and moral,
with the different degrees of probability; and shows how the under-
standing is to be conducted in our inquiries after truth of all kinds. He
likewise explains the fundamental rules to be observed in the interpreta-
tion of the texts of very ancient authors. He teaches metaphysics in
lectures upon De Vries’s “Ontologia,” in which he explains the several
terms and distinctions which frequently occur in the writings of the
learned. He also lectures upon Longinus, per Ûyouj, in which he illus-
trates the several precepts of oratory given by Cicero and Quintilian;
and also, upon Aristotle, per toihtmi»j, in which he illustrates his
rules by examples from ancient and modern poets, and explains the
grounds of criticism in eloquence and poetry. He gives likewise a course
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of the most famous philosophers ancient and modern, and the several
opinions by which the different sects were distinguished. Each of his
students is required to make a discourse upon a subject assigned him,
and to impugn and defend a thesis, for his improvement in the art of
reasoning. These exercises are performed before the principal and some
of the professors with open doors. The students met him two hours daily;
one of them was devoted to lectures on logic, delivered in the Latin
tongue. It is stated that the college opens about the 10th of October, and
rises about the end of May. The shortening of the length of the session in
the colleges of Scotland, in later years, has done much to lower the
standard of attainment.
John Stevenson was appointed professor in Edinburgh, in 1730,
and died Sept. 12th, 1775, in the eighty-first year of his age. It is men-
tioned to his credit, by Stewart, that at the age of seventy be gave a
candid reception to the philosophy of Reid, which was subversive of the
theories which he had taught for forty years; and that “his zeal for the
advancement of knowledge prompted him, when his career was almost
finished, to undertake the laborious task of new-modelling that useful
compilation of elementary instruction to which a singular diffidence of
his powers limited his literary exertions.” (Stewart’s “Life and Writings
of Reid.”)
XVI. Sir John Pringle29
He was for a time “professor of pneumatology and ethical philosophy”
in Edinburgh University. The pneumatics are divided into the following
parts: (1) A physical inquiry into the nature of such subtle and material
substances as are imperceptible to the senses, and known only front
their operations; (2) The nature of immaterial substances connected with
matter, in which is demonstrated, by natural evidence, the immortality
of the human soul (3) The nature of immaterial created beings not con-
nected with matter (4) Natural theology, or the existence and attributes
of God demonstrated front the light of nature. Ethics or moral philoso-
phy is divided into the theoretical and practical parts, in treating of
which the authors he chiefly uses are Cicero, Marcus Antoninus,
Puffendorf, and Lord Bacon. He had lectures explaining the origin and
principles of civil government, illustrated with an account of the rise
and fall of the ancient governments of Greece and Rome, and a view of
that form of government which took its rise from the irruptions of the
northern nations. His students have also discourses presented to them104/James McCosh
upon some important heads of pneumatical or moral philosophy, which
are delivered before the principal with open doors. Pringle was by no
means so thorough an instructor as Stevenson. Carlyle describes him
“as an agreeable lecturer, though no great master of the science he taught.”
“His lectures were chiefly a compilation from Lord Bacon’s works, and
had it not been for Puffendorf’s small book, which he made his text, we
should not have been instructed in the rudiments of the science.” Never-
theless, we see that he discussed topics which must issue, sooner or
later, in a scientific jurisprudence and political economy. We see, in the
case both of Stevenson and Pringle, how much attention was paid in the
Scottish universities to the practice of English composition.
Pringle’s taste did not lie specially in metaphysics. He was born in
Roxburghshire, in 1707, and became a physician. He settled in Edinburgh
about 1734; and after 1748, resided in London, where be was elected
president of the Royal Society in 1773. He died in 1782
XVII. Thomas Boston
We wish our readers to transport themselves to the eastern border coun-
try of Scotland, and to try to realize its condition in the first half of last
century. People are apt to take their views of that district from Sir Walter
Scott, who passed the most interesting portion of his boyhood there, and
picking up the dim traditions of the past ere they were finally lost, and
tingeing them with the romantic hues of his own imagination, has pre-
sented to us such a picture as a man of the nineteenth century, in love
with chivalry, would be likely to furnish of the ages of border strife. But
the truth is, Sir Walter has given us only one side of the Scottish charac-
ter; he never thoroughly sympathized with the more earnest features of
the national mind, and he did not appreciate the attempts which were
made in the seventeenth century to deliver the country from violence
and superstition, and to Promote education and a scriptural religion.
The people of the eighteenth century had such traditions of the earlier
ages as to be glad that the days of the border raids had passed away. At
the time we wish to sketch, two classes of people were to be found in the
district. There were landed prorietors, disposed to allow no opposition
to their not very generous or enlightened will, but who were already
catching the taste for improving the land, which has made Berwickshire
one of the most advanced agricultural districts in the three kingdoms.
Under them were small farmers and their servants, with the ignorance
and much of the rudeness of the previous ages, and not yet awakened toThe Scottish Philosophy/105
independent thought and action. Between them there was scarcely any
middle class, except the parish ministers, who, in the early part of the
century, if not highly cultivated, were zealous preachers of the doctrines
of grace, and actively seeking to raise their people to church-going hab-
its and a decent morality; and who, at a later date, as patrons began to
assert their legal rights, and colleges adopted the new philosophy, be-
came the most vehement opponents of the evangelical party: so that, in
the days of Carlyle, the Synod of Merse and Teviotdale turned the vote
against popular rights, and the ministers of it, coming to the General
Assembly, rushed to the theatre to hear Mrs. Siddons when she hap-
pened to be in Edinburgh. Believing that there was nothing suited to
them in such a religion, the common people set up in the towns and large
villages seceding congregations, which drew towards them the more
earnest of the inhabitants. Out of one of these congregations sprang
Thomas M’Crie, who has given us the other phase of the Scottish char-
acter.
At the beginning of the century, the most remarkable man in the
district was undoubtedly Thomas Boston. Born at Dunse in the previ-
ous century, he remembered his going, when a boy, to the prison of his
native place to keep his father company when he was incarcerated for
resisting the imposition of Prelacy. All his life he is most sedulous and
consistent in discountenancing the system of church patronage, which is
being steadily introduced. Settled as a minister first in Simprin, and
then in Ettrick, he is consumingly earnest in visiting once a year, in
catechising twice a year, and in preaching on Sabbath-day and week-
day to, an ignorant and careless people just rising out of barbarism. But
he contrived to retain a literary taste amidst his active parochial em-
ployments. With a difficulty in getting books, and rejoicing so when a
good one came in his way, he was able, by his own independent study, to
develop views in regard to the importance of Hebrew points which were
far in advance of those attained in his time by any British scholar. En-
dowed with a clear, logical mind, he has, in his “Fourfold State “and
“Covenant of Grace,” given us perhaps the best exposition we have of
the old Scotch theology in its excellencies,—some would add, in its
exclusiveness. Living and breathing in the doctrine of free grace, he
seized with avidity and valued excessively the “Marrow of Modern Di-
vinity,” which he found in the cottage of one of his people, and he vigor-
ously opposed the moral or legal preaching which was fast coming in
with the new literature and philosophy. Singularly single-minded, ear-106/James McCosh
nest, and fervent in his piety, this man becomes a favorite and a power,
first in his district, and, in the end, by his theological works all over
Scotland. In reading his Memoirs, we observe that he was painfully
careful in watching his moods of mind, often referring to spiritual inter-
position what arose from wretched health; and that he was ever looking
on events occurring in God’s providence as signs indicating that he should
pursue a particular line of conduct. It needed a philosophy—we regret
that it should have been an infidel one which did the work—to correct
these errors of a narrow theology.30
XVIII. David Dudgeon
Already the old orthodoxy was being troubled. Mr David Dudgeon pub-
lished, in 1732, a work entitled “The Moral World.” We have no record
of the early history of this man, and we do not know whether he received
a college education. When he comes under our notice, he is tenant of a
large farm called Lennel Hill, in the parish of Coldstream. In the work
referred to he maintains, with clearness and ability, a doctrine like that
of Anthony Collins, whom he had read. He asserts “that there is no evil
in the moral world but what necessarily ariseth from the nature of im-
perfect creatures, who always pursue their good, but cannot but be li-
able to error or mistake,” and “that evil or sin is inseparable in some
degree from all created beings, and most consistent with the designs of a
perfect Creator.” On account of the errors in this work, he was sum-
moned before the Presbytery, where two charges are brought against
him: 1st, That he denies and destroys all distinction and difference be-
tween moral good and evil, or else makes God the author of evil, and
refers all evil to the imperfection of creatures; 2d, That he denies the
punishment of another life, or that God punishes men for sin in this
life,—yea, that man is accountable. He appears before the court, and
holds it to be contrary to Scripture that man has free-will in the Arminian
sense, but holds that man is accountable and punishable for practising
contrary to the divine precepts of our Saviour, the practice of which
tends to make all men happy. The case goes up from presbytery to synod,
and from synod to General Assembly, which remits it to the Commis-
sion of Assembly in 1733, again in 1734, again in 1735, and again in
1736, with no evidence that the commission ever ventured to take it
up.31 In 1734, he published a vindication of the “Moral World,” in reply
to a pamphlet against him, said to be written by Andrew Baxter; and
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state where he may be reformed. His most important work is “Philo-
sophical Letters concerning the Being and Attributes of God,” first printed
in 1737. These letters were written, in the midst of pressing agricultural
cares. to the Rev. Mr Jackson, author of a work written in the spirit of
Clarke, “The Existence and Unity of God.” In these letters, Dudgeon
reaches a species of refined Spinozism, mingled with Berkeleyanism.
He denies the distinction of substances into spiritual and material, main-
tains that there is no substance distinct from God, and that “all our
knowledge but of God is about ideas they exist only in the mind, and
their essence and modes consist only in their being perceived.” In 1739,
he published a “Catechism founded upon Experience and Reason, col-
lected by a Father for the use of his Children “and, in an introductory
letter, he wishes that natural religion alone was embraced by all men,
and states that, though he believes there was an extraordinary man sent
into our world seventeen hundred years ago to instruct mankind, yet he
doubts whether he “ever commanded any of those things to be written
concerning him which we have.” The same year, he published “A View
of the Necessitarian or Best Scheme, freed from the Objections of M.
Crousaz, in his Examination of Pope’s ‘Essay on Man.’”
Dudgeon died at Upsettlington, on the borders of England, January,
1743, at the age of thirty-seven. His works were published in a com-
bined form in 1765, in a volume without a printer’s name attached,
showing, that there was not as yet thorough freedom of thought in Scot-
land. His writings had for a time a name in the district (the “Catechism”
reached a third edition), but afterwards passed away completely from
public notice. The late Principal Lee was most anxious to know more of
his history, and in particular whether he could have influenced David
Hume in personal intercourse or by his writings. As they lived in the
same district, Hume must have heard of the case, which appeared when
Hume was cogitating his own system. There are points in which Dud-
geon anticipated Hume. Thus, Dudgeon maintains that all knowledge is
about ideas, the essence of which is that they are perceived. He says that
the words “just, unjust, desert etc., are necessarily relative to society;”
and that if we allow that there is not justice in the government of this
world, we cannot argue that there is justice in the world to come. Dud-
geon, too, is a stern necessarian. But in all these points Dudgeon had
himself been anticipated by others. In other respects the two widely
differ. Dudgeon assumes throughout a much higher moral tone than
Hume ever did. Dudgeon had evidently abandoned a belief in Christian-108/James McCosh
ity, but he stood up resolutely for a rational demonstration of the exist-
ence of God as the cause of the ideas which come under our experience;
and he has a whole system of natural religion: whereas Hume under-
mines all religion, natural as well as revealed. Dudgeon had superior
philosophic abilities; and in other circumstances might have had a chance
of becoming the head of a new philosophic Heresy. But there was a
young man in his own neighborhood being trained to supersede and
eclipse him in his own line, and to go beyond deism to atheism. It is thus
that error advances till it corrects itself.
XIX. David Hume32
David Hume was born at Edinburgh, on April 26, 1711. He was the
second son of Joseph Home or Hume, of Ninewells, so called from a
number of springs which may still be seen as fresh as when the name
was given. The mansion is in the parish of Chirnside, in Berwickshire,
and is situated on the green slope of a hill which rises from the river
Whitadder, immediately in front. The situation is remarkably pleasant,
and from the heights above there are extensive views of the whole east-
ern border country, now associated in the minds of all reading people
with tales of romance. Here David Hume passed the greater portion of
his younger years, and much of the quieter and more studious parts of
his middle age. But he never refers to the scenes of his native place, not
even (as Mr Burton has remarked) when be has occasion in his “History
of England” to relate events which might have led him to do so. It is
clear that his taste for the beauties of nature was never very keen; the
time had not come when all people rave about natural scenery; he was in
no way disposed to expose himself to English prejudice by betraying
Scottish predilections, and I rather think that he was glad that the time
of border raids had for ever passed away.
His father was a member of the Faculty of Advocates, but passed
his life as a country gentleman. His mother was a daughter of Sir D.
Falconer of Newton, who had been a lawyer in the times of the Stuarts,
and had filled the office of president of the Court of Session from 1682
to 1685. So far as the youth was exposed to hereditary predilections,
they were those of Scotch landlords, who ruled supreme in their own
estates, of hard-headed Edinburgh lawyers, and of old families opposed
to the great Whig or covenanting struggle of the previous century. His
father having died when the second son was yet an infant, the education
of the children devolved on their mother, who is represented as trainingThe Scottish Philosophy/109
them with great care,—in what way or form in respect of religion we are
not told.
David became an entrant of the class of William Scott, professor of
Greek in the Edinburgh University, February 27, 1723, being still under
twelve years of age. What his precise college course was is not recorded;
but we know generally that in those times, and for many years after,
boys who should have been at school, after getting an imperfect ac-
quaintance with Latin and Greek, were introduced in the classes of logic,
pneumatics, and moral philosophy, to subjects fitted only for men of
mature powers and enlarged knowledge. I suspect there was no ruling
mind among his teachers to sway him, and he was left to follow the bent
of his own mind. Already he has a taste for literature, and a tendency to
speculative philosophy. “I was seized very early,” be says in “My Own
Life,” “with a passion for literature, which has been the ruling passion
of my life, and a great source of my enjoyments.” In writing to a friend,
July 4, 1727, he mentions having by him written papers which he will
not make known till he has polished them, and these evidently contain
the germs of a system of mental philosophy. “All the progress I have
made is but drawing the outlines on loose bits of paper: here a hint of a
passion; there a phenomenon in the mind accounted for; in another an
alteration of these accounts.” Mr Burton publishes part of a paper of his
early years, being “An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honor.”
In it we have no appreciation of chivalry, but we have the germs of the
historical, political, and ethical speculations which he afterwards devel-
oped. He inquires why courage is the principal virtue of barbarous na-
tions, and why chastity is the point of honor with women (always a
favorite topic with him), and is evidently in the direction of his utilitar-
ian theory of virtue. About his seventeenth year he began, but speedily
relinquished, the study of the law. “My studious disposition, my sobri-
ety, and my industry, gave my family a notion that the law was a proper
profession for me; but I found an unsurmountable aversion to every
thing but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning; and while
they fancied I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil
were the authors I was secretly devouring.”
We have two admirable accounts of Hume’s life: the one, “My Own
Life,” calm as philosophy itself; the other by Mr Hill Burton, who had
access to the papers collected by Baron Hume, and deposited with the
Royal Society of Edinburgh; and who has collected all other available
information, and put it together in a clear and systematic manner. But110/James McCosh
David HumeThe Scottish Philosophy/111
there is much that we should like to know not communicated. The auto-
biography, though honest enough, is not open or communicative. We
may rest assured that in that great lake which spreads itself so calmly
before us, there were depths, and movements in these depths, which
have been kept from our view. Though so skilled in psychological analy-
sis, he gives no account of the steps by which he was led to that deadly
scepticism in philosophy and theology which be held by so firmly, and
propounded so perseveringly. Mr Burton has, however, published a re-
markable document, which lets us see what we should never have learned
from “My Own Life,” that there had been an awful struggle and a crisis.
It is a letter written to a physician with great care, but possibly
never sent. He begins with stating that he “had always a strong inclina-
tion to books and letters,” and that, after fifteen years, he had been left
to his own choice in reading: “I found it to incline almost equally to
books of reasoning and philosophy, and to poetry and the polite authors.
Every one who is acquainted either with the philosophers or critics,
knows that there is nothing yet established in either of these sciences,
and that they contain little more than endless disputes, even in the most
fundamental articles. Upon examination of these, I found a certain bold-
ness of temper growing in me, which was not inclined to submit to any
authority on these subjects, but led me to seek out some new medium by
which truth might be established. After much study and reflection on
this, at last, when I was about eighteen years of age, there seemed to be
opened up to me a new source of thought, which transported me beyond
measure, and made me, with an ardor natural to young men, throw up
every other pleasure or business to apply actively to it. The law, which
was the business I designed to follow, appeared nauseous to me; and I
could think of no other way of pushing my fortune in the world but that
of scholar and philosopher. I was infinitely happy in this course of life
for some months, till at last, about the be ginning of September, 1729,
all my ardor seemed in a moment to be extinguished, and I could no
longer raise my mind to that pitch which formerly gave me such exces-
sive pleasure. I felt no uneasiness or want of spirits when I laid aside my
book; and therefore never imagined there was any bodily distemper in
the case, but that my coldness proceeded from a laziness of temper which
must be overcome by redoubling my application. In this condition I
remained for nine months, very uneasy to myself, but without growing
any worse, which was a miracle. There was another particular which
contributed more than any thing to waste my spirits, and bring on me112/James McCosh
this distemper, which was, that, having read many books of morality,—
such as Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch,—and being smit with their beau-
tiful representations of virtue and philosophy, I undertook the improve-
ment of my temper and will, along with my reason and understanding. I
was continually fortifying myself with reflections against death and
poverty and shame and pain, and all the other calamities of life. These
no doubt are exceeding useful when joined with an active life, because
the occasion being presented, along with the reflection, works it into the
soul, and makes it take a deep impression; but in solitude they serve to
little other purpose than to waste the spirits, the force of the mind meet-
ing with no resistance, but wasting itself in the air, like our arm when it
misses the aim. This, however, I did not learn but by experience, and till
I had already ruined my health, though I was not sensible of it.” He then
describes the symptoms: scurvy spots breaking out on his fingers the
first winter, then a wateriness in the mouth. Next year, about May, 1731,
there grew upon him a ravenous appetite, and a palpitation of heart. In
six weeks, from “being tall, lean, and rawboned, he became on a sudden
the most sturdy robust, healthful-like fellow you have seen, with a ruddy
complexion and a cheerful countenance.” He goes on to say, that “hav-
ing now time and leisure to cool my inflamed imagination, I began to
consider seriously how I should proceed with my philosophical studies.
I found that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by antiquity labored
under the same inconvenience that has been found in their natural phi-
losophy, of being entirely hypothetical, and depending more upon in-
vention than experience every one consulted his fancy in erecting schemes
of virtue and happiness, without regarding human nature, upon which
every moral conclusion must depend. This, therefore, I resolved to male
my principal study, and the source from which I would derive every
truth in criticism as well as morality.” He tells how he had read most of
the celebrated books in Latin, French, and English; how “within these
three years I find I have scribbled many a quire of paper, in which there
is nothing contained but my own inventions;” how he “had collected the
rude materials for many volumes” but he adds, “I had no hopes of de-
livering my opinions with such elegance and neatness as to draw to me
the attention of the world, and I would rather live and die in obscurity
than produce them maimed and imperfect.” “It is a weakness rather
than lowness of spirits which troubles me;” and he traces an analogy
between what he had passed through and recorded religious experiences.
“I have noticed in the writings of the French mystics, and in those of ourThe Scottish Philosophy/113
fanatics here, that when they give a history of the situation of their
souls, they mention a coldness and desertion of the spirit, which fre-
quently returns.” But, “however this may be, I have not come out of the
cloud so well as they commonly tell us they have done, or rather began
to despair of ever recovering. To keep myself from being melancholy on
so dismal a prospect, my only security was in peevish reflections on the
vanity of the world, and of all human glory, which, however just senti-
ments they may be esteemed, I have found can never be sincere, except
in those who are possessed of them. Being sensible that all my philoso-
phy would never make me contented in my present situation, I began to
rouse up myself.” He found these two things very bad for this distem-
per, study and idleness, and so he wishes to betake himself to active life.
His choice was confined to two kinds of life, that of a travelling gover-
nor, and that of a merchant. The first not being fit for him he says he is
now on his way to Bristol, to engage in business till he is able to “leave
this distemper behind me.” He says, that “all the physicians I have con-
sulted, though very able, could never enter into my distemper,” and so
he now applies to this eminent doctor.
In this remarkable document Hume unbosoms himself for the first
time, and, I may add, for the last time. He had endeavored to act the
self-righteous and self-sufficient stoic. We have other evidence of this.
In the letter already extracted from, written when he was sixteen, he
says. “I hate task-reading, and I diversify them at pleasure; sometimes a
philosopher, sometimes a poet.” “The philosopher’s wise man and the
poet’s husbandman agree in peace of mind in a liberty and independence
on fortune, and contempt of riches, power, and glory. Every thing is
placid and quiet in both, nothing perturbed or in disorder.” “A perfectly
wise man that outbraves fortune is surely greater than the husbandman
who slips by her; and indeed this pastoral and Saturnian happiness I
have in a great measure come at just now. I live a king, pretty much by
myself, neither full of action nor perturbation,—molles somnos. This
state, however, I can foresee, is not to be relied on. My peace of mind is
not sufficiently confirmed by philosophy to withstand the blows of for-
tune. This greatness and elevation of soul is to be found only in study
and contemplation; this can alone teach us to look down on human acci-
dents. You must allow me to talk thus like a philosopher; ‘tis a subject I
think much on, and could talk all day long of.” But the attempt had
turned out a miserable failure, as he acknowledges in his letter to the
physician. Doubts had crept in, and the stoic was tempted to turn scep-114/James McCosh
tic. Writing long after to Sir Gilbert Elliott in regard to his “Dialogues
on Natural Religion,” which sap all religion, be mentions a manuscript,
afterwards destroyed, which he had written before twenty. “It began
with an anxious search after arguments to confirm the common opinion,
doubts stole in, dissipated, returned, were again dissipated, returned
again; and it was a perpetual struggle of a restless imagination against
inclination, perhaps against reason.”
The letter is supposed by Mr Burton, on good grounds, to have been
written to the celebrated Dr. Cheyne, author of the “Philosophical Prin-
ciples of Natural Religion” (1705), and “The English Malady; or a Trea-
tise of Nervous Diseases of all kinds, Spleens, Vapours, Lowness of
Spirits, Hypochondriacal Distempers,” etc. It is doubtful whether the
letter ever reached Dr. Cheyne, and it may be doubted whether that
eminent physician had in all his pharmacopoea a medicine to cure the
malady of this remarkable youth. Dr. Cheyne defends with the common
arguments the “great fundamental principles of all virtue and all moral-
ity: viz., the existence of a supreme and infinitely perfect Being; the
freedom of the will, the immortality of the spirits of all intellectual be-
ings, and the certainty of future rewards or punishments.” But the youth
who proposed to address him had already a system evolved which un-
dermined all these. One could have wished that there had been a friend
at hand to direct him away from Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, to a
better teacher who is never mentioned. Not that we should have ex-
pected him in his then state to be drawn to the character of Jesus, but he
might have found something in His work fitted to give peace and satis-
faction to his distracted soul. But it is useless to speculate on these
possibilities. All he says himself is: “In 1734 I went to Bristol with some
recommendations to eminent merchants, but in a few months found that
scene totally unsuitable to me. I went over to France, with a view of
prosecuting my studies in a country retreat, and I there laid that plan of
life which I have steadily and successfully pursued.”33
We can easily picture the youth of twenty-three as he set out for
France. By nature he is one of a class of persons to be found in all
countries, but quite as frequently in Scotland as anywhere else, who are
endowed with a powerful intellect, conjoined with a heavy animal tem-
perament, and who, with no high aspirations, ideal, ethereal, or spiri-
tual, have a tendency to look with suspicion on all kinds of enthusiasm
and highflown zeal. With an understanding keen and searching, he could
not be contented with the appearances of things, and was ever bent onThe Scottish Philosophy/115
penetrating beneath the surface; and his native shrewdness, his heredi-
tary predilections, and the reaction against the heats of the previous
century, all combined to lead him to question common impressions and
popular opinions. He saw the difficulties which beset philosophical and
theological investigations, and was unable to deliver himself from them,
being without the high sentiments which might have lifted him above the
low philosophy of his own day in England and France, and the sophist-
ries suggested by a restless intellect. He knew only the ancient Stoic
philosophy in the pages of Roman authors, and the modern philosophy
of Locke, as modified by such men as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and
driven to its logical consequences by Berkeley: he bad tried the one in
his practical conduct, and the other by his sifting intellect, and having
found both wanting, he is prepared to abandon himself to scepticism,
which is the miserable desert resorted to by those who despair of truth.
Meanwhile his great intellectual powers find employment in construct-
ing theories of the mind, in which he himself perhaps had no great faith,
but which seemed the logical conclusion of the acknowledged philo-
sophical principles of his time, and quite as plausible as any that had
been devised by others, and brought such fame to their authors.
With these predilections, France was the country which had most
attractions to him, but was at the same time the most unfortunate coun-
try he could have gone to, and the middle of the eighteenth century the
most unfortunate period for visiting it. In philosophy, the age had out-
grown Descartes and Malebranche, Arnauld and Pascal, and the grave
and earnest thinkers of the previous century, and was embracing the
most superficial parts of Locke’s philosophy, which had been introduced
by Voltaire to the knowledge of Frenchmen, who turned it to a wretched
sensationalism. In religion he saw around him, among the great mass of
the people, a very corrupted and degenerate form of Christianity, while,
among the educated classes, infidelity was privately cherished, and was
ready to burst out. Voltaire had issued his first attack on Christianity, in
his “Epitre à Uranie,” published in 1728, and the fire spread with a
rapidity which showed that there were materials ready to catch it and
propagate it. Sixty years later, one so fond of order and peace would
have been scared by the effects produced by scepticism, so powerful in
overthrowing old abuses, and so weak in constructing any thing new or
better but at this time infidelity was full of hope, and promising an era
of liberty and peace. The very section of the Catholic Church which
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involved in a transaction which favored the sceptical tendency among
shrewd minds. Only a few years before, the people believed that the sick
were healed, and the blind made to see at the tomb of the famous Jansenist,
the Abbé Paris; the noise made by the occurrences, and the discussions
created by them, had not passed away when Hume arrived in Paris; and
the youth pondered the event, to bring it out years after in his “Essay on
Miracles.” While he lived at La Flêche, a Jesuit plied him with some
“nonsensical miracle,” performed lately in their convent, and then and
there occurred to him the famous argument which he afterwards pub-
lished against miracles. “As my head was full of the topics of the ‘Trea-
tise of Human Nature,’ which I was at that time composing, the argu-
ment immediately occurred to me, and I thought it very much gravelled
my companion; but at last he observed to me that it was impossible for
that argument to have any validity, because it operated equally against
the gospel as the Catholic miracles, which observation I thought fit to
admit as a sufficient answer.”
After living a short time in Paris, he retired to Rheims, and after-
wards went to La Flêche, where he passed two of the three years he
spent in France. We know nothing of his employments these years, ex-
cept that he devoted himself most earnestly to the composition of his
“Treatise on Human Nature.” In 1737 he brought it over with him to
London, where he published the two first books the end of the following
year.
This treatise is by far the most important of all. his philosophical
works. If we except certain speculations in history and political economy,
it contains nearly all his favorite ideas. He devoted to it all the resources
of his mighty intellect. He had read extensively, pondered deeply, and
taken immense pains in polishing his style. He could scarcely, indeed,
be called a learned man, in the technical sense of the term, but he was
well informed. We could have wished that he had possessed wider sym-
pathies with earnest seekers after truth in all ages, but this was not in the
nature of the man. His knowledge of Greek was very imperfect at this
time (he afterwards renewed his acquaintance with that language); what
he knew of Greek philosophy was chiefly through Cicero (his very pic-
tures of the Stoics and Epicureans are Roman rather than Grecian), and
he never entered into the spirit of such deep and earnest thinkers as
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle,—he tells us somewhere that the fame of
Aristotle is utterly decayed. In respect even of modern writers, he never
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in the previous century; and he had no appreciation of the speculations
of Clarke and Leibnitz, who lived in the age immediately preceding his
own. He belongs to the cold, elegant, doubting, and secular eighteenth
century; and, setting little value on antiquity, he builds for the present
and the future on the philosophy of his own time.
As to style, which he greatly cultivated, the models which he set
before him were the Roman prose writers, the French authors of his
own day, and the Englishmen who were introducing the French clear-
ness and point, such as Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, and Pope,—he says:
“The first polite prose we have was written by Swift.” Though he took
great pains, he never altogether succeeded in weeding out his Scotticisms,
nor in acquiring a genuine English idiom; but his style is always clear,
manly, and elegant, and worthy of his weighty thoughts. When he broke
down his elaborate treatise into smaller ones, he endeavored to catch the
ease and freedom of the lighter French literature; but neither the sub-
jects discussed nor the ideas of the author admit of such treatment; and
though the essays are more ornate, and have more attempts at smartness
and repartee, the student will ever betake himself to the treatise, as con-
taining the only systematic, and by far the most satisfactory statement
of his views.
He is now publicly committed to a theory, and he adheres to it reso-
lutely and doggedly. In after years he said: “So great an undertaking,
planned before I was one-and-twenty, and composed before twenty-five,
must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my haste a hundred
and a hundred times.” But this refers to the form and style, not the
matter. He never abandoned nor modified the scepticism advanced in
the early work. When he failed in obtaining a hearing for his views in
the more elaborate treatise, he set them forth in “Essays,” which might
be more attractive to the general reader. He had instituted an inquiry,
and satisfied himself that speculative truth was unattainable, either in
philosophy or theology, owing to the weakness of the human intellect,
and he did not wish to be disturbed with questionings. He seems to have
studiously abstained from speaking on such subjects in social intercourse,
except at times, in a tone of playful humor, not meant to be offensive;
and on becoming an author he formed the resolution “never to reply to
anybody.” He rather delighted to associate with ministers of religion,
such as Robertson, Blair, and Carlyle, whom he reckoned moderate and
tolerant, and helpful in producing a religious indifference; but he never
allowed them to try to convert him to the truths of natural and revealed118/James McCosh
religion which they held by; and when Dr. Blair ventured on one occa-
sion to make the attempt, he received such a reply as prevented the
repetition of it on any future occasion. There are traditions of him and
Adam Smith conversing familiarly on such subjects on the sands of
Kirkcaldy, and of Hume succeeding in bringing his friend over to infi-
delity; but we have no authenticated record of Hume ever opening to
any human being the religious or irreligious convictions of his soul. A
good-natured and sociable man, kind and indulgent to those with whom
he came in contact, he passed through life a solitary being, certainly
with no God, and apparently with no human being to whom to unbosom
himself.
Having set the matured and confirmed man before our readers, we
have no intention of detailing minutely the events of his future life. Hav-
ing published his work, he retired to Ninewells to wait the result. “Never
literary attempt was more unfortunate than my ‘Treatise of Human
Nature.’ It fell deadborn from the press without reaching such distinc-
tion as even to create a murmur among the zealots.” He evidently felt
the disappointment. “I am out of humor with myself.” He was amazed
that the liberty he had taken with all established truth had not created a
sensation. But he was conscious of intellectual power: he had laid his
plan for life; and he indomitably persevered in his literary career. Next
year he published the third volume of his treatise, that on ethics, with no
better success. In 1741 he printed at Edinburgh the first, and in 1742 the
second, of his “Essays Moral and Political.” The work was favorably
received and he was encouraged. In 1744 he was anxious to be ap-
pointed Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh,
but public sentiment could not bear the idea of one so sceptical being
appointed a teacher of youth. He was a younger brother without a pro-
fession, and he wished to have a competency; and so in 1745, the year of
the rebellion of Prince Charles, he became the companion and guide of
the weak-minded Marquis of Annandale. The engagement brought him
some accession of fortune, but terminated abruptly from the caprice of
the Marquis. In 1747 he attended General St. Clair in his military em-
bassy to the Courts of Vienna and Turin. There he saw a variety of life;
and he congratulates himself that when the engagement closed, he was
“master of near a thousand pounds.” In 1748 he cast the first part of his
unfortunate treatise in a new form, in the “Inquiry concerning Human
Understanding,” but the work failed to excite any interest. His brother
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Edinburgh, where he was appointed to, and held for five years, the of-
fice of librarian to the advocates’ library, a situation which brought him
little or no emolument. In 1752 he published in Edinburgh the second
part of his essays, being his “Political Discourses.” This work was im-
mediately received with acclamation; and, being translated into French,
it procured him a high reputation, and in fact awakened those discus-
sions which issued in making political economy a science in the “Wealth
of Nations.” Whatever merit Hume may have in demolishing error, he
has, I believe, established very little positive truth: what he effected in
this way was done in political economy. The same year he published his
“Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,” being an improved ver-
sion of the third part of his treatise. “Meanwhile my bookseller, A. Millar,
informed me that my former publications (all but the unfortunate trea-
tise) were beginning to be the subject of conversation, that the sale of
them was gradually increasing, and that new editions were demanded.
Answers by reverends and right reverends came out two or three in a
year; and I found, by Dr. Warburton’s railing, that the books were be-
ginning to be esteemed in good company.” He had long had the idea of
writing some historical work, and from the time of his being appointed
librarian to the well-stored advocates’ collection of books, he formed
the plan of writing the “History of England.” The first volume com-
menced with the accession of the house of Stuart, but was received so
coldly that in a twelvemonth the publisher sold only forty-five copies.
Nevertheless he persevered, bringing out volume after volume, till at
last the great merits of the work were acknowledged. This perseverance
in his life plan, in spite of discouragements, I reckon as the noblest
feature in Hume’s character. It does not concern us here to speak of the
excellencies and defects of the history. It could be shown that the preju-
dices running throughout it were his constitutional and hereditary ones,
and that the work, as a whole, is an illustration of his metaphysical and
ethical theory.
In 1763 he received from the Earl of Hertford an invitation to attend
him on his embassy to Paris. His visit to the capital of France on this
occasion deserves a special notice. It may be doubted whether there ever
were such compliments paid to any literary man. Dukes, mareschals,
foreign ambassadors, vied with each other in honoring him. The famous
men, whose persons and conversations he liked best, were D’Alembert,
Marmontel, Diderot, Duclos, Helvetius, and old President Henault; and
he writes to Dr. Blair, and bids him tell Dr. Robertson that there was not120/James McCosh
a single deist among them, meaning that there was none of them but
went farther. He met also with Buffon, Malesherbes, Crebillon, Holbach,
Renauld, Suard, and Turgot.
But he was the special favorite of the ladies, who at that time ruled
the fashion in Paris. In particular, he was flattered and adored by the
Countess de Boufflers. His correspondence with that lady had com-
menced in 1761. She addressed him first, declaring the admiration which,
your sublime work (the ‘History of England’) has awakened in me.” “I
know no terms capable of expressing what I felt in reading the work. I
was moved, transported; and the emotion which it caused me, is in some
measure painful by its continuance. It elevates the soul it fills the heart
with sentiments of humanity and benevolence it enlightens the intellect,
by showing that true happiness is closely connected with virtue; and
discovers, by the same light, what is the end, the sole end, of every
reasonable being”! In truth, I believed I had before my eyes the work of
some celestial being, free from the passions of humanity, who, for the
benefit of the human race, has designed to write the events of these latter
times”! The philosopher is evidently gratified. “What new wonder is
this which your letter presents to me? I not only find a lady, who, in the
bloom of beauty and height of reputation, can withdraw herself from the
pleasures of a gay court, and find leisure to cultivate the sciences, but
deigns to support a correspondence with a man of letters, in a remote
country, and to reward his labors by a suffrage the most agree able of all
others to a man who has any spark of generous sentiment or taste for
true glory.” This lady, it is proper to say in plain terms, was the wife of
the Comte de Boufflers, still alive, but the mistress of the Prince of
Conti, who superintended for the king that mean diplomatic correspon-
dence which he carried on unknown to his ministers. Hume might also
be seen attending the evening salons of Madame Geoffrin, who had
been the daughter of a valet de chambre, and was now the centre of a
circle of artists and men of letters. He also waited on the entertainments
of the famous Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse, who, originally an illegiti-
mate child, had raised herself by being, first, the humble companion,
and then the rival of Madame Du Deffaud, and was well known to have
been the mistress of a number of successive or contemporaneous lovers.
There must have been something in the philosophy of Hume which rec-
ommended him to so many ladies of this description. We believe they
were glad to find so eminent a philosopher, with a system which did not
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Pompadour “was never heard to say so much to any man.”
He says of himself: “I eat nothing but ambrosia, drink nothing but
nectar, breathe nothing but incense, and tread on nothing but flowers.
Every man I meet, and still more every lady, would think they were
wanting in the most indispensable duty if they did not make a long and
elaborate harangue in my praise.” Lord Charlemont has given us a pic-
ture, or rather a caricature, of his person as he met him at Turin some
years before this. “His face was broad and flat, his mouth wide, and
without any other expression than that of imbecility. His eyes vacant
and spiritless, and the corpulence of his whole person was far better
fitted to communicate the idea of a turtle-eating alderman than of a
refined philosopher. His speech in English was tendered ridiculous by
the broadest Scotch accent, and his French was, if possible, still more
laughable.” This was the man who was made by the Parisian ladies to
take the part, in an acted tableau, of a sultan assailed by two female
slaves: “On le place sur un sopha entre les deux plus jolies femmes de
Paris, il les regarde attentivement, il se frappe le ventre et les genoux à
plusieurs reprises, et ne trouve jamais autre chose a leur dire que,—‘Eh
bien! mes demoiselles. ... Eh bien! nous voilà donc. ... Eh bien! vous
voilà. ... vous voilà ici.’” His good sense led him to see the vanity of all
this: but he was pleased with it; and he often expresses a wish to settle in
Paris, or somewhere in France.
When he was introduced to the Dauphin, his son, afterwards the
unfortunate Louis XVI, but then a boy of nine, stepped forth, evidently
by instruction, and told him how many friends and admirers he had in
the country, and that he reckoned himself among the number from the
reading of many passages in his works. The Comte de Provence (who,
after his long exile, became Louis XVIII),a year or so younger, now
approached Hume, and told him he had been long and impatiently ex-
pected in France, and that he anticipated great pleasure from reading his
fine history. Even the Comte d’Artois, afterwards Charles X, but then a
boy of six, had to mumble a panegyric. A wise man learned in provi-
dence might have seen that awful miseries must issue from a state of
things in which, as Horace Walpole pointedly expresses it, “There is a
God and the king to be pulled down first, and men and women are de-
voutly employed in the demolition,” while princes were taught to cher-
ish the viper that was to sting them. It would have been an appropriate
punishment to have got Hume placed, half a century later, in the scenes
of the French Revolution, to let him eat the fruit of the seed he had122/James McCosh
helped to sow.
But what, it may be asked, did be think of the state of society in
which he had to mingle? It is evident that he was horrified at times with
the proclaimed atheism of men and women. But what did he think of the
morality of the circles in which he moved, more especially of the loose
relationship of the marriage tie? Did his utilitarian theory of morals, of
which he surely knew the bearing and tendency, allow of such a state of
things? It is certain that Hume uttered no protest at the time, and he has
left behind no condemnation of the morality of France, while he was
fond of making sly and contemptuous allusions to the manifestations of
religious zeal in his own country. The tone of morality in France could
never have been amended by him, nor, we venture to say, by any utilitar-
ian. When the husband of Madame Boufflers dies, he writes to her as a
person now within reach of honor and felicity; that is, as likely to be
married to the Prince de Conti. However, the prince declines, and Hume
gives her wise enough counsel: gradually to diminish her connection
with the prince, and at last to separate from him; and, he says: “If I
could dispose of my fate, nothing would be so much my choice as to live
where I might cultivate your friendship. Your taste for travelling might
also afford you a plausible pretence for putting this plan in execution; a
journey to Italy would loosen your connections here; and, if it were
delayed, I would, with some probability, expect to have the felicity of
attending you thither.” One can picture the scene; the countess travel-
ling with Hume attending her. But the prospect had not such attractions
as to induce her to leave the prince. Hume continued his correspondence
with her; and, on hearing of the death of the Prince of Conti, wrote her
within a few days of his own death, knowing he was dying, and ex-
presses no condemnation of her past conduct. The question arises whether
this would be the moral tone allowed in a community in which the word
of God is discarded, and utilitarian principles are adopted?
We do not mean to discuss the miserable quarrel between him and
Rousseau. His attention was called to the alleged ill usage of Rousseau
by Madame de Boufflers, who described him as a noble and disinter-
ested soul, “flying from intercourse with the world,” and “feeling plea-
sure only in solitude.” Hume, believing him to be persecuted, exerted
himself to help him. But his morbid vanity and intolerable habits (he
insisted in taking his disgusting governante with him when he visited a
family) rendered it impossible to befriend him. Unwilling to allow him-
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repaid Hume’s manly and delicate kindness with suspicion; and Hume,
who began by describing him as a man whose modesty proceeded from
ignorance of his own excellence,” ended by declaring him to be “the
blackest and most atrocious villain beyond comparison that now exists
in the world.” It is justice to Hume to say that he was always kind to
persons of literary ability. Thus, he interested himself much in Thomas
Blacklock, a blind man, of some poetical talent, when the people of
Kirkcudbright declined to accept him as their minister. He also did all in
his power to bring into notice the publications of Robertson, Adam Smith,
and Ferguson.
By his connection with the embassy and the sale of his works, which
had become great, he now attained a competency which made him feel
independent. He had many temptations to settle in France, but old asso-
ciations drew him back to Scotland. It was proposed by Lord Hertford
to send him to Ireland as Secretary; but the Irish would not receive him,
because he was a Scotchman. It was on this occasion that the Princess
Amelia said that she thought the affair might be easily accommodated.
“Why may not Lord Hertford give a bishopric to Mr Hume?” In 1767–
68 he was appointed by Lord Conway Under-Secretary of State, and
had charge of Scottish affairs, including the patronage of churches But
his residence was now mainly in Edinburgh, first in the old town, after-
wards in a house which he built in the new town, in St. David Street, so
called as the name had been chalked on the wall by a witty young lady
as she passed. Here he was the acknowledged chief of a literary circle,
embracing men of considerable eminence, such as Robertson, Blair, Lord
Kames, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith at Kirkcaldy, who all looked
up to him with respect. He rather enjoyed being an object of wonder to
the multitude beyond the favored circle in which he mingled, and made
many jocular remarks about the unpopularity of his opinions. Good-
natured, sociable, and avoiding controversy, he suffered few annoyances
because of his scepticism—certainly none that deserved to be called
persecution. For we suppose it will be scarcely reckoned as such, that,
on one occasion, in picking his steps from his lodging in the old town to
the house he was building in the new, he fell into a swamp, and, observ-
ing some Newhaven fishwives passing, he called to them for help, but
on learning that it was Hume the unbeliever who was in such a plight,
they refused to aid him till he said the Lord’s prayer. He carried on a
pleasant correspondence with Sir Gilbert Elliott of Minto, with Mure of
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miliar terms with several of the moderate clergy, such as Robertson and
Blair, and at times mingled in their ecclesiastical counsels. Many of the
younger ministers reckoned it an honor to be admitted to his society, and
he encouraged them to associate with him. These circumstances have
led some to think that the leading moderate ministers of that period must
have been infidels in secret, and acting hypocritically in professing Chris-
tianity; but there is no ground for such a charge: they believed sincerely
in the doctrines of natural religion, and in the Word of God as inspired
to teach a pure morality and the immortality of the soul. But it is equally
clear, that they had no faith in the peculiar Bible doctrines of grace; and
Hume was delighted to find them frowning on all religious earnestness,
and advancing so rapidly on the road to deism and philosophic indiffer-
ence.
By April, 1776, Hume knew that he would not recover from the
disease with which he had been afflicted for two years, being a disorder
in the bowels. He bought a piece of ground in the new church-yard in
the Calton Hill as a burying-place, and left money for the erection of a
small monument, with the simple inscription, “David Hume.” He wrote
“My Own Life,” giving an account of his literary career. In his will
Adam Smith had been appointed his literary executor, and two hundred
pounds had been bequeathed to him for the pains he might take in cor-
recting and publishing his “Dialogues on Natural Religion,” a work
written before 1751, but not yet given to the world. But he had ground
for fearing that Smith might be unwilling to take the odium of editing
such a work, and so he took effectual steps to guard against its suppres-
sion. He came to an understanding with Smith on the subject, and in a
codicil to his will, dated August 7, he left the manuscripts to Strahan the
publisher, ordaining “that if my ‘Dialogues’ from whatever cause be
not published within two years and a half after my death, as also the
account of my life, the property shall return to my nephew David, whose
duty in publishing them, as the last request of his uncle, must be ap-
proved of by all the world.” Strahan was as indisposed as Smith to
undertake the responsibility of publishing so offensive a work. The truth
is, Hume’s Scottish friends, though they had abandoned Christianity,
were most anxious to have left to them a natural religion, in which they
might find a refuge and some comfort; and in the “Dialogues” Hume
had undermined this last support. The “Dialogues “were published in
1779 by the author’s nephew.
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with no hope of ultimate recovery. John Home, the author of “Douglas,
a Tragedy,” travelled with him, and has preserved a diary. He talked
cheerfully of the topics of the day, and of his favorite subjects, lament-
ing over the state of the nation, and predicting that the national debt
must be the ruin of Britain. He returned to Edinburgh about the begin-
ning of July. Dr. Cullen reports: “He passed most part of the day in his
drawing-room: admitted the visits of his friends, and with his usual spir-
its conversed with them upon literature, politics, or whatever was acci-
dentally started.” Colonel Edmonstoune had come to take leave of him
Hume said he had been reading a few days before, Lucian’s “Dialogues
of the Dead,” and, among all the reasons for not entering readily into
Charon’s boat, he could not find one that fitted him, and he invented
several peculiar ones to give the boatman. “I might urge, have a little
patience, good Charon: I have been endeavoring to open the eyes of the
public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing
the downfall of some of the prevailing systems of superstition.’ But
Charon would then lose all temper and decency: ‘You loitering rogue,
that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will
grant you a lease for so long a term? Get into the boat this instant, you
lazy, loitering rogue.’” All this is evidently very gratifying to the colo-
nel. Dr. Black reports that he “passes his time very well with the assis-
tance of amusing books.” Dr. Cullen continues: “For a few days before
his death, he became more averse to receive visits; speaking, became
more and more difficult to him; and for twelve hours before his death his
speech failed him altogether. His senses and judgment did not fail till the
last hour of his life. He constantly discovered a strong sensibility to the
attention and care of his friends, and, amidst great uneasiness and lan-
guor, never betrayed any peevishness or impatience.”
This was the account left by his literary friends, and it was matter
of triumph to them that he betrayed no signs of fear in his hour of weak-
ness. Are we to allow, that, as in the early ages of the world’s history,
those who did not like to retain God in their knowledge continued all
their lives in the most abject superstition, so in these last days, under
other influences, there may be persons so bewildered that they die as
they live, without any fixed religious belief? The fact, if it be a fact, is
not flattering to the race; nor is the prospect encouraging. Good Chris-
tians had hoped, that ere he left the world there might be a change of
sentiment, and an acknowledgment of the existence of God, and the
need of a Saviour. Many of them maintained that it was impossible for126/James McCosh
an infidel to die in peace, and it was reported among religious circles,
that, though he was cheerful when his unbelieving friends visited him,
he had terrible uneasiness when left alone. Some of these rumors utterly
break down when we try to trace them to their original sources. The
statement, however, of Mr Robert Haldane of Airthrey, as to what he
learned from his neighbor, Mr Abercromby of Tullibody, must contain
some truth. Mr Abercromby was travelling to Haddington in a lumber-
ing stage-coach. “The conversation during the tedious journey turned
on the death-bed of the great philosopher, and as Mr Abercromby’s son-
in-law, Colonel Edmonstoune of Newton, was one of Hume’s intimate
friends, he had heard from him much of the buoyant cheerfulness which
had enlivened the sick room of the dying man. Whilst the conversation
was running on in this strain, a respectable-looking female, dressed in
black, who made a fourth in the coach, begged permission to offer a
remark: ‘Gentlemen,’ she said, ‘I attended Mr Hume on his death-bed,
but, I can assure you, I hope never again to attend the death-bed of a
philosopher.’ They then cross-examined her as to her meaning; and she
told them that, when his friends were with him, Mr Hume was cheerful
even to frivolity, but that when alone be was often overwhelmed with
unutterable gloom, and had in his hours of depression declared that he
had been in search of light all his life, but was now in greater darkness
than ever.” This is Mr Haldane’s statement, as taken from Mr
Abercromby.34 We confess we should like to know more of this woman
in black, and to have taken part in the cross-questioning. The question is
left in that region of doubt where Hume himself left all religion. He died
on Monday, August 26, 1776, at four o’clock in the afternoon.
Everybody knows that Hume was a sceptic. It is not so generally
known that he has developed a full system of the human mind. Students
of philosophy should make themselves acquainted with it. It has in fact
been the stimulating cause of all later European philosophy: of that of
Reid and his school of that of Kant, and the powerful thinkers influ-
enced by him and of that of M. Cousin, and his numerous followers in
France, in their attempt to combine Reid and Kant. Nor is it to be omit-
ted that Mr J. S. Mill, in his “Examination of Hamilton,” has repro-
duced to a large extent the theory of Hume, but without so clearly seeing
or candidly avowing the consequences. I rather think that Mr Mill him-
self is scarcely aware of the extent of the resemblance between his doc-
trines and those of the Scottish sceptic; as he seems to have wrought out
his conclusions from data supplied him by his own father, Mr JamesThe Scottish Philosophy/127
Mill, who, however, has evidently drawn much from Hume. The cir-
cumstance that Mr Mill’s work was welcomed by such declamations by
the chief literary organs in London is a proof, either that the would-be
leaders of opinion are so ignorant of philosophy that they do not see the
consequences; or that the writers, being chiefly young men bred at Ox-
ford or Cambridge, are fully prepared to accept them in the reaction
against the revived mediaevalism which was sought to be imposed upon
them. In no history of philosophy that we are acquainted with is there a
good account of the system of Hume. As few persons now read, or in
fact ever did read, through his weighty volumes, we are in hopes that
some may feel grateful to us, if in short space we give them an exposi-
tory and critical account of his philosophy, with a special facing to-
wards the philosophy which has been introduced among us by the Brit-
ish section of the nescient school of Comte.
Hume begins thus his famous “Treatise of Human Nature:” “All the
perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds,
which I call impressions and ideas. The difference betwixt them con-
sists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon
the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those
perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we may name
impressions, and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, pas-
sions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By
ideas, I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such,
for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse,
excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and except-
ing the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion.” He tells us,
that, in the use of terms, “I rather restore the word idea to its original
sense, from which Mr Locke had perverted it, in making it stand for all
our perceptions.” This theory is certainly very simple, but surely it is
lamentably scanty. It will not do to place under the same head, and call
by the one name of impressions, two such things as the affections of the
senses on the one hand, and the mental emotions of hope, fear, joy, and
sorrow, on the other. Nor can we allow him to describe all our sense-
perceptions by the vague name of impressions. What is meant by im-
pressions? If the word bas any proper meaning, it must signify that
there is something impressing, without which there would be no impres-
sion, and also something impressed. If Hume admits all this to be in the
impression we ask him to go on with us to inquire what is in the thing
impressed and in the thing that impresses, and we are at once in the128/James McCosh
region of existences, internal and external. “I never,” he says, “catch
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any
thing but the perception.” His very language contradicts itself. He talks
of catching himself. What is this self that he catches? But he may say it
is only a perception. I reply that there is more. We never observe a
perception alone. We always observe self as perceiving. It is true that I
never can catch myself at any time without a perception; but it is quite
as certain, and we have the same evidence for it, that we never observe
a perception except when we observe self perceiving. Let us unfold what
is in this self, and we shall find that it no way resembles an impression,
like that left by a seal upon wax.35 In regard to certain of our percep-
tions, those through the senses, we observe not only the self perceiving,
but an object perceived.
He now explains the way in which ideas appear. By memory the
impressions come forth in their original order and position as ideas.
This is a defective account of memory, consciousness being the witness.
In memory, we have not only a reproduction of a sensation, or, it may
be, a mental affection, we recognize it as having been before us in time
past. Of all this we have as clear evidence as we have of the presence of
the idea.36 In imagination the ideas are more strong and lively, and are
transposed and changed. This, he says, is effected by an associating
quality; and he here develops his account of the laws of association,
which has been so commended. But the truth is, his views on this sub-
ject, so far from being an advance on those of Hutcheson, are rather a
retrogression: they are certainly far behind those of his contemporary
Turnbull. He seems to confine the operation of association to the exer-
cise of imagination: he does not see that our very memories are regu-
lated by the same principle; nay, he allows that the imagination can join
two ideas without it. The associating qualities are said by him to be
three in number: resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause or
effect. “I do not find,” he says, “that any philosopher has attempted to
enumerate all the principles of association.” But the classification pro-
pounded by him bears so close a resemblance to that of Aristotle, that
we must believe that the one given by the Stagyrite had, in the course of
his reading, fallen under his notice, though he had forgotten the circum-
stance. The difference between the two lies in Hume giving us cause and
effect, instead of contrast as proposed by the Greek philosopher. It has
often been remarked that Hume’s arrangement is redundant, inasmuch
as cause and effect, according to him, are nothing but contiguity in timeThe Scottish Philosophy/129
and place.
He now shows how our complex ideas are formed. Following Locke,
he represents these as consisting of substances, modes, and relations.
He dismisses substance very summarily. He proceeds on the view of
substance given by Locke, one of the most defective and unsatisfactory
parts of his philosophy. Locke stood tip for some unknown thing, called
substance, behind the qualities. Berkeley had shown that there is no
evidence of the existence of such a substratum. Hume assumes that we
have no idea of external substance different from the qualities, and he
proceeds to show that we have no notion of the substance mind distinct
from particular perceptions. “I believe none will assert that substance is
either a color, or a sound, or a taste. The idea of substance must there-
fore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But
the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and
emotions, none of which can possibly represent a substance.” A sub-
stance is thus nothing else than a collection of particular qualities united
by the imagination. He thus suits the idea to his preconceived theory,
instead of looking at the peculiar idea, and suiting his theory to the
facts. I give up the idea of an unknown substratum behind the qualities.
I stand up only for what we know. In consciousness, we know self, and
in sense-perception we know the external objects as existing things ex-
ercising qualities. In this is involved what I reckon the true idea of
substance. We can as little know the qualities apart from an object exer-
cising them, as we can an object apart from qualities. We know both in
one concrete act, and we have the same evidence of the one as the other.
When he comes to modes, he examines them by the doctrine of
abstract or general ideas propounded by Berkeley, which he character-
izes “as one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been
made of late years in the republic of letters.” According to this very
defective theory (as it appears to us), all abstract or general ideas are
nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term. Like Locke, Hume
confounds abstract and general ideas, which should be carefully distin-
guished: the former meaning the notion of the part of an object as a part,
more particularly an attribute; the other, the notion of objects possess-
ing common attributes, the notion being such that it embraces all the
objects possessing the common attributes. Abstraction and generaliza-
tion are most important intellectual operations, the one bringing spe-
cially to view what is involved in the concrete knowledge (not impres-
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of which objects agree. Without such elaborative processes, we should
never know all that is involved in our original perceptions by sense and
consciousness. Nor is it to be forgotten, that when the concrete is a real
object, the abstract is a real quality existing in the object; and that when
the singulars are real, the universal is also real, that is, a class all the
objects in which possess common qualities. Here again we find Hume
overlooking one of the most essential of our mental attributes, and thus
degrading human intelligence. In relation to the particular end for which
he introduces his doctrine, I hold that substance and mode are known in
one concrete act and that we can separate them by abstraction for more
particular consideration; the one having quite as real an existence as the
other, and both having their reality in the singular object known by sense
and consciousness.
He goes on to a very subtle discussion as to our ideas of space and
time. He says, that “it is from the disposition of visible and tangible
objects we receive the idea of space, and from the succession of ideas
and impressions we form the idea of time.” The statement requires to be
amended. It is not from the disposition of separate objects we have the
idea of space, but in the very perception of material objects we know
them as extended, that is, occupying space; and in the very remem-
brance of events we have time in the concrete, that is, events happening
in time past. He is therefore wrong in the sceptical conclusion which he
draws, that the ideas of space and time are no distinct ideas; for they are
ideas formed by a high intellectual process from things immediately
known. Taking a defective view of the nature and function of abstrac-
tion, he denies that we can form any idea of a vacuum or extension
without matter. He maintains that the idea we form of any finite quality
is not infinitely divisible. The dispute, he says, should not be about the
nature of mathematical points, but about our ideas of them; and that, in
the division of our ideas, we come to a minimum, to an indivisible idea.
This whole controversy seems to me to arise from a misapprehension.
Our idea of space, it is evident, is neither divisible nor indivisible and as
to space, it is not divisible either finitely or infinitely for while we can
divide matter, that is, have a space between, we cannot separate any
portion of space from all other space: space is and must be continuous.
He is evidently jealous of the alleged certainty of mathematics, which
seemed to be opposed to his universal scepticism. He maintains that the
objects of geometry are mere ideas in the mind. I admit that surfaces,
lines, points, have no independent existence, but they have all an exist-The Scottish Philosophy/131
ence in solid bodies. By an excess of ingenuities and subtleties, he would
drive us to the conclusion that space and time are mere ideas, for which
we need not seek a corresponding reality; a conclusion unfortunately
accepted by Kant, who thus opened the way to the empty idealism which
so long reigned in the German philosophy.37
The result reached is summed up in the statement: “As long as we
confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses,
without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and op-
erations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrassed
by any question; “but, “if we carry our inquiry beyond the appearances
of objects to the senses, I am afraid that most of our conclusions will be
full of scepticism and uncertainty.” The intelligent reader will here per-
ceive the source whence Kant derived his doctrine that the senses give
us, not things, but phenomena, that is appearances, and that we are
involved in contradiction when we suppose that they furnish more. How-
ever great the logical power of the German metaphysician, it is clear
that he did not possess the shrewdness of the common-sense philoso-
pher of Scotland, when he adopted the conclusion of the sceptic as his
starting-point.
He has now to face the important subjects of existence and knowl-
edge. Proceeding on his assumption that nothing is present to the mind
but perceptions, he argues, I think logically (if the premises be allowed),
that we can never advance a step beyond ourselves, and that it is “im-
possible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing
specifically different from ideas or impressions.” As knowledge had been
represented by Locke as consisting in comparison (I reckon this a false
and dangerous doctrine), Hume has to consider the relations which the
mind of man can discover.
These he represents as being seven: those of resemblance, identity,
space and time, quantity, degree, contrariety, cause and effect. This is a
very good enumeration of the relations perceivable by man: it is cer-
tainly very much superior to that of many later metaphysicians, British
and Continental. “These relations may be divided into two classes, into
such as depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together, and
such as may be changed without any change in the ideas.” In the first
class he places resemblance, contrariety, degree, proportion. These de-
pend solely on our ideas. These only can be the objects of knowledge
and certainty, but they can never go beyond our ideas, which can never
go beyond our impressions. The other four do not depend on our ideas,132/James McCosh
and might seem to carry us beyond them; but this he shows is an illu-
sion. In identity, and time and space, we can never “go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses,” and thus can never discover the real
existence or the relations of objects. And so “‘tis only causation which
produces such a connection as to give us assurance, from the existence
or action of one object, that ‘twas followed or preceded by any other
existence or action.” He devotes the whole energy of his intellect to the
task of showing that we know nothing of the nature of the relation be-
tween cause and effect; that we know their conjunction within our expe-
rience, but not their connection.
In discussing this question, and kindred ones, he finds it necessary
to explain the nature of belief. “The belief of the existence of an object
joins no new ideas to those which compose the idea of the object.” What
then is the difference between belief and incredulity? It consists solely in
the liveliness of the former. “We must not be contented with saying that
the vividness of the idea produces the belief, we must maintain that they
are individually the same.” “The belief or assent which always attends
the memory and senses is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions
they represent, and this alone distinguishes them from imagination.”
The theory is surely palpably false here, for our imaginations, in which
there is no faith, are often livelier than our memories, in which there is
belief. But, by this theory, he would account for all our beliefs. He
would establish it as a general maxim in the science of human nature,
that when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports
the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to
them a share of its force and vivacity. “A present impression being vivid,
conveys its vividness to all the ideas which are associated with it by
such general laws as those of resemblance, contiguity, and causation.”
“A person that has lost a leg or an arm by amputation, endeavors, for a
long time afterwards, to serve himself with them. After the death of any
one, ‘tis a common remark of the whole family, but especially the ser-
vants, that they can scarce believe him to be dead, but still imagine him
to be in his chamber, or in any other place where they were accustomed
to find him.” The explanation may seem a very ingenious, but it is a
very feeble one. We may believe that we saw a particular person yester-
day, though we have no lively impression or idea retarding him; and we
do not believe in the existence of Achilles, though the reading of Homer
has given us a vivid conception of him.38
But this theory is employed to give an explanation of our belief inThe Scottish Philosophy/133
the relation of cause and effect. The one having always been with the
other in our experience, we are led by habit, and proceeding on the
principle of association, when we find the one to look for the other, and
thus, too, the effect being present, that is an impression, gives its vivid-
ness to the cause as an associating idea. “The idea of cause and effect is
derived from experience, which, presenting us with certain objects con-
stantly conjoined with each other, produces such a habit of surveying
them in that relation, that we cannot, with out a sensible violence, sur-
vey them in any other.” This is his explanation of what is implied in
efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, connection, productive quality.
The essence of necessity is “the propensity which custom produces to
pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant.” “When any object
is presented to it, it immediately conveys to the mind a lively idea of that
object which is usually found to attend it, and this determination forms
the necessary connection of these objects.” His definition of cause is
“an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it
that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other,
and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.”
Hume’s doctrine is founded on his favorite principle, “that all our
ideas are copied from our impressions but the necessary connection of
cause and effect cannot be in the impression, for “when I cast my eye on
the known qualities of objects, I immediately discover that the relation
of cause and effect depends not the least on them.” Not being in the
impression, it cannot be found in the idea. Now it is here, I apprehend,
that Hume is to be met. I have disputed his theory that the mind begins
with mere impressions; it commences with the perception or knowledge
of objects within itself, and without itself. Now, in its primitive percep-
tion of objects, it knows them as having power; it knows self as a power,
and it knows the not-self as a power,—as a power in resisting and im-
pressing the self. Here is the impression, if any one will call it so (I call
it knowledge), that gives rise to the idea which may be separated in
thought by abstraction, and put in the form of a maxim by generaliza-
tion.
Unfortunately, as I think, the opponents of Hume have not always
met him at the proper point. They have allowed him that we have no
original knowledge of power in the objects, and having given this en-
trance to the sceptic, they find great difficulty in resisting his farther
ravages. Sometimes they have endeavored to discover a nexus of some
kind between the cause and its effect, but have always failed to tell what134/James McCosh
the bond is. Causation is not to be regarded as a connection between
cause and effect, but a power in the object, that is, substance (or objects
and substances), acting as the cause to produce the effect. Kant labored
to oppose the scepticism of the Scotchman by supposing that the mind,
by its own forms, bound together events in its contemplation of them.
But when he allowed that the power was not in the objects, he intro-
duced a more subtle and perilous scepticism than that which he sought
to overthrow. We avoid this subjective idealism by insisting that it is on
the bare contemplation of a thing becoming, and not by the mere asso-
ciation of ideas and custom (which may aid), that we declare that it
must have had a cause.
He is now prepared to discuss two questions: “Why we attribute a
continued existence to objects even when they are not present to the
senses, and why we suppose them to have an existence distinct from the
mind and perception?” He shows, as to the first, the senses give us
nothing but a present perception; and, as to the second, that our percep-
tions being of ourselves, can never give us the least intimation of any
thing beyond. He dwells in the usual manner on the acknowledged unre-
ality of what have been called the secondary qualities of matter, and as
we naturally look upon the primary qualities, such as motion and solid-
ity, and the secondary qualities, such as colors, sound, heat and cold, as
alike real, so we must philosophically consider them as alike unreal.
After the manner of the times, he rejects the notion that we can immedi-
ately perceive our bodily frame, and not mere impressions, and that we
can know both the “objects and ourselves.” But whence, it is asked, the
coherence and constancy of certain impressions? He accounts for it on
the principle that the thought, according to the laws of association, slides
from one impression to others with which it has been joined, and reck-
ons them the same, and mistakes the succession of images for an iden-
tity of objects. The result reached by him is, “All our distinct percep-
tions are distinct existences,” and “the mind never perceives any real
connection among distinct existences.” “What we call mind is nothing
but a heap or collection of different impressions united together by cer-
tain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a per-
fect simplicity and identity.” He gives the same account of what we call
matter. He shows that having nothing but impressions, we can never, on
the mere ground of a conjunction which we have never witnessed, argue
from our perceptions to the existence of external continued objects; and
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never have any reason to infer that the supposed objects resemble our
sensations.39 He now draws his sceptical conclusion: “There is a direct
and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses, or, more prop-
erly speaking, betwixt those conclusions which we form from cause and
effect, and those that persuade us of the continued and independent ex-
istence of body. When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude
that neither color, sound, taste, nor smell have a continued and indepen-
dent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities, there remains
nothing in the universe which has such an existence.”
The question is: How is such a scepticism to be met? Reid opposed
it by showing that the sensation leads us intuitively to believe in the
existence of the external thing, and that the states of self, known by
consciousness, imply a thinking substance. The more correct statement
seems to me to be, that we know at once the external objects; that intu-
itively we know our own frame and objects affecting it; that we are
conscious, not of states arguing a self, but of self in a certain state; and
that, on comparing a former self recalled by memory and a present self
known by consciousness, we declare them to be the same. Kant cer-
tainly did not meet the scepticism of Hume in a wise or in an effective
manner, when he supposed that the unity was given to the scattered
phenomena by forms in the mind.
It is clear that all the usual psychological arguments for the imma-
teriality and immortality of the soul are cut up and destroyed by this
theory. We cannot speak of the soul as either material or spiritual, for
we know nothing either of matter or spirit except as momentary impres-
sions. “The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a
fictitious one.” Identity is nothing really belonging to these different
perceptions, but is merely a quality which we attribute to them because
of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon
them.
His theory of causation undermines the argument for the divine ex-
istence. He carefully abstains from dwelling on this in his great philo-
sophic work, but he expounds it at great length, and with all his intellec-
tual power, in his “Dialogues on Natural Religion.” We know nothing
of cause, except that it has been observed to be the antecedent of its
effect; when we have noticed an occurrence usually preceded by another
occurrence, we may on discovering the one look for the other. But when
we have never seen the events together, we have really nothing to guide
us in arguing from the one to the other. We can argue that a watch136/James McCosh
implies a watchmaker, for we have observed them together; but never
having had any experience of the making of a world, we cannot argue
that the existence of a world implies the existence of a world maker.
There is no effective way of answering this objection, but by maintain-
ing that an effect necessarily implies a cause. It was on this ground that
he was met by Reid, who argues that traces of design in God’s works
argue an intelligent cause. Kant deprived himself of the right to argue in
this way, by making the mind itself impose the relation of causation on
events, so that we cannot argue that there is a corresponding law in the
things themselves. Hume urges with great force and ingenuity, as Kant
did after him, that if we are compelled to seek for a cause of every
object, we must also seek for a cause of the Divine Being. This is to be
met by showing that our intuitive conviction simply requires us to seek
for a cause of a new occurrence. He argues, as Kant also did after him,
that the existence of order in the universe could at best prove merely a
finite and not an infinite cause. The reply is, that we must seek for the
evidence of the infinity of God in the peculiar conviction of the mind in
regard to the infinite and the perfect.40
This may be the most expedient place for stating and examining his
famous argument against miracles, as advanced in his essay on the sub-
ject. It is clear that he could not argue, as some have done, that a miracle
is an impossibility, or that it is contrary to the nature of things. He
assails not the possibility of the occurrence of a miraculous event, but
the proof of it. Experience being with him the only criterion of truth, it
is to experience he appeals. He maintains that there has been an invari-
able experience in favor of the uniformity of nature, and that a miracle
being a violation of a law of nature, can never be established by as
strong proof as what can be urged against it. He then exerts his ingenu-
ity in disparaging the evidence usually urged in behalf of miraculous
occurrences, by showing how apt mankind are to be swayed on these
subjects by such principles as fear, wonder, and fancy. We are not sure
whether Hume has always been opposed in a wise or judicious manner
by his opponents on this subject. It is of little use showing that there is
some sort of original instinct leading us to believe in testimony; for this
instinct, if it exists, often leads us astray, and we must still go to experi-
ence to indicate what we are to trust in and what we are to discard. But
the opponents of Hume were perfectly right when they showed, that in
maintaining that nature always acted according to certain mundane laws,
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tion is to be decided by experiential evidence. Let us concede that in the
present advanced state of science there is ample evidence that there is a
uniformity in nature; but then let us place alongside of this a counter-
part fact, that there is a sufficient body of evidence in favor of there
being a supernatural system. For this purpose let the cumulative proofs
in behalf of Christianity, external and internal, be adduced; those de-
rived from testimony and from prophecy, and those drawn from the
unity of design in the revelation of doctrine and morality, and from the
character of Jesus; and we shall find that in their consistency and con-
gruity they are not unlike those which can be advanced in behalf of the
existence of a natural system.
In Book Second of his Treatise, Hume treats of the passions. It is
the most uninteresting part of his writings. The reading of it is like trav-
elling over an immense plain, which looks inviting at the distance, but in
which we find no spots of fertility or of historical interest. It looks as if
the good-humored but phlegmatic man were incapable of discussing the
nature of the passions. The composition, though clear and sustained, is
never elevated by bursts of feeling or irradiated by gleams of genius. He
has a theory to support, and he defends it by wire-drawn ingenuity.
When he treats of the understanding, if be does not establish much truth,
he at least overthrows venerable error, and we are constrained to admire
his intellectual energy and courage; but, in dealing with the feelings of
our nature, he wastes his strength in rearing a baseless fabric, which, so
far as I know, no one has ever adopted, and no one has been at the
trouble to assail. He has no proper analysis of man’s original springs of
action. He says only in a general way, that “the chief spring or actuating
principle of the human mind is pleasure and pain.” He gives no psycho-
logical account of the place which the idea or apprehension of an object
as good or evil, or rather as appetible or inappetible, has in all feeling.
Of course, all passions are according to him impressions, only he calls
them reflective impressions, to distinguish them from sensations. The
reflective impressions are of two kinds, the calm and the violent; the
first including beauty and deformity, and the latter such passions as love
and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. He connects his theory of
the passions throughout with his theory of the understanding. There are
associations among the passions, as there are associations among ideas;
only he says, that while ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity,
and causation, impressions are associated only by resemblance. There
has as yet been no thorough examination, so it appears to me, of the138/James McCosh
laws of succession of feeling, as distinguished from that of ideas; I am
not convinced that the theory of Hume, that feelings are associated only
by resemblance, is the correct one. He draws a distinction between the
cause and the object of passion. Thus if a man has made a beautiful
house, the object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful
house. The idea of ourselves is always present with, and conveys a sen-
sible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object to which we are
related; in short, turns the idea into an impression. Some other person is
the object of love, but the cause of that passion is the relation of that
person to self. Out of this may proceed the desire of happiness or misery
of others, which he describes “as an arbitrary and original instinct
implanted in our nature,”—I put the language in italics, as I may have
occasion again to refer to it. In this way he constructs an elaborate, but
by no means clear, theory of the passions. He divides them into direct
and indirect. By direct, he understands such as arise immediately from
good or evil, that is, from pain or pleasure. He says of them: “The direct
passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is
perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our
enemies and of happiness to our friends, hunger, lust, and a few other
bodily appetites.” Under the direct, he includes desire, aversion, grief,
joy, hope, fear, despair, and security. The indirect proceed from the same
principles, but by conjunction with other qualities; and he comprehends
under them pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity,
malice, generosity, with their dependents. It may be said of his exposi-
tion of the passions generally, that he has often seized on important
circumstances which modify their action, but has altogether failed in his
explanation of their nature. Thus he has some just remarks upon the
transition of one idea to another, upon the effects thus produced, and
upon the predominant passion swallowing up the inferior; but after all
we have no proper evolution of the psychological process.
He occasionally refers to beauty, but the account he gives of it is
very inadequate. “Beauty is such an order and construction of parts, as
either by the primary constitution of our nature, or by custom, or by
caprice, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to our souls.” “The
conveniency of a house, the fertility of a field, the strength of a horse,
the capacity, security, and swift-sailing of a vessel, form the principal
beauty of these several objects.” It is clear that the aesthetic tastes of
one satisfied with such a theory could not have been keen, and we do not
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makes a single allusion to a fine statue or painting.
The account which he gives of the will is still more defective. “The
will is the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we
knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body.” Surely we may
have will in regard to our mental operations as well as in regard to our
bodily motions. The will, he says, is an impression, but surely it is an
impression of a very peculiar kind; and he should have inquired, which
he has not done, into its nature, when he would have seen that it pos-
sesses an essential freedom. As not perceiving this, he has left nothing
to save man from being driven on by an iron necessity.
In Book Third, he treats of morals, and starts his utilitarian theory,
which, however, he develops more fully, and in a livelier, more pointed,
and ornate manner, in his essay, “An Inquiry concerning the Principles
of Morals.” He says of this work, that it is “of all my writings, histori-
cal, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best.” In respect of prac-
tical influence, it has certainly been the most important. By his specula-
tive doubts in regard to the operations of the under standing he has
furnished a gymnastic to metaphysicians ever since his time; but by his
theory of virtue he has swayed belief and practice.
He shows that we cannot distinguish between good and evil by rea-
son alone, defining reason as the discovery of truth or false hood, and
truth and falsehood as consisting in the agreement or disagreement, ei-
ther to the real relation of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact.
Taking reason in this sense, it certainly cannot be said to discern the
morally good. But then it may be maintained that the mind has a power
of discerning moral good and evil analogous to the reason which distin-
guishes truth and falsehood, and all that he could urge in opposition
would be, that such a view is inconsistent with his theory of impressions
and ideas. It is by no means clear what is the faculty or feeling to which
he allots the function of perceiving and approving the morally good.
Sometimes he seems to make man a selfish being, swayed only by mo-
tives of pleasure or pain; and in this view virtue is to be regarded as
good, because associated directly or indirectly with the pleasure it would
bring to ourselves. But in other places he calls in a “benevolent senti-
ment, leading us to approve what is useful.” Hume’s general theory
might certainly seem opposed to every thing innate, and yet, in criticising
Locke, he is obliged to say: “I should desire to know what can be meant
by asserting that self-love or resentment of injuries, or passion between
the sexes, is not innate.” We have already quoted passages in which he140/James McCosh
appeals to instincts. He says elsewhere, “The mind, by an original in-
stinct, tends to unite itself with the good, and avoid the evil.” At times he
seems to adhere to the theory of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, as to the
existence of a moral sense. “The mind of man is so formed by nature,
that upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and ac-
tions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame.” He
tells us expressly that he is inclined to think it probable that the final
sentence in regard to moral excellence “depends on some internal sense
or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species.” I be-
lieve that we cannot account for the ideas in the mind except by calling
in such a faculty or feeling; and it was his business, as an experimental
inquirer, to ascertain all that is in this power, and to determine its mode
of operation and its laws. But such an investigation would have over-
thrown his whole theory, metaphysical as well as ethical.
According to Hume, virtue consists in the agreeable and useful.
“Vice and virtue may be compared to sounds, colors, heat and cold,
which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but
perceptions in the mind.” “Virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and
vice by the pain, that any action, sentiment, or character gives us by the
mere view and contemplation.” This theory goes a step farther than that
of Hutcheson in the same direction. Hutcheson placed virtue in benevo-
lence, thereby making the intention of the agent necessary to virtue;
whereas Hume does not regard it as necessary that it should be volun-
tary, and requires us to look merely to the act and its tendency. His
definition might lead one to think that an easy road or a pleasant car-
riage should be regarded as virtuous. But he will not admit that because
an inanimate object may be useful as well as a man, that therefore it
ought also to merit the appellation of virtuous; for he says: “The senti-
ments excited by utility are in the two cases very different, and the one
is mixed with affection, esteem, approbation, and not the other.” This
language, more particularly the phrases “esteem” and “approbation,”
might leave led him to discover that there is a peculiar judgment or
sentiment attached to virtuous action not produced by mere utility.
He easily satisfies himself that he can show that benevolence is a
virtue because it is so agreeable and useful; but he never faces the real
difficulty, which is to account for the sense of obligation which we feel,
and the obligation actually lying upon us, to do good to others.41 He
strives to show that justice is commended by us because of its beneficial
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society and arrangements made with others. True, the giving to every
one his due, implies beings to whom the due is to be given; but the due
arises from the relation in which we stand to these beings. Thus the first
man and woman having children, had duties to discharge towards them
as soon as they were born, and independent of any promise. He labors to
prove that our obligation to keep a promise arises from utility. “Fidelity
is no natural virtue, and promises have no force antecedent to human
conventions.” True, a promise implies a person to whom it is made, but,
once made, the obligation is complete.
This leads us at once to the fundamental objections which may be
taken to the utilitarian theory. Whence the obligation lying on us to
promote the happiness of others? to give others their due? to keep our
promises? From their utility, it is answered. But why are we bound to
attend to what is useful? is the question that immediately occurs; why
the reproach that follows, and which justifies itself when we have failed
to keep our word? These questionings bring us to a justice which guards
conventions, to a law which enjoins love.
The practical morality sanctioned by the system, and actually rec-
ommended by Hume, excludes all the higher virtues and loftier graces.
The adoration of a Supreme Being, and love to him, are represented as
superstition. He has no God to sanction the moral law, and no judgment
day at which men have to give in an account. Repentance has and can
have no place in a system which has no fixed law and no conscience.
Humility, of which he treats at great length, is disparaged. The stern
virtues of justice, of self-sacrifice, of zeal in a good cause, of faithful-
ness in denouncing evil, and of courage in stemming the tide of error
and corruption, these are often so immediately disagreeable, that their
ultimate utility will never be perceived except by those who are swayed
by a higher principle. It is certain that they were not valued by Hume,
who speaks of them as superstition and bigotry, and characterizes those
who practise them as zealots and fanatics. His view of the marriage
relation was of a loose and flexible character, and did not profess to
discountenance the evil practices of his time. “A man in conjoining him-
self to a woman is bound to her ac cording to the terms of his engage-
ment: in begetting children, he is bound by all the ties of nature and
humanity to provide for their sustenance and education. When he has
performed these two parts of duty, no one can reproach him with injus-
tice or injury.” Not acknowledging a God bestowing the gift of life, and
requiring us to give an account of the use we make of it, and setting no142/James McCosh
value on courage in difficulties, he argues that a man may take away his
life when it is no longer useful.
The state of society which he aimed at producing is thus described:
“But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous .to society
than those here delivered, which represent virtue in all her genuine and
most engaging charms, and make us approach her with ease, familiar-
ity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off with which many divines,
and some philosophers, have covered her, and nothing appears but gentle-
ness, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay, even at proper intervals
play, frolic, and gayety. She talks not of useless austerities and rigors,
suffering and self-denial.” People have often speculated as to what Hume
would have taught had he been elected professor of moral philosophy in
Edinburgh. I believe he would have expounded a utilitarian theory, end-
ing in the recommendation of the pleasant social virtues; speaking al-
ways respectfully of the Divine Being, but leaving his existence an un-
settled question.
And what, it may be asked, is the conclusion to which he wishes to
bring us by his whole philosophy? I am not sure that he has confessed
this to himself. Sometimes it looks as if his sublime aim was to expose
the unsatisfactory condition of philosophy, in order to impel thinkers to
conduct their researches in a new and more satisfactory manner. “If, in
order to answer the doubts started, new principles of philosophy must
be laid, are not these doubts themselves very useful? Are they not pref-
erable to blind and ignorant assent? I hope I can answer my own doubts;
but, if I could not, is it to be wondered at? “I verily believe that this was
one of the alternatives he loved to place before him to justify his scepti-
cism. “I am apt,” he says, in writing to Hutcheson, “to suspect in gen-
eral that most of my reasonings will be more useful in furnishing hints,
and exciting people’s curiosity, than as containing any principles that
will augment the stock of knowledge that must pass to future ages.” But
I suspect that the settled conviction reached by him was that no cer-
tainty could be attained in speculative philosophy; he was sure that it
had not been attained in time past. The tone of the introduction to his
great work is: “There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and
in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. If truth be at all
within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must be very deep and
abstruse; and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the great-
est geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be es-
teemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous.” As being thus deep, heThe Scottish Philosophy/143
feels as if the great body of mankind need not trouble themselves much
about it. He seems at times complacently to contemplate this as the
issue to which he would drive mankind for he sees at once that if men
become convinced that they cannot reach certainty in such speculations,
they will give up inquiry. “For nothing is more certain than that despair
has almost the same effect upon us as enjoyment, and that we are no
sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire than
the desire itself vanishes and he thinks it a satisfactory condition of
things when men discover the impossibility of making any farther
progress, and make a free confession of their ignorance. Considered in
this light, Hume’s philosophy, in its results, may be considered as an
anticipation of the positive school of M. Comte, which in the British
section of it approaches much nearer the position of Hume than most
people are aware of.
He allows that man should, as indeed he must, follow his natural
impulses, and the lessons of experience, as far as this world is con-
cerned. But he will grant nothing more. He thus closes his inquiry into
the understanding: “When we trace up the human understanding to its
first principles, we find it to lead us into such sentiments as seem to turn
into ridicule all our past pains and industry, and to discourage us from
future inquiries.” “The understanding, when it acts alone, and accord-
ing to its general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the
lowest degree of confidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or
common life.” In common life this scepticism meets with insuperable
barriers, which we should not try to overcome. But it is different with
philosophical, and, we may add, theological truths, which are supported
solely by speculative considerations. In these departments we may dis-
cuss and doubt as we please, without doing any injury. “What injury
can ever come from ingenious reasoning and inquiry? The worst specu-
lative sceptic I ever knew was a much better man than the best supersti-
tious devotee.” Those who think they can reach truth in these matters
are at liberty to cherish their conviction, provided always that they do
not thereby disturb their neighbors. But the time is coming, and already
wise men see that it is coming, when mankind will not concern them-
selves with such speculative questions, or will engage in them only as a
gymnastic to the intellect, or as a means of showing that ultimate truth
is unattainable by man.
It was, I believe, on such grounds as these that Hume justified him-
self in his sceptical doubts, and his sceptical solution of these doubts.144/James McCosh
He thought they might stir up inquiry on subjects on which no truth had
been reached; and tend to confound the dogmatism and restrain the dis-
putations in philosophy, and the fanaticism and superstition in religion,
which had wrought such mischief; and prepare the way for a reign of
universal toleration. As to religious belief, it could be supported only by
speculative arguments, derived from an absolute causation, or from
miracles which cannot stand a searching investigation. So far as men
follow a moderate and tolerant religion, Hume was rather pleased with
them, and he evidently shrank from the fanatical atheism avowed by
some of the more advanced followers of the system in France. If there
be a world to come, it will clear up itself when it comes; and, mean-
while, there are duties which we must perform, from a regard to our-
selves and our relation to others. There had hitherto been no science of
metaphysics; but there could be a science of ethics (and also of politics)
founded on the circumstance, that certain acts are found to be agreeable
and useful to ourselves and others.
It is in this way we are to reconcile certain seeming inconsistencies
in his character. He had no settled faith in any religion, yet he went to
church, at least at times; he wished his servant to go to church, and he
mingled in the counsels of the Church of Scotland. He never committed
himself to deism or atheism. He wrapped up his thoughts on these sub-
jects in his bosom, perhaps with some feeble hope that he might get
light; but the cloud seems only to have settled more deeply upon him.
When the pert Mrs. Mallet met him one night at an assembly, and boldly
accosted him, “Mr Hume, give me leave to introduce myself to you: we
deists ought to know each other,” “Madam,” replied he, “I am no deist:
I do not style myself so, neither do I desire to be known by that appella-
tion.” He did not avow himself an atheist in Paris. Sir Samuel Romilly
has detailed a characteristic anecdote told of him by Diderot. He dined
with a large company at the house of Baron D’Holbach. “As for athe-
ists,” said Hume, “I do not believe one exists: I have never seen one.”
“You have been a little unfortunate,” said the baron: “here you are with
seventeen of them at the table for the first time.” We may suppose there
was some sincerity in the statement he made: “I have surely endeavored
to refute the sceptic with all the force of which I am master, and my
refutation must be allowed to be sincere because drawn from the capital
principles of my system,” only he was not prepared to review his sys-
tem. In writing to Elliott, he says he wishes to make Cleanthes, the
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ports the incident, that one clear and beautiful night, when they were
walking home together, Hume suddenly stopped, looked up to the starry
sky, and said, “O Adam, can any one contemplate the wonders of that
firmament, and not believe there is a God! “Dr. Carlyle tells us, that
when his mother died he was found in deepest affliction and a flood of
tears, upon which Mr Boyle said to him that his uncommon grief arose
from his having thrown off the principles of religion; to which he re-
plied: “Though I throw out my speculations to entertain the learned and
metaphysical world, yet in other things I do not think so differently from
the rest of the world as you imagine.” In whatever way we may account
for it, there was evidently a consistency in the character of Hume which
made him respected by his worldly friends, who thought a man might be
good, though he had no godliness.
The all-important question is, How is this spirit to be corrected, this
error to be met?
First. It must be firmly maintained that an honest mind can sponta-
neously attain such truth, secular, moral, and religious, as is needful to
its peace and progress. This truth does not lie deep down in some pit,
which can be reached only by deep down, or whence it can be drawn
only by the cords of lengthened ratiocination; it lies on the surface, and
may be seen by immediate perception, or picked up by brief discursive
processes. By this spontaneous exercise of our faculties and common
observation, we reach the existence of God, the accountability of man,
and a day of judgment. By such an easy method we rise to a belief in the
Word of God, and in the spiritual verities there set forth. We should hold
that man reaches all this by as natural a procedure as that by which he
comes to know what path he should take in the common affairs of this
life. No doubt be will at times meet with difficulties, but this only as he
may be beset by perplexities in the affairs of this world; and in the one
case, as in the other, the sincere mind has commonly enough of light to
guide it.
Secondly. It should be held that he who undermines the fundamental
truth spontaneously discovered, is doing an injury to humanity. Scepti-
cism, as Hume delights to show, can produce no mischief in the com-
mon secular affairs of life, because there are circumstances which keep
men right in spite of their principles, or want of principles. But it is very
different in respect of those questions which fall to be discussed in higher
ethics and theology. A man will not be tempted by any sophistry to
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cup of water before him; in such a case he will put forth his hand and
take it, knowing that the beverage will refresh him. But he may be led by
a wretched sophistry to deny the necessary relation of cause and effect
when it would lead him upward from God’s works to God himself, or
induce him to seek peace in Him. Hence the importance of not allowing
fundamental truth to be assailed; not because the attack will have any
influence on the practical affairs of this life, but because it may hold
back and damp our higher aspirations, moral and religious. Hume hoped
that his scepticism might soften asperities, but he did not wish to think
that any bad influences could follow from it. On one occasion he was
told of a banker’s clerk in Edinburgh, of good reputation, who had eloped
with a sum of money; and the philosopher wondered greatly what could
induce such a man thus to incur, for an inconsiderable sum, such an
amount of guilt and infamy. “I can easily account for it,” said John
Home, “from the nature of his studies, and the kind of books he was in
the habit of reading.” “What were they,” said the philosopher. He was
greatly annoyed when told, Boston’s “Fourfold State,” and Hume’s “Es-
says.” Certainly the youth must have been in a perplexed state who had
been converted from a belief in the “Fourfold State” by Hume’s “Es-
says,” or who was hesitating between them. Thirdly. The philosopher
must undertake a more important work. He must inquire into the nature
of fundamental truth; he must endeavor to unfold the mental powers
that discover it, and to expound their mode of operation, and their laws.
He cannot indeed prove first truths by mediate evidence, for if they were
capable of probation they could not be first truths; but he can show that
they are first truths perceived by immediate cognition of the objects,
and in no need of external support. He must as far as possible clear tip
the difficulties and perplexities in which the discussions in regard to
them have become involved. In particular, he must show that while the
reflex consideration of the ultimate principles of knowledge often lands
us in difficulties, the principles them selves never lead us into positive
contradictions; and that, therefore, while we allow that the human fac-
ulties are limited, we cannot admit that they are deceptive. This is what
has been attempted by one philosopher after another since the days of
Hume.
In fact, all later philosophy springs directly or indirectly from the
thorough-going examination to which the Scotch sceptic had subjected
received truths. It has been the aim of the Scottish school, as modified
and developed by Reid, to throw back the scepticism of Hume. ReidThe Scottish Philosophy/147
tells us that he once believed the received doctrine of ideas so firmly as
to embrace the whole of Berkeley’s system along with it, till, on discov-
ering the consequences to which it had been driven by Hume, he was led
to review the whole theory and abandon it. Kant declares that he was
roused from his dogmatic slumbers by the assaults of the Scottish scep-
tic, and was thus impelled to the task of repelling the attack. It is scarcely
necessary to say that all other philosophies, deserving the name, which
have originated within the last hundred years, have ramified directly or
indirectly from the Scottish and the German schools; one school, the
French school of M. Cousin, seeking to combine the two.
It is interesting to observe the respective ways in which the Scottish
and the German metaphysician sought to meet the great sceptic. It is
evident that his assaults might be repelled at one or other of two places:
either where the foe has entered, or after he has made certain advances.
That the mind begins with impressions and goes on to ideas, which are
mere reproductions of impressions,—this is the fundamental principle
of Hume. Now this may be denied, I think should be denied. On what
ground, we ask, does he allow the existence of impressions and ideas?
When he answers, we can show him that on the same ground he must
admit more; that he must allow that the mind has convictions in regard
to its own existence, and the existence of external objects, and percep-
tions of moral goodness. But again, he may be met at the farther stages
of his progress. He asserts that the mind can reach no truth except such
as it gets from experience. It may be shown in opposition that it has an
original furniture in the shape of tendencies and laws which lead to and
guarantee necessary and eternal truth.
It is interesting to observe that Reid met him at both these points.
Reid made a very careful inquiry into the nature of the senses as inlets
of knowledge; and showed that accompanying the sensation there is
always an intuitive perception of an external world. He showed too,
though he did not make so much of it as he might, that consciousness is
a mental faculty and a source of knowledge. He farther met the sceptic
at the more advanced point, and proved that the mind has a primitive
reason or common-sense which decides at once that things are so and
so; that every effect, for instance, must have a cause. I am not of opin-
ion that Reid has thoroughly cleared up these subjects, that he has de-
tected all that is in the senses, that he has unfolded fully the laws of
intuition and its mode of operation; but he has established enough to
repel the assaults of the sceptic.148/James McCosh
Reid possessed many of the best qualities of his countrymen; in
particular, he was shrewd and independent: but he was not endowed
with great powers of logical analysis. On the other hand, Kant was
strong where Reid was weak; that is, in power of dissection and con-
struction: but was deficient where Reid excelled, in patient observation.
He neglected, as I think most unfortunately, to oppose the fundamental
principle of Hume. He allows that the mind begins with phenomena in
the sense of appearances, and these phenomena are just the impressions
of Hume. But if it be allowed that in the original inlet we have only
impressions or phenomena, it never can be satisfactorily shown how we
can reach reality by any composition or decomposition of these. Kant
exercised his vast powers in meeting Hume at the other point; that is, in
showing that there is an a priori furniture in the mind, independent of
all experience. But what he built with the one hand he took down with
the other. For these a priori forms could not, in his theory, guarantee
any objective reality. He accepts the conclusion of Hume, and allows
that the speculative reason could not guide to truth; he goes so far as to
maintain that it lands us in contradictions. This philosophy, intended to
overthrow the scepticism of Hume, has thus led to a scepticism which
has had a more extensive sway than that of the cold Scotchman ever
had. He endeavored to save himself from such an issue by calling in a
practical reason, which guaranteed as its corollaries the freedom and
immortality of the soul, and the Divine existence. But it was immedi-
ately asked how it could be shown that the practical reason does not
deceive, after it has been conceded that the speculative reason leads to
illusion? Thus the insecure mound, raised with such labor to stem the
flood, only aggravated the outburst and overflow as it gave way.
Sir W. Hamilton sought to unite Reid and Kant, but was never able
to weld thoroughly together the principles which he took from two such
different sources. His doctrines of the relativity of knowledge, and of
causation as a mere impotency of the mind, have prepared the way for a
doctrine of nescience now largely espoused. Some of his pupils have
betaken themselves to a sort of confused Berkeleyanism mingled with
Kantism, which will furnish an easy passage to the nescient theory in so
shrewd a nation as Scotland, and among so practical a people as the
English. Mr Mill, in his examination of Hamilton’s Philosophy, has
brought us to a Humism joined to Comtism. This is the dismal creed
provided for those who choose to follow the negative criticisms. of the
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a new Thomas Reid, not to do over again the work which the common-
sense philosopher did, but a corresponding service in this age to what he
did in his time.
XX. Books Advertised in “Scot’s Magazine.”
The “Scot’s Magazine” begins in 1739. The works mentioned and the
topics discussed will give us a better idea of the times, than any thing
else that can be produced. In January is advertised “A Treatise of Hu-
man Nature,” the work that revolutionized all modern philosophy. For
years, we have papers about Whitefield, who revolutionized religion in
England, and had a mighty influence in Scotland and America. The
magazine has a series of papers, lasting for years, under the head of
“Common Sense.” In March, there is an advertisement of a “Second
Volume of Common Sense Letters collected,” showing that we have no
need to go to remote quarters to find the source from which Reid and the
Aberdeen school got the phrase, “common sense,” which had been in
constant use since the time of Shaftesbury (p. 31). It is curious to notice
that, in January, comedians are prosecuted before the Court of Session,
and, in February, are found guilty, and “decerned for the penalties in the
late Act against strollers.” In March, there is an advertisement, “A View
of the Necessitarian or Best Scheme, freed from the Objections of M.
Crouzaz in his Examinations of Pope’s ‘Essay on Man.”’ In June, “The
Necessity of Revelation,” by Archibald Campbell, pp. 45, 3d. in sheets,
showing that revelation needed to be defended. In October, an attack on
Campbell’s book, and, in December, a reply by Campbell. In October,
“A Treatise of Ancient Painting,” by Dr. Turnbull, £4 4s. in sheets. In
February, 1740, “The Principles of Moral Philosophy;” in December,
“A Methodical System of Universal Law; “and, in May,—A Curious
Collection of fifty Ancient Paintings,” £1 8s., all by Turnbull, showing
that there was a taste in the country for ethical and aesthetic discus-
sions,—the failure of Turnbull’s works proving that it was not to be
gratified by the excellent commonplace of that author. In 1740, Simson,
whose views in regard to the Trinity raised such discussion, passes away
from this world, after having lived in retirement since his suspension in
1728. In May, we have “The Principles and Connection of Natural and
Revealed Religion,” by A. Ashley Sykes; and “The Divine Authority of
the Old and New Testament asserted,” by J. Leland, D.D., 25s.; and, in
July, “Discourses concerning the Being and Natural Perfections of God,”
by J. Abernethy, M. A., 5s 6d; all showing that there were men ready to150/James McCosh
defend natural and revealed religion on sound, sensible principles. That
deism is alive, appears from May, when “Physico, Theologico,
Philosophico, Moral Disquisition concerning Human Nature, Free
Agency, Moral Government, and Divine Providence,” by T. Morgan,
M.D., 5s. 6d., appears. In June, “Remarks on the Inquiry into the Na-
ture of the Human Soul,” 1s. In December, among preferments, Adam
Smith, Comptroller of the Customs at Kirkcaldy, Inspector-General of
the Customs; showing that a competent man was being prepared to dis-
cuss political economy. In April, 1741, “The Temper, Character, and
Duty of a Minister of the Gospel,” a sermon by William Leechman, M.
A., 6d.; indicating the introduction of Moderatism into the Church of
Scotland in its most plausible form, denying no orthodox doctrine, and
yet recommend, in graceful language, only the truths of natural religion,
and the common moralities of life,—an evidence that the attacks of de-
istical writers had made many ashamed of the deeper doctrines of Scrip-
ture. In January, 1744, there is an abstract of the associate presbytery
for renewing the Covenants, dated at Stirling, Dec. 23, 1743, “com-
plaining of several immoralities, and the repealing of the penal statutes
against witches. The penal statutes against witches have been repealed
by the parliament, contrary to the express law of God: by which a holy
God may be provoked in a way of righteous judgment, to leave those
who are already ensnared to be hardened more and more, and to permit
Satan to tempt and seduce others to the same wicked and dangerous
snares.” The above list shows clearly an age of great intellectual activ-
ity, a strong tendency to philosophical discussion among Scotchmen, a
vigorous attack on Christianity, a respectable defence of it and of natu-
ral religion, a revival of evangelical religion under Whitefield, and a
strong love of it on the part of the common people, along with the ap-
pearance of intemperance and strolling players. It was in the midst of
this ferment that Hume’s work appeared, to shake all that was thought
to be established in philosophy and in natural religion.
XXI. Adam Smith42
His is perhaps the most illustrious name appearing in these sketches.
But he has a higher reputation in political economy than in metaphysics,
in which latter department he comes before us as the author of a theory
of moral sentiments, and of very interesting fragmentary histories of
certain departments of philosophy.
He was born June 5, 1723, in the “lang toun” of Kirkcaldy, whichThe Scottish Philosophy/151
lies on the opposite side of the Frith of Forth from Edinburgh. His father
was comptroller of the customs there and his mother, a benignant Chris-
tian lady, watched over his sickly childhood with tenderness, which he
repaid her by a corresponding kindness for the long period of sixty years,
for the greater part of which the two lived together. When about three
years old he was stolen by a party of tinkers, who took him to the woods,
but was fortunately rescued. We should have liked to hear him, in his
later years, speculating as to what might have been his place in the
gypsy camp had he been brought up among them. We can conceive that,
while fashioning spoons out of horns and mending tin dishes, his com-
prehensive head would have been spinning a theory of the organization
of the tribe. But it would have been beyond the capacity even of the
explorer of the nature and causes of national wealth to determine what
he himself or any other might have become if trained in such different
circumstances. He seems to have received an excellent education in his
native place, at a school which reared a number of eminent men. Unable
from his weak bodily constitution to join in active amusements, he gave
himself to reading, and, even at that early age, was noted for speaking to
himself when alone, and falling into absent fits in company. At the pre-
mature age of fourteen, he went to the University of Glasgow, where his
favorite studies seem to have been mathematics and natural philosophy.
But before he left he attended the lectures of Hutcheson, whom he greatly
admired, and who, no doubt, helped to direct him to philosophic pur-
suits. From Glasgow he went, on a salary provided by the Snell Foun-
dation, to Baliol College, Oxford, where he resided for seven years, and
seems to have given himself specially to the studies of polite literature.
“He employed himself frequently in the practice of translation (particu-
larly from the French), with a view to the improvement of his own style.”
Every one knows that the French authors were the models to which the
greater part of the Scottish writers looked at that time. Hume and Smith
entertained a feeling of admiration for French prose and poetry, but had
no appreciation (as Adam Ferguson remarked) of Shakespeare or Milton.
His original destination had been to the Church of England, but he
did not find the profession to suit him. When at Oxford, the heads of the
college found him reading Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature,” and they
seized the work, and reprimanded the youth. (“Life,” by M’Culloch.)
On leaving Oxford he spent two years at Kirkcaldy, uncertain as to
what he might do. In 1748 he removed to Edinburgh, where he delivered
lectures on rhetoric and belles-lettres; the commencement, I believe, of152/James McCosh
that instruction in polite literature and English composition which has
ever since been a distinguishing feature of the collegiate education in
Scotland. In 1748 he was elected professor of logic, and in 1752 profes-
sor of moral philosophy, in the University of Glasgow. In the former,
after an exposition, apparently brief (as we might expect from the spirit
of the times), of the ancient logic, he devoted the rest of his time to
rhetoric and belles-lettres. In the latter he divided his course into four
parts: (1) Natural theology; (2) Ethics, unfolding the views he after-
wards published in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments; “(3) Justice, that
part of morality which can be expressed in precise rules; (4) Political
science in which he delivered the thoughts and observations which were
afterwards embodied in his great work, “The Wealth of Nations.” In the
later years of his Glasgow life, he expanded this last part more and
more. An eminent pupil, Dr. Millar, afterwards professor of law in the
university, describes him as a lecturer. “In delivering his lectures, he
trusted almost entirely to extemporary elocution. His manner, though
not graceful, was plain and unaffected; and, as he seemed to be always
interested in the subject, he never failed to interest his hearers. Each
discourse consisted commonly of several distinct propositions, which
he successively endeavored to prove and illustrate. These propositions,
when announced in general terms, had, from their extent, not unfrequently
something of the air of a paradox. In his attempts to explain them, he
often appeared at first not to be sufficiently possessed of the subject,
and spoke with some hesitation. As he advanced, however, the matter
seemed to crowd upon him: his manner became warm and animated,
and his expression easy and fluent. In points susceptible of controversy,
you could easily discover that he secretly conceived an opposition to his
opinions, and that he was led upon this account to support them with
greater energy and vehemence. By the fulness and variety of his illustra-
tions, the subject gradually swelled in his hands, and acquired a dimen-
sion which, without a tedious repetition of the same views, was calcu-
lated to seize the attention of his audience, and to afford them pleasure,
as well as instruction, in following the same object through all the diver-
sity of shades and aspects in which it was presented, and afterwards in
tracing it backwards to that original proposition or general truth from
which this beautiful train of speculation had proceeded.”
The thirteen years he spent in this office, he looked back upon as the
happiest in his life. He published, in 1759, his “Theory of Moral Senti-
ments,” to which was appended an article on Johnson’s Dictionary forThe Scottish Philosophy/153
the then “Edinburgh Review.” While in Glasgow he collected a large
body of the observations and facts which he afterwards embodied in his
immortal work. He was stimulated and aided in these studies by his
attending a weekly club founded by Provost Cochran, a Glasgow mer-
chant, who furnished him with much valuable information on mercan-
tile subjects.
In 1763 he gave up his chair in Glasgow, and, at the invitation of
Mr Charles Townsend, became travelling tutor to the young Duke of
Buccleuch. One wonders, in these times, at so intellectual a man aban-
doning the influential position he held in Glasgow to become the teacher
of a single youth, however eminent in station. But it was undoubtedly a
great advantage to Smith that he was thus enabled to see more of man-
kind and of the world, and was brought into immediate contact with
eminent men of kindred tastes and pursuits in France. Proceeding to
France in the spring of 1764, he and his pupil spent eighteen months at
Toulouse, and lived on terms of intimacy with some of the principal
members of their parliament, and is supposed to have gathered there
further materials for his great projected work. On leaving this place, he
took an extensive tour in the south of France; spent two months at Geneva;
and then went to Paris, and, having recommendations from Hume, he
enjoyed the society of such men as Turgot, Quesnay, Morellet, Necker,
D’Alembert, Helvetius, Marmontel, and Madame Riccoboni. He is sup-
posed to have derived special benefit from his intercourse with Turgot
and Quesnay, who were engaged in political studies similar to his own.
In October, to Great Britain, and spent the 1766, he returned next ten
years with the mother whom he so much loved, in Kirkcaldy. There are
traditions of David Hume visiting him there from time to time, and of
their holding earnest conversations on questions of political economy,
and, it is supposed, of religion, as they walked on the sands of the Frith
of Forth. From this retreat issued, in 1776, his “Inquiry into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,”—the work which made political
economy a science.
In 1778 he was appointed, at the request of the Duke of Buccleuch,
one of the commissioners of his majesty’s customs in Scotland, and
removed to Edinburgh, taking his mother with him: it is scarcely neces-
sary to mention that he continued all his life a bachelor. Here he spent
the last twelve years of his life. Henceforth he became an object of
curiosity to all people of literary culture; and his person was scruti-
nized, as he walked the streets, by the curious, and his peculiar habits154/James McCosh
reported. Many a youth, studying in Edinburgh, was proud to relate in
after years that he had seen him,—a fine gentleman of the old school, a
little above the ordinary size, with a manly countenance lighted by large
gray eyes, wearing a cap, a long, wide great-coat, breeches, and
shoebuckles; and they remarked that, when “he walked, his head had a
gentle motion from side to side, and his body, at every step, a rolling or
vermicular motion, as if he meant to alter his direction, or even turn
back. In the street, or elsewhere, he always carried his cane on his shoul-
der, as a soldier does his musket.” (“Lives,” by Smellie.) Dr. Carlyle
gives a graphic picture of his manner in company. “Adam Smith was far
superior to Hume in conversational talents. In that of public speaking
they were equal. David never tried it; and I never heard Adam but once,
which was at the first meeting of the Select Society, when he opened up
the design of the meeting. His voice was harsh, and enunciation thick,
approaching to stammering. His conversation was not colloquial, but
like lecturing, in which, I have been told, he was not deficient, espe-
cially when he grew warm. He was the most absent man in company
that I ever saw; moving his lips, and talking with himself, and smiling,
in the midst of large companies. If you awaked him from his reverie and
made him attend to the subject of conversation, he immediately began to
harangue, and never stopped till he told you all he knew about it, with
the utmost philosophical ingenuity. He knew nothing of characters, and
yet was ready to draw them on the slightest invitation. But when you
checked him, or doubted, he retracted with the utmost ease, and contra-
dicted all he had been saying.” Carlyle tells us that “David Hume, like
Smith, had no discernment at all of character.”
Dugald Stewart mentions it as an interesting circumstance that all
Hume’s works were written with his own hands, whereas Smith dictated
to a secretary as he walked up and down his apartment, and hints that
we may perceive, in the different styles of these two classical writers,
the effects of these different modes of study: as he wrote with his own
pen, Hume, gave a greater terseness and compactness to his style, whereas
Smith, in dictating to an amanuensis, kept himself more in sympathy
with his reader, and was more disposed, like a speaker, to flow and
fluency. It may have been from the same circumstance that Hume wrote
with great rapidity, whereas Smith composed as slowly, and with as
great difficulty, at last as at first.
In Edinburgh, his studies were much interrupted by his official du-
ties, and often—as he mentions in a letter written on his being elected byThe Scottish Philosophy/155
the students lord rector of his old University—did he cast a longing eye
back upon the academic leisure he enjoyed in Glasgow. Like most men
of high aims, he regretted, when he saw death approaching, that he had
done so little. “I meant to have done more, and there are materials in my
papers of which I could have made a great deal. But that is now out of
the question.” Shortly before his death, he gave orders to destroy all his
manuscripts, which were supposed to contain his lectures on rhetoric,
on natural religion, and on jurisprudence. He died in July, 1790.
Let us turn to his philosophy. His mind was essentially a reflecting
one, a self-revolving one. He was always thinking, and talking to him-
self, gathering facts, forming theories, and seeking out events to con-
firm them; thus building up a system which was always ingenious, some-
times too ingenious, but ever worthy of being weighed. His “Theory of
Moral Sentiments” has commonly been a favorite with students, be-
cause of the eloquence of its language, modelled after the best philo-
sophic writers of ancient Rome and modern France, and of the fertility
of his resources in confirming his positions from his varied observation
and reading. But his theory has gained the assent of few, and has often
been prescribed by professors as a subject on which to exercise the
critical acumen of their pupils. Adam Smith is always a discursive writer,
and in the work now before us he wanders like a river amidst luxuriant
banks, and it is not easy to define his course. Dugald Stewart in his
“Memoir” has given the clearest account of it I have seen; and I mean to
make free use of what he has written, in the shorter abstract which I
submit.
According to the common moral theories, men first judge of their
own actions, and then those of their neighbors. Smith reverses this, and
maintains that the primary objects of our moral perceptions are the ac-
tions of other men. We put ourselves in their position, and partake with
them in their affections by what he calls sympathy or fellow-feeling,
which is the grand principle of his system. We thus judge of their con-
duct, and then apply to ourselves the decisions which we have passed on
our neighbors, and which we may conceive they would pronounce on
us. Our moral judgments, both with respect to others and ourselves,
include two perceptions: first, of conduct as right or wrong; and, sec-
ondly, of the merit or demerit of the agent. When the spectator of an-
other man’s situation, upon bringing home to himself all its various
circumstances, feels himself affected in the same manner with the per-
son principally concerned, he approves of the affection or passion of156/James McCosh
this person as just, proper, and suitable to its object. We judge of the
propriety of the affection of another only by its coincidence with that
which we feel when we put ourselves in the same circumstances, and the
perception of this coincidence is the foundation of the perception of
moral obligation. Now this is a very circuitous way of gendering our
moral ideas and judgments. Whether we look to ourselves or others, the
mind pronounces a judgment upon the act,—say a deed of benevolence
or cruelty,—and must do so according to some law which is the true
basis of morality. We are more likely to pronounce first upon ourselves.
But it may be acknowledged that it does help us in forming a correct
judgment, to put ourselves in the position of others, and inquire how
they would view us; and hence the important rule: “Whatsoever ye would
that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them.” This is the
element of truth in Smith’s theory. In illustrating his views, he is par-
ticularly happy in showing how circumstances affect our moral judg-
ments; that, for example, when there is no envy in the case, our sympa-
thy with joy is much stronger than our sympathy with sorrow, and that
in consequence it is more easy to obtain the approbation of mankind in
prosperity than in adversity. From the same principle he traces the ori-
gin of ambition, or of the desire of rank and pre-eminence the great
object of which passion is to attain that situation which sets a man most
in view of general sympathy and attention, and gives an easy empire
over the affections of others.
Having thus shown how we come to a sense of propriety (as he calls
moral excellence), he proceeds to analyze our sense of merit and de-
merit, which have always a respect to the effect which the affection
tends to produce. The only actions which appear to us deserving of
reward are actions of a beneficial tendency, proceeding from proper
motives, with which we can sympathize; the only actions which seem to
us to deserve punishment are actions of a hurtful tendency, proceeding
from improper motives. He accounts for our sense of justice by the
circumstance that, if I wish to secure the sympathy and approbation of
my fellow-men,—represented by Smith as the strongest desire of our
natures,—it is necessary for me to regard my happiness not in that light
in which it appears to myself, but that in which it appears to mankind in
general, as if in all justice there was not an inflexible rule for judging of
the conduct both of ourselves and others.
He then shows how our sense of duty comes to be formed in conse-
quence of an application to ourselves of the judgments we have previ-The Scottish Philosophy/157
ously passed on others. In doing this we lay down rules of morality
which become universally applicable. He allows to Hume that every
thing approved of by the mind is useful and agreeable; but he insists that
it is not the view of this utility which is either the first or principal
source of moral approbation.
Most people have felt that this theory is too artificial,—is too inge-
nious to be true. It contains some elements of truth, but they are not put
in their proper place; and the fabric is left without a sure foundation,—
virtue has no other foundation than the sympathy and approbation of
men. The beauty of the building lies not in the structure as a whole, but
in portions, often subordinate portions of it. His illustrations are abun-
dant, and always felicitous; and many of them show a very nice and
delicate perception of the peculiarities of human nature. We see this
very specially in his chapter “Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion
upon our Notions of Beauty and Deformity,”—perhaps the most valu-
able part of his work, as being that in which he sketches the various
moral systems, such as those of the Stoics and Epicureans. Here he
shows erudition, and enters thoroughly into the spirit of the authors and
their times. The work will continue to be read for its style and these
adjuncts, by persons who set no value on the theory which be expounds.
Smith intended to write a connected history of the liberal sciences
and elegant arts, but found the plan far too extensive. He has left us only
a few fragments, which were published posthumously by Joseph Black
and James Hutton. In these be discusses, always ingeniously, such top-
ics as the nature of the imitation which takes place in what are called the
imitative arts; the affinity between music, dancing, and poetry; the af-
finity between English and Italian verses. But the most valuable of these
papers, are three on the principles which lead and direct philosophical
inquiries, Illustrated by the history of astronomy, of ancient physics, of
ancient logic and metaphysics, and one on the external senses.
The three philosophico-historical essays exhibit all the peculiarities
of his mind: they are theoretical, they inquire into causes, and display an
enlarged acquaintance with the sciences. He begins with showing that
wonder called forth by the new and singular, surprise excited by what is
unexpected, and admiration raised by what is great and beautiful, these—
and not any expectation of advantage, or the love of truth for its own
sake—are the principles which prompt mankind to try to discover the
concealed connections that unite the various appearances of nature, which
give rise to the study of philosophy, which is defined as the science of158/James McCosh
the connecting principles of nature. “Nature, after the largest expendi-
ture that common observation can acquire, seems to abound with events
which appear solitary and incoherent with all that go before them, which
therefore disturb the easy movement of the imagination; and philosophy
aims at discovering the invisible chains which bind together all the dis-
jointed objects. Hence, in astronomy, the invention of eccentric spheres,
of epicycles, and of the revolution of the centres of the eccentric spheres;
in physics, the four elements; and in metaphysics and logic, species,
essence, and ideas,—all these give the imagination something to rest
on.” These motives have no doubt helped to create a taste for science,
and often given it a particular direction; but many other causes have
been in operation. It appears to me that, had Smith been able to devote
as much time to a history of philosophy as he did to the “Wealth of
Nations,” and been in circumstances to review his theories from time to
time, he might have written a better work than any produced in that
century. No doubt he would at times have added a thought of his own to
the account given of a philosophic opinion; but, following out his favor-
ite principle of sympathy, he would always have put himself en rapport
with the authors and their times.
His paper “Of the External Senses” is characterized by much sound
sense and a profound study of the subject. He goes over the senses one
by one. He has a glimpse of the important distinction—afterwards care-
fully elaborated by Sir William Hamilton, and Müller the physiologist—
between the perception of the organ and of objects beyond the body.
Tasting, smelling, hearing, and certain sensations of touch, are alto-
gether in the organ, and nowhere else but in the organ. But in regard to
touching, “the thing which presses and resists I feel as something alto-
gether different from these affections, as external to my hand, and as
altogether independent of it.” He represents the objects of touch as so-
lidity, and those modifications of solidity which we consider as essential
to it and inseparable from it,—solid extension, figure, divisibility, and
mobility.” He defines the impenetrability of matter as “the absolute im-
possibility that two solid, resisting substances should occupy the same
place at the same time.” He expounds a doctrine in regard to the so-
called secondary qualities of matter or, to speak more properly, these
four classes, of sensations heat and cold, taste, smell, and sound being
felt not as resisting or pressing on the organ, but as in the organ.” He
says that they “are not naturally perceived as external and independent
substances, but as mere affections of the organ, and what can exist no-The Scottish Philosophy/159
where but in the organ.” This is perhaps a more philosophical account
than that given by Locke, Reid, or Hamilton, who proceed on the dis-
tinction drawn between the primary and secondary qualities of matter.
In regard to sight, he says the objects of it are color, and those modifica-
tions of color which in the same manner we consider as essential to it
and inseparable from it,—colored extension, figure, divisibility, and
mobility.” The tangible world has three dimensions,—length, breadth,
and depth; the visible world, only two,—length and breadth. He recog-
nizes Berkeley’s theory of vision as “one of the finest examples of philo-
sophical analysis that is to be found either in our own or in any other
language;” and he quotes the Chiselden case. He notices the fact that,
antecedent to all experience, the young of at least the greater part of
animals possess some instinctive perception of distance. “The young
partridge, almost as soon as it comes from the shell, runs about among
the long grass and corn.” He is inclined to think that the young of the
human race may have some instinctive perception of the same kind,
which does not come forth or manifest itself so strongly as in the lower
animals, because mankind have greater aids from intelligence and edu-
cation. He thinks that other senses, “antecedently to all observation and
experience, may obscurely suggest a vague notion of some external thing
which excites it. The smell not only excites the appetite, but directs to
the object which can alone gratify that appetite. But, by suggesting the
direction towards that object, the smell must necessarily give some no-
tion of distance and externality, which are necessarily involved in the
idea of direction.” These hints are worthy of being carried out: they will
certainly not be despised by those who in our day are studying heredi-
tary instinct.
It does not consist with our purpose to give an account of his labors
in political economy. I may remark, however, that in his work, and in
every other, there is an omitted chapter, which will require to be written
by some one before the science is completed. In speaking of soil, labor,
money, rent, and other external agents, there is no searching estimate of
the internal motives which impel men to the acquisition and distribution
of wealth. Some writers, such as James Mill, represent all men as swayed
only by self-love; others dwell fondly on such principles as a taste for
literature or the fine arts: but there has been no discriminating computa-
tion of the springs of action, general and special, which lead men to
make acquisitions, and which have produced different results in differ-
ent ages and nations; for instance, to one form of civilization in Italy or160/James McCosh
in France, to others in Germany or in Scotland. Smith might have been
tempted to set too high a value on certain influences which were favor-
ites with him, but he was eminently fitted to begin the undertaking; and
had he done so, he would have left us admirable illustrations of the
power of motives actually swaying mankind.
XXII. Henry Home (Lord Kames)44
He was the son of George Home, of Kames, a country gentleman of
small fortune, in Berwickshire, married to a granddaughter of Principal
Baillie. He was born in 1696, and was educated at home, under a pri-
vate tutor. It was in after life that he devoted himself to the study of
Greek and Latin, to which be added mathematics, natural philosophy,
logic, ethics, and metaphysics. He was never at any university. He showed
an early taste for philosophical speculation. It seems that he came in
contact with Andrew Baxter, who was tutor to a son of Mr Hay, of
Drumelzier, and lived at that time at Dunse Castle, within a few miles of
Kames, and the two had a correspondence; Home arguing that motion
was not a single effect, but a continued succession of effects, each re-
quiring a new or a successive repetition of the cause to produce it. Like
so many others in the same age, he had a thrust at Clarke’s “Demonstra-
tion of the Existence of God,” and wrote, in 1723, a letter to the doctor.
Already he is drawing up arguments against liberty of will. Having cho-
sen the law as his profession, he was called to the bar 1723–24. As a
pleader he began with a very short and distinct statement of the facts f
the cause and a plain enunciation of the question of law thence arising,
abandoning all the weaker points of the case. He excelled more in mak-
ing an opening statement than in reply. We have a picture of his habits.
He rose at five or six, and spent his morning in preparation for the
business of the court. In the forenoon he was at the Court of Session,
which, at that time, rose soon after mid-day. He did not go much out to
dinner, as he needed all his time for business and study. In the evening,
if he had leisure, he joined the ladies in the drawing-room, or took part
in a game of cards, or might be seen at the concert or the assembly
room. “The evening was generally closed by a small domestic party,
where a few of his intimate friends assembled, for the most part without
invitation; found a plain but elegant little supper, and where, enlivened
often by some of Mrs. Home’s female acquaintance, the hours were
passed in the most rational enjoyment of sensible and spirited conversa-
tion, and easy social mirth, till after midnight.”The Scottish Philosophy/161
Throughout his life he published various works on law and juris-
prudence; beginning, in 1728, with a folio volume of “Remarkable Deci-
sions of the Court of Session” from 1716 down to that period. In 1752
he was appointed a judge of the Court of Session, by the title of Lord
Kames.
But his tastes ever led him towards metaphysical speculation. From
1727 he had been acquainted with David Hume, and he carefully stud-
ied his writings as they were published. It seems he had dissuaded the
sceptic from publishing his “Philosophical Essays,” and he felt himself
called to oppose what he believed to be the extreme views there pro-
pounded. This gave rise, in 1751, to a work which produced a great
noise in his own day, “Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural
Religion.” It was published under the name of “Sopho.” He shows that
man is influenced by a great number and variety of principles, such as
self-love, benevolence, sympathy, and utility, consonance to the divine
will; and that his actions are most frequently the combined result of the
opposite springs, tempering and restraining each other’s powers. He
shows that man has, as a separate principle, in his nature and constitu-
tion, a moral feeling or conscience, the function of which is to judge
with unerring rectitude of all his motives to action, and direct his con-
duct to one great and beautiful end,—the utmost happiness of his na-
ture. In expounding these views, he examines Hume’s theory, and shows
that it annihilates all real distinction between right and wrong in human
actions, and makes our preference of one or other depend on the fluctu-
ating opinions of men in respect to the general good. In particular, he
opposes Hume’s view of justice, and shows that the idea of property is
coeval with society, and that its violation is universally attended with a
feeling of a breach of duty, which is the sentiment of justice. He sets
himself specially to oppose Hume’s attempt to undermine the arguments
in behalf of the Divine Existence.
In developing his moral and esthetic views, in this and in other works,
he enunciates his metaphysical principles. He maintains that man can
acquire intuitive knowledge from a single act of perception. “It is an
undoubted truth that man has an original feeling or consciousness of
himself and of his existence.” He maintains (“History of Man,”) that
there is a sense by which we perceive the truth of many propositions:
such as that every thing which begins to exist must have a cause; that
every effect adapted to some end or purpose proceeds from a designing
cause; and that every effect adapted to a good end or purpose proceeds162/James McCosh
from a designing and benevolent cause. A multitude of axioms in every
science, particularly in mathematics, are equally perceived to be true.
By a peculiar sense we know that there is a Deity. From all this it is
evident that he stood up for intuitive principles.
There must surely be truth in the account he gives of power; so
different from that of Locke on the one hand, and that of the high a
priori philosophers on the other. “Every action we perceive gives a no-
tion of power; for a productive cause is implied in every action or event,
and the very idea of a cause comprehends the power of producing its
effects. Let us only reflect on the perception we have when we see a
stone thrown into the air out of one’s hand.” “As I discover power in
external objects by the eye, so I discover power in my mind by an inter-
nal sense.” “This feeling is involved in the very perception of the action,
without taking in either reason or experience.” “We cannot discover
power in any object as we discover the object itself, merely by intuition;
but the moment an alteration is produced by any object, we perceive
that the object has a power to produce that alteration, which leads us to
denominate the one a cause and the other an effect.” It is generally ac-
knowledged that we know objects within and without us only by their
properties; but what are properties but powers, which must thus be known
intuitively with the objects that possess them.
But the doctrine which startled the public was that of philosophical
necessity, as expounded and defended by him. It is a circumstance wor-
thy of being noted that this doctrine was upheld by three men, who arose
about the same period and in much the same district of country,—David
Dudgeon, David Hume, and Henry Home; it looks as if it were the re-
siduum left by the doctrine of predestination, when the flowing waters
of the stream have been dried up by an and period. “With respect to
instinctive actions, no person, I presume, thinks that there is any free-
dom; an infant applies to the nipple, and a bird builds a nest, no less
necessarily than a stone falls to the ground. With respect to voluntary
actions done in order to produce some effect, the necessity is the same,
though less apparent at first view. The external action is determined by
the will; the will is determined by desire , and desire, by what is agree-
able or disagreeable. Here is a chain of causes and effects, not one link
of which is arbitrary, or under command of the agent. He cannot will
but according to his desire; he cannot desire but according to what is
agreeable or disagreeable in the objects perceived. Nor do these quali-
ties depend on the inclination or fancy: he has no power to make a beau-The Scottish Philosophy/163
tiful woman appear ugly, nor to make a rotten carcase smell sweetly.”
“Thus, with regard to human conduct, there is a chain of laws estab-
lished by nature, no one link of which is left arbitrary. By that wise
system man is made accountable; by it he is made a fit subject for divine
and human government; by it persons of sagacity foresee the conduct of
others; and by it the presence of the Deity with respect to human actions
is clearly established.” He founds the responsibility of man upon this
very doctrine. “The final cause of this branch of our nature is admi-
rable. If the necessary influence of motives had the effect either to lessen
the merit of a virtuous action, or the demerit of a crime, morality would
be totally unhinged.” In regard to liberty, man acts with the conviction
of his being a free agent, and is quite as much accountable as if he were
truly free. The answer to all this is, that man has an intuition in regard to
his possessing freedom quite as deep and ineradicable as his intuition
about cause and effect. If we attend to the latter of these, and adhere to
it, as Home does, we should equally hold by the other.
The friends of religion, unenlightened and enlightened, felt at once
that there was something here repugnant to all that they had been led to
believe about God and man; and Henry Home came to be put in the
same class with David Hume, to whom he was in many respects op-
posed. In 1753, there appeared “An Estimate of the Profit and Loss of
Religion, illustrated with References to Essays on Morality and Natural
Religion.” The author was Rev. George Anderson, who had been an
army officer, and was now chaplain to Watson’s Hospital in Edinburgh,
and who wrote some tracts against the stage, and a “Remonstrance against
Bolingbroke’s Philosophical Religion.” He is described, by Home’s bi-
ographer, as “a man of a bold spirit and irascible temperament, and
considerable learning.” This gave rise to other pamphlets, as “A Letter
to the Author of a late Book entitled an ‘Estimate of the Profit and Loss
of Religion.”’ Anderson sets him self in opposition to those who say
that Christianity is not founded on argument, and to Sopho, Hume, and
Hutcheson. “Feelings being so uncertain and variable, it is most ridicu-
lous to found upon them a law so important and extensive as is the law
of nature.” He prefers the ground taken by Clarke and Cumberland. As
to the scheme of necessity, it is no other than that of Collins. “That
Sopho’s (Home’s) principles serve the cause of atheism will be plain
enough to any who duly consider the consequences of his scheme of
necessity, which excludes a providence and binds up the Almighty in the
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1755 “An Analysis of the Moral and Religious Sentiments contained in
the Writings of Sopho and David Hume, Esq., addressed to the Consid-
eration of the Reverend and Honorable Members of the General Assem-
bly.45 The author denounces Home as maintaining that man is a mere
machine, under an irresistible necessity in all his actions, and yet, “though
man be thus necessarily determined in all his actions, yet does he believe
himself free, God having planted in his nature this deceitful feeling of
liberty,” this deceitful feeling being the only foundation of virtue. He
argues that from this doctrine it follows, as a necessary consequence,
that there can be no sin or moral evil in the world.47 As to Hume, he is
charged with making all distinction betwixt virtue and vice as merely
imaginary: “Adultery is very lawful, but sometimes not expedient.” This
letter was met by a pamphlet, “Observations on the Analysis,” gener-
ally attributed to Blair, “who is believed likewise to have lent his aid to
the composition of a formal reply made by Mr Home himself, under the
title of “Objections against the ‘Essays on Morality and Natural Reli-
gion’ examined, 1756.”
In all this we have an able and legitimate discussion. But the oppo-
nents of the rising scepticism resorted to other and more doubtful steps.
Henry Home, it is presumed, was a member of the Church of Scotland,
and it would have been quite within the province of that church to sum-
mon him before it, and inquire into the opinions which he was believed
to be propagating. Over David Hume, it is clear that the church had no
jurisdiction. But the Church of Scotland claimed to be the guardian of
religion in the country, and to have an authority to prevent the circula-
tion of error. So a motion was made in the committee of overtures of the
General Assembly that the body should take into their consideration
how far it was proper to call before them and censure the authors of
infidel books. “There is one person, styling himself David Hume, Esq.,
hath arrived at such a degree of boldness as publicly to avow himself
the author of books containing the most rude and open attacks on the
glorious gospel of Christ, and principles evidently subversive even of
natural religion and the foundations of morality, if not establishing di-
rect atheism: therefore, the Assembly appoint the following persons as a
committee to inquire into the writings of this author. to call him before
them, and prepare the matter for the next General Assembly.” “I here
was a keen debate in the committee for two days.” It was moved in
opposition, “that although all the members have a just abhorrence of
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gion; yet, on account of certain circumstances in this case, they drop the
overture, because it would not, in their judgment, serve the purpose of
edification.” The question being put, “transmit the overture to the As-
sembly or not,” it passed in the negative by a majority of fifty to seven-
teen votes. After this, Mr Anderson gave in a petition and complaint to
the Presbytery of Edinburgh against the printer and publisher of the
“Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion,” requiring
that the presbytery should summon them to appear before them and
declare the name of the author of that work, that he might be censured
according to the law of the gospel and the practice of this and all other
well-governed churches.” The defenders appeared by counsel. Mean-
while Mr Anderson was summoned away by death from the scene. The
case, however, goes on to a decision on the merits, and the complaint is
rejected. These incidents give us a more vivid picture of the times than
any generalized statements. It is evidently the good function of the ris-
ing Moderate party in the church to restrain the intemperate zeal of
those who would lay restraint on liberty of thought and writing, who
would claim for the church a power not committed to it, and meet error
with other weapons than argument.
Meanwhile there are able thinkers preparing to meet the scepticism
both of Hume and Home, by well-established philosophic principles.
We shall see that Reid and James Gregory, in particular, came forth to
defend the doctrine of the freedom of the will. A curious cross-fight was
produced at this stage by the introduction into Scotland of Edwards’
“Treatise on the Will.” In the pamphlet published in defence of Home, it
is urged that, “among the list of subscribers to Edwards’ book are many
members of this church; and it was dispersed last year in this city by the
most zealous friends to religion and true Calvinism.” It is clear that
Home and his friends wished to shelter themselves under the Calvinism
of the Church of Scotland; and the pamphlet quotes Calvin, Turretin,
and Pictet. It might have been urged in reply that Calvin stands up for
an essential freedom of the will, possessed by all responsible beings;
and that the reformers generally, in holding by a slavery of the will,
meant a slavery produced by the fall of man and by sin. As to Edwards’
doctrine, it is a metaphysical one not before the mind of the reformers;
and it is so explained and illustrated by the author as to make it have a
very different aspect and practical tendency from that propounded by
the Scottish necessarians.
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greatest sensation. It was followed by other philosophical works. In
1761, he published his “Introduction to the Art of Thinking,” in which
shrewd metaphysics and practical remarks are grafted on the old logic.
For several years be had meditated an extensive work on the principles
of criticism, which would inquire into the causes of that pleasure which
is derived from the production of poetry, painting, sculpture, music, and
architecture. The work appeared in 1762, under the title of “Elements of
Criticism.” It is gracefully written: it treats of all the subjects usually
discussed in books of rhetoric, and shows an extensive reading in the
great classical writers of ancient and modern times. He professes to
found the whole upon a philosophic basis. But his analysis of the mental
principles involved does not seem to me to be very searching or pro-
found. What is the use of telling us, What is now said about the produc-
tion of emotion or passion resolves into a very simple proposition, that
we love what is agreeable and hate what is disagreeable”? He does not
follow the Scottish metaphysicians in resolving beauty into association
of ideas. He discovers a beauty that is intrinsic as well as a relative
beauty.
For years he was collecting materials for a work on man, which
appeared in 1774 under the title of “Sketches of the History of Man.”
This work is meant to describe the progress made by man, in respect of
language, food, commerce, the arts, science, government, morality, and
religion. He is inclined to think that, as there are different climates, so
there are different species of men fitted for these climates, and argues
that we cannot account for the differences of mankind by climate or by
external agencies. He would believe that there must have been an origi-
nal difference of languages; but, yielding to the Scriptures, he accounts
for the diversities by the confusion of tongues at Babel. He is fond of
discovering every where a final cause on the part of God, and a progress
on the part of man. He has collected what seems a wide induction of
facts; but there is a great want of what Bacon insists on as a necessary
part of all legitimate induction,—“the necessary rejections and exclu-
sions.”
He was married to Miss Drummond, by whom he became possessed
of one of the most beautiful places in Scotland, Blair Drummond,—on
the banks of the Teith, half way between hill and dale,—in the south of
Perthshire. Home was one of the earliest of those agricultural improvers
who became very numerous, from this time onward, for an age or two
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took a lead first at Kames, and then at Blair Drummond, in summer-
fallow, and in raising green crops and sown grass. His great agricultural
work, which made him famous all over Scotland, consisted in clearing
the moss of Kincardine, which extended four miles in length and one or
two miles in breadth, and was covered with turf, eight or nine feet in
thickness, and underneath which was a rich soil. He effected this by
giving the land for a time to moss-planters, who floated away the turf by
means of ditches which he dug. He was a leading member of the Board
of Trustees for the Encouragement of the Fisheries, Arts, and Manufac-
tures of Scotland, and of the Commission for the Management of For-
feited Estates, the rents of which were to be applied to the improvement
of the highlands and islands of Scotland. By means of these boards he
did much to stimulate the industry of Scotland. It is asserted that he did
more than any man in his time in encouraging the introduction of “new
modes and instruments of industry, the enclosure and culture of wastes
and moors, the rearing of forest timber, the draining and cultivation of
moss lands, the raising and spinning of flax, the growth and storing of
winter fodder for cattle, the improvement of the breed of sheep, and the
manufacture of coarse woollen stuffs.”
In his old age he published “Loose Hints on Education.” He thought
that religion should form a main branch of education even in the earliest
period of infancy, and that the parents or preceptor should acquaint the
child with the fundamental doctrines of revealed religion. The common
opinion of him was, that he must be a man devoid of all religion. But a
clergyman writes “I have heard him mention the light of immortality as
an excellence peculiar to the doctrine of Christ. He gave unqualified
praise to Butler’s ‘Analogy,’ which is a defence of revealed as well as of
natural religion. He was regular in his attendance upon public worship;
and during my abode with him he had divine worship in his family every
evening.” It is interesting to notice that he defends the Scottish view of
the Sabbath. “This consideration leads me necessarily to condemn a
practice authorized among Christians, with very few exceptions; that of
abandoning to diversion and merriment what remains of Sunday after
public worship, parties of pleasure, dancing, gaming, any thing that
trifles away the time without a serious thought; as if the purpose were to
cancel every virtuous impression made at public worship.” (“Sketches
of the History of Man,” B. III.)
In his person he was tall and of a thin and slender make. His portrait
shows a high, marked brow; a long nose; and a shrewd, humorous face,—168/James McCosh
altogether a strong-marked countenance. “In his manners there was a f
rankness amounting to bluntness, and in his conversation a humorous
playfulness.” He died Dec. 27, 1782, in the eighty-seventh year of his
age.
XXIII. American Philosophy—John Witherspoon
America was now reaching such a settled condition that reflective thought
could make its appearance. Underneath the Puritan action and self-sac-
rifice, there was a Puritan faith which required men to judge and reason.
American philosophy put forth at that time its greatest representative.
Jonathan Edwards was born in Connecticut, in 1703; was a tutor in
Yale in 1724; was pastor and missionary from 1726 to 1757; and died
President of Princeton College, in 1758. From his very childhood he
pondered the profoundest subjects, and penetrated as far as—at times
farther, some think, than—human thought could carry him. Possessed
of no great variety of reading, he reached his very definite opinions, by
revolving every subject in his own mind. I am inclined to think that his
opinions might have been modified, had he been brought more fully into
contact and collision with other thinkers. His “Freedom of the Will” is
the acutest work ever written on that perplexing subject; but many think
that he has overlooked an essential freedom in the mind, acknowledged
by Calvin, Owen, and the great Calvinistic divines, and revealed by
consciousness. He is known more as a theologian than a philosopher;
but the fact is, his metaphysics, always along with his deep spiritual
insight, are the valuable element in his divinity. Contemporaneously with
Berkeley, he arrives at a doctrine of power and of body,—not the same
with that of the ideal bishop, but coming close to it and perhaps of a
more consistently philosophic structure. Cause he explains to be “that
after or upon the existence of which, or its existence after such a man-
ner, the existence of another thing follows. The connection between these
two existences, or between the cause and effect is what is called power.”
“When we say that grass is green, all that we can mean is, that, in a
constant course, when we see grass, the idea of green is excited by it”
“What idea is that which we call by the name of body? I find color has
the chief share in it. ‘Tis nothing but color, and figure, which is the
termination of this figure, together with some powers, such as the power
of resisting and motion, that wholly takes up what we call body, and if
that which we principally mean by the thing itself cannot be said to be in
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then nothing be longing to body exists out of the mind, but resistance,
which is solidity, and the termination of this resistance with its relations,
which is figure, and the communication of this resistance from place to
place, which is motion; though the latter are nothing, but modes of the
former. Therefore, there is nothing out of the mind but resistance; and
not that either, when nothing is actively resisted. Then there is nothing
but the power of resistance. And, as resistance is nothing but the actual
exertion of God’s power, so the power can be nothing else but the con-
stant law or method of that actual exercise.” (Notes on Mind, in Dwight’s
“Life of Edwards.”)
It could be shown that, at this time, there was everywhere a ten-
dency towards idealism among the higher minds, which had been trained
under the philosophy of Locke. The Rev. Samuel Johnson, the tutor of
Edwards in Yale, who afterwards wrote “Elementa Philosolphica,” wel-
comed Berkeley on his coming to Rhode Island, and adopted his phi-
losophy. Berkeley was personally beloved by all who came in contact
with him, and gained some devoted adherents to his theory. In Princeton
College, Mr Meriam, a tutor, defended the system. But idealism has
never struck deep into the American soil. The “Scottish Philosophy,”
coming in with the great Scotch and Scotch-Irish migration, which, next
to the Puritan, has had the greatest power for good on the American
character, has had much greater influence. Edwards was acquainted
with the moral theory of Hutcheson, which makes virtue consist in be-
nevolence; but propounded one of his own, somewhat akin to it, but
much more profound, making virtue consist in love to being as being. I
feel that I must take a passing notice of the energetic man who actually
introduced Scottish thought into the new world.
John Witherspoon47 was the son of a minister of the Church of Scot-
land, and was born February 5, 1722, in the parish of Yester, in East
Lothian, the probable birthplace of Knox. He entered the university of
Edinburgh, at the age of fourteen, and pursued his studies there for
seven years, with such fellow-students as Blair, Robertson, and John
Erskine. Carlyle, who could not have been specially inclined towards
him, is obliged to say that “he was open, frank, and generous, pretend-
ing to what he was, and sup porting his title with spirit.” “At the time I
speak of, he was a good scholar, far advanced for his age, very sensible
and shrewd, but of a disagreeable temper, which was irritated by a flat
voice and awkward manner, which prevented his making an impression
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Knox, through his heroic daughter, Mrs. Welch, who told King James
that she would rather “kep his head in her lap” than have him submit to
the king’s supremacy in religion,” young Witherspoon inherited the spirit
of the reformer,48—his devoted piety, his keen perception of abounding
evil, his undaunted courage, his unflinching perseverance, and, I may
add, his vigorous sense and his broad humor. He was settled as minister,
first in Beith in Ayrshire, famous for its cheese, and then in Paisley,
famous for its shawls and for the piety of its older inhabitants; and in
both places was an effective, popular preacher, and wrote works—such
as his Treatises on justification, and on Regeneration—which continue
to be read with profit to this day.
He perceived clearly and felt keenly the great change which was
coming over the Church of Scotland: he watched carefully the rise and
progress of moderatism, tracing it to the restoration of church patron-
age, and to the philosophy of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, favored by a
young race of divines, who seemed to him to be addicted to levity in
their whole character, to be ready to abandon the old truths, and to
trample on the spiritual rights of the people. He did not scruple to sati-
rize it in a work, published anonymously, and distinguished for its plain
speaking and its humor, scarcely inferior in power to the sarcasm of
Swift, and having a much higher aim,—“Ecclesiastical Characteristics,
or the Arcana of Church Policy: Being an humble attempt to open the
mystery of moderation, wherein is shown a plain and easy way of at-
taining to the character of a moderate man, as at present in repute in the
Church of Scotland,” “Oh, yes! fierce for moderation.” “When any man
is charged with loose practices or tendencies to immoralities, he is to be
screened and protected as much as possible; especially if the faults laid
to his charge be—as they are incomparably termed in a sermon, preached
by a hopeful youth, that made some noise lately—‘good-humored vices.”’
“It will serve further for the support of this maxim, that, according to
modern discoveries, there is a great analogy between the moral virtues,
or, if you will, the science of morals, and the fine arts: and it is on
account of this analogy that most of the present reigning expressions
upon the subject of morals are borrowed from the arts; as, beauty, or-
der, proportion, harmony.” “Another thing strongly pleads for gentle-
men having the chief hand in settling kirks, that nowadays very few of
our principal gentry attend ordinances, or receive any benefit by a min-
ister after he is settled, unless perhaps talking of the news at a private
visit or playing a game at backgammon.” “As for logic, it is well knownThe Scottish Philosophy/171
this part of education is fallen into great contempt, and it is not to be
expected that such brisk and lively spirits, who have always hated every
thing that looked scholastic-like, can bear to be tied down to the strict
rules of argumentation.” “It illustrates the truth of Mr H——‘s doc-
trine: that virtue is founded upon instinct and affection, and not upon
reason; that benevolence is its source, support, and perfection; and that
all the particular rules of conduct are to be suspended when they seem to
interfere with the general good.” This satire cut deep, and he was at-
tacked on all hands, for resorting to such a weapon. He defended him-
self in a “Serious Apology for the ‘Ecclesiastical Characteristics,’ by
the real author of that performance.” One other reason I shall mention
for making choice of this way of writing was drawn from the modern
notions of philosophy, which had so greatly contributed to the corrup-
tion of the clergy. The great patron and advocate for these was Lord
Shaftesbury, one of whose leading principles it is, that ‘ridicule is the
test of truth.’ This principle of his had been adopted by many of the
clergy; and there is hardly any man conversant in the literary world,
who has not heard it a thousand times defended in conversation. I was
there fore willing, to try how they themselves could stand the edge of
this weapon.” Taking his part in the controversy raised by the publica-
tion of Home’s “Douglas,” he published “A Serious Inquiry into the
Nature and Effects of the Stage.” Robertson, now acknowledged as the
consummately able leader of the moderate party, found at times a pow-
erful opponent in Witherspoon. Dr. Robertson had remarked that, with
a real minority, the moderate party had been able to carry their mea-
sures; whereupon Witherspoon said: ‘We allow you whatever merit you
may be entitled to for your skill, but remember the authority which says,
I the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children
of light.’ “One day after Witherspoon had carried some important ques-
tions in the General Assembly, Dr. Robertson said to him in a pleasant
and easy manner: “I think you have your men better disciplined than
formerly,” a remark showing how much value he set on skilful leader-
ship. “Yes,” replied Witherspoon, “by urging your politics too far, you
have compelled us to beat you with your own weapons.” He acts in
character throughout, and as if be still lived in the seventeenth century.
On the night before the communion sabbath, it is reported that a set of
youths, following the example set in the “hell-fire clubs,” to which I
have referred (p. 19), held a meeting for mock preaching and praying.
This was an awful scene to been acted, in so godly a town as Paisley,172/James McCosh
where, on a sabbath morning, family praise might be heard rising from
every dwelling; and Witherspoon a fortnight after, Feb. 21, 1762,
preaches “a seasonable advice to young persons,” and publishes it with
the names of the offenders. But he is living in the eighteenth and not the
seventeenth century, and a lawyer started an action and got costs, which
greatly embarrassed the doctor. All these things—the enemies raised up
by the “Characteristics,” and these local troubles—must have made
Scotland somewhat too hot for him, the more so that the law was against
him, and the church party opposed to him was increasing in power and
in imperiousness. He had a brave heart and could have stood it all. But
it was at this juncture that there came an invitation to him to become
president of the college of New Jersey, Princeton. He did not listen to
that call when it was first made in 1766; but he accepted it in 1768, and
was inducted as president, Sept. 28 of that year. He had now a far wider
field opened to him than ever he could have had in his own country,
where all the civil patronage and the literature of the age were against
him He has evidently fallen into his predestined sphere, and feels that he
has a fitness, a taste, and a talent for the work.
The course of instruction followed in the college during his admin-
istration was a good one. “In the first year, they read Latin and Greek,
with the Roman and Grecian antiquities and rhetoric. In the second,
continuing the study of languages, they learn a complete system of ge-
ography with the use of the globes, the first principles of philosophy,
and the elements of mathematical knowledge. The third, though the lan-
guages are not wholly omitted, is chiefly employed in mathematics and
natural Philosophy, and the senior year is employed in reading the higher
classics, proceeding in the mathematics and natural philosophy, and going
through a course of moral philosophy.” In addition, Dr. Witherspoon
delivered lectures to the juniors and seniors upon chronology and his-
tory, and upon composition and criticism, and taught Hebrew and French
to those who wished it. During the whole course of their studies, the
three younger classes, two or three every evening, were called to pro-
nounce an oration on a stage erected for the purpose, immediately after
prayers, “that they may learn, by early habit, presence of mind and
proper pronunciation and gesture in public speaking.” “The senior schol-
ars, every five or six weeks, pronounce orations of their own composi-
tion, to which all persons of any note in the neighborhood are invited or
admitted.” (“Address by Witherspoon in behalf of the College of New
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speaking, there is something not found in the European colleges. The
course as a whole is good; but the State of New Jersey would not fur-
nish funds, and private benevolence did not supply sufficient means to
procure an adequate number of instructors. By means of this instruc-
tion, even with its scanty staff of teachers, the college in that age raised,
not only a large body of devoted ministers. but a great number of the
ablest statesmen and lawyers of which America can boast, and fur-
nished professors to a great many colleges, west and south.49 Witherspoon
took four different departments, composition, taste, and criticism; chro-
nology and history; moral philosophy; and divinity. Many of his pupils
have testified to the benefit which they derived from his instructions, so
sagacious, so stimulating and practically useful. In particular, James
Madison, perhaps the most philosophical of all the founders and fram-
ers of the American constitution, acknowledges his obligations to the
study of moral philosophy under Witherspoon. “The increased attention
paid to the study of the nature and constitution of the human mind, and
the improvements which had been introduced into this fundamental de-
partment of knowledge by the philosophical inquiries of his own coun-
trymen, constituted a marked and most important feature of Dr.
Witherspoon’s reforms. Mr Madison formed a taste for these inquiries,
which entered deeply, as we shall hereafter have occasion to remark,
into the character and habits of his mind, and gave to his political writ-
ings in after life a profound and philosophic cast, which distinguished
them eminently and favorably from the production of the ablest of his
contemporaries.” (“Life and Times of Madison,” by William C. Rives.)
President Ashbel Green tells us, “The Berkeleyan system of meta-
physics was in repute in the college when he entered. The tutors were
zealous believers in it, and waited on the president with some expecta-
tion of either confounding him, or making him a proselyte. They had
mistaken their man. He first reasoned against the system, and then ridi-
culed it till he drove it out of the college. The writer has heard him state,
that, before Reid or any other author of their views had published any
theory on the ideal system, he wrote against it, and suggested the same
trains of thought which they adopted, and that he published his essay in
a Scotch magazine.” He refers in his moral philosophy to the common-
sense school of Scotland. “Some late writers have advanced, with great
apparent reason, that there are certain first principles or dictates of com-
mon-sense, which are either simple perceptions or seen with intuitive
evidence. These are the foundation of all reasoning, and, without them,174/James McCosh
to reason is a word with out a meaning. They can no more be proved
than you can prove an axiom in mathematical science. These authors of
Scotland have lately produced and supported this opinion, to resolve at
once all the refinement and metaphysical objections of some infidel writ-
ers. (“Moral Philosophy,” sect. v.) His son-in-law, and his successor as
president, Samuel Stanhope Smith, at one time inclined to Berkeleyanism,
formally renounces idealism. “Whatever medium, in the opinion of these
philosophers (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume), nature may employ to con-
nect the object with the organ of sense, whether image or idea, or any
other sensible phantasm, it is, beyond a doubt the object itself, not its
idea, which is discovered by the sense; any image or phantasm, in the
case, being either unknown or unperceived, and at the time wholly
unthought of. An idea is merely a conception of the fancy, or the remi-
niscence of the object.”50 From this date, the Scottish became the most
influential philosophy in America.
His work on moral philosophy is not particularly profound or inter-
esting. But I suppose we have only the skeleton of his course; and, as he
illustrated it orally by his reading and wide observation of mankind, I
believe it was useful and attractive. He discussed such authors as Leibnitz,
Clarke, Hutcheson, Wollaston, Collins, Nettleton, Hume, Kames, Adam
Smith, Reid, Balfour, Butler, Balguy, Beattie. He had vigorously op-
posed Hutcheson in Scotland, and he sees the logical result of his view
of virtue in the systems of Hume and Home, who are criticised by him.
He refers to the theory of his predecessor in office, Edwards, that “vir-
tue consists in the love of being as such,” but without approval. His own
view is summed up in these words: “There is in the nature of things a
difference between virtue and vice; and, however much virtue and hap-
piness are connected by the divine law and in the event of things, we are
made so as to feel towards them and conceive of them as distinct,—we
have the simple perceptions of duty and interest.” “The result of the
whole is, that we ought to take the rule of duty from conscience, enlight-
ened by reason, experience, and every way by which we can be sup-
posed to learn the will of our Maker.”
But Witherspoon was a man of action, rather than reflection. His
administration of the college seems to have been successful. Following
the original theory of the American college, Princeton college was placed
in a village supposed to be away from the temptations of great cities. “It
is not,” Witherspoon says, “in the power of those who are in great cities
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temptations to do evil, and can so easily and effectually conceal it after
it is done. With us, they live all in college, under the inspection of their
masters; and the village is so small that any irregularity is immediately
and certainly discovered, and therefore easily corrected.” The rules of
government which he explained to the tutors are admirable. “Govern,
govern always, but beware of governing too much. Convince your pu-
pils, for you may convince them, that you would rather gratify than
thwart them; that you wish to see them happy; and desire to impose no
restraints but such as their real advantage, and the order and welfare of
the college, render indispensable. Put a wide difference between youth-
ful follies and foibles, and those acts which manifest a malignant spirit
or intentional insubordination. Do not even notice the former, except it
be by private advice. Overlook them entirely, unless they occur in such
a public manner that it is known that you must have observed them. Be
exceeding careful not to commit your own authority or that of the col-
lege, in any case that cannot be carried through with equity. But having
pursued this system, then, in every instance in which there has been a
manifest intention to offend or resist your authority, or that of the col-
lege, make no compromise with it whatever: put it down absolutely and
entirely. Maintain the authority of the laws ,in their full extent. and fear
no consequences.”
But his influence was exerted and felt far beyond the college walls.
As might have been expected from his love of liberty, and his impetuous
spirit, and the part he took in Scotland, be early threw himself into the
struggle for independence, and he was elected a representative in Con-
gress for the State of New Jersey, in 1776, and declared there the way
by which he had been led. “We were contending for a restoration of
certain privileges under the government of Great Britain, and were pray-
ing for a reunion with her. But in the beginning of July, with the univer-
sal approbation of all the States now united, we renounced this convic-
tion, and declared our selves free and independent.” His is one of the
names—the most honored of any in America—attached to the Declara-
tion of Independence, and his portrait adorns Independence Hall. I rather
think that—if we except Washington, Franklin, and perhaps half a dozen
others—none bad so important an influence as Witherspoon in guiding
the American Revolution. It will be remembered that one of the decisive
battles of the war was fought at Princeton; and, in 1783, the Congress
sat for months in the college, presided over by one of the trustees, and
with Witherspoon as a member. When in Congress, he exerted himself176/James McCosh
to secure a firm, central government, and a gold instead of a paper
standard. He retired from Congress in 1783, to give himself to his col-
lege work. He died, Nov. 15, 1794.
From the picture of him by the elder Peale in Princeton college, and
the account given by Ashbel Green, we learn that “his stature was of
middle size, with some tendency to corpulence. His limbs were well-
proportioned, and his complexion was fair. His eyes were strongly in-
dicative of intelligence. His eyebrows were large, hanging down at the
ends next his temples, occasioned, probably, by a habit he had con-
tracted of pulling them when he was under excitement.” His whole air is
that of a man of strong character; and we see traces of his being natu-
rally a man of strong passion, which, however, he was able to subdue.
Scotland did not allow him, what would have been for her good, to
become a leader of men; and Scotland’s loss became America’s gain.
XXIV. James Balfour
He was a member of the Scotch bar, and one of the many Edinburgh
lawyers who devoted themselves to philosophy. He was one of the first
to write against the ethical principles of Hume, which he did in his “De-
lineations of the Nature and Obligations of Morality,” published anony-
mously, 1752 or 1753. He sets out with the principle that private happi-
ness must be the chief end and object of every man’s pursuit; shows how
the good of others affords the highest happiness; and then to sanction
natural conscience be calls in the authority of God, who must approve
of what promotes the greatest happiness. This theory does not give mo-
rality a sufficiently deep foundation in the constitution of man or the
character of God, and could not have stood against the assaults of Hume.
In 1754, he was appointed professor of moral philosophy in the univer-
sity of Edinburgh, the chair which David Hume had wished to fill some
years before,—and continued to hold it till 1764, when be became pro-
fessor of the law of nature and nations, and held the office till about
1779. In 1768, he published a second work, written against Hume and
Lord Kames and in defence of active power and liberty. Like all enlight-
ened opponents of the new scepticism, he felt it necessary to oppose the
favorite theory of Locke, that all our ideas are derived from sensation
and reflection. “It may indeed be allowed that the first notions of things
are given to the mind by means of some sensation or other; but then it
may also be true that after such notions are given the mind, by the exer-
tion of some inherent power, may be able to discover some remarkableThe Scottish Philosophy/177
qualities of such things, and even things of a very different nature, which
are not to be discovered merely by any sense whatever.” He published
“Philosophical Dissertations,” in 1782.
He was born in 1705, and died 1795. His father was a merchant in
Edinburgh, and his mother a daughter of Hamilton of Airdrie, from
which family Sir William Hamilton was descended. He seems to have
received his education first in Edinburgh College, and then, like so many
scholars of the preceding ages, at Leyden.
XXV. Alexander Gerard.
He was the son of the minister of a parish, called the chapel of Garioch,
in Aberdeenshire, and was born in 1728. In July, 1752, he was admitted
professor of moral philosophy in Marischal College. In August, 1755,
he submits in a printed paper an improved plan of education for the
college. He argues powerfully against the established practice of reach-
ing logic in the early years of the course. He recommends that the cur-
riculum consist: First year, classics; second year, history and elemen-
tary mathematics; third year, natural philosophy, with belles-lettres and
mathematics; fourth year, pneumatology, or natural philosophy of spirit,
including the doctrine of the nature, faculties, and states of the human
mind, and natural theology; moral philosophy, containing ethics, juris-
prudence, and politics,—the study of these being accompanied with a
perusal of some of the best ancient moralists; logic, or the laws and
rules of inventing, proving, retaining, and communicating knowledge;
and metaphysics. This is, in many respects, an enlightened course, but
confines the attention of every student too exclusively to one department
for the year,—whereas the mind works better with some variety,—and
does not give a sufficient space to classics and English. This course was
substantially adopted by the college, which thus came to differ from the
other Scotch universities.
It is indicative of a strong desire on the part of an enlightened body
of men to promote elegance and refinement in their country, that the
Edinburgh Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Sciences, Manufac-
tures, and Agriculture offered a premium for the best essay on “Taste,”
the phrase “taste” having come unfortunately into use as the translation
of the French “gout” The prize was gained by Gerard, and the work was
published in 1759, the publisher adding three dissertations by Voltaire,
D’Alembert, and Montesquieu. Anxious to promote the objects of the
above- named society, he offered through it a gold medal on style in178/James McCosh
composition. In the same year, he was chosen professor of divinity in
Marischal, and, in 1773, he became professor of divinity in King’s Col-
lege, and his attention was thus called away from philosophy. In 1766,
he published “Dissertations on Subjects relating to the Genius and Evi-
dences of Christianity.” Still cherishing his old tastes, he published, in
1774, an “Essay on Genius,” meant to be the complement of his work
on ,Taste.” He wrote also “Sermons,” in two volumes; “The Pastoral
Care;” and “The Evidences of the Christian Religion.”
He is best known by his work on “Taste.” He enlarges the number
of senses or tastes far beyond what Hutcheson or any other has done,—
illustrating the sense or taste of novelty, sublimity, beauty, imitation,
harmony, oddity and ridicule, and virtue, and shows bow they all enter
into fine taste He calls them internal or reflex senses, as distinguished
from external senses. He does not enter upon a searching inquiry into
their psychological nature, nor seek to determine what objective reality
is implied in them: he contents himself with a graceful pleasant exposi-
tion and illustration. In his other philosophical work, he describes ge-
nius as the faculty of invention, treats of such interesting subjects as the
influence of habit and passion on association, and quotes largely from
the best writers of Greece and Rome, France and England; but shows
little analytic or metaphysical acumen. By his lectures and works, he
helped to create and foster a literary taste in the region of which Aber-
deen claims to be the capital, and is believed to have had influence on
the studies and teaching of Beattie. Beattie is said to allude to him, when
he speaks of a person who “by two hours’ application could fix a ser-
mon in his mind so effectively as to be able to recite it in public without
the change, omission, or transposition of a single word.” He died in
1795.51
XXVI. Thomas Reid52
If he was not the founder, he is the fit representative of the Scottish
philosophy. He is in every respect, a Scotchman of the genuine type:
shrewd, cautious, outwardly calm, and yet with a deep well of feeling
within, and capable of enthusiasm; not witty, but with a quiet vein of
humor. And then he has the truly philosophic spirit: seeking truth mod-
estly, humbly, diligently; piercing beneath the surface to gaze on the
true nature of things; and not to be caught by sophistry, or misled by
plausible representations. He has not the mathematical consecutiveness
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the spirituel of Berkeley, or the detective skill of Hume; but he has a
quality quite as valuable as any of these, even in philosophy; he has in
perfection that common-sense which he so commends, and this saves
him from the extreme positions into which these great men have been
tempted by the soaring nature of their inexorable logic. It is genius, and
not the want of it, that adulterates philosophy.” He looks steadily and
inquires carefully into the subjects of which he is treating; and if he does
not go round them he acknowledges that he has not done so; and what he
does see, he sees clearly and describes honestly. “The labyrinth may be
too intricate, and the thread too fine to be traced through all its wind-
ings; but if we stop when we can trace it no farther, and secure the
ground we have gained, there is no harm done, and a quicker eye may at
times trace it farther.” Speculative youths are apt to feel that, because
he is so sober, and makes so little pretension, he cannot possibly be far-
seeing or profound; but this is at the time of life when they have risen
above taking a mother’s counsel, and become wiser than their fathers;
and, after following other and more showy lights for a time, they may at
last be obliged to acknowledge that they have here the true light of the
sun, which it is safer to follow than that of the flashing meteor. M.
Cousin, in his preface to the last edition of his volume on the Scottish
philosophy, declares that the true modern Socrates has not been Locke,
but Reid. “Kant,” he says, “has commenced the German philosophy,
but he has not governed it. It early escaped him, to throw itself in very
opposite directions. The name of Kant rests only on the ruins of his
doctrines. Reid has impressed on the Scottish mind a movement less
grand, but this movement has had no reactions.” “Yes,” he adds, “Reid
is a man of genius, and of a true and powerful originality; so we said in
1819, and so we say in 1857, after having held long converse with mighty
systems, discovered their secret, and taken their measure.” There is pro-
found truth in this; but it is scarcely correct to say that there have been
no reactions against Reid in Scotland. There was a reaction by Brown
against his indiscriminate admission of first principles. Again, there is a
reaction in the present day on the part of those who dislike his appeal to
consciousness as revealing to us a certain amount of truth, and who
deal, in consequence, solely with historical sketches of philosophic sys-
tems, or who make the philosophy of the human mind a branch of physi-
ology. Still Reid has continued to exercise a greater influence than any
other metaphysician on the thought of his country. It is true, that in
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quite as much as the Scotch mind differs from the Greek. Both have
very much the same truth-loving spirit, the same homely sense, and
contempt for pretension: but Socrates has vastly more subtlety and dia-
lectic skill, and reaches the conclusion that truth cannot be found except
in moral subjects; whereas Reid firmly maintains and resolutely pro-
claims that settled truth can be attained by observation, in the kingdoms
both of mind and matter. Reid’s style will not please those who are
seeking for flashes of genius, of wit or eloquence. But it always clearly
expresses his ideas; and some prefer his plain statements, his familiar
idioms, commonly purely English, to the stateliness of Stewart,—who
cannot express a commonplace thought except in a rounded period,—
and the perpetual rhetoric of Brown.
Thomas Reid was born, April 26, 1710, at Strachan, which is situ-
ated about twenty miles from Aberdeen, on the banks of a lively moun-
tain stream, which rises on the high Grampians, and flows down the
hollows of their northern slope into the Dee. The place is rather tame,
and must have been bleak enough in winter; but it is quite a spot in
which a thoughtful student might profitably pass the long summer vaca-
tions which the Scotch colleges allow, and have enjoyable rambles among
the heath-clad and rocky mountains above him, including Clochnaben
with the conspicuous stone on the top. His father, the Rev. Lewis Reid,
was minister of the place for fifty years, and stood by the whig and
reformation cause at the great crisis of the Revolution of 1688, when the
people of that region, still under strong landlord influence, might have
been readily swayed to the one side or the other. He was descended from
a succession of Presbyterian ministers in Banchory-Ternan on the Dee,
who traced their descent from an old county family, and go as far back
as the Reformation. His mother was Margaret Gregory of Kinnairdie in
Banffshire, and be longed to the family of that name, which was so
illustrious in Scotland during the whole of last century and the begin-
ning of this. On both sides of his house were persons who had risen to
eminence in literature and science. On his father’s side, Dugald Stewart
mentions Thomas Reid, who, on finishing his education at home, went
to the continent, and maintained public discussions in several universi-
ties, and afterwards collected his theses in a volume; who published
some Latin poems to be found in the “Delitim Poetarum Scotorum;”
who became Secretary in the Greek and Latin tongues to James I, and,
along with Patrick Young, translated the works of that monarch into
Latin. A brother of his, Alexander Reid, was physician to King CharlesThe Scottish Philosophy/181
I, and published several books on medicine; and another brother, Adam,
translated into English Buchanan’s “History of Scotland.” On the side
of the Gregorys the subject of our memoir could claim as grand-uncle,
James Gregory, the inventor of the reflecting telescope, and as uncles
David Gregory,—Savilian professor of astronomy at Oxford, and an
intimate friend of Sir Isaac Newton’s,—and two others, professors of
mathematics respectively at St. Andrews and Edinburgh. Such a kins-
manship must have given a powerful stimulus towards literature and
science to a thoughtful youth like Thomas Reid.
The boy was two years at the parish school of Kincardine when the
teacher foretold “that he would turn out to be a man of good and well-
wearing parts.” He was then sent to Aberdeen to prosecute his classical
studies. He entered Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1722, when he was
only twelve years of age. He was in the first Greek class taught by Dr.
Thomas Blackwell, afterwards principal, who took such pains to revive
the study of the Greek tongue in the north of Scotland; and the pupil
seems to have caught somewhat of the spirit of his master, for in after
life he was known to recite in his class demonstrations of Euclid in the
Greek language. But his special instructor was Dr. George Turnbull,
who conducted him and other thirty-nine pupils through a three years’
course in what was called philosophy.
He has left us in a letter written in 1779, an account of a curious
youthful experience.
“About the age of fourteen, I was almost every night, unhappy in
my sleep, from frightful dreams—sometimes hanging over a dreadful
hemisphere and just ready to drop down; sometimes pursued for my life
and stopped by a wall, or by a sudden loss of all strength; sometimes
ready to be devoured by a wild beast. How long I was plagued with such
dreams, I do not now recollect. I believe it was for a year or two at least;
and I think they had quite left me before I was fifteen. In those days, I
was much given to what Mr Addison, in one of his “Spectators,” calls
castle-building; and, in my evening solitary walk, which was generally
all the exercise I took, my thoughts would hurry me into some active
scene, where I generally acquitted myself much to my own satisfaction;
and, in these scenes of imagination, I performed many a gallant exploit.
At the same time, in my dreams, I found myself the most arrant coward
that ever was. Not only my courage, but my strength, failed me in every
danger; and I often rose from my bed in the morning in such a panic that
it took some time to get the better of it. I wished very much to be free of182/James McCosh
these uneasy dreams, which not only made me unhappy in sleep, but
often left a disagreeable impression in my mind, for some part of the
following day. I thought it was worth trying whether it was possible to
recollect that it was all a dream, and that I was in no real danger. I often
went to sleep with my mind as strongly impressed as I could with this
thought, that I never in my lifetime was in any real danger, and that
every fright I had was a dream. After many fruitless endeavors to recol-
lect this when the danger appeared, I effected it at last, and have often,
when I was sliding over a precipice into the abyss, recollected that it
was all a dream, and boldly jumped down. The effect of this commonly
was, that I immediately awoke. But I awoke calm and intrepid, which I
thought a great acquisition. After this, my dreams were never very un-
easy; and, in a short time, I dreamed not at all. During all this time I was
in perfect health; but whether my ceasing to dream was the effect of the
recollection above mentioned, or of any change in the habit of my body,
which is usual about that period of life, I cannot tell. I think it may more
probably be imputed to the last. How ever, the fact was that, for at least
forty years after, I dreamed none, to the best of my remembrance; and,
finding from the testimony of others that this is somewhat uncommon, I
have often, as soon as I awoke, endeavored to recollect without being
able to recollect any thing that passed in my sleep. For some years past,
I can sometimes recollect some kind of dreaming thoughts, but so inco-
herent that I can make nothing of them. The only distinct dream I ever
had since I was about sixteen, as far as I remember, was about two
years ago. I had got my head blistered for a fall. A plaster, which was
put on it after the blister, pained me excessively for a whole night. In the
morning I slept a little, and dreamed very distinctly that I had fallen into
the bands of a party of Indians, and was scalped. I am apt to think that
as there is a state of sleep and a state wherein we are awake, so there is
an intermediate state which partakes of the other two. If a man peremp-
torily resolves to rise at an early hour for some interesting purpose, he
will of himself awake at that hour. A sick-nurse gets the habit of sleep-
ing in such a manner that she hears the least whisper of the sick person,
and yet is refreshed by this kind of half sleep. The same is the case of a
nurse who sleeps with a child in her arms. I have slept on horseback, but
so as to preserve my balance; and, if the horse stumbled, I could make
the exertion necessary for saving me from a fall, as if I was awake. I
hope the sciences at your good university are not in this state. Yet, from
so many learned men so much at their ease, one would expect somethingThe Scottish Philosophy/183
more than we hear of.”
He graduated in 1726 at the age of sixteen. His college life was
prolonged by his being appointed librarian to the university, which of-
fice he continued to hold till 1736. Ever a student, and busied with solid
work, he joined eagerly with his friend John Stewart, afterwards profes-
sor in Marischal College, in pursuing mathematical studies, specially
the “Principia” of Newton. His life was varied by his taking with his
friend Stewart an excursion into England, and visiting London, Oxford,
and Cambridge. Through his relative David Gregory he got access to
the house of Martin Folkes, where he met with “the most interesting
objects which the metropolis had to offer to his curiosity. At Cambridge
he saw Dr. Bentley,—who delighted him with his learning and amused
him with his vanity,—and enjoyed repeatedly the conversation of the
blind mathematician Saunderson, a phenomenon in the history of the
human mind to which he has referred more than once in his philosophi-
cal speculations.”
In 1737, he was presented by King’s College, Aberdeen, to the liv-
ing of New Machar,—a country parish about a dozen miles from Aber-
deen, lying on the level agricultural land of the county, but with glorious
views of the distant mountains towards the west. The circumstances
connected with his settlement furnish a vivid picture of the age. By this
time there was a keen antagonism between the Evangelical and the
Moderate parties in the Church of Scotland and this was fiercely mani-
fested on this occasion. In order to his being settled, the probationer or
minister had not only to receive a presentation from the patron, but a
“call” from the people, which, however, was by this time becoming a
mere form, as the ecclesiastical courts falling under the influence of the
patronage spirit contrived to avoid insisting on a bona fide concurrence
from the members of the congregation. We have preserved “A Sermon
preached before the Reverend the Presbytery of Aberdeen in the Church
of New Machar, Feb. 10, 1737, at the Moderation of a Call to a Minis-
ter for that vacant Church, by Mr John Bisset, Minister of the Gospel at
Aberdeen.” Mr Bisset had formerly been minister of New Machar, and
was known all over the north as a popular preacher, a defender of evan-
gelical religion, and an opponent of patronage. In this discourse, which
is full of stirring appeals, he warns the people against “the fear of man
which bringeth a snare,” against being intimidated by their landlords,
and acting on the slavish principle, “I am for the man the laird is for.”
Expressing his affection for a people to whom he had been minister for184/James McCosh
twelve years, he reminds them that when he left them their landlords had
persuaded them to take a minister who had fallen into fornication and
absconded. He complains of persons not residing in the parish, or though
residing in it not attending gospel ordinances, interfering to serve a friend,
referring, it is supposed, to a near relative of Dr. Reid’s. He asserts that
the election of a minister is a Christian right, and that “the poor Chris-
tian in vile raiment may claim the same regard that is paid to him who
wears the gay clothing, the gold ring and the goodly apparel.” It is a
poor and worthless story for any man to say, that you, the people, are
tenants at will, and to improve this as if you were to have no will but
theirs in the work of this day. Well may you reply that you are tenants at
God’s will, who can take them away with His stroke when they are
thinking to have their wills of you. He exhorts them to trust in God and
do what is right, and warns them that, even though they should by act-
ing an unconscientious part secure an earthly habitation, yet they might
soon be driven out of it.” The appeal produced a powerful effect. The
people, having no hope of getting their rights protected by the church
courts, adopted a mode of expressing their feelings characteristic of the
times. The tradition is that, when their minister came to the place, men
dressed in women’s clothes, ducked him in a pond; and that, on the
sabbath on which he preached his first sermon, an uncle of his who
resided at Rosehill, two miles off, defended him on the pulpit stair with
a drawn sword.
I am not sure that the sphere to which Reid was now appointed was
the one exactly suited to him, or that he was the fittest man to preach the
gospel of Christ to a country congregation, or indeed that the old Scotch
theory of connecting the church and the colleges so closely was the best
either for the church or the colleges. For the first seven years he was in
the way of preaching the sermons of others, a practice very obnoxious
to the people. The tradition is that on one occasion when at Fintray,
three miles off, the lady of Sir—— Forbes thanked him for preaching
on the previous sabbath so excel lent a sermon from Tillotson; where-
upon he denied in strong terms that he had taken a sermon from Tillotson.
To his confusion he found, on retiring to his bedroom, a volume of
Tillotson’s on his table, lying open at the place where was the discourse
he had preached. Ashamed, not of the fact of his preaching another
man’s sermons, but of his being supposed capable of uttering a false-
hood, he hastened to inform the lady that he had taken the discourse not
from Tillotson’s published sermons, but from a packet which he hadThe Scottish Philosophy/185
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But while thus obnoxious at his first settlement, he is said to have
gradually won the good opinion of his parishioners by the propriety of
his conduct, his conscientiousness, and his kindness. His popularity was
increased when, in 1740, he married Elizabeth,—the daughter of his
uncle Dr. George Reid, physician in London,—who endeared herself to
the people by her kind offices to the sick and poor. There is reason to
believe that in the later years of his ministry he became earnest in his
Master’s service. The tradition is that, in dispensing the sacrament of
the supper, tears rolled from his eyes, when he spoke of the loveliness of
the Saviour’s character. The following dedication of himself to God is
preserved in the manuscripts,54 and lets us see more clearly than any
thing that has been printed by Dugald Stewart the deep feeling that lay
beneath that calm outward demeanor. It is dated March 30, 1746.
“ O God: I desire humbly to supplicate thy Divine Majesty in be-
half of my distressed wife, who is by thy hand brought very low,
and in imminent danger of death, if thou, who alone dost won-
ders, do not in mercy interpose thy Almighty arm, and bring her
back from the gates of death. I deserve justly, O Lord, that thou
shouldst deprive me of the greatest comfort of my life, because I
have not been so thankful to thee as I ought for giving me such a
kind and affectionate wife. I have forgot thy goodness in bringing
us happy together by an unforeseen and undesigned train of events,
and blessing us with so much love and harmony of affections and
so many of the comforts and conveniences of life. I have not been
so careful as I ought to have been to stir her up to piety and Chris-
tian virtues. I have not taken that pains with my children and
servants and relatives as I ought. Alas! I have been too negligent
of my pastoral duty in my private devotions, too much given to the
pleasures and satisfactions of this world, and too little influenced
by thy promises and the hopes of a future state. I have employed
my studies, reading, and conversation, rather to please myself than
to edify myself and others. I have sinned greatly in neglecting
many opportunities of making private applications to my flock
and family in the affairs of their souls, and in using too slight
preparation for my public exercises. I have thrown away too much
of my time in sloth and sleep, and have not done so much for the
relief of the poor and destitute as I might have done. The means
that Providence has afforded me of correcting any evil inclina-
tions I have abused to pamper and feed them, on various instances.
For these and many other sins which have escaped my memory,186/James McCosh
thou mightst justly inflict so great a chastisement upon me, as to
make my children motherless, and deprive me of my dear wife. O
Lord, for thy mercy’s sake, accept of my humble and penitent con-
fession of these my offences, which I desire to acknowledge with
shame and sorrow, and am resolved by thy grace to amend. If thou
art pleased to Hearken to the voice of my supplications, and grant
my request in behalf of my dear wife in restoring her to health, I
do promise and covenant through grace to turn from these
backslidings, to express my thankfulness by a vigorous discharge
of my duty as a Christian, a minister, and master of a family; and
by an alms of ten pounds sterling to the poor, in meal and money.
Lord, pardon, if there is any thing in this over presumptuous, or
unbecoming a humble, penitent sinner; and, Lord, accept of what
is sincerely designed as a new bond upon my soul to my duty,
through Jesus Christ, my Lord and Saviour.”
Stewart tells us that, “during his residence at New Machar, the greater
part of his time was spent in the most intense study; more particularly in
a careful examination of the laws of external perception, and of the
other principles which form the groundwork of human knowledge. His
chief relaxations were gardening and botany, to both of which pursuits
he retained his attachment in old age.” It was while he was minister, and
at the mature age of thirty-eight, that he published in the “Transactions
of the Royal Society of London,” “An Essay on Quantity, occasioned
by reading a Treatise in which Simple and Compound Ratios are ap-
plied to Virtue and Merit.” Francis Hutcheson had spoken of the be-
nevolence of an agent—which with him constitutes virtue—as “propor-
tional to a fraction, having the moment of good for the numerator and
the ability of the agent for denominator.” I suspect that he meant this to
be little more than an illustration, and did not seriously propose to apply
mathematical demonstration to moral subjects. But Pitcairn and Cheyne
had been applying mathematical reasoning to medicine; and Reid thought
it of importance to show what it is that renders a subject susceptible of
mathematical demonstration. It is interesting to notice that the first pub-
lications both of Reid and Kant had a relation to mathematical subjects.
But it was the publication of Hume’s “Treatise of Human Nature” that
first directed his intellectual abilities to independent philosophic research.
In his “Essays on the Intellectual Powers,” published in 1785, he says,
“having long believed the prevailing doctrine of ideas, it came into my
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I for this doctrine, that all the objects of my knowledge are ideas of my
own mind? From that time to the present, I have been candidly and
impartially, as I think, seeking for the evidence of this principle; but can
find none, excepting the authority of philosophers.” It is clear that the
professors of King’s College put one so employed in the fitting place,
when, in 1752, they elected him professor of philosophy.
“Immediately on Dr. Reid’s appointment to the place of one of the
regents of King’s College, he prevailed on his colleagues to make great
improvements in their system of university education. The session was
extended from five to seven months; a humanity class was added, on a
higher scale than had been taught previously; and the teaching of the
elements of Latin, by the professor of humanity, discontinued; some of
the small bursaries were united, and an account of these alterations was
given to the public, in 1754. Dr. Reid was in favor of one professor
teaching the whole or the greater part of the curriculum, and therefore
did not follow the plan of confining the professors to separate branches,
as had been done in Glasgow since 1727, and at Marischal College
since 1723. The plan of a seven- months’ session, after a trial of five
years, was abandoned.”55
In Aberdeen he was surrounded by an able body of colleagues in the
two universities, by not a few thoughtful and accomplished men, minis-
ters and professional men of the town and neighborhood and he had
under him a succession of shrewd students, whom he conducted, in a
series of years, through all the higher branches. He managed to bring
together the literary and scientific men by means of the famous “Aber-
deen Philosophical Society,” which he was the main instrument in found-
ing, and which helped to call forth and combine what may be called the
Aberdeen branch of the Scottish philosophy. To that society he contrib-
uted a series of papers containing most of the views which were after-
wards embodied in the work which established his reputation, “An In-
quiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense.” That
work was published in 1764.
In the end of 1763, he was invited by the University of Glasgow to
the professorship of moral philosophy there, and entered upon his duties
the following year. In this new sphere he confined his instructions to the
intellectual and active powers of man, and unfolded a system of ethics
comprising some general views with respect to natural jurisprudence
and the fundamental principles of politics; he delivered, besides, a few
lectures on rhetoric to an advanced class. We have here a sketch of him188/James McCosh
by his most distinguished pupil and biographer: “In his elocution and
mode of instruction there was nothing peculiarly attractive. He seldom,
if ever, indulged himself in the warmth of extempore discourse; nor was
his manner of reading calculated to increase the effect of what he had
committed to writing. Such, however, was the simplicity and perspicu-
ity of his style, such the gravity and authority of his character, and such
the general interest of his young hearers in the doctrines which he taught,
that, by the numerous audiences to which his instructions were addressed,
he was heard, uniformly, with the most silent and respectful attention.
On this subject I speak from personal knowledge, having had the good
fortune during a considerable part of the winter of 1772 to be one of his
pupils.”
We have preserved letters56 of his to his old Aberdeen friends, Dr.
Andrew Skene and Dr. David Skene, which give us glimpses of the
Glasgow college life of the period.—“Glasgow, Nov. 14, 1764. I must
launch forth in the morning so as to be at the college (which is a walk of
eight minutes), half an hour after seven o’clock, when I speak for an
hour, without interruption, to an audience of about a hundred. At eleven,
I examine for an hour upon my morning prelection, but my audience is
little more than a third part of what it was in the morning. In a week or
two, for three days of the week, I have a second prelection at twelve,
upon a different subject, when my audience will be made up of those
who hear me in the morning, but do not attend at eleven. My hearers
attend my class two years at least. The first session they attend the
morning prelection and the time of examination at eleven; the second
and subsequent years they attend the two prelections, but not the hour of
examination. They pay fees for the first two years; and then they are
cives of that class, and may attend gratis as many years as they please.
Many attend the moral philosophy class four or five years, so that I
have many preachers and students of divinity and law of considerable
standing, before whom I stand in awe to speak without more prepara-
tion than I have leisure for. I have great inclination to attend some of the
professors here, several of whom are very eminent in their way, but I
cannot find much leisure. Much time is consumed in our college in busi-
ness meetings, of which we have, commonly, four or five in the week.
We have a literary society once a week, consisting of the masters and
two or three more, where each of the members has a discourse once in
the session. The professors of humanity, Greek, logic, and natural phi-
losophy, have as many as I have, some of them more. All the otherThe Scottish Philosophy/189
professors, except one, teach at least one hour a day, and we are no less
than fourteen in number. The hours of the different professors are dif-
ferent, so far as can be, that the same student may attend two or three, or
perhaps more, at the same time. Near a third part of our students are
Irish. Thirty came over lately in one ship, besides those that went to
Edinburgh. We have a good many English, and some foreigners. Many
of the Irish, as well as Scotch, are poor and came up late to save money,
so that we are not fully convened, though I have been teaching ever
since the 10th of October. Those who pretend to know say that the num-
ber of students this year, when fully convened, will amount to 300. The
masters live in good habits with one another, and manage their political
differences with good manners, although with a good deal of intrigue
and secret caballing when there is an election.”
A year after we have another picture of his collegiate position. “Our
college is considerably more crowded than it was last session. My class
indeed is much the same as last year, but all the rest are better. I believe
the number of our students of one kind or other may be between four
and five hundred. But the College of Edinburgh is increased this year
much more than we are. The professor, Ferguson, is indeed as far as I
can judge a man of noble spirit, of very elegant manners, and has a very
uncommon flow of eloquence. I hear he is about to publish, I do not
know under what title, a natural history of man, exhibiting a view of
him in the savage state, and in the several successive states of pastur-
age, agriculture, and commerce.” “The most disagreeable thing in the
teaching part is to have a great number of stupid Irish teagues who
attend classes for two or three years, to qualify them for teaching schools
or being dissenting teachers. I preach to these as St. Thomas did to the
fishes. I do not know what pleasure he had in his audience; but I should
have none in mine if there was not in it a mixture of reasonable crea-
tures. I confess I think there is a smaller portion of these in my class this
year than there was the last, although the number on the whole was not
less. I have long been of opinion that in a right constituted college there
ought to be two professors for each class,—one for the dunces, and
another for those who have parts. The province of the former would not
be the most agreeable; but perhaps it would require the greatest talents,
and therefore ought to be accounted the post of honor. There is no part
of my time more disagreeably spent than that which is spent in college
meetings, of which we have often five or six a week.” “These meetings
are become more disagreeable by an evil spirit of party, that seems to190/James McCosh
put us in a ferment; and I am afraid will produce bad consequences.”
We have here glimpses of the evils arising from the college patronage
being so largely vested in a limited self-elected body, who turned it to
party and family ends. As to the roughness of the Irish teagues (colts)
which seems partly to have amused, and partly to have alarmed him, the
blame of it is partly to be charged on the college itself, which received
these students too eagerly, and allowed them to graduate too easily after
a shorter period of attendance than the Scottish youths. The Presbyte-
rian youth of Ulster-shut out from Dublin University, owing to its sec-
tarian character—received from Glasgow, if not a refined, a very useful
education, which enabled them, as ministers, doctors, and teachers, to
raise their province above the other districts of Ireland in industry and
intelligence.
As it is interesting to notice the Aberdeen philosopher’s view of the
frolicsome Irish youth, so it is instructive to observe the estimate by the
Aberdeen moderate of the Calvinistic religion of the land of the cov-
enant. Writing to Aberdeen, July 13, 1765: “I think the common people
here and in the neighborhood, greatly inferior to the common people
with you. They are Boeotian in their understandings, fanatic in their
religion, and clownish in their dress and manners. The clergy encourage
this fanaticism too much, and find it the only way to popularity. I often
hear a gospel here which you know nothing about; for you neither hear
it from the pulpit nor will you find it in the Bible.” Possibly this gospel
was the very gospel of grace so valued by the people of the west of
Scotland. It is possible, too, that at this time, when the contest between
the refined moral system and the evangelical system was the closest and
keenest, Dr. Reid may have been kept at a distance from the latter. In
another letter he sees some of the more favorable features of the western
character. “The common people have a gloom in their countenance which
I am at a loss whether to ascribe to their religion or to the air and cli-
mate. There is certainly more of religion among the common people in
this town than in Aberdeen, and although it has a gloomy enthusiastic
cast, yet I think it makes them tame and sober. I have not heard either of
a house or head broke, of a pocket pict [picked], or of any flagrant
crime, since I came here. I have not heard any swearing in the streets,
nor seen a man drunk (excepting, inter nos, one prof——r), since I
came here.” The Aberdeen moderate is not prepossessed in favor of the
west-country religion, but testifies in behalf of the west-country moral-
ity. He has an idea that the morality may somehow be connected withThe Scottish Philosophy/191
the religion; and possibly he might have seen more amiability and cheer-
fulness in the piety of the common people had he come in closer contact
with it. It is significant that the drunk man is to be found in the class
which had risen above the national faith. We shall have to look at a very
different picture half a century later, when Chalmers begins his moder-
ate regime labors in Glasgow. By that time, under the regime, both mo-
rality and religion have disappeared from the region (Drygate) in which
Reid lived. The Glasgow professors may not have been directly respon-
sible for the growing wickedness; but there was nothing in their teach-
ing, moral or theological, adequate to the task of purifying the pollution
coagulating all around them.
There are indications in these letters of the interest taken by Reid in
every sort of scientific pursuit. He confidentially reports to Dr. David
Skene Dr. Black’s theory of heat before it was made known to the world.
He is aiding a Turin professor of medicine who comes to Glasgow in his
inquiries about the petrifaction of stones. He sends philosophical instru-
ments to his friends in Aberdeen (Feb. 25, 1767). “For my part, if I
could find a machine as proper for analyzing ideas, moral sentiments,
and other materials belonging to the Fourth Kingdom, I believe I should
find in my heart to bestow the money for it. I have the more use for a
machine of this kind, because my alembic for performing these opera-
tions—I mean my cranium—has been a little out of order this winter by
vertigo, which has made my studies go on heavily, though it has not
hitherto interrupted my teaching.”
Thus flowed along, quietly and honorably, the remaining days of
Dr. Reid. He corresponded with Lord Kames and Dr. James Gregory on
such subjects as liberty, cause, motives, and volition. The letters have
been published. Many of them are controversial, but they are conducted
in an admirable spirit. He wrote a number of papers of some value,
apparently for the literary society of Glasgow. In particular, be has “Some
Observations on the Modern System of Materialism,” meaning by Ma-
terialism that advanced by Dr. Priestley in his “Disquisitions relating to
Matter and Spirit” (1777), and “A free Discussion of the Doctrines of
Materialism and Philosophical Necessity” (1777). This paper appears
in no fewer than five forms, showing what pain she had taken with it.
One or two of the forms look like mere notes or preparations, the other
three are fully written out. It is of a thorough and searching character,
distinguished for acuteness beyond almost any of his published writ-
ings, and written with great point and naivete. He also wrote “Miscella-192/James McCosh
neous Reflections on Priestley’s Account of Hartley’s “Theory of the
Human Mind.” He speaks with great fondness and respect of Hartley,
but shows that his doctrines were unfounded hypotheses. He is severe
upon Priestley’s application of Hartley’s theories, and examines the at-
tempt to explain the memory, and the mental faculties generally, and the
passions and volitions, by association.57 But the principal work of his
declining life consisted in writing his “Essays on the Intellectual Powers
of Man,” published in 1785, and the “Essays on the Active Powers,”
which appeared in 1788.
Underneath the calm, unpretentious demeanor, there was a deep
fountain of devout feeling ready to burst out on certain occasions. Again
we are told that, in dispensing the sacrament of the Lord’s supper, he
could not refer to the love of Christ without tears running down his
eyes.58 In the autumn Of 1796, he had repeated strokes of palsy, and he
died Oct. 7th. His daughter Mrs. Carmichael writes: “His piety and
resignation never forsook him in times of deepest affliction, and in all
his distress during his last illness. Such is the blessed effect of the power
of religion, and of a conscience void of offence towards God and man.”59
Turning now to the philosophy of Reid, we find it distinguished
throughout by independence of thought and a love of truth. He admires
the genius of those who were rulers in the world of speculation in his
time, but he does not follow them. He might have been inclined to do so,
but he was staggered by the consequences which had been drawn by
Hume; and this led him to review the philosophy that prevailed in his
time, and which claimed as its authors the illustrious names of Descartes,
Locke, and Berkeley. The consequence is, that his works, though ex-
pository throughout, have all along a polemical front, but always bear-
ing a calm, a polite, and benignant aspect. We cannot understand his
philosophy, and we cannot appreciate his originality, unless we bear
this circumstance in mind, which, I may add, we are not likely to forget,
as he is constantly referring to some one or other of these authors. He
claims credit in regard to two points,—one in examining and under min-
ing the ideal theory of sense-perception, the other in establishing the
doctrine of common sense. These are the topics on which I mean chiefly
to dwell in the exposition and criticism of his two works.
His “Inquiry” is occupied almost exclusively with the senses. It is
one of the excellencies of his philosophy as compared with those that
have gone before, and most of those that have appeared since his time,
that he so carefully inquired into these original inlets of knowledge. InThe Scottish Philosophy/193
doing so, he shows that be is acquainted with all that had been done in
physiology down to his time, and that he had been in the way of making
original observations. He goes over the senses one by one, beginning
with the simpler, smelling and tasting; and going on to the more com-
plex, hearing, touch, and seeing. Under smelling he announces a num-
ber of general principles applicable to all the senses, as in regard to
sensation considered absolutely, and the nature of judgment and belief.
Under hearing he speaks of natural language; and under touch, of natu-
ral signs and primary qualities. He dilates at greatest length on sight:
discussing such topics as color, visible figure, extension, the parallel
motion of the eyes, squinting, and Berkeley’s theory of vision. He treats
them physiologically, so far as physiology could then carry him; but he
treats them also, which so many later German and British psychologists
do not, in the light of the revelations of consciousness. He takes up the
same subject in the earlier parts of his “Essays.”
“All philosophers, from Plato to Hume, agree in this that we do not
perceive external objects immediately, and that the immediate object of
perception must be some image present to the mind.” He shows that no
solid proof has been advanced of the existence of the ideas; that they are
a mere fiction and hypothesis, contrived to solve the phenomena of the
human understanding; that they do not at all answer this end; and that
this hypothesis of ideas or images of things, in the mind or in the senso-
rium, is the parent of foolish paradoxes.
Let us try to determine precisely his doctrine as to perception by the
senses. Negatively: he denies, first, that we perceive by means of ideas,
in the mind or out of it, coming between the mind and the material object
perceived; secondly, that we reach a knowledge of the external object by
means of reasoning; and, thirdly, that, in order to the conception of any
thing it is necessary to have some impression or idea in our minds which
resembles it, particularly setting himself against the doctrine of Locke,
that our ideas of the primary qualities are resemblances of them. What
he advances on these points seems to me clear, full, and satisfactory. He
has done special service to philosophy by removing these confusing and
trouble some intermediaries which were called ideas. It may be that the
great body of philosophers had not drawn out for their own use such a
doctrine of ideas as Reid exposes; it may be that some of them, if the
question had been put to them, would have denied that they held any
such doctrine; it may be, as Hamilton has tried to show, that some few
held a doctrine of perception without ideas: but I believe that Reid was194/James McCosh
right in holding that mental philosophers generally did bring in an idea
between the mind perceiving and the external object; that some objecti-
fied the internal thought, and confounded it with the object perceived
that others created an image in the mind or in the brain and that some
had not clearly settled what they meant by the term they employed. I
believe he is right when he says generally, that “ideas being supposed to
be a shadowy kind of beings, intermediate between the thought and the
object of thought, sometimes seem to coalesce with the thought, some-
times with the object of thought, and sometimes to have a distinct exist-
ence of their own.” I am sure that the discussion in which he engaged
has been of great utility in compelling those philosophers who still use
the word “idea” to tell us what they mean by it, and of still greater utility
in leading so many to abandon the use of the phrase altogether in strictly
philosophic investigations.
I am not to enter deeply into the interminable discussions as to the
sense in which the word “idea” has been used by Descartes and Locke.
Hamilton says that by the phrase Descartes “designated two very differ-
ent things; viz., the proximate bodily antecedent and the mental conse-
quence.” (“Works,” p. 273.) As to the meaning which Locke attached to
the term, I must content myself with referring to the discussions of
Stewart, Brown, and Hamilton. After reading these with care, I am con-
vinced that the following observations of Reid are as just as they are
important: “Perhaps it was unfortunate for Mr Locke that he used the
word idea so very frequently as to make it very difficult to give the
attention necessary to put it always to the same meaning. And it appears
evident that, in many places, be means nothing more by it but the notion
or conception we have of any object of thought; that is, the act of the
mind in conceiving it, and not the object conceived.” But then he fre-
quently uses it to signify “the images of external things in the mind.”
“There is a third sense in which he uses the word not unfrequently,—to
signify objects of thought that are not in the mind, but external.” “Thus
we see that the word idea has three different meanings in the ‘Essay;’
and the author seems to have used it sometimes in one, sometimes in
another, without being aware of any change in the meaning. The reader
slides easily into the same fallacy, that meaning occurring most readily
to his mind which gives the best sense to what he reads.” It is specially
true of Locke what Reid affirms generally: “The way in which philoso-
phers speak of ideas seems to imply that they are the only objects of
perception “(p. 263).The Scottish Philosophy/195
The service which Reid has done to philosophy by banishing these
intermediaries between perception and its external object cannot be over-
estimated. He has also been successful in proving that it cannot be by a
process of reasoning that we reach the conception of, and belief in, the
existence of body. There is nothing in any organic affection of the nerves
or brain, nothing in the sensation in the mind, to entitle us to believe in
an extended resisting object. He also deserves great credit for showing
so clearly that the conceptions of the qualities of matter are not to be
supposed to have a resemblance to the qualities themselves. Locke ac-
knowledges as to the secondary qualities of matter that the ideas are not
to be regarded as being like them; but he still talked of ideas of the
primary qualities as being resemblances. This may have been little else
than loose language on the part of Locke, to indicate that there was a
correspondence or relation of some kind; but it was desirable to correct
it, as it was fitted to convey a very erroneous impression. In a later age,
Hamilton exposed thoroughly the more general error, that like can only
influence like, and that like can only be known by like. It is dishearten-
ing to think how much of the energy of our greatest thinkers has been
spent in correcting errors which other great thinkers have introduced. It
looks as if it were only by a continued struggle that truth is to gain a
victory over error.
He has not been so successful in establishing a doctrine of his own
as in opposing the errors of others. But his view of perception, whether
we approve of it or not, can be understood by us. He maintains that
there is first a sensation in the mind, and that this sensation suggests a
perception. The word suggestion to denote the rise of a thought in the
mind, was employed by earlier philosophers, but was adopted by Reid
from Berkeley, who again took it from Locke. Reid maintains that there
are natural suggestions; particularly that sensation suggests the notion
of present existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel does
now exist; that memory suggests the notion of past existence, and the
belief that what we remember did exist in time past; and that our sensa-
tions and thoughts do also suggest the notion of a mind, and the belief of
its existence and of its relation to our thoughts. By a like natural prin-
ciple it is, that a beginning of existence, or any change in nature, sug-
gests to us the notion of a cause and compels our belief in its exist-
ence.... And, in like manner, certain sensations of touch, by the constitu-
tion of our nature, suggest to us extension, solidity, and motion.”
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of suggestion is his doctrine of natural language and signs,—a phrase-
ology also taken from Berkeley. He maintains that there are natural
signs, “which, though we never had any notion or conception of the
thing signified, do suggest it, or conjure it up, as it were by a natural
kind of magic, and at once give us a conception and create a belief in it.”
He calls “our sensations signs of external objects.” The operations are
represented by him as “simple and original, and therefore inexplicable,
acts of the mind.”
The whole account seems to me unsatisfactory, nearly as much so
as the ideal hypothesis. There is no evidence that sensation comes be-
fore perception. The two are thus distinguished by Reid: “When I smell
a rose, there is in this operation both sensation and perception. The
agreeable odor I feel, considered by itself, without relation to any exter-
nal object, is merely a sensation.” The quality in the rose which pro-
duces the sensation “is the object perceived, and that act of my mind by
which I have the conviction and belief of this quality is what I call
perception.” (310.) These two seem to me to constitute one concrete act,
and they can be separated only by a process of abstraction. There is not
first a sensation of a colored surface, and then a perception of it; but we
have the two at once. This does away with the necessity of signs and
suggestions, which might be quite as troublesome intermediaries as ideas.
It would be better to say that, upon certain affections of sense being
conveyed to the mind, it knows (this is a better phrase than conceive, or
than believe in at once the colored surface.
Hamilton, when he began to edit Reid, thought that Reid’s doctrine
was the same as his own. But, as he advances, he sees that it is not so;
and he comes to doubt whether, after all, Reid held the doctrine to which
he himself adhered so tenaciously, that of immediate perception. Reid
does, indeed, represent perception as immediate; meaning that it is di-
rect, and with out a process of reasoning. Yet he tells us that, “although
there is no reasoning in perception, yet there are certain means and in-
struments, which, by the appointment of nature, must intervene between
the, object and our perception of it; and by these our perceptions are
limited and regulated.” Surely Hamilton himself will admit that there
are such means in the action of the senses, of the nerves, and the brain,
without which there can be no perception. Reid indeed calls in more of
such anterior processes than Hamilton does; in particular, he calls in
signs and suggestions, and makes sensation come before perception.
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men do, that there are processes prior to the perception, both agree that
when the mind is perceiving, it is perceiving not an idea, or even a sen-
sation or suggestion, but an external extended object.
On one point, however, and this not an unimportant one, Reid and
his commentator do differ; and that is as to what should be represented
as the object of perception. Locke means by idea, “whatever is the ob-
ject of the understanding when it thinks.” But the word object, in such a
connection, may be as ambiguous as idea. Reid speaks of the stars as
the objects before the mind when we look into the heavens. Hamilton
says that the object is the rays of light reaching the eye. He maintains
that in perception the proper object is not a distant one, but is either the
organism or the objects in contact with the organism. Physiological re-
search seems to show that in this respect Hamilton is right. But still it is
true that, whatever be the immediate object, the distant star, and not the
rays of light, does become, always by an easy process of observation
and inference, the main object contemplated. The two are agreed that
the object is an external extended one; is, in short, a natural object, and
not an idea in the mind, or a modification of the mind.
Let us attend a little more carefully to the view which he gives of
perception proper. “If, therefore, we attend to that act of our mind which
we call the perception of an external object, we shall find in it these
three things: First, some conception or notion of the object perceived;
secondly, a strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present
existence; thirdly, that this conviction and belief are immediate, and not
the effect of reasoning.” (“Works,” p. 258.) The two first of these he
discovers by an analysis of the concrete act. They are not happily ex-
pressed. The better statement is, that in perception we know at once the
object; and this knowledge embraces what he calls the “notion” or “con-
ception,”—phrases which should be reserved for the abstract and gen-
eral notions which are formed by a subsequent discursive process,—
and also what he calls the conviction and belief, which latter phrase
should be confined, I think, to the conviction which we have of objects
not now present, to objects of faith as distinguished from objects of
sight or sense generally. By giving this account we are saved from being
obliged to represent such ideas as extension as concomitants of our per-
ceptions. The correct statement is that, by sight and touch,—I believe
by all the senses,—we know objects as extended; and we can then sepa-
rate, by abstraction, the extension from the other parts of our concrete
cognition, and can also inquire what intuitive convictions are involved198/James McCosh
in it. Hamilton, venturing “a step beyond Reid and Stewart, no less than
Kant” has fallen into the awkwardness of calling in both an a priori
conception with Kant, and an a posteriori perception with Reid. (p.
126.) Our cognition of extension is just one experience, but involves
certain intuitive convictions.
Reid, like Locke, draws the distinction between the primary and
secondary qualities of matter; but he grounds it on a different principle.
According to Locke, primary qualities are “such as are utterly insepa-
rable from the body in what state soever it be.” (“Essay” II, 8.) Accord-
ing to Reid, “the distinction is this, that our senses give us a direct and
a distinct notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what they are in
themselves. But of the secondary our senses give us only a relative and
obscure notion. They inform us only that they are qualities that affect us
in a certain manner; that is, produce in us a certain sensation: but, as to
what they are in themselves, our senses leave us in the dark.” He says
more expressly: “Of some things, we know what they are in themselves:
our conceptions of such things I call direct. Of other things, we know
not what they are in themselves, but only that they have certain proper-
ties or attributes, or certain relations to other things: of these our con-
ception is only relative.” (p. 513.) Hamilton remarks that “by the ex-
pression, ‘what they are in themselves,’ in reference to the primary quali-
ties, and of ‘relative notion’ in reference to the secondary, Reid cannot
mean that the former are known to us absolutely and in themselves; that
is, out of relation to our cognitive faculties.” (pp. 313, 314) Certainly
Reid was not dealing with such ideas as the absolute, and things “out of
relation to our faculties:” these are phrases and distinctions belonging to
a very different philosophy. He means that, when we look on a material
object, we are led to believe it to be extended; whereas, when we expe-
rience the sensation of heat, we simply know that there must be an ex-
ternal object causing it, without knowing what it is. When physical sci-
ence shall have thrown farther light on the qualities of bodies, I should
like to have the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities
of bodies reviewed by a competent philosopher. For the present, the
distinction, as drawn by Reid, seems to me to be upon the whole the
best: “The notion we have of primary qualities is direct, and not relative
only.” Hamilton might have done well, in reference to his own theory of
relativity, to ponder the statement of Reid: “A relative notion of a thing
is, strictly speaking, no notion of the thing at all, but only of some rela-
tion which it bears to something else.”The Scottish Philosophy/199
The substance of the “Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man,”
was delivered annually, for more than twenty years, in lectures to his
class in the University of Glasgow, and for several years before in Ab-
erdeen. He commences with such topics as the explication of words,
principles taken for granted, analogy, the proper means of knowing the
operations of the mind, the difficulty of attending to the operations of
the mind, on all of which he has remarks characterized by much sound
sense and fitted to be eminently useful to those entering on the study of
the human mind. He closes Essay I with a classification of the mental
powers: (1) The powers we have by means of our external senses; (2)
Memory; (3) Conception; (4) The power of resolving and analyzing
complex objects, and compounding those that are simple; (5) judging;
(6) Reasoning; (7) Taste; (8) Moral perception; and, last of all, con-
sciousness. may offer a few remarks on each of these.
Perception. After the full discussion in which we have been en-
gaged in reviewing his “Inquiry,” it is not needful to dwell on this sub-
ject. A large portion of Essay II. is occupied with a review of the “sen-
timents of philosophers about the perception of external objects,” such
as the Peripatetics, Malebranche, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume,
Arnauld, and Leibnitz. His account of the opinions of these men is marked
by great conscientiousness and candor: it is generally clear, often search-
ing, always characterized by plain sense, at times superficial and mis-
taken. Hamilton has shown that Reid has fallen into gross blunders from
not having mastered, as a whole, the higher speculative systems, such
as those of Aristotle, Descartes, and Leibnitz. Hamilton’s notes should
always be read with Reid’s exposition. These notes are as valuable for
their logical acumen and erudition, as the text is for its independence
and its homely sense.
Memory. His analysis of this power, which will be found to contain
such elements as retention, phantasy, association, and recognition, is
not at all searching. But he is successful in showing that it is an original
faculty, and he has a number of useful, though somewhat superficial,
remarks upon its mode of operation. He describes memory as giving us
an immediate knowledge of things past, which leads to a very severe
criticism by Hamilton, who remarks that an immediate knowledge of
things past is a contradiction. But Reid does not use the word ‘immedi-
ate’ in the same rigid sense as Hamilton: all that he means is that, in our
recognition of the past, there is no reasoning or any other discursive
process. Hamilton is right when he says that the immediate object be-200/James McCosh
fore the mind is a phantasm or representation in the mind; but it is also
true that in memory we go intuitively, beyond the representation in the
mind, to the past occurrence which it represents. Reid says that “our
notion of duration, as well as our belief in it, is got by the faculty of
memory.” Whereon Hamilton remarks that this is to make “time an
empirical or generalized notion,” and then tells us that time is a neces-
sary notion, arising on the occasion of experience. But Reid’s doctrine
is the more correct of the two. In every act of memory we have the
remembrance of an event in time past, and have thus the idea of time in
the concrete, and get the idea of time in the abstract by separating the
time from the event; and upon reflection we discover that there are nec-
essary convictions involved in our belief in time. Reid’s account of the
idea of time, though not exhaustive, is thus correct so far as it goes. By
not calling in a faculty of recognition, Hamilton has not been able to
show how we get the idea of time, and has been obliged with Kant to
make it some sort of a priori form.
Conception. Under this phrase he includes three things. They are
either the conceptions of individual things, the creatures of God; or they
are conceptions of the meaning of general words; or they are the crea-
tures of our own imagination.” He has sensible remarks as to each of
these, but not a good nomenclature to indicate the distinctions. It is in
this essay that he treats of the train of thought in the mind, which he
does in a superficial manner, compared even with his predecessors
Turnbull and Hutcheson.
Abstraction. He does not distinguish so carefully as he should have
done between the abstract and general notion. He has a glimpse of the
distinction between the comprehension and extension of a general con-
ception. “The species comprehends all that is in the genus, and those
attributes, likewise, which distinguish that species from others belong-
ing to the same genus, and, the more subdivisions we make, the names
of the lower become still the more comprehensive in their signification,
but the less extensive in their application to individuals.” (p. 391) In
regard to the subjects discussed by the nominalists, realists, and con-
ceptualists, he is a moderate conceptualist, dwelling fondly on the ne-
cessity of observing the points of resemblance in the objects placed in
the group. He has some good remarks on the formation of general no-
tions, but does not discover—what is, after all, the essential point—the
putting together in the class all the objects possessing the common at-
tribute, or attributes, fixed on. His realistic tendency is seen in the re-The Scottish Philosophy/201
mark: “When I speak of general notions, or general conceptions, I al-
ways mean things conceived, and not the act of the mind in conceiving
them.” (p. 404.)
Judgment. Under this head we are introduced to the full discussion
of his favorite subject, common sense, which he says means common
judgment. “We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is
to judge of things self-evident the second, to draw conclusions which
are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province
and the sole province of common sense; and therefore it coincides with
reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or
degree of reason.” (p. 425) He divides the principles of common sense
into two classes:—as they are contingent; or as they are necessary and
immutable, whose contrary is impossible.
I. Principles Of Common Sense Relating To Contingent
Truth
1. The existence of every thing of which I am conscious.
2. The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being
which I call myself, my mind, my person.
3 Those things did really happen which I distinctly remember.
4. Our own personal identity and continued existence as far back as we
remember distinctly.
5. Those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses,
and are what we perceive them to be.
6. We have some degree of power over our actions, and the determina-
tions of our wills.
7. The natural faculties by which we distinguish truth from error are not
fallacious.
8. There is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we con-
verse.
9. That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and
gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the
mind.
10. There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact,
and even to human authority in matters of opinion.
11. There are many events depending on the will of man in which there
is a self-evident probability, greater or less according to circumstances.
12. In the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like to
what has been in similar circumstances.202/James McCosh
II. Principles Relating To Necessary Truths
1. Grammatical; as, that every adjective in a sentence must belong to
some substantive expressed or understood.
2. Logical axioms; such as, any contexture of words which does not
make a proposition is neither true nor false.
3. Mathematical axioms.
4. Axioms in matters of taste.
5. First Principles in Morals; as, that an unjust action has more demerit
than an ungenerous one.
6. Metaphysical; as that,
a. The qualities which we perceive by our senses must have a
subject, which we all body; and that the thoughts we are conscious of
must have a subject, which we call mind.
b. Whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced
it.
c. Design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with
certainty from marks or signs of it in the effect.
The first remark I have to make on this scheme is, that it may be
doubted whether the distinction which he draws between contingent and
necessary truths is so profound as he would represent it. The test of the
latter is that “their contrary is impossible.” But is it not true of all the
truths of common sense when they are properly expressed, that their
contrary or rather contradictory is impossible? Thus take the case of the
intuitive conviction of our own existence. The conviction is not that I
must have existed, but that “I do now exist; “and of the contradictory of
this, “I do not now exist,” the conviction is as impossible as of the
contradictory of the metaphysical principle of substance and quality,—
namely, that this quality does not imply a substance.
Looking to the account as a whole, including the division and ar-
rangement, it seems to me sufficiently crude. Some of the principles
enumerated under the head of contingent truths have no claim to be
regarded as original laws of reason; such as the signification of sounds
of the voice, and gestures of the body, the belief in human testimony,
and the uniformity of nature. These seem rather to be the result of a
gathered experience, to which we may be impelled by natural inclina-
tion; and in all such cases the natural principle, which in the case of the
uniformity of nature is the principle of cause and effect, should haveThe Scottish Philosophy/203
been enunciated, and not the experiential rule. If these laws were prin-
ciples of reason, there could be no exceptions to them: but every one
knows that the sounds of the voice, and the expression of the counte-
nance, and human testimony, may deceive; and it is conceivable that the
present order of things may be changed “as a vesture.” I cannot see how,
under the head of principles relating to necessary truth, he should in-
clude convictions relating to so artificial a product as language. It may
be argued, I think, that the principle of design is a modification of the
principle of causality; that is, discovering design as an effect, we argue
an intelligent cause. By his loose statements he exposed himself to the
criticism of Priestley,60 who objects to our regard for testimony as being
a principle of common sense. “It is a long time before a child hears any
thing but truth, and therefore it can expect nothing else. The contrary
would be absolutely miraculous.” But while Reid may be justly charged
with a defect of critical analysis, and of categorical expression, he has
enunciated in a plain manner an immense body of important truth which
can be shown to have the sanction of intuitive reason.
The question has been much discussed, Where did Reid get the phrase
common sense? I believe it is not difficult to settle that question. The
phrase was introduced formally into philosophy by Shaftesbury, who,
however, shows that it was in use before. Reid has been charged with
borrowing it without acknowledgment from Buffier, who certainly em-
ploys it in much the same sense as Reid.61 But it might be argued with
greater show of reason, but yet with no sufficient reason, that Buffier,
who published his “First Truths “in 1717, took it from Shaftesbury or
those who were familiar with the writings of Shaftesbury, which be-
came known on the Continent at an early date. It is certain that by the
time of Reid the phrase was in constant use.62 Even Berkeley says that
“since his revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of na-
ture and common sense he found his understanding strangely enlight-
ened.” (Preface to “Dialogues.”) In the previous age philosophy had
taken up a number of extreme positions, and those who were not ready
to adopt them, and yet were not prepared to refute them by logic, were
everywhere appealing to common sense.
Notwithstanding the able and learned defence of the phrase by
Hamilton, I look upon it as an unfortunate one. The word sense seems to
associate the faculty with the bodily organism, with which certainly it
has no connection. Still the term was so frequently used by Locke,
Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, who all talked not only of a bodily but an204/James McCosh
internal sense, while the two latter called in a moral sense and a sense of
beauty, that it might, in accordance with established usage, be employed
to indicate that the sense common to all mankind is an original inlet of
knowledge,—an aspect often overlooked by those who represent it as an
a priori form or regulative principle. By employing the word,
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Reid meant to intimate that there are other
sources of ideas besides the external and internal senses, sensation and
reflection. The fundamental objection to the phrase “common sense” is,
that it is ambiguous. In saying so, I do not refer to the meaning attached
to it by Aristotle, who denoted by coin¾ asqhsij the knowledge im-
parted by the senses in common. This continued, for long, to be one of
the meanings of the phrase in philosophy; but by Reid’s time it was thus
known only to scholars. In the use which Reid makes of it, there is a
fatal ambiguity. It is employed to signify two very different things. It
denotes that combination of qualities which constitutes good sense, be-
ing, according to an old saying, the most uncommon of all the senses.
This valuable property is not common to all men, but is possessed only
by a certain number; and there are others who can never acquire it, and
it is always the result of a number of gifts and attainments, such as an
originally sound judgment and a careful observation of mankind and the
world. In this signification common sense is not to be the final appeal in
philosophy, science, or any other department of investigation; though in
all it may keep us from much error. Practical sense, as it claimed to be,
long opposed the doctrine of there being an antipodes and of the earth
moving; it spoke contemptuously in the first instance of some of the
greatest achievements of our world, the deeds of philanthropists, and
the sufferings of martyrs; it laughed at the early poetry of Wordsworth
and Tennyson. All that good sense can do in science and philosophy is
to guard us against accepting any doctrine till it is settled by inductive
proof.
But the phrase has another and a different signification in the philo-
sophical works, including Reid’s, of last century. It denotes the aggre-
gate of original principles planted in the minds of all, and in ordinary
circumstances operating in the minds of all. It is only in this last sense
that it can be legitimately employed in overthrowing scepticism, or for
any philosophic purpose. Reid seeks to take advantage of both these
meanings. He would show that the views he opposes, though supported
by men of high intellectual power,—such as Locke, Berkeley, and
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shown that he employs the phrase once and again to designate sound
practical judgment. He describes Newton’s “Regulae Philosophandi” as
“maxims of common sense.” (p. 97) He is constantly opposing common
sense to reason and philosophy; whereas he admits elsewhere, using the
phrase in the other sense that “philosophy has no other root but the
principles of common sense.” (p. 101) This dexterous attempt to com-
bine the two meanings, while perhaps contributing to the immediate
popularity of Reid, and still more of Beattie, turned in the end against
them (in the use of a two-edged sword, one edge is apt to wound him
who uses it) in the estimation of philosophic thinkers, who, looking on
the appeal as only to vulgar judgment, which may be prejudice, have
denied the validity of the argument.
Hamilton has succeeded, so I think, in showing that the argument as
employed by Reid is valid in itself, and legitimately used against scepti-
cism. His appeal is to principles in our constitution which all are obliged
to admit and act upon. But an appeal in a loose way to a sense supposed
to be in all men may be very illusive. In order to its philosophical appli-
cation, it must be shown that the principle is in all men as a necessary
principle; and this Reid has commonly done, though there are cases, we
have seen, in which he admits first principles too readily. But he should
have done more: it is only when we have carefully ascertained the pre-
cise nature of the original perception, and expressed it in a law, that we
are entitled to employ it in constructing a philosophy or in opposing
scepticism. As long as it is a mere loose appeal to an undetermined
principle, the argument may be very illusive. At this point Reid has
often failed, owing to a deficiency of logical power. What he calls in is
commonly a genuine mental principle; but, owing to his not furnishing a
rigid account of its nature and its laws, we may be in doubt whether the
application which he makes of it is legitimate. The important work of
Reid needs to be supplemented by an investigation, conducted in his
own careful manner, of the precise nature of the principles of common
sense, of their points of agreement and of difference, of their precise
laws and varied modes of action.
It is not easy to determine to what the appeal is ultimately to be in
the philosophy of Reid. It is to common sense: but in what signification?
Because it is a sense? Or because it is so constituted as to discern ob-
jects and truth? Or because it is common to all men? Or because we
must trust to it whether we will or no? It is not easy to ascertain what
would be Reid’s, or even Hamilton’s, answers to these questions. There206/James McCosh
are frequent passages in which Reid’s appeal seems to be to the consti-
tution of our minds (Hamilton’s ultimate test, like Kant’s, seems to be
necessity); for he says, we “cannot have a better reason for trusting
consciousness, than that every man, while his mind is sound, is deter-
mined by the constitution of his nature, to give implicit belief to it.” But
some one may ask, Why should we trust our constitution? May not our
constitution, common or individual, deceive us? Has Hume succeeded
in showing that our constitution followed out in different ways leads to
contradictions? To such questions Reid would have little else to say
than that we must attend to these principles of common sense; and this
would make his appeal to be, like that of Kant and Hamilton, to stern
necessity. It is worthy of being stated that, in his manuscript papers,63
an answer is attempted to some of these questions, and this of a more
satisfactory kind than any thing I have noticed in his published writings.
“As soon as this truth is understood, that two and two make four, I
immediately assent to it; because God has given me the faculty of imme-
diately discerning its truth, and if I had not this faculty, I would not
perceive its truth. The truth itself, therefore, does not depend on my
constitution; for it was a truth before my existence, and will be a truth,
although I were annihilated: but my perception evidently depends on my
constitution, and particularly upon my having, as a part of my constitu-
tion, that faculty, whether you call it reason or common sense, by which
I perceive or discern this truth.” “The truth of this proposition, that a
lion is a ravenous beast, depends on the constitution of a lion, and upon
nothing else.” In like manner as to right and wrong “although the recti-
tude or depravity has a real existence in this case, yet it cannot be dis-
cerned by a spectator who has not the faculty of discerning objects of
this kind.” “Evidence is the sole and ultimate ground of belief, and self-
evidence is the strongest possible ground of belief; and he who desires
reason for believing what is self-evident knows not what he means.”
Any one who would join into a consistent whole the various character-
istics referred to in this paper, and give each its exact place, will ad-
vance a step beyond Reid, and, I may add, beyond Hamilton. The ques-
tion occurs, Why has he not’ placed these statements in his published
works? Was it because he was not prepared to reduce them to a rigid
consistency, and was averse to utter anything which he could not stand
by in every respect?
It is also worthy of being noticed that, in one of the manuscripts, he
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analytic and synthetic judgments. The question is put, “Is there not a
difference between the evidence of some first principles and others?”
and he answers, “There are various differences. This seems to be one,
that, in some first principles, the predicate of the proposition is evi-
dently contained in the subject, as in this, two and three are equal to
five, a man has flesh and blood; for, in these and the like self-evident
principles, the subject includes the predicate in the very notion of it.
There are other first principles in which the predicate is not contained in
the notion of the subject, as when we affirm that a thing which begins to
exist must have a cause.” This last is an example of what Kant calls
synthetic judgments a priori. Reid, however, has not laid hold of the
distinction so firmly as Kant, nor did he see its importance, and elabo-
rate it so fully as the great German metaphysician. It is interesting to
notice these correspondences between the Scottish and German oppo-
nents of Hume.
I do not mean to dwell on the remaining portion of the essays, which
contain many sound remarks, but little that is fresh and novel.
Reasoning. This essay has nothing worthy of comment, except a
vigorous attempt to show, as against Locke, that morality is not capable
of demonstration.
Taste. He argues that “it implies an original faculty, and that it is in
the moral and intellectual perfections of mind, and in its active powers,
that beauty originally dwells.” In a letter to Rev. Archibald Alison, he
claims: “I am proud to think that I first, in clear and explicit terms, and
in the cool blood of a philosopher, maintained that all the beauty and
sublimity of objects of sense is derived from the expression they exhibit
of things intellectual, which alone have original beauty.” (p. 89) Possi-
bly this may be a pretty close approximation to the truth. It seems to me
to be a more just and enlightened view than that presented by Alison,
and those Scotch metaphysicians who refer beauty to the association of
ideas capable of raising feeling.
Active Power in General. He argues resolutely, that we have an
idea of active power, and examines the doctrines of Locke and Hume. It
does not appear to him that there can be active power “in a subject
which has no thought, no understanding, no will.” He maintains that
natural philosophy, even if brought to perfection, “does not discover the
efficient cause of any one phenomenon in nature.” He draws the distinc-
tion between efficient and physical causes. “A physical cause is not an
agent. It does not act, but is acted on, and is passive as to its effect.” (p.208/James McCosh
74.) He holds that it is the business of natural philosophy, to discover
physical cause. On this, Cousin remarks that “to pretend that all cause
is necessarily endowed with will and thought, is to deny all natural cause.”
The human race believes in the reality of natural causes: it believes that
the fire burns, that the fire is the cause of pain which we feel, etc.; and,
at the same time, according as it reflects, it attaches all natural causes to
their common and supreme principle.” When we discover a true physi-
cal cause, say that oxygen and hydrogen when joined in certain propor-
tions, produce water, intuitive reason leads to believe that there is prop-
erty, that is power, in the object; that the physical cause is truly an
efficient cause; and that the effect follows from a power in the agents.
Will. He is a strenuous advocate of free-will. “Every man is con-
scious of a power to determine in things which he conceives to depend
on his determination.” He draws the distinction between desire and will.
“The distinction is, that what we will must be an action, and our own
action: what we desire may not be our own action; it may be no action at
all. The following statement is taken from the manuscripts: “I grant that
all rational beings are influenced, and ought to be influenced, by mo-
tives. But the relation between a motive and the action is of a very
different nature from the relation between an efficient cause and its ef-
fect. An efficient cause must be a being that exists, and has power to
produce the effect. A motive is not a thing that exists. It is only a thing
conceived in the mind of the agent. Motives supply liberty in the agent,
otherwise they have no influence at all.” Such statements may not go
down to the depths of this deep subject, but they are worthy of being
considered and weighed.
Principles of Action. By which he means “every thing that makes
us to act.” He divides them into mechanical, animal and rational. Under
mechanical be includes instincts and habits. Under animal principles,
appetites and desires, benevolent affections and passions. The rational
embrace a regard to our good upon the whole, the notions of duty, rec-
titude, and moral obligation; and, in treating of these, he offers observa-
tions on conscience, maintaining that it is both an active and intellectual
power.
The Liberty of Moral Agents. He had entered on this subject in
treating of the will. He now discusses it more fully, showing that man
has a power over the determination of his own will, and that we have by
our constitution a natural conviction or belief that we act freely.
Morals. If he delivered nothing more to his class than is containedThe Scottish Philosophy/209
in this essay, it must have been a very defective system of moral phi-
losophy; but there is no reason to believe that he published all the in-
struction he conveyed in college. What he does say is always weighty.
He shows that there are first principles in morals, that an action deserv-
ing moral approbation must be done with the belief of its being morally
good. “Hence it follows necessarily that the moral goodness which we
ascribe to an action considered abstractly, and that which we ascribe to
a person for doing that action, are not the same.” He is careful to ex-
plain that “morality requires not only that a man should act according to
his judgment, but that he should use the best means in his power that his
judgment be according to truth,” thus pointing to a standard above the
judgment. He argues powerfully against Hume that justice is a natural,
and not a mere artificial, virtue. He maintains that we draw the senti-
ments of justice from conscience. That these sentiments are not the ef-
fects of education or acquired habits we have the same reason to con-
clude, as that our perception of what is true, and what is false, is not the
effect of education or acquired habits.” “By the conscience we perceive
a merit in honest conduct, and a demerit in dishonest, without regard to
public utility.” He is particularly successful in proving that a contract
implies an obligation, independent of the beneficial or prejudicial con-
sequences that may follow.
XXVII. The Aberdeen Philosophical Society64
This society deserves a special notice, as from it proceeded, directly or
indirectly, the greater number of the works of the Aberdeen metaphysi-
cians. The names of the members are worthy of being preserved, as they
were all men of ability. The original members were Dr. John Gregory,
Dr. David Skene, Mr Robert Trail, Mr George Campbell, Mr John Stew-
ard and Mr Thomas Reid. In 1758, were elected Mr Charles Gordon,
Mr Alexander Gerard, Mr John Farquhar (minister at Nigg), and Mr
John Kerr. In later years were elected Mr James Beattie in 1760, Dr.
George Skene in 1763, Mr W. Ogilvy in 1763, Mr James Dunbar in
1765, and Mr William Traill in 1766. Dr. Reid was secretary for the
first year. The society met twice a month, in the afternoon or evening, in
a tavern in one or other of the towns. We are amused at the provision
made by the philosophers for their bodily wants. There was an enter-
tainment, the expense of which was not to exceed eighteen pence a head;
the whole expense might be about ten shillings, of which one-half was
for a bottle of port, for punch and porter, the other half for the more210/James McCosh
solid eatables. It was a written rule, showing how anxious the grave
men were to secure propriety, that “any member may take a glass at a
by-table while the president is in the chair, but no health shall be drunk
during that time.” The meeting continued its sittings for three hours,
there being room for free conversation half an hour before, and half an
hour after, the president took or vacated the chair. The attendance may
have averaged half a dozen. The first meeting was held Jan. 12, 1758.
About 1772, the forfeits for nonattendance are getting heavy, and dis-
content is expressed. The minutes show a meeting so late as February,
1773, after which the society disappears.
The society was formed for the purpose of reading discourses or
dissertations, and making observations on the subjects of them, and of
discussing questions proposed and sanctioned. “The subjects of the dis-
courses and questions shall be philosophical; all grammatical, histori-
cal, and philological discussions being conceived to be foreign to the
design of this society [it is evident that they had no idea of the impor-
tance of philology]. And philosophical matters are understood to com-
prehend every principle of science, which may be deduced by just and
lawful induction from the phenomena either of the human mind, or of
the material world; all observations and experiments that may furnish
materials for such inductions; the examination of false schemes of phi-
losophy and false methods of philosophizing; the subserviency of phi-
losophy to arts, the principles they borrow from it, and the means of
carrying them to their perfection.”
It is interesting to notice that so many of the speculations of the
Aberdeen philosophers, afterwards given to the world in their published
writings, were first laid before this society. Thus Dr. Reid, on May 24,
1758, intimates that the subject of his discourse at next meeting (June
13) is to be “The philosophy of the mind in general, and particularly on
the perceptions we have by sight.” In 1760, he gives an analysis of the
senses, and a discourse on the sense of touch. On Jan. 26, 1762, he read
a discourse at the laying down of the office of president, on “Euclid’s
definitions and axioms.” On Oct. 11, 1762, Dr. Reid read a discourse,
which the society approved of; but he declined inserting it, in regard he
proposed soon to send it to the press, along with the other discourses he
had read before the society.
Gerard, too, discourses on his own subjects, from 1758 to 1771,
and reads a series of papers on genius, and a paper on the effect of the
passions on the association of our ideas. Between 1761 and 1768, beThe Scottish Philosophy/211
inquires: “What is peculiar to those Operations of the Mind of which we
can form some Ideas, and what distinguishes them from other Opera-
tions of the Mind of which we can form no Ideas? “He writes on the
Principles which determine our Degrees of Approbation in the Fine Arts;
upon the “Characters of Poetical Imagination; “upon the “Difference
between Common Sense and Reason;” and he gives a series of papers
on the “Universality and Immutability of the Moral Sentiment.” From
1761 to 1767, Dr. Campbell reads papers on “Eloquence; “on “The
Relation of Eloquence to Logic;” on “The Dependence of Eloquence on
Grammar.”
The other members take up cognate subjects. Traill takes “An Ab-
stract of a Discourse of M. Rousseau, of the Sourse [so spelled] of the
Inequality among Mankind.” Mr Gordon treats of “Memory and its In-
fluence in forming Characters among Men; “on the “Origin of Polythe-
ism;” on the Universal Belief in a Deity; on the “Existence and Perfec-
tions of the Supreme Being;” on “Language; “and on the “Alphabet.”
Farquhar reads on the “Imagination,” and a “Particular Providence.”
Dr. David Skene has a paper on “The Different Branches of Philoso-
phy,” particularly “The Study of the Nature and Philosophy of the Mind.”
Dr. Gregory discourses on “The Usefulness of Natural Philosophy” on
“The Prolongation of Human Life;” “The Retardation of Old Age; and
“The Foundation of Taste in Music.” Mr Ross takes up “The Use of the
Leaves of Plants;” and “The Methods of Classing Plants.” Professor
Stuart writes on the “Nature of Evidence” on “Mathematical Evidence;”
on the “Evidence of Experience;” and “Moral Evidence.” Dr. George
Skene reads on “The Abuse of Mechanical Reasoning in Natural Phi-
losophy.” Mr Traill discourses on “The Arrangement and Evidence of
Mathematics;” and Dunbar, on “The Union of King’s and Marischal
Colleges,” on “The Equality of Mankind,” and “The Influence of Place
and Climate upon Human Affairs.” Dr. David Skene has a paper on
“Happiness.” Surely there is proof here of great intellectual activity,
and of the keen interest felt in a wide range of subjects.
Most of the topics discussed turn round the various departments of
mental science and speculative philosophy. But it will be seen, from the
list of questions propounded for discussion, that they travelled over other
fields. Many of the discussions had a special reference to the new scep-
tical philosophy; so that Reid could write to Hume, March 18,1763:
“Your friendly adversaries, Drs. Campbell and Gerard, as well as Dr.
Gregory, return their compliments to you, respectfully. A little philo-212/James McCosh
sophical society here, of which all three are members, is much indebted
to you for its entertainment. Your company would, although we are all
good Christians, be more acceptable than that of Athanasius; and since
we cannot have you upon the bench, you are brought oftener than any
other man, to the bar; accused and defended, with great zeal, but with-
out bitterness. If you write no more in morals, politics, or metaphysics,
I am afraid we shall be at a loss for subjects.”
XXVIII. James Oswald
Priestley speaking of “a set of pretended philosophers, of whom the
most conspicuous and assuming is Reid,” says of Oswald, that he won-
ders how his “performance should have excited any other feeling than
that of contempt.” “As to Dr. Oswald, whom I have treated with the
least ceremony, the disgust his writings gave me was so great, that I
could not possibly show him more respect.” (“Examination of Dr. Reid’s
Inquiry.”) Oswald’s work is entitled “An Appeal to Common Sense in
behalf of religion.” The first volume appeared in 1766, and it reached a
second edition in 1768. The second volume was published in 1772. He
takes substantially the same line of defence as Reid; but the “Appeal” is
less pointed, and is vastly looser than Reid’s “Inquiry;” and one feels it
a dreary task to go through its platitudes. He entrenches himself behind
certain distinctions recognized in the age. “The distinction between the
occasion and cause of a thing is too considerable to be overlooked in a
philosophical inquiry. Sensation and reflection, do indeed give occasion
to all our ideas, but do not therefore produce them. They may in our
present state be considered as the sine qua non to our most rational and
sublime conceptions, but are not therefore the powers by which we form
them.” He opposes Lord Kames, and blames him for resting morality on
feeling, and Adam Smith for resting it on sympathy, whereas it should
be represented as founded on common sense. “Common sense perceives
and pronounces upon all primary truths with the same indubitable cer-
tainty with which we perceive and pronounce on objects of sense by our
bodily organs.” “By the discernment peculiar to rational beings we per-
ceive all primary truths, in the same manner as we perceive objects of
sense by our bodily organs.” “Primary truths of religion and morality
are as much objects of common sense as other primary truths.” In the
advertisement to the second volume, be mentions that some think that
this Appeal ought to have set out with a definition of common sense;
and be goes on to show that he does not mean by it common opinion,The Scottish Philosophy/213
just or unjust. He calls it the simple authority of reason, or that capacity
of pronouncing on obvious truth. “Reason requires our admitting pri-
mary truths on its authority, under the penalty of being convicted of
folly and nonsense, if we do not.” Oswald cannot be represented as
grappling with the deeper problems of metaphysics, as, for example,
with the question, whether the common sense is subjective or objective,
or whether it is subjective in one sense, as it is in the mind, and objective
in another sense, as the mind in many cases—not all, however—looks
to external objects. He seems to me to be right when he combines two
elements in moral apprehension: “we have a feeling, as well as percep-
tion, of moral excellence.” Dr. Oswald was born in Dunnet became min-
ister there (1727), and at Methven (1750), and died in 1793.
XXIX.  James Beattie66
James Beattie was born Oct. 25, 1735, at the north-east end of
Lawrencekirk, a village in the heart of the Howe of the Mearns in
Kincardineshire, where his father kept a retail shop, and rented a small
farm in the neighborhood. He was educated, as so many eminent
Scotchmen have been, at his parish school, and showed an early taste
for reading, especially books of poetry. In 1749, he entered Marischal
College, Aberdeen, where he competed for and received a bursary; and
there his classical tastes were at once discovered by Dr. Blackwell, and
there in coming years he studied philosophy under Dr. Gerard. In 1753,
he was appointed schoolmaster of the parish of Fordoun about six miles
from his native place, in a hollow at the base of the Grampians. He had
all along a taste for the beauties of nature; and his poetical genius was
kindled, and may have been partly guided into the direction which it
took, by the peculiar scenery of the country, where a fine rich plain
stretches out with a low range of hills overlooking the German Ocean on
the one side, and the lofty Grampians on the other. The tradition is, that
at this period of his life he would saunter in the fields or on the hills the
livelong night, watching the aspects of the sky and welcoming the ap-
proach of day, and that he was specially fond of wandering in a deep
and finely wooded glen in the neighborhood. While at this place he se-
cured friends and patrons in the parish minister, in Lord Monboddo and
Lord Gardenstone. The last named of these having seen some pieces of
his poetry in manuscript, and being in doubt whether they were entirely
the composition of so young a man, asked him to translate a passage of
Lucretius; whereupon Beattie retired into an adjoining wood, and pro-214/James McCosh
duced a translation in a very short time. While a schoolmaster at Fordoun,
he seems to have attended divinity lectures during several winters at
Aberdeen, with a view to the gospel ministry; but he soon relinquished
the pursuit. In 1757, he stood a competitive examination for the office
of usher in the grammar-school of Aberdeen, and was defeated; but so
satisfied were the judges of his qualifications that, on the office falling
vacant the following year, he was appointed to it without any farther
examination. In this more public position, his literary abilities became
known; and, through the influential friends whom he had acquired, be
was installed professor of moral philosophy and logic in Marischal
College in 1760. About this time he became a member of the Aberdeen
Club, and associated with such men as Reid, Campbell, John Gregory,
and Gerard.
As professor, he lectured and examined two or three hours every
day, from November to April, on pneumatology, embracing psychology
and natural theology; on speculative and practical ethics, economics,
jurisprudence, politics, rhetoric, and logic, with readings in Cicero and
others of the ancient philosophers. As a moral philosopher, he felt him-
self called to oppose the scepticism of which Hume was the champion.
It appears from letters of Dr. John Gregory, published in Forbes’s “Life
of Beattie,” that atheism and materialism were at that time in high fash-
ion, and were spouted by many who used the name of Hume, but who
had never read his works, and who were incapable of understanding
them. Reid had for years been examining the foundations of philosophy,
which Hume had been undermining, and published his “Inquiry” in 1764.
Beattie followed in 1770, with the Essay on “The Nature and Immuta-
bility of Truth.” This work was his principal study for four years: he
wrote it three times over, and some parts of it oftener. It had so rapid a
sale that, in 1771, a second edition was demanded; and, shortly after,
there were proposals to translate it into French, Dutch, and German.
While engaged in these severer labors, he was all the while cherishing,
what I suspect was to him the more congenial occupation, his taste for
poetry. So early as 1766, he is laboring in the style and stanza of Spen-
cer, at a poem in which he is to give an account of the birth, education,
and adventures of one of the old minstrels. The First Book of the “Min-
strel” was published anonymously in 1771, and a new edition of this
Book and the Second Book, with his name attached, in 1774. Beattie, it
may be acknowledged, stands higher as a poet than a philosopher. Some
of his poems are in the first rank of their kind.The Scottish Philosophy/215
The personal incidents in his remaining life worthy of being re-
corded are not numerous. In 1767, he had married Miss Mary Dunn,
who was inflicted with a tendency to mental disease, which broke out
first in a distempered mind, and afterwards in insanity, which greatly
distressed the kind husband, and compelled him at last to provide for
her living separate from him. His quiet life was varied by several visits
paid to London, where, as he became known by his works, he received
considerable attention and was introduced to many eminent literary men.
On two several occasions he had the honor of an interview with George
III, who had a great admiration of the character and object of his works,
and granted him a pension. The famous painter Sir Joshua Reynolds
took a fine portrait of him, with the “Essay on Truth” under his arm,
and above him a winged angelic being holding scales in one hand, as if
weighing truth, and with the other pushing three hideous figures, sup-
posed to represent Sophistry, Scepticism, and Folly (Reynolds meant
two of these to be Voltaire and Hume),66 who are shrinking away from
the light of the sun, beaming from the breast of the angel.
His defences of religion were highly esteemed by several of the bish-
ops and a number of the clergy of the Church of England, and he was
offered a rich living if he would take orders in that church. This he
declined, not because he disapproved of the doctrine or worship of the
Episcopal Church, but he was apprehensive that by accepting such pre-
ferment he “might strengthen the hands of the gainsayer and give the
world some ground to believe that the love of the truth was not quite so
ardent or so pure as he had pretended.” In 1773, Oxford University
conferred an honorary degree of LL.D. upon him. The same year, he
was offered the chair of moral philosophy in Edinburgh, but declined,
as he preferred Aberdeen as his sphere, and was indisposed to go to a
place where he would be in the heart of those he had attacked. His
declining days were embittered by trials, which sank deep into his soul;
such as the state of his wife, and the death first of one and then of the
other of his sons, one of them being a very promising young man, called
in early life to be his father’s assistant in the college.67 We discover
traces of irritation in his afflictions; and one could have wished to see
him sustained not only by what he sincerely entertained, a belief in provi-
dence and in the word of God, but in the peculiar doctrines of redemp-
tion and grace, so specially fitted to give comfort in trouble. He died
Oct. 5, 1802.
In person he was of a middle size, with something of a slouch in his216/James McCosh
gait; and in his latter years he was inclined to corpulency. He had dark
eyes, and a mild and somewhat pensive look. There is an account of his
life and writings in a work by Sir W. Forbes, in three volumes. It con-
tains many of his letters, which are full of criticisms of no great profun-
dity, and display at once the amiabilities and weaknesses of the author.
The following are the titles, with the dates, of his works: Poems
(1760) Essay on Truth (1770); Minstrel, B. I. (1771); B. II. (1774); on
Poetry and Music, on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition, on Classi-
cal Learning (1776); Dissertations on Memory and Imagination, on
Dreaming, on the Theory of Language, on Fable and Romance, on the
Attachments of Kindred, on Illustrations of Sublimity (1783); Evidences
of Christianity (1786) Elements of Moral Science (1790–93). He has
also Scotticisms, and original notes to an edition of Addison’s papers.
His poems will ever hold a place among the classical writings of
Great Britain. His “Minstrel” and his “Hermit” are exquisite poems of
their kind: simple, graceful, tender, and leaving a peaceful and peace-
giving impression on the mind; and therefore not likely to be appreci-
ated by those whose tastes were formed by the passionate and startling
style of poetry introduced in the next age by Byron, who was at school
in Aberdeen while Beattie was in his declining years. His prose works
do not exhibit much grasp or depth of thought, but are characterized by
much ease and elegance. In his lectures he dwelt fondly on style (“Ele-
ments of Mental Science,” part 10), and his remarks are clear and judi-
cious, though somewhat tame and commonplace, but not on that ac-
count the less useful. His criticism of the “Pilgrim’s Progress” may be
compared with that of Macaulay, written in a later age: “It was written
about a hundred and thirty years ago, while the author, who had been a
tinker, was in prison in Bedford, where he was confined twelve years.
Some false notions in theology may be found in it; and the style is vul-
gar, and savors of the author’s trade; but the fable is ingenious and
entertaining.” He everywhere holds forth Addison as the model English
writer. His own style is without the idiom, the playfulness, the
corruscations, the flexible windings by which the best papers of the
“Spectator” are characterized. In reading such a work as his “Moral
Science,” we feel as if we were walking along a road with pleasant grass
and corn fields on either side, but without a turn in it, and without a rock
or stream, without a hill or valley. His papers on literary subjects are
more attractive, as allowing free scope for his fine taste.
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divine origin. In his “Dissertation on the Imagination,” which is very
pleasantly written, he holds the theory, afterwards expanded by Alison,
that the feeling of beauty arises from the association of ideas. He begins
his “Elements of Moral Science” with psychology. He mentions the two-
fold division of the faculties into perception and volition, but says it is
not accurate, and adds affections, approaching thus to the threefold di-
vision adopted by Kant and Hamilton. He mentions nine perceptive fac-
ulties: external sensation, consciousness, memory, imagination, dream-
ing, speech, abstraction, reason (judgment or understanding), conscience.
I rather think he is right in giving speech a place among the native fac-
ulties, but we wonder to find dreaming there. His account of conscious-
ness is loose and popular, but he avoids the error of Dugald Stewart in
making it look merely at qualities, and of Kant in making it look merely
at phenomena. “Of the things perceived by this faculty, the chief is the
mind itself,” etc. He has often valuable remarks on the faculties. Thus,
under memory: “What we perceive by two senses at once has a good
chance to be remembered. Hence, to read aloud slowly and with propri-
ety, when one is accustomed to it, contributes greatly to remembrance;
and that which we write in a good hand, without contractions, with
dark-colored ink, exactly pointed and spelled, in straight lines, with a
moderate space between them, and properly subdivided into paragraphs
as the subject may require, is better remembered than what we throw
together in confusion. For by all these circumstances attention is fixed,
and the writing, being better understood, makes a deeper impression.
Those things, also, which are related in two or more respects are more
easily remembered than such as are related in one respect only. Hence,
by most people verse is more easily remembered than prose, because the
words are related in measure as well as in sense; and rhyme, than blank
verse, because the words are related not only in sense and measure, but
also by similar sounds at the end of the lines.” Some will think that the
students who listened to such prelections ranging over all the faculties,
and touching on a great variety of topics, esthetical and moral, might be
as much benefited as those who had to listen to the more scholastic
discussions of the German universities. He says that “laughter is occa-
sioned by an incongruity or unsuitableness of the parts that compose, or
seem to compose, any complex idea or object.”
The philosophical work by which Beattie was best known in his
own day, and by which be is still known by students, is his “Essay on
the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and218/James McCosh
Scepticism.” He quotes approvingly Reid’s “Inquiry,” and Campbell’s
“Philosophy of Rhetoric.” In an edition published in 1776 he replies to
some who had blamed him for borrowing some hints without acknowl-
edgment from Dr. Price, Dr. Oswald, and Buffier. “I beg to say that I am
to this hour totally unacquainted with that work of Dr. Price which is
alluded to, and that when I published the first edition of the ‘Essay on
Truth’ I was totally unacquainted with the writings of Buffier and Dr.
Oswald. I had heard, indeed, that the French philosopher used the term
‘common sense’ in a way similar to that in which I use it; but this was
only hearsay, and I have since found that, though between his funda-
mental opinions and mine there is a striking resemblance, his applica-
tion of that term is not entirely the same.” All I have to remark on this
statement is, that if he had not read those well-known works on the
subject of which he was treating he ought to have done so.
The work is pleasantly and pointedly written, and it had an immedi-
ate and wide circulation. It wants the depth and shrewdness of Reid’s
“Inquiry,” but on that account was better relished by many readers,
such as George III. The book is, throughout, a popular, rather than a
scientific one. His somewhat ad captandum appeals gained the ear of
those who had never been troubled with doubts, but rather turned away
those who wished to find the great sceptic met by an opponent worthy of
him.
His object is, first, to trace the several kinds of evidence up to their
first principles; second, to show that his sentiments are in accordance
with true philosophy and the principles of the most eminent philoso-
phers; and, third, to answer sceptical objections. He says it is difficult,
perhaps impossible, to give a definition of truth; but endeavors to give
such a description of it as may make others understand what we mean
by the word. He then tells us that he accounts “that to be truth which the
constitution of human nature determines a man to believe, and that to be
falsehood which the constitution of human nature determines man to
disbelieve.” This makes the ultimate appeal to be to man’s constitution;
and does not meet those who say that man’s constitution may be an
accretion of fortuitous agencies gathered in the course of ages, and may
lead us into partial or total falsehood. According to this definition, there
might be events without a cause in the constellation Orion, or at a “rea-
sonable distance beyond,” provided the constitution of the inhabitants
there had been determined by a different experience. He then distin-
guishes between truth perceived intuitively and truth perceived in con-The Scottish Philosophy/219
sequence of a proof, and enters upon a discussion as to the most appro-
priate terms to employ to designate these two kinds of truth. “We might
call the one ‘reason,’ and the other reasoning;’ but the similarity of the
terms would frequently occasion both obscurity and harshness in the
sound.” Henceforward he seems to use the words “reason “and “reason-
ing” as synonymous, and uses “reason” in the sense of “reasoning.” He
is quite aware of the ambiguity in the phrase “common sense;” but he is
to use it to denote that “faculty by which we perceive self-evident truth,”
and then distinguishes between common sense arid reason. This distinc-
tion between common sense and reason is no modern discovery, and he
proceeds to quote Aristotle’s account of axioms, principles, and com-
mon sentiments.
He starts the question, “By what criterion shall we know a senti-
ment of nature from a prejudice of education, a dictate of common sense
from the fallacy of an inveterate opinion?” It is clear that Reid must
often have had that question before him, but does not give a very articu-
late reply. Beattie answers it clearly, and I believe judiciously. “He takes
that for an ultimate principle which forces our belief by its own intrinsic
evidence, and which cannot by any reasoning be rendered more evi-
dent.” Here the main stress is laid, as I believe it ought, on self-evi-
dence, while necessity comes in secondarily; “it forces our belief by its
own intrinsic evidence,” a better account than that given by Leibnitz
and Kant, who put necessity, in the front. He illustrates his views by
mathematical evidence and the evidence of sense; and shows that they
agree, in both having the sanction of common sense. He argues that
analogy and testimony are principles of common sense; but he is in
evident difficulties when he is obliged to admit that both of these may
deceive. He draws a distinction between two kinds of truths, each intu-
itively certain. “It is a character of some that their contraries are incon-
ceivable; such are the axioms of geometry. But of many other intuitive
truths the contraries are inconceivable. ‘I do feel a hard body,’ ‘I do not
feel a hard body;’ these propositions are equally conceivable.” If we
would defend fundamental truth effectively, we must draw such distinc-
tions; but the main point here is to determine what we are led intuitively
to believe in the different cases. He shows convincingly, in opposition to
Locke, that self-evidence is not confined to propositions.
He sustains these principles pretty satisfactorily; but when he pro-
ceeds to apply them in a criticism of Berkeley and Hume, is not emi-
nently successful. He understands Berkeley, as he has been vulgarly220/James McCosh
understood, as denying the existence of matter; whereas Berkeley is
continually asserting that he believes firmly in the existence of matter;
only he regards it as having no existence, except as an idea, in a contem-
plative mind,—whereas our intuitive convictions represent it as having
a reality, so far, independent of the mind contemplating it. The conse-
quence is, that Beattie’s objections are felt by us as missing the point; as
when he argues that, if Berkeley’s doctrine be true, we should not run
out of the way of threatened danger. He delights to point out some petty
incongruities in Hume; but we see at once that he is not able to meet him
face to face, and to wrestle with him. He acknowledges the superior
abilities of Hume; but thinks the sceptics unworthy of any kind of re-
serve or deference, and maintains that their reasonings were not only
false but ridiculous, and that their talents as philosophers and logicians
were absolutely contemptible.
XXX. George Cambell68
We are still in an age in which young men belonging to county families
devoted themselves to the work of the ministry of the gospel. George
Campbell was the son of the Rev. John Campbell, a minister in Aber-
deen, and one of the Campbells of Westhall, who claimed to be cadets of
the house of Argyll. He was educated at the grammar-school, Aberdeen,
and at Marischal College; and, being destined by his family to the law,
he was apprenticed to a writer to the signet in Edinburgh. But he had a
strong disposition towards the church, and he attended divinity lectures
first in Edinburgh, and then in Marischal and in King’s, Aberdeen. He
was licensed to preach the gospel in 1746, and was settled as minister of
Banchory-Ternan on the banks of the Dee in I 748. He was translated to
a church in Aberdeen in 1757, and there (in 1758) became a member of
the famous Philosophical Society, and contributed papers which were
afterwards elaborated into volumes. In 1759, he was made principal of
Marischal College, and every one felt that he was worthy of the office
and fitted for it. In 1779, he was appointed professor of divinity in the
same college, as successor to Gerard. In his opening lecture he says: “It
is supposed that I am to teach you every thing connected with the study
of divinity.” “I am to teach you nothing; but, by the grace of God, I will
assist you to teach yourselves every thing.” He now resigned his city
charge; but, as minister of Grayfriars, an office conjoined with the pro-
fessorship, he preached every Sunday in one of the churches.
It is a curious coincidence that as Reid succeeded the Rev. JohnThe Scottish Philosophy/221
Bissett in Old Machar, so Campbell succeeded him in Aberdeen: the
earnest evangelical giving way in both cases to the cultured moderate.
From his entrance into Aberdeen he was much admired by the educated
and refined. The story is that some one told Gerard that he must now
look to his laurels, whereupon the old professor replied that the incomer
was indolent, a remark which was reported to Campbell, who profited
by it, and became remarkable for his diligence. It is certain that in his
later years he showed amazing industry in his literary pursuits. From
time to time he gave to the press sermons characteristic of the age: calm,
dignified, elegant, and moral, full of reverence, and carefully free from
all extravagance and fanaticism. One feels as if be should have been a
bishop delivering charges to his clergy, fitted to sustain the dignity of
the Church of England. His speaking is thus described The closeness,
the force, the condensed precision of his reasoning exceed the power of
description. Not a single superfluous word was used, no weak or doubt-
ful argument introduced.”
But he gave to the world more elaborate works. Hume’s influence
was now beginning to be felt, and in 1763, Campbell publicly entered
the lists against him, in “A Dissertation on Miracles.” Before publish-
ing the work, he transmitted through Dr. Blair a copy to Hume, who
writes him in his usual pleasant manner, not entering into controversy,
but stating how his own argument had occurred to him when a Jesuit
was plying him with some “nonsensical miracle.” In answering the scep-
tic, Campbell proposes to prove that testimony hath a natural and origi-
nal influence on belief antecedent to experience. He may be right in
saying that there is such a tendency,—I believe it to be hereditary in
children; but this can serve him very little in his argument, as it is not of
the nature of a necessary principle, and he is obliged to admit that testi-
mony often deceives, so that we are brought back, as Hume maintains,
to experience. But he is more successful when he shows that experience
can prove a miracle, and this notwithstanding that nature is uniform.
“For this purpose I make the following supposition. I have lived for
some years near a ferry. It consists with my knowledge that the passage-
boat has a thousand times crossed the river, and as many times returned
safe. An unknown man, whom I have just now met, tells me in a serious
manner that it is lost, and affirms that he himself saw the passengers
carried down the stream and the boat overwhelmed. No person who is
influenced in his judgment of things, not by philosophical subtleties, but
by common sense, a much surer guide, will hesitate to declare that in222/James McCosh
such a testimony I have probable evidence of the fact asserted.” The last
work published by him was “The Four Gospels, translated from the
Greek, with Preliminary Dissertations, and Notes Critical and Explana-
tory,” 1789, The translation, though elegant, is not idiomatic; but the
dissertations show a fine critical spirit. After his death, his “Lectures on
Ecclesiastical History,” his “Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pul-
pit Eloquence,” and his “Lectures on the Pastoral Character,” were pub-
lished. But in this work we have to look merely at the philosophical
discussions in his work on the “Philosophy of Rhetoric,” which was
commenced at Banchory, and published in 1776.
We have seen all throughout this history that the Scottish metaphy-
sicians following Shaftesbury were fond of speculating about beauty
and taste, and that all the Scottish thinkers at this time were anxious to
acquire an elegant style. Adam Smith for several years read lectures
with great eclat on rhetoric and belles-lettres in Edinburgh, under the
patronage of Lord Kames, and afterwards did the same in the class of
logic in Glasgow University. Lord Kames himself discussed like sub-
jects in his “Elements of Criticism.” The elegant preacher Dr. Hugh
Blair lectured on the subject in the university of Edinburgh, and his
“Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-lettres” is one of the most useful books
ever published on the art of composition. These works were used for
several ages, not only in Scotland, but even in England, and helped to
make rhetoric a leading branch of study in all the American colleges.
Among all the works, Campbell’s “Philosophy of Rhetoric” is perhaps
the most philosophical, or is, at least, the one in which there is the most
frequent discussion of philosophic problems.69
He opens: “In speaking, there is always some end in view, or some
effect which the speaker intends to produce on the hearer.” The word
eloquence, in its greatest latitude, denotes that art or talent by which the
discourse is adapted to its end. In speaking of oratory suited to light and
trivial matters, he endeavors to define wit. “It is the design of wit to
excite in the mind an agreeable surprise, and that arising not from any
thing marvellous in the subject, but solely from the imagery she em-
ploys, or the strange assemblage of related ideas presented to the mind.”
This end is effected in one or other of these three was,—first, in debas-
ing things pompous or seemingly grave;” “secondly, in agarandizing
things, little and frivolous; thirdly, in setting ordinary objects by means
not only remote, but apparently contrary, in a particular and uncommon
point of view.”The Scottish Philosophy/223
He enlarges, as most of the Scottish metaphysicians have done, on
the different kinds of evidence. He begins with intuitive evidence, which,
he says, is of different sorts. “One is that which results purely from
intellection. Of this kind is the evidence of these propositions: ‘One and
four make five;’ things equal to the same thing are equal to one another;
‘the whole is greater than a part;’ and, in brief, all in arithmetic and
geometry. These are in effect but so many different expositions of our
own general notions taken in different views.” “But when the thing,
though in effect coinciding, is considered under a different aspect,—
when what is single in the subject’s divided in the predicate, and con-
versely, or when what is a whole in the one is regarded as a part of
something in the other,—such propositions lead to the discovery of in-
numerable and apparently remote relations.” Under this head be also
places, secondly, consciousness, “whence every man derives the perfect
assurance which he hath of his own existence.” He mentions, thirdly,
common sense, giving to Buffier the credit of first noticing this principle
as one of the genuine springs of our knowledge, whereas Shaftesbury
had previously given it a special and important place. That he has not a
definite idea of what common sense is as a philosophic principle, is
evident from his stating that “in different persons it prevails in different
degrees of strength,” thus confounding the common principles of intelli-
gence in all men with the sound sense possessed only by certain persons.
He mentions a number of such principles, such as “whatever has a be-
ginning has a cause;” “when there is in the effect a manifest adjustment
of the several parts to a certain end, there is intelligence,” “the course of
nature will be the same tomorrow that it is to-day.” He tries to draw
distinctions between different kinds of intuitive truth. Thus, in regard to
primary truths of the third class, “it may be urged that it cannot be
affirmed of them all at least, as it may be of the axioms in mathematics,
or the assurances we have from consciousness, that the denial of them
implies a contradiction.” It is necessary, I believe, to draw some such
distinctions as these between the various kinds of first truths; some of
them seem to me to be of the nature of primitive cognitions, others of
primitive judgments. But it is doubtful whether Campbell has been able
to enunciate the nature of the difference. That he has no clear ideas of
the relation of our primary perceptions to realities is evident from his
statement. “All the axioms in mathematics are but the enunciations of
certain properties in our abstract notions, distinctly perceived by the
mind, but have no relation to any thing without themselves, and cannot224/James McCosh
be made the foundation of any conclusion concerning actual existence;
“as if the demonstrations of Archimedes as to conic sections had not
been found to apply to the elliptic orbits of the comets as discovered by
Kepler.
In speaking of deductive evidence, he distinguishes between scien-
tific and moral. 1. “The subject of the one is abstract, in dependent
truth, or the unchangeable and necessary relation of ideas; that of the
other, the real but often changeable and contingent connections that sub-
sist among things actually existing.” 2. Moral evidence admits degrees,
demonstration doth not. 3. In the one there never can be any contrariety
of proofs; in the other, there not only may be, but almost always is. 4.
The one is simple, consisting of only one coherent series; whereas moral
evidence is generally complicated, being in reality a bundle of indepen-
dent proofs. Under moral reasoning he treats of experience, analogy,
testimony, calculation of chances, etc. He discusses the nature and use
of the scholastic art of syllogizing. He has no idea of the syllogism being
merely an analysis of the process which passes through the mind in all
ratiocination. His objections have been satisfactorily answered by
Whately.
He has a very interesting chapter on the cause of that pleasure which
we receive from objects or representations that excite pity and other
painful feelings, criticising the explanations by others, and unfolding
one of his own, which is rather complicated. We are not concerned to
follow him when he enters on style and elocution. Speaking of his philo-
sophic ability, I am inclined to place him next to Reid in the Aberdeen
school.
When minister at Banchory, he married Miss Farquharson, of
Whitehouse, of whom “I can say with truth that I never knew a more
pious, more humane woman, or a woman of better sense. She had an
enlargement of sentiment not often to be found in man (who have many
advantages by education), and very unlike the contracted notions of the
party among whom she had been bred. You will not mistake me, my
dear; it is not those of the Church of England I mean,—a society for
which I have a great respect,—but our Scotch non-jurors, who, though
they concur pretty much with the other in the ceremonial part, differ
widely in the spirit they infuse.” This is an extract from letters to his
niece, Annie Richardson, who bad gone to a boarding-school at Durham.
These letters are preserved in the Farquharson manuscripts, and are
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niece who has been so long with us, and whom we do and cannot help
considering as one of ourselves,—as an essential part of our little fam-
ily.” The advices given, though rather commonplace, are not on that
account the less useful. “Let it be an invariable maxim with you, my
dear, that no art will continue long to have influence but what is founded
on truth. Deceit and falsehood may sometimes serve a present turn, but
never fail sooner or later to be detected. An injury is done to the integrity
of one’s own mind by doing what is wrong, though it should never be
discovered; the discovery which commonly follows injures one’s char-
acter.” His religious counsels are characteristic: “In regard to religion,
you are now at the time of life when it specially claims your attention;
and I shall at present only observe to you that you ought to study to be
possessed of the spirit of it, which consists truly in fearing God and
working righteousness; in other words, in loving God and your neigh-
bor; but avoid carefully an excessive attachment to any particular form
or mode of worship. The two extremes to be guarded against are
libertinism and bigotry. The former consists in the want of a proper
sense of religion; and the latter in an inordinate attachment to forms, or
to any of the distinguishing badges of a particular sect or party.”
In the Farquharson manuscripts there are letters from Dr. Douglas,
of Windsor, from which we gather some glimpses of the times. “It ap-
pears that in Oxford and Cambridge the number of students [letter dated
1789] had greatly decreased in consequence of the little attention which
many of the bishops of late years had paid to their degrees.” He goes on
to say: The very great influx of young men from Scotland offering them-
selves as candidates for orders has been generally remarked. This did
not use to be the case, and nothing perhaps will check it but a strictness
which, in particular cases, will, I have no doubt, be dispensed with.” It
appears from these letters that he is in London in July, 1787, along with
Dr. Beattie and his son, and that he is making arrangements about the
publication of his “Dissertations.” He spends a week with Dr. Douglas;
and had the honor of a little conversation with his Majesty no less than
three different times, and once, which is still more, with the Queen. “It is
not to be questioned, that, after such distinction, I feel myself a much
greater man than when you knew me at Aberdeen.”
In person he was below the middle size, with a mild and delicate
expression. In conversation he was pleasant and agreeable, though at
times falling into fits of absence. He resigned his professorship in 1795,
and soon after his principalship. He died April 1, 1796.226/James McCosh
XXXI. James Burnett (Lord Monboddo)
He was descended from an ancient family in Kincardineshire, and was
born in October, 1714, at Monboddo, which is beautifully situated on
the southern slope of the Grampians, and commands a view of the Howe
of the Mearns, lying below it. He received the rudiments of his educa-
tion at the parish school of Laurencekirk, which lies a few miles off, and
studied the usual branches at King’s College, Aberdeen, where he showed
a taste for Greek literature, and graduated there in 1729. It was still the
habit of Scottish youths who wished to have a high education to resort
to Holland, and he went to Groningen, where he continued three years
studying civil law, and where, it is reported, in the society of some En-
glish Gentlemen and French refugees, he contrived to get rid of his Scotch
pronunciation, and to acquire an accurate knowledge of the French
tongue. In 1738, he was admitted to the Scotch bar, where he rose to
eminence by his learning and his shrewdness, and particularly distin-
guished himself in the famous Douglas case, and helped to gain the title
and estates for his client. In 1767, he was raised to the bench by the title
of Lord Monboddo. As a judge, he was painstaking and upright; his
decisions were sound, and supported by great erudition and acuteness-.
From time to time he rode up to London on horseback, and there mingled
in the best literary circles, with such men as Murdoch, Armstrong, James
Thomson, and Mallet, Markham, the Archbishop of York, Earl Stanhope,
the first and second Earls of Mansfield, Lords Thurlow and Grantley,
Bishops Horsley, Lowth, Porteous, Shipley, and Burgess, Sir John
Pringle, Lewis, Scot, Seward, and Harris the author of “Hermes.” While
there, he showed himself at the levee and drawing-room at St. James,
where the King took special notice of him.
He married a very lovely woman, Grace Farquharson, who died
early, having had three children, a son and two daughters; the son and
one of the daughters were cut off to the great distress of the father. The
poet Burns, who received much attention from the judge, addressed a
poem to that daughter, and says of her: “There has not been any thing
nearly like her, in all the combinations of beauty, grace, and goodness
the great Creator has formed, since Milton’s Eve, on the first day of her
existence.” In the midst of his legal studies and his domestic afflictions
be ever turned eagerly to metaphysical pursuits. In 1773, he published
his elaborate work, “On the Origin and Progress of Language,” and at
various times from 1779 to 1799 his still larger work on “Ancient Meta-
physics.” At his country seat, he acted the farmer, lived on terms ofThe Scottish Philosophy/227
pleasant familiarity with the people on his estate, was generously hospi-
table, and zealously promoted agriculture in his neighbor hood. At this
place he received Samuel Johnson on his Scottish tour. In Boswell’s
account of the intercourse of the two, Lord Monboddo appears in by no
means a disadvantageous light. He died at his house in Edinburgh, May
26, 1799.
The eccentricities of his opinions and his conduct never interfered
with his practical sagacity, or lowered him in the esteem and affection of
the community. “His unbounded admiration of the customs, the litera-
ture, and the philosophy of the ancients strongly prepossessed him in
favor of whatever was connected with such studies. In them, he sup-
posed that he beheld all that was praiseworthy and excellent, while he
looked on the moderns as a degenerate race, exhibiting only effeminacy
and corruption. This attachment to ancient manners led him to imitate
them, even in his amusements and habits of life. He was fond of athletic
exercises in his youth, particularly fencing and fox-hunting, which tended
to strengthen a constitution naturally healthy and robust. His general
hour of rising in all seasons was six in the morning; and till a late period
of his life he used the cold bath in the open air, even in the middle of
winter. He took a light, early dinner, and a plentiful supper. The ancient
practice of anointing, even, was not forgotten, though the lotion he used
was not the oil of the ancients, but a saponaceous liquid composed of
rose- water, olive oil, saline aromatic spirit, and Venice soap, which,
when well mixed, resembled cream. This he applied at bedtime, before a
large fire, after coming from a warm bath. His method of travelling was
also in conformity to his partiality for ancient customs. A carriage, which
was not in common use among the ancients, he considered as an engine
of effeminacy and sloth; and to be dragged at the tail of a horse, instead
of mounting upon his back, appeared to him to be a truly ludicrous
degradation of the genuine dignity of human nature.”71 In Kames’s Life
it is said his “temper was affectionate, friendly, social. He was fond of
convivial intercourse, and it was his daily custom to unbend himself
amidst a select party of literary friends, whom he invited to an early
supper. The entertainment itself partook of the costume of the ancients;
it had all the variety and abundance of a principal meal; and the master
of the feast crowned his wine, like Anacreon, with a garland of roses.
His conversation, too, had a race and flavor peculiarly its own. It was
nervous, sententious, and tinctured with genuine wit. His apothegms,
or, as his favorite Greeks would rather term them, were singularly terse228/James McCosh
and forcible, and the grave manner in which he often conveyed the keen-
est irony, and the eloquence with which he supported his paradoxical
theories, afforded the highest amusements of those truly Attic banquets
which will be long remembered by all who had the pleasure of partaking
in them.”
I confess that I have felt a deep interest in reading the philosophical
works of Lord Monboddo,—he is so unlike any other Scotch metaphy-
sician, he is so unlike his age. As appearing among a body of inductive
inquirers, and in the middle of the eighteenth century, he looks very
much like a megatherium coming in upon us in the historical period. His
society is not with the modern empiricists, not even with the Latins, but
with Plato and the Neo-Platonists, with Aristotle and his commentators.
As regards the higher Greek philosophy, he is the most erudite scholar
that Scotland has produced, not excepting even Sir William Hamilton.
His favorite author among the moderns is Cudworth, whom he charac-
terizes as “more learned in the whole ancient philosophy, the older as
well as the later, than any modern author I know.” He speaks of Locke’s
Essay as “no other than a hasty collection of crude, undigested thoughts,
by a man who thought and reasoned by himself upon subjects of the
greatest difficulty and deepest speculation, without assistance of learn-
ing.” He refers to Andrew Baxter, and charges the Newtonion astronomy
with making the system of the heavens a mere machine; it supposes the
universe had a beginning in time, contrary to all the ancients, who held
that it “was an eternal emanation of an eternal being.” It is mind that
moves the celestial bodies, mind moving simply and uniformly. He re-
fers to Berkeley, and also to Hume, lately deceased, and says of the
latter, that his chief argument arises from “confounding sensations and
ideas.” He refers also to Reid’s “Inquiry,” and I suppose that the rising
Scottish school was before him when he speaks of it as an unsatisfac-
tory philosophy, which would maintain that “the perception of every
sensible object is necessarily accompanied with a belief of its existence;
that is the constitution of our nature, and that we are to inquire no more
about it.” He holds it “to be impossible that intellect can believe any
thing without a reason.” He maintains that we do not form ideas by
nature. “We mistake habits of judging acquired by experience for the
natural perceptions of sense.” He thinks that by the eye we perceive
objects first as double and inverted. His postulatum is that “the evi-
dence of consciousness is infallible.” “By consciousness, we know that
we have perceptions of sense.” “In the perceptions of sense, every manThe Scottish Philosophy/229
is conscious that he is passive, and that he is moved or excited to sensa-
tion by some thing.” Of all his contemporaries, he is most thoroughly in
sympathy with Mr Harris, the author of “Hermes,” with whom he cor-
responded.
We may here give an extract-letter from Lord Monboddo to Mr
Harris, in return for presentation copy of “Hermes.”
“Edinburgh, Wednesday, 26 March, 1766.—As your works first
introduced me to the Greek Philosophy, so this present you have
now made me has revived my taste for that study, which, though
never quite extinguished, had been lost for some time amid the
hurry of law business. I fell on greedily, as soon as the book was
sent me, and began with the most philosophical part of your
‘Hermes,’ viz., the chapter upon General Ideas, which you have
explained most truly and philosophically, according to the dic-
tates of that school to which, I confess, I have entirely addicted
myself,—I mean the school of Aristotle, for as to Plato, he speaks
of them in such mysterious and enigmatical terms, as if they had
been a secret known only to himself; and I remember he makes
Hippias the Sophist, when he was asked what the tÕ kalÒn was,
answer, ‘it was a fine virgin.’ If philosophy was in such a state in
the days of Plato, as not to understand perfectly what is the foun-
dation of all science and knowledge among men, how much is it
indebted to that wonderful man, Aristotle, who, besides his dis-
coveries in every branch of philosophy, has cleared the principles
of it from that obscurity which the enthusiasm and mystic genius
of Plato had thrown upon them?
“I think I may, without the least suspicion of flattery, give to
you the praise which Cicero takes to himself, of teaching philoso-
phy to speak a new language; for as he taught it to speak Latin, so
you have taught it to speak English. The language which Mr Locke
has put into her mouth is mere stammering, and is, in my opinion,
as contemptible as the matter which he has made her utter. Mr
Hobbes I am not so well acquainted with; but as be is of the same
heresy, that is, one of those who pretend to philosophize, without
the assistance of the ancients, I suppose he has succeeded as ill.
As for myself, I am meditating great things in the literary way, but
I am not sure that I will ever execute any thing. I have one work in
view, which I think would not make a bad second part, if it were
executed, to your ‘Hermes,’—I mean a work showing the origin
and progress of this most wonderful of all the arts of man, the art
of speech. What set me upon this train of thinking was the study230/James McCosh
of some most barbarous and imperfect languages, spoken in
America, from grammars and dictionaries which I had out of the
King’s Library, when I was last at Paris. Besides the curiosity of
seeing the process of so wonderful an art, in tracing the progress
of language, you at the same time trace the progress of the human
understanding, and I think I have already collected materials from
which a very good history of the human mind might be formed,—
better, at least, than that which Mr Locke has given us. This, if I
had leisure, I would make part of a much greater work which I
project, viz., a History of Man; in which I would propose to trace
him through the several stages of his existence; for there is a pro-
gression of our species from a state little better than mere brutality
to that most perfect state you describe in ancient Greece, which is
really amazing, and peculiar to our species. But the business of a
laborious profession will, I’m afraid, prevent me from executing
this, and several other projects which I have had in my head. But
with respect to you, being now eased of the care of public affairs,
the world will certainly exact from you an account of your leisure;
especially as you have given them such pledges of your capacity to
instruct and entertain them. You have done enough upon gram-
mar. But I would have you do something upon logic, to show an
ignorant age that the greatest discovery in science ever made by
any one man is the discovery of the Syllogism by Aristotle.”71
He has two great philosophic works. The first is “Ancient Meta-
physics, or the Science of Universals; with an Appendix containing an
Examination of the Principles of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy.” It is
in six quarto volumes, averaging four hundred pages each. He treats
first of metaphysics and then of man. The proper subject of metaphysics
is “mind pure and separate from all matter.” In nature, all is either body
or mind or their accidents. There is not in the universe, so far as our
knowledge extends, any body without mind; they are never separated in
the material world. “What is moved I call body, what moves is called
mind.” “Under mind in this definition I include, 1st, the rational and
intellectual; 2d, the animal life; 3d, the principle in the vegetable by
which it is nourished, grows, and produces its like, and which, there-
fore, is commonly called the vegetable life; and 4th, the motive prin-
ciple, which I understand to be in all bodies, even such as are thought to
be inanimate.” He says the Greek word yuc» denotes the three first
kinds; the fourth, the motive, is not commonly in Greek called yuc»,
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motion an essential property of mind. In respect of quality, motion ap-
plies to mind as well as body. By motion the whole business of nature
above, below, and round about us is carried on. “It is impossible that
any thing can be generated, come to maturity, or be extinguished with-
out passing from one state to another. Now that passage is motion.” He
proves the immateriality of mind in general, (1) from the nature of mo-
tion, (2) from the nature of body, (3) from the nature of mind. He estab-
lishes the two first a priori, and the third by a demonstration ex absurdo.
He has then a posteriori proof. “Sensation cannot be produced by a
material cause; reasoning and consciousness far less.”
Coming to minds, he adopts the Aristotelean distinction between
the gnostic and orective powers. The gnostic powers are sense, phan-
tasy, and comparison. In sense, the mind is not conversant with the vis-
ible object itself, but with the image or edwlon, as the Epicureans called
it, thrown off from the object. The essential distinction between sense
and phantasia is, that what we perceive by the sense is present and
operating upon the sense, whereas the object of the imagination is not
present. Phantasy is only of sensible objects. Memory is only of ideas,
and belongs exclusively to man. “Brutes have no idea of time, or of first
and last. Phantasy serves to them the purpose of memory.” The object is
painted on the brute’s phantasia, but without any perception of the time
when he first saw it. Sense and phantasy perceive particular things,—
comparison, generals or ideas. He thinks that brutes possess the com-
parative faculty, and that here the mind of the brute acts without the
assistance of the body. As to will, he reckons “all will as free, and, at the
same time, it is necessary; but of a necessity very different from mate-
rial or physical.” Much of this psychology is avowedly taken from
Aristotle, but at the same time exhibits traces of shrewdness and inde-
pendence, and, it has to be added, of eccentricity.
He criticises Locke’s theory of the origin of ideas. He acknowledges
no innate ideas, if we mean ideas present to the mind, and contemplated
before they are excited by objects; but they are there though “latent and
unproductive,” and are there even before our existence in this world.
Nature, however, has so ordained it, that they can only be excited by the
impulse of objects upon our organs of sense.” It should be noticed here,
that notwithstanding the prominence given to it by Locke, Lord
Monboddo has no recognition of reflection or consciousness as a sepa-
rate source of ideas.
He dwells with evident fondness on categories or universal forms.232/James McCosh
All things are to be known by their causes. The knowledge of first causes
belongs to metaphysics. Every thing that is to be known falls under one
or other of the categories. He shows that God must have ideas. Man is
capable of forming ideas. Time is not a cause, but is a necessary adjunct
or concomitant of the material world. If nothing existed, it is evident
there could be no such thing as time. His definition of time does not
make the subject much clearer, as it introduces the phrase duration,
which needs explanation quite as much as time does: “it is the measure
of the duration of things that exist in succession by the motion of the
celestial bodies. Beings which suffer no change, neither in substance,
qualities, nor energies, cannot be in time. Of this kind we conceive Di-
vinity to be, and therefore he is not in time but in eternity.” As to space,
it is nothing actually, but it is something potentially; for it has the ca-
pacity of receiving body, “for which it furnishes room or place.” Here it
should be observed that room or place comes in to explain space, which
is as clear as either room or place,—which are, in, fact embraced in it.
“Space has not the capacity of becoming any thing, but only of receiv-
ing any thing.”
He represents Aristotle as saying that the beauty of nature consists
in final causes, without which we can conceive no beauty in any thing.
In expounding his own views, he tells us that in a single object there
may be truth, but no beauty. In order to give beauty to truth, there must
be “a system, of which the mind, perceiving the union, is at the same
time struck with that most agreeable of all perceptions which we call
beauty. And the greater the variety there is in this system, the greater the
number of parts, the more various their connections and dependencies
upon one another, the greater the beauty, provided the mind can dis-
tinctly comprehend the several parts in one united view.” There must be
some truth here, though it may not be the whole truth.
In vols. iii and iv he treats of man. This is the only part of his book
fitted to excite an interest in these times. “It is surprising,” he says, “that
so little inquiry has been made concerning the natural history of our
own species.” He then proceeds to divulge his own theory, which, in
some respects, is an anticipation of the Darwinian. He maintains that
man was at first a mere animal, that he walked on all fours, and that he
possessed a tail, of which we discover the rudiments. There has been a
progression in mankind from one stage to higher they erect themselves,
they learn the use of their hands, and they learn to swim. They lived first
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and fishing. Men were for a time solitary, and then came to herd to-
gether. He is not so trustworthy as Darwin in his facts: he tells us that
there is a whole nation of Esquimaux with only one leg; that the one-
eyed cyclops of Homer is not a mere fiction; that in Ethiopia men have
only one eye, and this in their foreheads and he expresses his belief in
mermaids.
But he detects far higher properties than the Darwinians have yet
done. Man’s mind was at first immersed in matter; but, by exerting its
native power, it can act without the assistance of body, and transports
itself into that ideal world which every man who believes in God must
believe to be the archetype of this material world. But he insists that
there has been a great degeneracy in the race, of which Moses’ account
of the fall of man is an allegorical version. Corruption of manners be-
gins in every nation among the better sort, and from them descends to
the people. He shows that there must be a total reformation of manners
and morals; and, in doing so, be speaks of the effeminacy which has
arisen from the use of clothes. But he is ever insisting on the difference
between man and brute. The actions of man proceed from opinion, but
not the actions of brutes. In the lower animals there is no consideration
of means and ends. He finds one great difference in the circumstance
that man is dissatisfied, envies, and repines, which the brute creatures
never do.
In volume vi he treats of the being of God. Nothing can exist with-
out a cause. A first cause, therefore, is necessary, and he inquires into
what must be the nature of the cause of the world. The cause must be
self-existent, necessarily existent, eternal, and unchangeable. Of this
nature must be the efficient cause of the world. But he agrees with
Aristotle that there must also have been a natural cause from all eter-
nity. In his work on language he represents the theology of Plato as
more sublime than that of Aristotle. The theology of Aristotle, so far as
it goes, is a pure system of theism; but it is defective in two great points.
First, the providence of God over all his works is not asserted; on the
contrary, God is represented as passing his whole time in contempla-
tion. Secondly, he does not make God the author of the material world,
but only the mover; he does not derive from Him even the minds that
animate this world.
His work on “The Origin and Progress of Language,” in six vols.
8vo, is less important. Still, it contains some shrewd remarks. By lan-
guage he means the expression of the conceptions of the mind by articu-234/James McCosh
late sounds. He does not think that language is natural to man. Men
came to invent articulate sounds by the imitation of other animals. A
political state was necessary for the invention of language. He had evi-
dently some acquaintance with the affinities of the Teutonic, Persian,
Greek, and Latin. He represents the Hebrew, Phoenician, Syriac, and
Chaldaic, as having also an affinity. He believes that there may also be
an affinity between the two groups.
He corrects a very common misapprehension of his day as to ab-
stract and general ideas. In his work on metaphysics: “Abstract ideas
are different from general, though they be confounded by our modern
philosophers; an idea must be first abstracted from the particular object
from which it exists before it can be generalized.” In his work on lan-
guage, he shows that we may have a conception of a particular quality
of any substance abstracted from its other qualities without averring
such quality to belong to any other substance. “In order to form the
general idea, a separation or discrimination is necessary of these quali-
ties one from another; and this kind of abstraction I hold to be the first
act of human intellect, and it is here the road parts betwixt us and the
brute; for the brute perceives the thing and perceives the perception in
his memory just as the object is presented by nature—that is, with all its
several sensible qualities united; whereas the human intellect separates
and discriminates and considers by itself the color, e.g., without the
figure, and the size without either.”
XXXII. Adam Ferguson72
He was the son of Rev. Adam Ferguson, minister of the parish of
Loarerait, Perthshire, and was born June 20, 1723. The Scottish minis-
ters often belonged to good families in these times, and Carlyle describes
Ferguson as the son of a Highland clergyman with good connections
and a Highland pride and spirit. He received his early education partly
from his father, partly at the parish school. We are ever discovering
traces of the influence of the parish schools of Scotland in producing its
great men. He afterwards went to the gram mar school of Perth, where
he excelled in classics and the composition of essays, which has always
had a high place in Scotland, fostered by the very circumstance that
boys had to unlearn the Scottish and learn the English tongue. Thence
he resorted to the University of St. Andrews, where he graduated May
4, 1742, with a high reputation in classics, mathematics, and metaphys-
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then in Edinburgh, where he fell into the circle of Robertson, Blair,
Wedderburn, and Carlyle, and joined them in forming a debating soci-
ety. Before finishing his theological course, he was appointed deputy-
chaplain of the Highland forty-second regiment, and was present at the
battle of Fontenoy, where he went into action at the head of the attack-
ing column with a drawn sword in his hand. His military career helped
him afterwards to give accurate descriptions of battles in—his “Roman
History,” and furnished him opportunities for studying human nature
and politics. He never had any predilection for the clerical profession,
and abandoned it altogether on the death of his father. After spending
some time in Holland, as so many Scottish youths had done in the previ-
ous century, he returned to his old associates in Edinburgh, where he
was appointed, in 1757, David Hume’s successor as librarian and clerk
in the Advocate’s Library. He there became a member of the “Select
Society” instituted in 1754 by Allan Ramsay, and holding its meetings
in one of the inner apartments of the library, for literary discussion,
philosophical inquiry, and improvement in public speaking. Among its
members were Hume, Robertson, Smith, John Home, Wilkie, Lord
Hailes, Lord Monboddo, Sir John Dalrymple, and the elder Mr Tytler,
the men who constituted the bright literary constellation of their age and
Country. This society declined after a time, but was renewed in 1762,
under the name (at the suggestion of Ferguson) of the “Poker Club.”
Ferguson became involved in the controversy stirred by his friend Home
writing the play of Douglas, and published “The Morality of Stage Plays
seriously Considered.” He seems to have left the office of librarian rather
abruptly, being allured by an offer to become tutor to the sons of Lord
Bute. By the influence of his friends he was made professor of natural
philosophy in the University of Edinburgh in 1759, and David Hume
remarked: “Ferguson had more genius than any of them, as he had made
himself so much master of a difficult science, viz., natural philosophy,
which he had never studied but when at college, in three months, so as to
be able to teach it.” In 1760, he was elected to an office more congenial
to him, that of professor of pneumatics and moral philosophy, as suc-
cessor to Mr Balfour, who took the chair of the law of nature and na-
tions. In less than two years he published his “Essay on the History of
Civil Society,” a work on which he had been engaged for a considerable
time. It was conceived in the manner of Montesquieu, but dwelt on ele-
ments at work in the formation of civil society which the French author
had overlooked. Part I treats of the “General Characteristics of Human236/James McCosh
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Nature.” Works on social economy proceed very much on the principle
that man is mainly swayed by a desire to promote his own interests, and
they furnish no analysis of the other interests which men look to. They
do not consider that man has social and conscientious feelings, by which
many are influenced quite as much as by self-love; and that he is as
often swayed by caprice, vanity, and passion, as by a cold-hearted self-
ishness. Ferguson perceived this. Mankind, we are told, are devoted to
interest, and this in all commercial nations is undoubtedly true. But it
does not follow that they are by their natural dispositions averse to soci-
ety and mutual affection. Speaking of those who deny moral sentiment,
he says that they are fond of detecting the fraud by which moral re-
straints have been imposed; “as if to censure a fraud were not already to
take a part on the side of morality.” “The foreigner who believed that
Othello on the stage was enraged for the loss of his handkerchief was
not more mistaken than the reasoner who imputes any of the more vehe-
ment passions of men to the impressions of mere profit or loss.” So,
after discussing the question of the state of nature, he treats of the prin-
ciples of self-preservation, of union among mankind, of war and dissen-
sion, of intellectual powers, of moral sentiment, of happiness, of na-
tional felicity. In unfolding these, be insists that mankind should be studied
in groups or in society. He then traces these principles in the history of
rude nations, of policy and arts, the advancement of civil and commer-
cial arts, the decline of nations, corruption of political slavery. The tone
of the work is healthy and liberal, but is filled with common-place thought
and observation. I find a sixth edition published in 1793. After this it
was not much heard of The French Revolution gave men more earnest
questions to think of. But these disquisitions, and still more effectively
the publication of the “Wealth of Nations,” in 1776, kindled a taste for
social inquiries in the University of Edinburgh and in the capital of
Scotland.
The smallness of his salary, only £100 a year, tempted him to un-
dertake the charge of the education of Charles, Earl of Chesterfield,
nephew to the earl who wrote on manners, and he had the benefit of a
continental tour with his pupil. He waited upon Voltaire at Ferney, where,
he tells us, “I encouraged every attempt at conversation, even jokes
against Moses, Adam, and Eve, and the rest of the prophets, till I began
to be considered as a person who, though true to my own faith, had no
ill-humor to the freedom of fancy in others.” His description is graphic:
“I found the old man in a state of perfect indifference to all authors238/James McCosh
except two sorts,—one, those who wrote panegyrics, and those who
wrote invectives on himself. There is a third kind, whose names he has
been used to repeat fifty or sixty years without knowing any thing of
them,—such as Locke, Boyle, Newton, etc. I forget his competitors for
fame, of whom he is always either silent or speaks slightingly. The fact
is, that he reads little or none; his mind exists by reminiscence, and by
doing over and over what it has been used to do,—dictates tales, disser-
tations, and tragedies, even the latter with all his elegance, though not
with all his former force. His conversation is among the pleasantest I
ever met with. He lets you forget the superiority which the public opin-
ion gives him, which is indeed greater than we conceive in this island.”
In consequence of his absence, the town council tried to turn Ferguson
out of his office in Edinburgh, but he resisted at law, and returned to his
duties in 1775.
He had evidently a strong inclination to active life, which might
bring him into new scenes and situations favorable to the study of char-
acter. So in 1778 he was appointed secretary to the commissioners ap-
pointed to discuss and settle the points in dispute between Great Britain
and her American colonies. In New York the commissioners received a
communication from Congress intimating that the only ground upon
which they could enter on a treaty would be an acknowledgment of the
independence of the States and the withdrawal of the British force from
America. So he returns the following year to his professorial duties,
which it is interesting to notice were performed during his absence by
his pupil, Dugald Stew art. During these years he became involved in
the controversy about the authenticity of the “Poems of Ossian,” taking,
as might be expected of a Highlander, the side of Mr McPherson. He
also took an active part in the formation of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh, which originated very much with Principal Robertson, and
was incorporated in 1783. He had long been engaged on the work by
which he was best known in his own day, “The History of the Progress
and Termination of the Roman Republic.” Avoiding the early and dis-
puted period of Roman history, and leaving the later period to Gibbon,
he gives a clear and judicious account of the time which elapsed be-
tween 240 A.U.C. and the death of Tiberius. I am not sure that we have
a better account of the republic, published prior to the investigations
started by Niebuhr.
In 1766, he had published a short syllabus of his lectures, entitled
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in the College of Edinburgh.” Using this as a text-book, he lectured to
his class without writing out what he said. He claims, however, that he
bestowed his utmost diligence in studying the subject, including the or-
der in which it was to be treated, and in preparing himself for every
successive step he was to make in his course, but to have no more in
writing than the heads or short notes from which he was to speak, pre-
paring himself, however, very diligently for every particular day’s work.
When his health gave way, in 1781, he wrote out his course, and during
his retirement corrected it for the press and published it in 1792: “Prin-
ciples of Moral and Political Science; being chiefly a retrospect of Lec-
tures delivered in the College of Edinburgh.” He confesses that he is
partial to the Stoic philosophy, and acknowledges his obligations to
Shaftesbury, Montesquieu, Harris, and Hutcheson. The work is divided
into two parts,—the first relating to the fact of man’s progressive na-
ture; the second, to the principles of right, or the foundations of judg-
ment and choice. The sources of knowledge are consciousness, percep-
tion, testimony, and inference. Consciousness is the first and most es-
sential attribute of the mind. To other animals, appetite continues to be
the sole motive to action; and the animal in every moment of time pro-
ceeds on the motive then present. But to man, the repeated experience of
gratification and crosses, like the detail of particulars in any other, is
matter of generalization; he collects from thence the predicaments of
good and evil, and is affected towards any particular object according
as he has referred it to the one or the other. In unfolding his views, he
has important remarks on the purposes served by abstraction. “The ab-
stract form of an operation is a physical law, and its application the
constituent of physical science. The abstract form and expression of
what is excellent or good is a moral law and principle of moral science.”
But “to whatever object we incline, or however we may have classed
individual things in our conception of what is good or evil, it is proper to
remember in this place that every effort of the mind is also individual
and particular, relating to an object in some particular and individual
situation.” There is a hint here of a distinction between governing prin-
ciples in their individual exercise and in their abstract form fashioned
by the logical understanding, which might have cleared up a vast amount
of confused discussion, had he carried it out. He adds: “The more gen-
eral character of man’s inclinations or active dispositions is not a blind
propensity to the use of means, but instinctive intimation of an end for
the attainment of which he is left to discover and to choose by his own240/James McCosh
observations and experience the means which may prove most effec-
tual.” He starts questions which had been discussed by Aristotle, but
which had been lost sight of by modern moralists, as to the ends by
which man is swayed, and the importance in ethics of considering means
and end, and for this gets an occasional commendation from Sir W.
Hamilton. Believing in the progression of man, he would set before him
no meaner end than the attainment of perfection, and places in this the
principle of moral approbation, and for this he receives the commenda-
tion of M. Cousin. “We find in his method the wisdom and circumspec-
tion of the Scottish school, with something more masculine and decisive
in its results. The principle of perfection is a new one, at once more
rational and comprehensive than benevolence and sympathy, and which,
in our view, places Ferguson as a moralist above all his predecessors.”
He thinks that he embraces all moral systems in his own, admitting,
with Hobbes and Hume’ the power of self-interest or utility, Hutcheson’s
benevolence and Smith’s sympathy,—all helping progression, and tend-
ing towards perfection. All this sounds very lofty, and contains impor-
tant truth, as we should all aim at our own perfection and that of the
race, but leaves the question unsettled, what is this perfection to be,—a
perfection in felicity, as the final end, or a perfection in moral good: and
what is the nature and criterion of moral good?
Ferguson’s style and manner are not so subdued as those of the
Scottish metaphysicians who preceded him. He has more of a leaping
mode of composition, as if he had an audience before him, and is at
times eloquent or magniloquent. I have an idea that, as Dugald Stewart
drew his philosophy mainly from Reid, so he got his taste for social
studies from Ferguson, who may also have helped to give him a livelier
style,—the academic dignity, however, being entirely Stewart’s own.
In 1785, he resigned his professorial labors. He passed the remain-
der of his life in retirement, residing in various places, and living till 22d
June, 1816. The following pen- and-ink sketch of the old man by Lord
Cockburn, in the “Memorials of his Time,” brings him vividly before
us: “His hair was silky and white; his eyes animated and light-blue; his
cheeks sprinkled with broken red, like autumnal apples, but fresh and
healthy; his lips thin, and the under one curled. A severe paralytic attack
had reduced his animal vitality, though it left no external appearance,
and he required considerable artificial heat. His raiment, therefore, con-
sisted of half-boots, lined with fur cloth breeches; a long cloth waist-
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also lined with fur; and a felt hat, commonly tied by a ribbon below the
chin. His boots were black, but, with this exception, the whole cover-
ings, including the hat, were of a quaker-gray color, or of a whitish-
brown; and he generally wore the furred greatcoat even within doors.
When he walked forth, he used a tall staff, which he commonly held at
arm’s-length out towards the right side; and his two coats, each but-
toned by only the upper button, flowed open below, and exposed the
whole of his curious and venerable figure. His gait and air were noble;
his gesture slow; his look full of dignity and composed fire. He looked
like a philosopher from Lapland.” I never heard of his dining out except
at his relation, Joseph Black’s, where his son, Sir Adam (the friend of
Scott), used to say “it was delightful to see the two rioting over a boiled
turnip. Domestically, he was kind, but anxious and peppery.” “He al-
ways locked the door of his study when he left it, and took the key in his
pocket , and no housemaid got in till the accumulation of dust and rub-
bish made it impossible to put the evil day off any longer, and then woe
on the family.”
XXXIII. James Hutton
He was the son of a merchant in Edinburgh, was born June 3, 1726,
studied first in his native city, then in Leyden, where he took the degree
of M.D., and devoted his life to agricultural pursuits and scientific in-
vestigations in chemistry, mineralogy, and specially in geology. He died
March 26, 1797. He is best known as the author of a “Theory of the
Earth,” which was expounded in a clear and elegant manner by Playfair.
He accounts for the present condition of the earth by the operation of a
central heat; and there was long a contest between his theory and that of
Werner, who explains the formation of strata by water; geologists now
find place for both agencies. It is not so generally known that he found
much satisfaction in the pursuit of metaphysics, and is author of an
elaborate work in three large quarto volumes, “An Investigation of the
Principles of Knowledge, and of the Progress of Reason from Sense to
Science and Philosophy.” The work is full of awkwardly constructed
sentences and of repetitions, and it is a weariness in the extreme to read
it. Yet we are made to feel at times that these thoughts must be pro-
found, if only we could understand them. He certainly speculates on
recondite subjects, but does not throw much light on them. Knowledge
is considered as consisting first of external information; secondly, of
internal conception. In the first, mind is made to know no passion; in the242/James McCosh
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second, it is made to known action.” “Knowledge is no more the at-
tribute of mind than mind is that of knowledge. We suppose that there is
a substance called mind, and we then attribute knowledge to this sub-
stance; but knowledge is the very thing which in this case subsists. Space
and time are conceptions of the mind, founded upon activity and inac-
tivity; that is to say, upon the volition of the mind, whereby either on the
one hand action is produced that is change, or on the other hand inaction
is ordained wherein the powers of the mind are preserved in a state of
attention to the idea then in view.” In his view of matter, he expounds a
dynamical theory which becomes an ideal theory, closely approaching
that of Berkeley. “There is no inert matter subsisting with magnitude
and figure; but the external thing exists with moving and resisting pow-
ers.” “Real solidity or impenetrability is truly a conception of our intel-
lect, like that of equal lines and angles, but it is a supposition which
nothing in nature authorizes us to make.” “We deceive ourselves when
we imagine that there is a subsisting independent of our thought,—an
external thing, which is actually extended and necessarily figured.” “Fig-
ure is a thing formed in the mind alone, or produced by the proper action
of our thinking substance.” He says it is wrong to suppose that magni-
tude and figure subsist without our mind. He tells us that big theory
agrees with that of Berkeley in this, that “figure and magnitude are not
real and absolute qualities in external things;” but he holds that “there is
truly an external existence as the cause of our knowledge,” whereas
Berkeley holds that there is no such external existence. We have here a
view of matter very different from that of the Scottish school, who have
commonly been inclined to the doctrine of Descartes. Metaphysical sci-
ence will now have to set itself to determine what substantial truth there
is in idealism, and, with the light of modern inquiries as to atoms, what
truth there is in the dynamical theory of matter.
XXXIV. John Gregory74
The Gregorys are about as illustrious a family as Scotland has pro-
duced. Chalmers, in his “Biographical Dictionary,” reckons no fewer
than sixteen who have held British professorships. The founder of the
family was James Gregory, the inventor of the reflecting telescope which
bears his name. He became professor of mathematics in St. Andrew’s,
where he died in 1675, at the early age of thirty-six. He had a son James,
who became professor of medicine in King’s College, Aberdeen, and
founded the school of medicine there. John, who merits a passing notice244/James McCosh
in our pages, was the son of this gentleman. He was born at Aberdeen in
1724, was educated there, occupied successively the chairs of philoso-
phy and medicine, and, along with Reid, instituted the famous literary
society. To this society he read essays, which were methodized and pub-
lished in 1764, under the title, “Comparative View of the State and
Faculties of Man with those of the Animal World.” He considers the
condition of man in a state of society under three different aspects; (1)
in a savage state, where be is distinguished by his corporeal powers; (2)
when the social affections and the heroic virtues appear; (3) where men
have the means of acquiring wealth. and seek refinement and luxury. In
treating of these topics he offers many thoughtful reflections. He re-
marks that men of refined genius must live in a manner abstracted from
the world, that hence they are liable to cherish envy and jealousy; so
there is perhaps less real friendship among authors than among the rest
of mankind. “Certain it is, virtue, genius, beauty, wealth, power, and
every natural advantage one can be possessed of, are usually mixed
with some alloy, while disappointing the fond hopes of their raising the
possessor to any uncommon degree of eminence, and even in some mea-
sure bring him down to the common level of his species.” He dwells
fondly on taste, and remarks, “wherever what is denominated a very
correct taste is generally prevalent, genius and invention soon languish.”
In treating of religion, he exhibits the rising spirit of his age. “The ar-
ticles of religious belief falling within the comprehension of mankind
are few and simple, but have been erected by ingenious men into mon-
strous Systems of metaphysical subtlety.” “Speculative and controver-
sial theology injure both the temper and affections.” In the same year he
removed to the wider field offered in Edinburgh, and became one of the
ornaments of the brilliant literary circle there. Two years after he was
appointed professor of the practice of medicine in the university, and
was a very popular teachers He published a number of medical works,
and left behind him when he died in 1773 a work composed after he lost
his wife, “A Father’s Legacy to his Daughter.” It is characterized by
calm wisdom, often somewhat worldly, and for long bad a large circula-
tion. “Be ever cautious in displaying your good sense. It will be thought
you assume a superiority over the rest of the company. But if you hap-
pen to have any learning, keep it a profound secret, especially from the
men, who generally look with a jealous and malignant eye on a woman
of great parts and a cultivated understanding.”The Scottish Philosophy/245
XXXV. James Gregory
James Gregory, the third of this name, was the son and the successor in
the chair of medicine in Edinburgh of John Gregory. He was born in
Aberdeen in 1753, and died in 1821. For many years he stood at the
head of his profession as a physician in Edinburgh. He published a num-
ber of medical works. His “Conspectus Medicinae Theoreticae,” writ-
ten in good Latin, was long used as one of the works on which the
candidates for medical degrees were examined. He comes before us as
author of “Philosophical and Literary Essays,” dated Jan. 1st, 1790,
and published 1792. He dedicates the work to Reid, and acknowledges
that he had taken a principal argument from one of Reid’s observations
in the essays on the “Intellectual Powers of Man.” The most important
essay is “On the difference between the Relation of Motive and Action
and that of Cause in Physics, on Physical and Mathematical Principles.”
In an introduction in which he is long in coming to the point, he dwells
on the looseness and ambiguity of the word “cause,” and remarks that if
there should be occasion to attend to the more minute or specific differ-
ences among the several things comprehended under the genus ‘cause,’
it would be highly expedient or rather absolutely necessary to give to
each of them a specific name, were it only an addition to the generic
name cause.” He has a glimpse of there being more than one agent in-
volved in cause. “No substance is of itself a physical cause; this de-
pends on its relation to some other substance, and implies the tendency
to change in the latter.” “The substance in which the change is observed
is considered as the subject, the other as the cause; and as change occurs
generally in both or all of the substances so related, though it be not
always of the same kind in them all, it depends on the circumstance of
our attention being directed first and chiefly to one or other of them, and
on our opportunities of observing the changes that occur in them, which
of them we shall regard as the subject and which as the cause, as in the
example of the communication and the loss of motion, of mutual gravi-
tation, of the solution of salt and saturation of water, the melting of ice,
or the boiling of water and the absorption of heat.” This is a vague
anticipation of the doctrine started in our day as to their being two or
more agents in all material causation,—a doctrine, I may add, not yet
followed out to its consequences in regard to mechanical, chemical, and
physiological action. He insists that there is in mind a certain indepen-
dent self-governing power which there is not in body; in consequence of
which there is a great difference between the relation of motive and246/James McCosh
action and that of cause and effect in physics; and by means of which a
person in all cases may at his own discretion act, either according to or
in opposition to any motive or combination of motives applied to him;
while body in all cases irresistible undergoes the change corresponding
to the cause or combination of causes applied to it. “I propose to dem-
onstrate the falsity and absurdity of the doctrine of necessity on math-
ematical principles, in mathematical form, partly by means of algebraic
formulae, partly with the help of diagrams,” and he uses mathematical
formulae and others invented by himself. He endeavors to show by an
indirect demonstration that the doctrine of necessity must be false, as it
leads to false conclusions. He takes the case of a porter carrying a bur-
den: “If a guinea should be offered for carrying it in the direction of A
B, and half a guinea for carrying it in the direction A C, and let him be
assured that if he can earn the guinea he cannot earn the half guinea, and
that if he earn the half guinea he cannot earn the guinea; will he go in the
direction of A B or A C, or remain at rest in A?” He answers, that if the
principle on which the necessity is founded be true, he must move in the
diagonal A D. “But as it must be acknowledged that the porter will not
move in that direction, experience proving the fact, then it follows that
the law of physical causes and that of motives do not coincide, and that
the relation between motives and actions is not necessary as between
physical causes and their effects.” Dr. Crombie attacked Dr. Gregory’s
reasoning, Sir W. Hamilton says “with much acrimony and consider-
able acuteness.” There subsequently appeared letters from Dr. James
Gregory, of Edinburgh, in defence of his essay on the “Difference of the
Relation between Motive and Action and that of Cause and Effect in
Physics; with Replies by the Rev. Alexander Crombie, LL.D.” London:
1819. “It is much to be regretted that Dr. Gregory did not find leisure to
complete his answer to Messrs Crombie, Priestley, and Co., of which
five hundred and twelve pages have been printed, but are still unpub-
lished.” (Coll. Works of Reid, by Hamilton. p. 87) We are reminded that
the clearest defence by Reid of the doctrine of the freedom of the will is
contained in letters to Dr. Gregory, and published in Hamilton’s edition
of his works. At a time when the Calvinistic faith of Scotland might
have led theologians into perilous necessarian doctrines, it was of great
moment to have the essential liberty of will (which Calvin never denied)
defended by such philosophers as Reid and Gregory.The Scottish Philosophy/247
XXXVI. Alexander Crombie
He was born in Aberdeen in 1760, and lived till 1842 He became a
Presbyterian minister in London, and a schoolmaster at Highgate and
afterwards at Greenwich. He wrote a number of educational works of
value, as “Etymology and Syntax of the English Language,” and “Gym-
nasium sive Symbola Critica.” He has two philosophical works, gone
on “Philosophical Necessity,” dated Newington Green, 1793, and an-
other on “Natural Theology,” in 1829. In the preface to the first of these
works, he tells us that he was initiated in the principles of moral science
by Dr. Beattie; that when he was a student in divinity the question was
debated in a theological society, “Is man a free or necessary agent?
“that he was then attached to the libertarian system, and continued to be
so till he read Priestley’s “Illustrations; “and that he was confirmed in
the change of view by Hartley’s “Observations.” He answers Gregory’s
argument and illustration quoted above: “This demonstration of the
essayist’s is founded in error. It proceeds on the supposition that the two
motives are not directly but indirectly repugnant, which is obviously
false; any reconciliation between them being absolutely impossible.” “If
a guinea is offered to carry a letter ten miles east, and another to carry a
letter ten miles south; and if I know I cannot earn both; if I know also
that by taking any intermediate road I shall receive nothing,—then my
situation is precisely the same as if the directions, instead of being east-
ward and southward, had been to points diametrically opposite.” He
admits “that a necessarian, consistently with his principles, cannot feel
that remorse which is founded on the conviction that he has acted im-
morally, and might have acted otherwise; but by the law of his nature he
feels pain from that state of mind which is connected with a vicious
conduct.” “A necessarian should feel no remorse, no painful sentiment
for any past action, as he knows it was necessary for general happi-
ness.” The opponents of necessity argue that these are the logical conse-
quences of the system, in order to land it in a reductio ad absurdum: but
scarcely any of the defenders have allowed this. It is evident that the
necessity he expounds is very different from that of Edwards. His work
on “Natural Theology” is a clear and judicious one. He argues that no
metaphysical argument such as Clarke’s, and no metaphysical principle
such as Reid’s common sense, can of itself prove the existence of God.
The question is “Are or are there not conclusive proofs in the phenom-
ena of nature that they must be productions of an intelligent author?”
“Wherever we find order and regularity obtaining, either uniformly or248/James McCosh
in a vast majority of instances, where the possibilities of disorder are
indefinitely numerous, we are justified in inferring from this an intelli-
gent cause.” He argues against materialism, and in favor of the immate-
riality of the soul.
XXXVII. Archibald Arthur
He was born at Abbot’s Inch in the parish of Renfrew in 1774, and died
in 1797. He became assistant and successor to Dr. Reid, in the chair of
moral philosophy, in Glasgow. There is a posthumous volume by him,
entitled “Discourses on Theological and Literary Subjects,” 1803, ed-
ited by Professor Richardson, and containing an account of his life. His
views do not seem profound or original, but his style is elegant, and he
has some good remarks on cause and effect and on beauty.
XXXVIII. John Bruce
He was born in 1744, and died in 1826. He published a little book for
the use of his students,—“First Principles of philosophy, by john Bruce,
A.M., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh.” It reached
a second edition in 1781—It consists of mere notes or heads. Logic has
a wide enough field:—it is “the comprehensive science which explains
the method of discovering and applying the laws of nature.” He makes
the sources of human knowledge to be sensation, understanding, and
consciousness. He has another work, “Elements of the Science of Eth-
ics, on the Principles of Natural Philosophy.” He defines the moral fac-
ulty as “the power of perceiving the objects which regard the happiness
or enjoyments of human nature.” If we ask in what the physical law of
gravitation consists, the answer is, in the uniformity of the effect in
material nature. If we ask in what the moral law consists, the answer is,
in the uniformity of the effect “that the observation of rights is the source
of enjoyment.” Mr Bruce does not sound the depths of any subject of
which he treats.
XXXIX. Review of The Century
By the close of the century, the fathers and elder sons of the family have
passed away from the scene; and we may be profited by taking a glance
at the work they have done. The Scottish metaphysicians have had an
influence on their country, partly by their writings, but still more by the
instruction which they imparted in the colleges to numerous pupils, af-The Scottish Philosophy/249
terwards filling important offices in various walks of life, and scattered
all over the land. I cannot do better here than quote from the chapter in
which M. Cousin closes his criticism of Reid. “By his excellencies as
well as his defects, Reid represents Scotland in philosophy.” “It would
be impossible to write a history of Scotland in the last half of the eigh-
teenth century, without meeting everywhere in the numerous and re-
markable productions of the Scotch genius of this epoch, the noble spirit
which that genius has excited, and which, in its turn, has communicated
to it a new force. In face of the authority of Hume, and despite the
attacks of Priestley, the philosophy of common sense spread itself rap-
idly, from Aberdeen to Glasgow, and from Glasgow to Edinburgh; it
penetrates into the universities, among the clergy, into the bar, among
men of letters and men of the world; and, without producing a move-
ment so vast as that of the German philosophy, it exercised an influence
of the same kind within narrower limits.” We have the testimony of a
succession of eminent men, to the effect that the chairs of mental phi-
losophy, taken along with the essay writing which the professors hold-
ing these chairs demanded, exercised a greater influence than any others
in the colleges and sent forth a body of youths capable of thinking, and
of expressing their thoughts in a clear and orderly manner. From an old
date, a reverence for the Roman law; and, at a later date, the judicial
training of many youths in Holland had given a logical form to the plead-
ings at the Scottish bar, and the decisions of the bench: and now the
philosophy widened the comprehension of the Edinburgh lawyers, and
gave to their law papers a philosophical order scarcely to be found in
those of England or Ireland.74 The Scottish philosophy never attempted,
as the German philosophy did (greatly to the injury of religion), to ab-
sorb theology into itself; but keeping to its own field, that of inductive
psychology, it allowed the students to follow their own convictions, evan-
gelical or rationalistic, but training all to a habit of skilful arrangement
and exposition. It enabled and it led the theological professors to dwell
on the relation between the truths of God’s Word, and the fundamental
principles of human nature; to lay a deep and solid foundation for moral
principle, to impart a moral tone to their teaching in divinity, and to
expound, clearly and wisely, the arguments for the existence of God and
the immortality of the soul. In the pulpit, it produced a thoughtful style
of address, of which English and Irish hearers were wont to complain,
as requiring from them too great a strain of thought. It fostered a habit
of reasoning and discussion among educated men generally; and, through250/James McCosh
the ministers of religion and the parochial teachers,—not a few of whom
were college bred,—it descended to the common people as a general
intelligence and independence of spirit.
On literature the influence of the Scottish has not been so great as
that of the German philosophy; but still it has been considerable, and
altogether beneficent. All the professors paid great attention to style:
they weeded out their Scotticisms with excessive care not a few of them
were teachers of rhetoric; they exacted essays on the subjects lectured
on, and sent forth a body of pupils capable of writing clearly and easily.
Every one who has read their writings notices a style common to the
whole Aberdeen school: it consists of simple sentences without strength
or genuine idiom, but always limpid, calm, and graceful. It is worthy of
being mentioned that, in the last quarter of the century, Edinburgh had a
distinguished literary circle: embracing the historian Robertson; the
preacher Blair; Mackenzie, the author of “The Man of Feeling;” such
scientific men as Hutton, Black, Playfair, the Monros (father and son),
and Cullen with the Gregories; and among them the metaphysicians,
Hume, Smith, Ferguson, Monboddo, and Dugald Stewart, held a promi-
nent place.
It has to be allowed that the original genius of Scotland was riot
called forth by the Scottish philosophy, nor, it may be added, by the
Scottish colleges. The truth is, it is not the province of colleges, or of
education even, to produce originality: their function is to guide and
refine it. Robert Burns owed little to school training, and nothing to
college learning; still such a man, with so much profound sense min-
gling with lust and passion, could have appeared only in a state of soci-
ety in which there was a large amount of intelligence. His father was a
thoughtful man, with a considerable amount of reading, and the mother’s
memory was filled with Scottish songs. After mingling in the literary
circle of Edinburgh, he testifies that he had found as much intelligence
and wit among the jolly bachelors of Tarbolton, as among the polished
men of the capital.75 It is to the credit of the Scottish metaphysicians,—
such as Lord Monboddo, Ferguson, and Stewart,—that they paid the
most delicate attention to the young poet when he came to Edinburgh in
1786. He strove to understand the Scottish metaphysics with only im-
perfect success.76 Alison’s, “Essay on Taste” made known to him the
theory which refers beauty to association of ideas, and Burns yields his
theoretical assent, while evidently doubting inwardly. He writes: “That
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heroic, and sublime, than the twingle-twangle of a jew’s-harp; that the
delicate texture of a rose-twig, when the half-blown flower is heavy
with the tears of dawn, was infinitely more beautiful and elegant than
the upright stalk of the burdock, and that from something innate, and
independent of all association of ideas,—these I had set down as irrefr-
agable orthodox truths until perusing your book shook my faith.” It is
an interesting circumstance that young Walter Scott met with Burns in
Edinburgh, in the house of Adam Ferguson, and was struck with his
dark, expressive eye, and with his combined humor and pathos. Scott
did not owe much more than Burns to the Scottish philosophy. But he
was a pupil of Dugald Stewart’s, and may have owed to him and his
college training, that power of clear exposition and order by which his
prose works are distinguished above those of most men of high imagina-
tive genius.77
It may be interesting at this point to look across the channel, and
inquire what philosophy was doing on the continent. I begin with that
country which was the ancient ally of Scotland. Both the Scotch and
French philosophies professed to draw much from Locke; but they seized
on very different elements. The Scotch followed him in his cautious
spirit and careful observation, but withstood from the beginning the
rash hypothesis which derived all our ideas from sensation and reflec-
tion; and they called in, besides the external and internal senses, other
senses as inlets, and in the end came to look upon them as being exer-
cises of reason.78 The French looked exclusively at the other side of
Locke’s philosophy, at the experiential side, carrying Locke’s theory a
stage farther; they left out reflection, made little use of observation,
betook themselves to analysis, and exerted their ingenuity to derive all
ideas from sensation. Condillac (born 1715, died 1786), made all man’s
ideas, even the highest, such as cause and moral good, transformed sen-
sations. Most of his works were written for the purpose of helping to
educate a prince of Parma, and the author did not mean to undermine
morality or religion. But the logical consequences of error follow it un-
relentingly, and are apt to come out in practical issues which the authors
of it never contemplated. If Condillac did not see, those who came after
him clearly perceived that we could not, out of the mere materials sup-
plied by the senses, extract, by any mental chemistry, the idea of moral
obligation and of a spiritual God. Helvetius expounded a morality of
self-interest; Cabanis evolved all thought out of organized matter, made
the brain secrete thought as the liver secretes bile; D’Holbach showed252/James McCosh
that the issue was blank atheism; and licentious men and women were
rejoicing in the thought that they had got rid of duty, of mind, and of
God. The fruit of the whole was seen, not in the French Revolution,
which was much needed, and would have come, with or without the
philosophy,—but in the direction which it took, and the atrocities which
it perpetrated, and which caused it, unlike the English and American
revolutions, to issue in a military despotism. By the close of the century,
this philosophy had gone beyond ripeness to rottenness, and finer minds
were turning away from it, and seeking for something better. The reac-
tion started by Laromiguierre, and carried on more effectively by Royer
Collard, and yet more so by his pupils Jouffroy and Cousin, turned
eagerly, as we shall see, towards the well-rounded philosophy of Reid
and Stewart.
In Germany, philosophy took a very different direction. Leibnitz
had opposed Locke and his experiential method, and had imparted a
speculative spirit and an ideal elevation to the German thinking; and
Wolf had labored to reduce the whole to logical forms. And now, as the
offspring of the two, of idealism and formalism, the true German phi-
losophy came forth from the brain of Emmanuel Kant, who was born
1724, died 1804, and published his great work, the “Kritik der reine
Vernunft” in 1781, which took a considerably revised form in 1787.
That philosophy was already taking firm hold of the German mind, and
has not at this day lost its grasp, notwithstanding the efforts of Darwin-
ism and materialism to loosen it. As it differed from the French, so it
also differed from the Scotch. In a sense, indeed, Kant’s philosophy was
transplanted from the Scottish soil. Kant’s grandfather named Cant, a
saddler, emigrated from Scotland;79 I and some think that he thence
derived hereditarily his high conception of moral law: and he acknowl-
edges that he was roused from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume’s scep-
tical account of the relation of cause and effect. But Reid and Kant,
though both opposed to Hume, took up very different lines of defence.
In respect of method, Reid followed the inductive method, with self-
consciousness as the instrument of observation; whereas Kant inaugu-
rated the critical method, as distinguished from the dogmatic method of
Descartes on the one hand, and the empirical method of Locke on the
other. The critical method takes upon itself to criticise all principles; but
it can do so only by other principles, avowed, or more frequently un-
avowed,—and the question is started: How are these other principles to
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end? Or, if we must stop somewhere, the question is, Where? and, Why
there? Every German metaphysician plants himself on his own stand-
point, which he says cannot be disputed: but his neighbor disputes it or
selects another; and there is a perpetual criticism, and an endless build-
ing, but without an undisputed foundation. In one respect, indeed, the
two, the Scotch and German philosophies, were alike: both stood up for
principles which did not derive their authority from experience. But the
Scottish metaphysicians discovered these by a careful inquiry into the
operations of the human mind; Kant, by a process of logical discussion.
On another point they differed: the Scottish metaphysicians make our
primitive perceptions or intuitions look at realities; whereas Kant stands
up for a priori principles, which regulate experience and have only a
subjective validity. Having allowed idealism to enter, there was no means
of arresting its career. As Kant had made time and space, substance and
cause, mere forms in the mind, Fichte was only advancing a few steps
farther on the same road when he made the whole universe a projection
of the mind; and, in the succeeding age, Schelling made it an intellectual
intuition, and Hegel a logical process. Even as the French sensational-
ism led to atheism, so the German idealism culminated in pantheism.
Every one will allow that the German philosophy had a much more
elevated character, and a much more elevating tendency, than the French.
Its influence on the great body of the German people may not have been
so great as that of the Scottish philosophy on the Scottish thought. On
the other hand, its influence has been vastly greater on literature, to
which it has imparted a high ideal character, as seen especially in the
poetry of Germany, and of other countries which have borrowed from
it.
XL. Dugald Stewart80
Dugald Stewart was born in the old college buildings, Edinburgh, on
November 22, 1753. His father was Dr. Matthew Stewart, at one time
minister at Roseneath, and afterwards successor to Maclaurin in the
mathematical chair in Edinburgh, and still known as one of those Brit-
ish mathematicians, who were applying, with great skill and beauty, the
geometrical method, while the continental mathematicians were far out-
stripping them by seizing on the more powerful instrument of the calcu-
lus. His mother was the daughter of an Edinburgh writer to the signet.
He was thus connected on the part of his father (and also of his grandfa-
ther, who had been minister of Rothesay), with the Presbyterian minis-254/James McCosh
try, and on the part of his mother with the Edinburgh lawyers,—the two
classes which, next to the heritors, held the most influential position in
Scotland.
Dugald was a feeble and delicate infant. He spent his boyish years
partly in Edinburgh, and partly in the maternal mansion-house of Catrine,
which I remember as being, when I paid pilgrimage thither many years
ago, a whitewashed, broad-faced, common-place old house, situated
very pleasantly in what Wordsworth calls expressively the “holms of
bonnie Ayr,” but unpleasantly near a cotton-mill and a thriving village,
which, as they rose about 1792, destroyed to Stewart the charms of the
place as a residence. Stewart entered, at the age of eight, the High School
of Edinburgh, where he had, in the latter years of his attendance, Dr.
Adam for his instructor, and where he was distinguished for the elegance
of his translations, and early acquired that love for the prose and poeti-
cal works of ancient Rome which continued with him through life. He
entered Edinburgh College in the session 1765–66; that is, in his thir-
teenth year. I remember that Bacon, David Hume, Adam Smith, Tho-
mas Reid, and many other original-minded men, entered college about
the same age; and I am strengthened in the conviction that, in order to
the production of fresh and independent thought, it is of ad vantage to
have the drilling in the ordinary elements all over at a comparatively
early age, and then allow the mind, already well stocked with general
knowledge, to turn its undivided energies to its favorite and evidently
predestinated field; and that the modern English plan of continuing the
routine discipline in classics or mathematics till the age of twenty-two,
while well fitted to produce good technical scholars, is not so well cal-
culated to raise up great reformers in method and execution. What the
Scottish colleges have to deplore is not so much the juvenility of the
entrants—though this has been carried to excess—as the total want of a
provision for bringing to a point, for carrying on, for consolidating and
condensing the scattered education which has been so well begun in the
several classes. But to return to the college youth, we find him attend-
ing, among other classes, that of logic under Stevenson, for two ses-
sions; that of moral philosophy under Adam Ferguson; that of natural
philosophy under Russell: and from all of these he received a stimulus
and a bent which swayed him at the crisis of his being, and abode with
him during the whole of his life.
After finishing his course in Edinburgh, he went to Glasgow in 1771,
partly by the advice of Ferguson, that he might be under Dr. ThomasThe Scottish Philosophy/255
Reid, and partly with the view of being sent to Oxford on the Snell
foundation, which has been of use to many students of Glasgow, but has
in some respects been rather injurious to the college; as it has led many
to ascribe to it the mere reflected glory of being a training- school to
higher institutions, whereas Glasgow should assert of itself that it is
prepared to give as high an education as can be had in any university in
the world. The youth seems at this time to have had thoughts of entering
the Church of England; and if he had gone south, he would no doubt, in
that event, have discharged the duties of the episcopal office with great
propriety and dignity. But a destiny better suited to his peculiar charac-
ter and gifts was awaiting him. In the autumn of 1772—that is, when he
was at the age of nineteen—he became substitute for his father in the
chair of mathematics in Edinburgh. It is precisely such an office as this,
a tutorship or assistant professorship, that the Scottish colleges should
provide for their more promising students; an office not to be reserved
for sons or personal friends of professors, but to be thrown open to
public competition. This is the one thing needful to the Scottish univer-
sities, to enable them to complete the education which they commence
so well, and to raise a body of learned youths, ready to compete with the
tutors and fellows of Oxford and Cambridge. In 1775, Mr Stewart was
elected assistant and successor to his father; in 1778, on Professor Adam
Ferguson going to America as secretary to a commission, he, upon a
week’s notice, lectured for him on morals; and, in 1785, Ferguson hav-
ing resigned, Stewart was appointed to the office for which he was so
specially fitted,—to the chair of moral philosophy in the university of
Edinburgh.
We pause in the narrative, in order to look at the circumstances
which combined to influence the youth, to determine his career, and to
fit him for the good work which he performed. First we have a mind, not
certainly of bright original genius, or of great intellectual force, but
with a blending of harmonious qualities, a capacity for inward reflec-
tion, and a disposition toward it, a fine taste, and consummate judg-
ment. From his youth he breathed the air of a college. He was early
introduced to Roman literature, and made it his model. Stevenson used
Wynne’s “Abridgment of Locke’s Essay” as a text-book, and from it the
student may have caught the fresh and observational spirit which Locke
had awakened, while, at the same time, he was kept from what Cousin
describes as the common defect of the British philosophy—being “insu-
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Philosophiae” of Heineccius, and the “Determinationes Ontologicae” of
De Vries; works which discussed, in a more abstract and scholastic
method, the questions agitated on the continent posterior to the publica-
tion of the philosophy of Descartes. A still greater influence was exer-
cised over the youth by Ferguson, who, with no great metaphysical abil-
ity, but in an altogether Roman and in a somewhat pagan manner, dis-
cussed, with great majesty and sweep, the topics—of which the pupil
was ever after so fond—lying between mental science on the one hand,
and jurisprudence on the other. From his own father and through his
own academical teaching, he acquired a taste for the Geometrical method,
so well fitted to give clearness and coherency to thought, and to teach
caution in deduction. He thus became one of those metaphysicians (and
they are not few) who have been mathematicians likewise, in this re-
spect resembling (no, to go back to Thales, Pythagoras, and Plato, in
ancient times) Descartes, Leibnitz, Samuel Clarke, Reid, and Kant. In
the class of natural philosophy he was introduced to the Newtonian
physics, which had been taught at an early date in Scotland, and caught
an enthusiastic affection for the inductive method and for Bacon, which
continued with him through life, and is his characteristic among meta-
physicians. But the teacher influencing him most, and, indeed, deter-
mining his whole philosophic career, was Thomas Reid, who, in a homely
manner, but with unsurpassed shrewdness, and great independence and
originality, was unfolding the principles of common sense, and thus lay-
ing a foundation for philosophy, while he undermined the scepticism of
Hume. Stewart has found in Reid the model instructor, and it may be
added that Reid has found in Stewart the model disciple. This whole
course was an excellent training for a metaphysician: it would have
been perfect if, along with his knowledge of natural philosophy, his
somewhat dull apprehension had been whetted by an acquaintance—
such as that of Locke in an earlier, and that of Brown in a later age—
with the more fugitive and complicated phenomena of the physiology of
the body; and if, in addition, his over-cautious temper had been raised
heavenward by an intimacy with the lofty spirit of Plato, or, better still,
by an appreciation of the deep theological discussions which had col-
lected around them so much of the English and Scottish speculative
intellect of the two preceding centuries.
Like every other man not altogether self-contained, Stewart must
have felt the spirit of his age, which, as coming in from every quarter,
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men than individual teachers can possibly do through the special chan-
nels open to them. Hume had stirred the thoughts of thinkers to their
greatest depths; and this was now the age in which Hume had to be met.
Stewart was born fourteen years after the publication of the great scep-
tical work of modern times, the “Treatise on Human Nature” and two
years after the publication of the work from which all modern utilitari-
anism has sprung, the “Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.”
At the time when the youth was forming his convictions, Hume was
living in Edinburgh, and the centre of an influence radiating round the
man, who was a mixture of the lively, good-natured animal and of the
intellectual giant, but with a terrible want of the high moral and spiri-
tual. The original disposition of Stewart did not tempt him to daring
speculation; his domestic training must have prepossessed him against
infidelity; and he had been placed, in Glasgow, under the only opponent
worthy of Hume, who had appeared; and so these earthquake shocks
just made him look round for a means of settling fast the foundations of
the temple of knowledge.
Locke’s philosophy had been the reigning one for the last age or
two. Mr Vetch speaks of the “tradition of sensationalism, which the
Scottish universities during the first half of the century, and up to the
time of Reid, had in general dispensed in Scotland.” This statement is
too sweeping: for, first, Locke had given as high a place to reflection as
to sensation; and, secondly, he had given a high office to intuition; while,
thirdly, Locke’s philosophy had not been received in Scotland without
modification, or in its worst aspects, as it had been in France. Stewart,
like Reid, entertained a high admiration of Locke, and was unwilling to
separate from him, but he saw at the same time the defects of Locke,
and that there were fundamental laws in the mind which Locke had
overlooked, or only incidentally noticed. In Glasgow he must have felt
the influence left behind by a train of eminent men. There Hutcheson
had been the founder of the genuine Scottish school. In Glasgow, too,
Adam Smith had expounded those original views which he afterwards
published in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments” and his “Wealth of Na-
tions.” In order to estimate the character of the age, it must also be taken
into account that there was a strong expectation that results were to
follow, from the application of inductive science, to mental phenomena,
similar to those which had flowed from its application to physics.
Turnbull’s aim was to “apply himself to the study of the human mind, in
the same way as to that of the human body, or to any other part of258/James McCosh
natural philosophy.” Catching this spirit, Reid was even now employing
it to discover principles deeper than any that had been systematically
noticed by Locke, by Hutcheson, or any Scottish philosopher. To this
same noble work Stewart now devoted himself; but seeking, meanwhile,
to combine with the profound philosophy of Reid a literary excellence
like that of Hume and Smith.
And this leads us to notice that we cannot form any thing like an
adequate idea of the influences which combined to mould the character
of Stewart, who cultivated literature as eagerly as he did philosophy,
without taking into account that he lived in an age of great literary re-
vival in Scotland. The union between Scotland and England being now
compacted, it was seen that the old Scottish dialect must gradually dis-
appear; and ambitious youths were anxious to get rid of their northern
idioms, and even grave seniors, including noblemen and dignified doc-
tors, like Robertson (as we learn from Lord Campbell’s “Life of
Loughborough”), had formed a society, in order to be delivered from
their Scottish pronunciation. A company of authors had sprung up, de-
termined to assert their place among the classical writers of England;
and this had been already allowed to Hume, to Robertson and Smith,
and was being allowed to Beattie. Stewart had, no doubt, an ambition to
take his place among the classical writers of Scotland.
While pursuing his studies at Glasgow, he read a paper on “Dream-
ing” before a literary society in connection with the university; and he
subsequently read the same paper to a similar society in Edinburgh. The
theory here started was afterwards embodied in his “Elements,” and
contains certainly not the whole truth on this mysterious subject, but
still a truth, namely, that in dreaming the will is in abeyance, and the
mind follows a spontaneous train. In the Edinburgh society he also read
papers on “Taste,” on “Cause and Effect,” and “Scepticism.” The fact
that such topics were discussed is a sign of the spirit which prevailed
among the youth of Scotland at that time. It is worthy of being noticed
that at Glasgow he boarded in the same house with Mr Alison, who
afterwards, in his essay on “Taste,” carried out the theory which had
been started by Beattie in his “Dissertation on Imagination,” as to the
feeling of beauty being produced by the association of ideas.
Quitting his course of training, we may now view him as delivering
his professorial lectures in the class-room in Edinburgh. By far the live-
liest account of him is by Lord Cockburn. It is worthy of being read
again by those who may have seen it before.The Scottish Philosophy/259
“He was about the middle size, weakly limbed, and with an ap-
pearance of feebleness which gave an air of delicacy to his gait
and structure. His forehead was large and bald; his eyebrows busily;
his eyes gray and intelligent, and capable of conveying any emo-
tion from indignation to pity, form serene sense to hearty humor,
in which they were powerfully aided by his lips, which, though
rather large perhaps, were flexible and expressive. The voice was
singularly pleasing; and, as he managed it, a slight burr only made
its tones softer. His ear both for music and for speech was exquis-
ite; and he was the finest reader I have ever heard. His gesture was
simple and elegant, though not free from a tinge of professional
formality, and his whole manner that of an academic gentleman....
He lectured standing, from notes which, with their successive ad-
ditions, must, I suppose, at last have been nearly as full as his
spoken words. His lecturing manner was professorial, but
gentlemanlike, calm and expository, but rising into greatness, or
softening into tenderness, whenever his subject required it. A slight
asthmatic tendency made him often clear his throat; and such was
my admiration of the whole exhibition, that Macvey Napier told
him not long ago that I had said there was eloquence in his very
spitting, ‘Then,’ said he, I am glad there was at least one thing in
which I had no competitor.’ . . To me, his lectures were like the
opening of the heavens. I felt that I had a soul. His noble views,
unfolded in glorious sentences, elevated me into a higher world.”
There were hearers who felt that there was a want in his exposi-
tions, and there are readers still who feel in the same way. Ardent youths,
like Brown and Chalmers, looked on him as timid and over-cautious.
Chalmers wrote in 1801: “I attend his lectures regularly. I must confess
I have been rather disappointed. I never heard a single discussion of
Stewart’s which made up one masterly and comprehensive whole. His
lectures seem to me to be made up of detached hints and incomplete
outlines, and he almost uniformly avoids every subject which involves
any difficult discussion.” Chalmers lived to proclaim him the highest of
academic moralists. Still there was ground, in appearance and in reality,
for the early criticism. In his writings he adopts the plan which Dr.
Robertson took credit for introducing, that of throwing a great deal of
his matter into notes and illustrations. This method, carried to the extent
to which it has been done by Robertson, Stewart, and M’Crie, is a radi-
cally defective one, as it interrupts the flow of the discourse, and, with260/James McCosh
this, the interest in and comprehension of the whole. He has a most
sensitive aversion to all such bold speculations as Leibnitz indulged in,
and is jealous of all such consecutive deductions as Descartes and Kant
have drawn out. He has no ability for sharp analysis, and he looks on a
high abstraction with as great terror as some men do on ghosts. He
studiously avoids close discussion, and flinches from controversy; he
seems afraid of fighting with an opponent, lest it should exhibit him in
no seemly attitudes. Seldom does he venture on a bold assertion, and,
when he does, he takes shelter immediately after behind an authority.
Determined to sustain his dignity and keep up his flow of language, he
often takes rounded sentences and paragraphs to bring out what a more
direct mind would have expressed in a single clinching clause, or even
by an expressive epithet. Often does the eager, ingenuous youth, in reading
his pages, wish that he would but lay aside ceremony for a very little,
and speak out frankly and heartily.
Still we should form a very unjust opinion of Stewart, if, in conse-
quence of weaknesses, we thought him devoid of originality, indepen-
dence, or profundity. We certainly do not claim for him the sagacity of
Locke, or the speculative genius of Leibnitz, or a power of generalizing,
details equal to Adam Smith, or the shrewdness of Reid, or the logical
grasp of Kant and Hamilton, and I admit that he was inferior to all these
men in originality; but he has admirable qualities of his own, in sound-
ness of judgment he is more to be trusted than any of them; and, if he is
without some of their excellencies, he is also without some of their faults.
He has no such rash and unmeasured diatribes as Locke’s assault on
innate ideas; no such extravagances as the monadical theory of Leibnitz;
no such wasting of ingenuity as Smith’s theory in his “Moral Senti-
ments;” he does not commit such gross misapprehensions in scholarship
as Reid does; and he never allows any logic to conduct him to such
preposterous conclusions as Kant and Hamilton landed themselves in,
when they declared causation to be a law of thought and not of things. I
have noticed that in many cases Stewart hides his originality as care-
fully as others boast of theirs. Often have I found, after going the round
of philosophers in seeking light on some abstruse subject, that, on turn-
ing to Stewart, his doctrine is, after all, the most profound, as it s the
most judicious.
I do not mean to enter into the details of his remaining life. In 1783,
he married a Miss Bannatyne of Glasgow, who died in 1787, leaving an
only child, afterwards Colonel Stewart. He spent the summers of 1788The Scottish Philosophy/261
and 1789 on the Continent. In the appendix to the Memoir, there is a
selection from the letters which he wrote to his friends at home. Though
written in the midst of instructive scenes, and on the eve of great events,
they are excessively general and common-place, and display no shrewd-
ness of observation. In 1790, he married a daughter of Lord Cranston, a
lady of high accomplishments, fascinating manners, and literary tastes.
His house now became the resort of the best society of Edinburgh, and
he himself the centre and bond of an accomplished circle, at a time when
the metropolis of Scotland in the winter months was the residence of
many of the principal Scottish families, and of persons of high literary
and scientific eminence. The weekly reunions in his house, which hap-
pily blended the aristocracies of rank and letters, bringing together the
peer and the unfriended scholar, were for many years the source of an
influence that most beneficially affected the society of the capital. His
influence was extended by his receiving into his house, as boarders,
young men chiefly of rank and fortune. In his classes of moral philoso-
phy and of political economy, he had under him a greater body of young
men who afterwards distinguished themselves, than any other teacher
that I can think of. Among them we have to place Lord Brougham, Lord
Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Francis Horner, Lord Lansdowne,
Francis Jeffrey, Walter Scott, Sydney Smith, Thomas Brown, Thomas
Chalmers, James Mill, Archibald Alison, and many others who have
risen to great eminence in politics, in literature, or philosophy; and most
of these have acknowledged the good which they derived from his lec-
tures, while some of them have carried out in practical measures the
principles which he inculcated. He seems, in particular, to have kindled
a fine enthusiasm in the breast of Francis Horner, who ever speaks of
him in terms of loftiest admiration, and, though cut off in early life,
lived long enough to exhibit the high moral aims which he had imbibed
from the lessons of Stewart.
It was in 1792 that the first volume of his “Elements” was pub-
lished. In 1793, appeared his “Outlines of Moral Philosophy,” contain-
ing an epitome of the doctrines expanded in his larger writings. His
other works appeared after successive intervals: his Account of Adam
Smith in 1793, of Robertson in 1796, and of Reid in 1802; his “Philo-
sophical Essays” in 1810; the second volume of his “Elements” in 1814;
the first part of his Dissertation, in 1815, and the second in 1821; the
third volume of his “Elements” in 1827; and the “Active and Moral
Powers” in 1828. The lectures on Political Economy, were not pub-262/James McCosh
lished till 1856.
In 1805, he threw himself, with more eagerness than he was wont to
display in public matters, into the controversy which arose about the
appointment of Leslie—a man of high scientific eminence, but with a
great deal of the gross animal in his nature—to the chair of mathemat-
ics. He wrote a pamphlet on the subject, and appeared in the General
Assembly of the Church of Scotland, as a Presbyterian elder, to aid the
evangelical party, who, under the leadership of Sir Henry Moncreiff,
were no way inclined to join the moderate party in their attempt to keep
out a distinguished man, because he entertained certain views on the
subject of physical causation, and to retain the college chairs for them-
selves. In his speech on the occasion, Stewart does let out feeling for
once, and it is mingled pride and scorn. “After having discharged for
more than thirty years (not, I trust, without discredit to myself) the im-
portant duties of my academical station, I flatter myself that the House
does not think it incumbent on me to descend to philosophical contro-
versies with such antagonists. Such of the members, at least, as I have
the honor to be known to, will not, I am confident, easily allow them-
selves to be persuaded that I would have committed myself rashly and
wantonly on a question in which the highest interests of mankind are
involved.” In delivering the speech from which the above is an extract,
he was called to order, and, not being accustomed to such handling, he
sat down abruptly. The motion of Sir Henry Moncreiff was carried by a
majority, which occasioned great joy to the Edinburgh Liberals, and
helped to sever the connection between the universities and the church.
In 1806, the Whig party, being in power, procured for him a sine-
cure office, entitled the writership of the “Edinburgh Gazette,” with a
salary of £300 a year. In 1809, he was in a precarious state of health,
much aggravated by the death of a son by his second wife, and he asked
Dr. Thomas Brown to lecture for him. In 1810, Brown, being strongly
recommended to the Town Council by Stewart, was appointed conjoint
professor, and henceforth discharged all the duties of the office. Brown
never attacked Stewart, but he openly assailed Reid; and we suppose
the intimacy between Stewart and Brown henceforth could not have
been great. Stewart delivered his ultimate estimate of Brown in a note
appended to the third volume of the “Elements.” There is evidently keen
feeling underlying it; but the criticism is, on the whole, a fair and just
one. Stewart now lived, till the close of his life, at Kinniel House,
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Hamilton Henceforth he was chiefly employed in maturing and arrang-
ing the philosophical works which he published. The details given of
this part of his life are scanty and uninstructive. In 1820, he came forth
to support Sir James Mackintosh as successor to Brown; and when Sir
James declined the office, Stewart recommended Sir William Hamilton,
who seems ever afterwards to have cherished a feeling of gratitude to-
wards Stewart. The election fell on Professor Wilson, who, while the
fittest man living for the chair of rhetoric and belles-lettres, had no spe-
cial qualifications for a chair of philosophy.
In 1822, Mr Stewart had a stroke of paralysis, from which, how-
ever, he partially recovered. Mrs. Stewart describes him, in 1824, as
troubled with a difficulty of speech, and a tremor in his hand, as walk-
ing two or three hours every day, as cheerful in his spirits, his mind as
acute as ever, and as amusing himself with reading on his favorite pur-
suits, and with the classics. He had just given to the world his work on
the “Active Powers,” and was on a visit to a friend in Edinburgh, when
he died on 11th June, 1828. He was buried in the family vault in the
Canongate. There is a monument in honor of him on the Calton Hill; but
the fittest memorial of him is to be found, first, in his pupils, who have
done a good work in their day, and now in his writings, which may do a
good work for ages to come.
His collected works have been edited by Sir William Hamilton. The
editor has not enriched it with such notes as he has appended to his
edition of Reid,—notes distinguished for the very qualities which Reid
was deficient in, extensive scholarship and rigid analysis. Sir William
Hamilton, in undertaking the work, stipulated that Mr Stewart’s writ-
ings should be published without note or comment. I rather think that
Hamilton had not such a sympathy with the elegant and cautious dis-
ciple as with the shrewd and original master. Besides, elaborate notes to
Stewart must have been very much a repetition of his notes to Reid. In
this edition Hamilton is tempted at times to depart from his rule: he does
give us a note or comment when the subject is a favorite one, such as the
freedom of the will; and often must he have laid a restraint on himself, in
not pruning or amending to a greater extent. .But the value of this edi-
tion consists in its being complete, in its having references supplied, and
one index after another, and in its containing additions from Stewart’s
manuscripts, and these often of great value, both in themselves and as
illustrating Stewart’s philosophy. Sir William Hamilton was cut off be-
fore the edition was completed, but Mr Vetch has carried on the work in264/James McCosh
the same manner and spirit. Having said so much of this fine edition, we
must protest against the occasional translation of the language and views
of Stewart into those of Hamilton, in places where it is purported to give
us Stewart himself. Thus, in index, vol. iv, p. 408, Stewart is repre-
sented as, in a place referred to, discussing the question as to whether
some of our notions be not “native or a priori,” but, on looking up the
page, no such language is used; and the same remark holds good of vol.
v, p. 474, where Stewart is spoken of as describing our notions both of
matter and mind as merely “phenomenal,” a view thoroughly Kantian
and Hamiltonian, and not sanctioned by Stewart. I must be allowed,
also, to disapprove of the liberty taken with the “Outlines of Moral
Philosophy,” which is cut up into three parts, and appears in three dis-
tinct volumes. This is the most condensed and direct of all Stewart’s
writings: it contains an abridgment of his whole doctrines; it is one of
the best text-books ever written, and it should have appeared in its unity,
as Stewart left it.
I do not propose to criticise these ten massive volumes of his works.
This would be a heavy work to my readers: it would almost be equiva-
lent to a criticism of all modern philosophy. Nevertheless, I must touch
on some topics of an interesting and important kind, as discussed by
Stewart, and again discussed by later writers on mental science.
The first volume of the collected works contains the “Dissertation
on the Progress of Metaphysical and Ethical Philosophy.” I look upon it
as the finest of the dissertations in the “Encyclopaedia Britannica”; and
this is no mean praise, when we consider the number of eminent men
who have written for that work. I regard it, indeed, as, upon the whole,
the best dissertation which ever appeared in a philosophical serial. As a
history of modern philosophy, especially of British philosophy, it has
not been superseded, and, I believe, never will be set aside. It is pre-
eminent for its fine literary taste, its high moral tone, its general accu-
racy, its comprehensiveness of survey, and its ripeness of wisdom. When
we read it, we feel as if we were breathing a pure and healthy atmo-
sphere, and that the whole spirit of the work is cheering, as being so full
of hope in the progress of knowledge. Its critical strictures are ever
candid, generally mild, very often just, and always worthy of being noted
and pondered. The work is particularly pleasing in the account given of
those who have contributed by their literary works to diffuse a taste for
metaphysical studies, such as Montaigne, Bayle, Fontenelle, and Addison.
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and failed to fathom the depth of such minds as Leibnitz and Jonathan
Edwards. I agree, moreover, with those who regret that he should ever
have been tempted to enter on a criticism of Kant, whose works he knew
only from translations and imperfect compends.
The next three volumes contain the “Elements of the Philosophy of
the Human Mind,” and are introduced by a portion of the “Outlines of
Moral Philosophy.” In the first volume of the “Elements” and in the
opening of the second, he spreads out before us a classification of the
intellectual powers,—as perception, attention, conception, abstraction,
association of ideas, memory, imagination, and reason. The list is at
once defective and redundant. Stewart acknowledges self-consciousness,
which is an inseparable concomitant of all the present operations of the
mind, to be a separate attribute; and in this he seems to be right, inas-
much as it looks at a special object, namely, self in the existing state,
and gives us a distinct class of ideas, namely, the qualities of self, such
as thinking and feeling. Yet it is curious that, while he gives it half a
page in his “Outlines,” it has no separate place in the “Elements.” It is
also a singular circumstance that Reid dismisses it in the same summary
way. An inductive observation, with an analysis of the precise knowl-
edge given us by self-consciousness, would give a solid foundation for
the doctrine of human personality, and clear away the greater part of the
confusion and error lingering in the metaphysics of our day. Nor is there
any proper account given in the “Elements” of that important group of
faculties which discover relations among the objects known by sense-
perception and consciousness. The omission of this class of attributes
has led him into a meagre nominalism, very unlike the general spirit of
his philosophy. He restricts the word conception to the mere imaging
power of the mind, and even to the picturing of bodily objects, as if we
could not represent mental objects as well, as, for example, ourselves or
others in joy or sorrow. In a later age, Hamilton has confined the term in
an opposite direction to the logical or general notion. Stewart’s classifi-
cation is also redundant. Attention is not a separate faculty, but is an
exercise of will,—roused, it may be, by feeling, and fixing the mind on
a present object. He does not seem to know what to make of reason as a
distinct faculty; and, as defined by him, it ought to include abstraction,
which is certainly a rational exercise. But, if the work is defective in
logical grasp, it excels in its descriptions of concrete operations, and in
its explanations and elucidations of phenomena presenting themselves
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which Bacon commends as most useful of all, as being removed equally
from the lowest axioms, which differ but little from particulars, and
from the highest and most general, which are notional, abstract, and of
no weight; whereas the “intermediate are true, solid, full of life, and
upon them depend the business and fortune of mankind.” The fine re-
flection and lofty eloquence of Stewart come out most pleasingly and
instructively in all those passages in which he treats of association and
imagination.
On one important point, discussed frequently in the “Elements,” the
school of Reid and Stewart was led into error by their excessive caution,
and by being awed so much by the authority of Locke. Reid maintained
in a loose way, that we do not know substance, but qualities; and Stewart
wrought this view into a system. We are not, he says, properly speaking,
conscious of self or the existence of self: we are conscious merely of a
sensation or some other quality, which, by a subsequent suggestion of
the understanding, leads to a belief in that which exercises the qual-
ity.—(“Phil. Essays,” p. 58, etc.) This I must regard as a radically de-
fective doctrine. We do not know intuitively a quality of self apart from
self; we know both in one primitive, concrete act, and it is only by a
subsequent operation that we separate in thought the quality which may
change in its action from the self or substance which abideth. Descartes
erred I think, when he represented the mental process as being “cogito,
ergo sum:” the primitive cognition is of the ego cogitans. But I look on
Stewart as equally erring when he says, that there is first a sensation
and then a belief in self. In a later age, Sir William Hamilton connected
the qualitative theory of Stewart with the phenomenal theory of Kant.
In doing so he was guilty, I must take the liberty of saying of a great and
inexcusable blunder. Stewart would have repudiated the phenomenal
theory of Kant as at all identical with his own. Stewart, no doubt, speaks
of the phenomena of the mind; but he means by phenomena not, as Kant
did, appearances, but individual facts to be referred to a law; and quali-
ties with him were realities. But, legitimately or illegitimately, Hamilton
identifying the qualitative theory with the phenomenal, deduces from
them a system of relativity, which ended in nihilism, or at least in
nescience. I am glad to notice that Mr Mansel, notwithstanding his great
and just admiration of Hamilton, has emancipated himself from this
fundamental error. He proclaims, “I am immediately conscious of my-
self, seeing and hearing, willing and thinking.”—(“Proleg. Logica,” p.
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that, if Stewart had foreseen ail the logical consequences to be deduced
from his views, he would have fallen back on the same common-sense
doctrine. I regret that Mr Mansel has not gone a step farther, and placed
our cognition of matter on the same footing in this respect as our knowl-
edge of mind. I am sure, at least, that this would be altogether in the
spirit of Reid and Stewart. I maintain that, just as by self-consciousness
we know self as exercising such and such a quality, say thinking or
feeling, so, by sense-perception, we know a body as extended and exer-
cising power or energy. This is the simplest doctrine: it seems to be the
only one consistent with consciousness, and is the proper doctrine of
natural realism as distinguished from an artificial system of relativity.
In the second volume of the “Elements,” after a feeble and chiefly
verbal disquisition on reason, he proceeds to treat of the “fundamental
laws of belief.” I reckon the phrase a very happy one, and a great im-
provement on “common sense,” which labors under the disadvantage of
being ambitious; inasmuch as it usually denotes that unbought, untaught
sagacity, which is found only in certain men, and which others can never
acquire, whereas it can be admitted into philosophical discussion only
when it denotes principles which are regulating the minds of all. I have
a remark to make as to the place in which he discusses these fundamen-
tal laws. It is after he has gone over the greater number of the faculties,
and he seems to treat them as involved in reason. And I acknowledge
that there may be some advantages in first going over the faculties and
then speaking of these fundamental laws. But we must guard against the
idea that these principles are not involved in the faculties which he has
previously gone over; such as, perception, abstraction, and memory.
The “fundamental laws” are not to be regarded as different from the
faculties: they are, in fact, the necessary laws of the faculties, and guid-
ing their exercise. These laws work in all minds, infant and mature, sane
and insane. M. Morel was asked to examine a prisoner who seemed to
be deranged, and he asked him how old he was; to which the prisoner
replied: “245 francs, 35 centimes, 124 carriages,” etc. To the same ques-
tion, more distinctly asked, he replied,: “5 metres, 75 centimetres.” When
asked how long he had been deranged, he answered: “Cats, always cats.”
M. Morel at once declared his madness to be simulated, and states: “In
their extreme aberrations, in their most furious delirium, madmen do
not confound what it is impossible for the most extravagant logic to
confound. There is no madman who loses the idea of cause, of sub-
stance, of existence.” (See “Psychol. Journal,” Oct. 1857.)268/James McCosh
Stewart’s doctrine of causation seems to me to be deficient and in-
adequate. He is altogether right in calling it a fundamental law of belief,
which necessitates the mind to rise from an effect to a cause. But he
does not seem to observe all that is involved in the cause. He gives in too
far to Hume on this subject, and prepares the way for Brown’s theory.
He does not see, in particular, that causation springs from power being
in the substance or substances which act as the cause, and that we intu-
itively discover power to be in substances both mental and material. His
distinction between efficient and physical cause is of a superficial and
confused character. It may be all true that, in looking at physical action,
we may not know intuitively where the full efficiency resides, whether
in the physical object alone or in mind (the divine) acting in it; but we
are certain that there is an efficiency somewhere in some substance. I
am by no means sure that he is right in limiting power in the sense of
efficiency to mental action. I agree here with the criticisms of Cousin
(as indeed I agree with most of the criticisms of Cousin on the Scottish
school) where he says that, while our first idea of cause may be derived
from our own voluntary action, we are at the same time intuitively led to
ascribe potency to other objects also; and that Reid and Stewart, in
denying that we discover efficiency in body, are acting contrary to their
own principles of common sense, and in contradiction to the universal
opinion of the human race, which is, that fire burns and light shines.
(See Cousin, “Phil. Ecoss.,” p. 437, ed. 1857.) Stewart has also failed,
as it appears to me, to give the proper account of the intuition which
regulates and underlies our investigations of nature. This is not, as he
represents it, a belief in the uniformity of nature; a belief which appears
to me to be the result of experience, which experience, as it discovers
the rule, may also announce the exceptions. The child does not believe,
nor does the savage believe, nature to be uniform. The underlying be-
liefs, which carry us on in our investigations of nature are those of
identity, of being, of substance and quality, of cause and effect. Hence it
is quite possible to prove a miracle which may not be in conformity with
the uniformity of nature, but is quite compatible, as Brown has shown,
with our intuitive belief in causation for when creature power fails we
can believe in creative.
It is in the second volume of the “Elements” that we find the logical
disquisitions of Stewart. He has utterly failed in his strictures on
Aristotle’s logic. The school of Locke, and the school of Condillac, and
the school of Reid, have all failed in constructing a logic of inferenceThe Scottish Philosophy/269
which can stand a sifting examination. The Aristotelian analysis of rea-
soning stands at this moment untouched in its radical positions. The
objections of Campbell and Stewart have been answered by Whately,
who shows that the syllogism is not a new or peculiar mode of reason-
ing, but an analytic of the process which passes through the mind when
it reasons. In giving an adherence to the Aristotelian analysis, I admit
that improvements were wrought in it by that school of logicians which
has sprung from Kant, and of which Hamilton was the leader in Great
Britain, followed by such eminent men as Mansel, Thomson, and
Spalding. But their improvements ought not to be admitted till the for-
mal logicians thoroughly deliver their exposition of the laws of thought
from all that false Kantian metaphysics which represents thought as
giving to the objects a “form” which is not in the objects themselves.
Besides, I cannot allow logic to be an a priori science except under an
explanation: I admit that the laws of thought operate in the mind prior to
all experience; but I maintain that they can be discovered by us only a
posteriori, and by a generalization of their individual actings.
But while we may thus expect a perfected universal logic, treating
of the laws of thought as laws of thought,—not independent of objects,
but whatever be the objects,—I hope there will grow up alongside a
particular logic, which will be a more practically useful logic, to con-
sider the laws of thought as directed to particular classes of objects, and
to treat of such topics as demonstrative and probable evidence, induc-
tion, and analogy. In regard to this latter logic, Stewart must ever be
referred to as an authority. So far, indeed, as the theory of definitions
and axioms is concerned, I prefer very much the view of Whewell, as
developed in his “Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.” But, in regard
to induction, I believe that Stewart’s account of it is, upon the whole, the
best which appeared from the time of Bacon down to his own age. Since
his time, we have two great works, which have left every other far be-
hind,—that of Whewell and that of Mr John Stuart Mill. Not that I
regard either of these as perfect. Dr. Whewell has exaggerated the place
of the mental element, and has expressed it in most unfortunate phrase-
ology, such as “fundamental ideas” and “conceptions,” terms which have
been used in twenty different significations, and are used by him to
denote that the mind superinduces on the facts something not in the
facts, whereas the mental power merely discovers what is in the facts.
Mr Mill, on the other hand, has overlooked the mental element alto-
gether, and denies all necessary and universal truth. We may hope, in270/James McCosh
future years, to have a perfect inductive logic by a judicious combina-
tion of these two works but this can be done only by a man of the same
high intellectual stature as Whewell and Mill, and this will seldom be
met with. It is to be regretted that, since the days of Stewart, there is not
a single Scotchman who has presented a work on induction, of any name
or value.81 In regard to analogy, the discoveries as to the typical forms
of animals and plants and evolution will enable logicians to give a far
more comprehensive and yet more stringent view of reasoning from anal-
ogy than has been done by Stewart, by Whewell, or by Mill.
The third volume of the “Elements” treats of certain concrete and
practical matters, which Stewart was peculiarly qualified to discuss,
and which bring out some of the finer qualities of his mind. All his
disquisitions had tended to become verbal; and here he treats expressly
of languages which he does with fine discernment, but falls into a great
blunder in regard to Sanscrit, which he represents as of comparatively
late origin, and analogous to mediaeval Latin, whereas it has a literature
reaching back at least twelve hundred years before Christ. He has some
interesting, though by no means profound, remarks on the sympathetic
affections. But by far the finest parts of the volume are those in which
he treats of the varieties of intellectual character, and of the peculiarities
of the metaphysician, the mathematician, the poet, and the sexes. Thus,
of the mere metaphysician, he says, that, “he cannot easily submit to the
task of examining details, or of ascertaining facts, and is apt to seize on
a few data as first principles, following them out boldly to their remot-
est consequences, and afterwards employing his ingenuity to reconcile,
by means of false refinements, his theoretical assumptions with the ex-
ceptions which seem to contradict them.” He shows that the metaphysi-
cian is safe from the checks met with in physics, “where speculative
mistakes are contradicted by facts which strike our senses.” Again, of
mathematics, he says, “that, while they increase the faculty of reasoning
or deduction, they give no employment to the other powers of the under-
standing concerned in the investigation of truth.” He adds: “I have never
met a mere mathematician who was not credulous to excess.”
In the same volume he discusses cautiously and judiciously the com-
parison between the faculties of man and brutes. I suspect, however,
that the theory has not yet been devised—it has certainly not been pub-
lished—which is fitted to give a satisfactory account of the relation of
the brute to the human faculties. I suppose that Bonnet is right when he
says that we shall never be able to understand the nature of brute in-The Scottish Philosophy/271
stinct, till we are in the dog’s head without being the dog. It is certain
that we have at this moment nothing deserving of the name of science on
this subject. I have sometimes thought that the modern doctrine of ho-
mologues and analogues, if extended and modified to suit the new ob-
ject, might supply the key to enable us to express some of the facts.
Certain of the brute qualities are merely analogous to those of man (as
the wing of a butterfly is analogous to that of a bird); others are homo-
logues, but inferior in degree; while there are qualities in man different
in kind from any, in the brute. Aristotle called brute instincts, mim»mata
t½j ¢nqwtnhj zw¼j. They would be more accurately described as
anticipations or types of the coming archetype. The volume closes with
an account of James Mitchell, a boy born blind and dumb.
The “Philosophical Essays” are an episode in his system as a whole,
even as his numerous notes and illustrations are episodes in the indi-
vidual volumes. I am tempted, in looking at them, to take up two of the
subjects discussed, as a deep interest still collects around them, and the
questions agitated cannot yet be regarded as settled.
Every careful reader of Locke’s “Essay” must have observed two
elements running through all his philosophy,—the one, a sensational, or
rather to do justice to Locke, who ever refers to reflection as a separate
source of ideas, an experiential element, and the other a rational. In the
opening of the “Essay” he denies innate ideas apparently in every sense,
and affirms that the materials of all our ideas are derived from sensation
and reflection; but, as he advances, his language is, that by these sources
ideas are “suggested and furnished to the mind” (the language adopted
by Reid and Stewart); he calls in faculties with high functions to work
on the materials; speaks of ideas which are “creatures and inventions of
the understanding;” appeals to “natural law” and the “principles of com-
mon reason;” and in the Fourth Book gives a very high, or rather deep,
place to intuition; says we have an intuitive knowledge of our own exist-
ence; speaks of the “mind perceiving truth as the eye doth light, only by
being directed toward it;” declares that, in the “discovery of and assent
to these truths, there is no use of the discursive faculty, no need of rea-
soning, but they are known by a superior and higher degree of evi-
dence,” and talks even of a “necessary connection of ideas.” It unfortu-
nately happened that in France, to which Locke was introduced by
Voltaire and the encyclopedists, they took the sensational element alone,
and the effect on thought and on morality was most disastrous. Unfortu-
nately, too, Locke has become known in Germany, chiefly through France,272/James McCosh
and hence we find him, all over the Continent, described both by friends
and foes as a sensationalist; and the charge has been re-echoed in Great
Britain by Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Morell. Yet it is quite certain
that Locke has an intellectual as well as a sensational side.82 I have, in a
careful perusal of the “Essay,” mainly for this very end, discovered in
every book, and in the majority even of the chapters, both sides of the
shield; but I confess that I have not been able to discover the line that
joins them. I do not think that Stewart’s remarks on this subject are
exhaustive or decisive: he is evidently wrong in supposing that Locke
identified reflection with the reason which discovers truth, but his stric-
tures are always candid and sometimes just.
In the “Philosophical Essays,” Stewart has many fine observations
on taste and beauty. On this subject he was favorably disposed towards
the theory of his friend Mr Alison, and he ascribes more than he should
have done to the association of ideas. But he never gave his adhesion to
this hypothesis as a full explanation of the phenomena. “If there was
nothing,” he says, “originally and intrinsically pleasing or beautiful, the
associating principle would have no materials on which it could oper-
ate.” The theory of association was never favorably received by artists,
and has been abandoned by all metaphysicians. The tendency now is to
return to the deeper views which had been expounded long ago by Plato,
and, I may add, by Augustine. I find that Stewart refers to the doctrine
of Augustine, who “represents beauty as consisting in that relation of
the parts of a whole to each other which constitutes its unity;” and all
that he has to say of it is: “The theory certainly is not of great value, but
the attempt is curious.” The aesthetical writers of our age would be
inclined to say of it that there is more truth in it than in all the specula-
tions of Alison, Stewart, Jeffrey, and Brown. It may be safely said that,
while earnest inquirers have had pleasant glimpses of beauty, to no one
has she revealed her full charms. When such writers as Cousin, Ruskin,
and Macvicar dwell so much on unity, harmony, proportion, I am tempted
to ask them: Does then the feeling of beauty not arise till we have dis-
covered such qualities as proportion, unity, and harmony? And if they
answer in the affirmative, then I venture to show them that they are
themselves holding a sort of association theory; for they affirm that the
beautiful object does not excite emotion till, as a sign, it calls forth
certain ideas,—I suspect of truth and goodness. I am not quite sure that
we can go the length of this school, when they speak of beauty as a
quality necessary, immutable, eternal, like truth and moral good, andThe Scottish Philosophy/273
connect it so essentially with the very nature of God. There are sounds
and colors and proportions felt to be beautiful by us, but which may not
be appreciated by other intelligences, and which are so relished by us,
simply because of the peculiarities of our human organization and con-
stitution. I acknowledge that, when we follow these colors and sounds
and proportions sufficiently far, we come in variably to mathematical
ratios and relations; but we are now, be it observed, in the region of
immutable truth. Other kinds of beauty, arising from the contemplation
of happiness and feeling, land us in the moral good, which is also neces-
sary and eternal. I have sometimes thought that beauty is a gorgeous
robe spread over certain portions of the true and the good, to recom-
mend them to our regards and cluster our affections round them. Our
aesthetic emotions being thus roused, the association of ideas comes in
merely as a secondary agent to prolong and intensify the feeling.
The two volumes on the “Philosophy of the Active and Moral Pow-
ers” were published by Stewart immediately before his death. The lead-
ing ideas unfolded in them had been given, in an epitomized form, in the
“Outlines,” published many years before. They are somewhat too bulky
for all the matter they contain, and they want somewhat of the freshness
of his earlier works; but they are characterized by profound wisdom, by
a high moral tone, by a stately eloquence, and the felicitous application
of general principles to the elucidation of practical points. He begins
with the instinctive principles of action, which he classifies as appetites,
desires, and affections. The arrangement is good in some respects, but
is by no means exhaustive. As the next step in advance in this depart-
ment of mental science, an attempt must be made to give a classification
of man’s motive principles, or of the ends by which man may be swayed
in desire and action. Among these will fall to be placed, first of all
pleasure and pain; that is, man has a natural disposition to take to plea-
sure and avoid pain. But this is far from being the sole motive principle
in man’s mind. There are many others. There is, for example, the ten-
dency of every native faculty to act, and this irrespective of pleasure or
pain. Again, there are particular natural appetencies, which look to ends
of their own, towards (to use the language of Butler) particular external
things of which the mind hath always a particular idea or perception,
towards these things themselves, such as knowledge, power, fame, and
this independent of the pleasure to be derived from them. Higher than
all, and claiming to be higher, is the moral motive, or obligation to do
right. A classification of these motive principles, even though only ap-274/James McCosh
proximately correct, would serve most important purposes in philoso-
phy generally, and more especially in ethics and all the social sciences.
Very low and inadequate views have been taken of these motive prin-
ciples of humanity, especially by those who represent man as capable of
being swayed only by the prospect of securing pleasure or avoiding
pain. It should never be forgotten, that the emotive part of man’s nature
may be excited by a great many other objects as well as pleasure and
pain, by all the objects, indeed, which are addressed to the motive prin-
ciples of man. It is the apprehension of objects as about to gratify the
motive principles of the mind—whatever they be—which stirs up the
emotions. Thus, the apprehension of a coming object, which is to gratify
a motive principle, excites hope, which is strong in proportion to the
strength of the apprehension, and the strength of the particular motive
principle; while the apprehension of a coming object, which is to disap-
point this motive principle, stirs up fear. It is strange that Stewart no-
where treats of the emotions in his “Philosophy of the Active Powers.”
Stewart’s view of the moral power in man, and of moral good, seems
to me to be substantially correct. In treating of these subjects, he avows
his obligations to Butler and Price. His doctrine has been adopted, with
some modifications, which are improvements, by Cousin. Stewart and
Cousin are the most elevated of all the moralists who treat of ethics on
grounds independent of the Word of God. I am convinced that they never
could have given so pure a morality, had they not lived in the midst of
light shed abroad on our earth by a super natural religion. I have always
felt it to be a strange circumstance, that Stewart and Cousin, in giving
so high a view of the moral faculty, are never led to acknowledge that it
condemns the possessor; and after presenting moral good in so rigid a
form, are not constrained to acknowledge that the moral law has not
been kept by man. Taking their own high principles along with them,
neither could have looked within, without discovering sin to be quite as
much a reality as virtue. Stewart could not have gone out of his dwelling
in the old College or the Canongate, nor could Cousin have gone out of
his chambers in the Sorbonne, without being obliged to observe how far
man and woman have fallen beneath the ideal picture which they have
drawn in their lectures. At the very time when the Scottish metaphysi-
cians were discoursing so beautifully of moral virtue, there was a popu-
lation springing up around their very colleges in Edinburgh and Glasgow,
sunk in vice and degradation, which appalled the good men of the next
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know not how to grapple with, and which is not to be arrested by any
remedy which the mere philosophic moralists have propounded. I ac-
knowledge most fully, that Stewart’s lectures and writings have tended,
directly or indirectly, to carry several important measures which are
calculated to elevate the condition of mankind, such as reform in the
legislature, prison improvement, and the abolition of tests and of re-
strictions on commerce. But the institutions which aim at lessening the
sin and misery of the outcast and degraded such as missions, ragged
schools, and reformatories,—have proceeded from very different influ-
ences; and a philosophy embracing the facts which they contemplate,
must dive deeper into human nature, and probe its actual condition more
faithfully, than the academic moralists of Scotland ever ventured to do.
It is very evident that the Scottish academic metaphysicians of last
century, while they pay a dignified respect to Christianity, have not iden-
tified themselves with its profound peculiarities. Without meaning to
excuse this deficiency, I may yet affirm that some incidental advantages
have sprung from this reticence. It was certainly better that they should
have kept at a respectful distance from Christianity, than that they should
have approached it only, like the great German metaphysical systems,
to set all its truths in rigid philosophic framework,—to absorb them all
within themselves, as by a devouring flame. But the peculiar advantage
arising from their method consists in this, that they have, by induction,
established a body of ethical truth on grounds independent of revealed
religion; and this can now be appealed to in all defences of Christianity,
and as an evidence of the need of something which philosophy is incom-
petent to supply. Divines can now found on those great truths which the
Scottish philosophers have established, as to there being a distinct moral
faculty and an immutable moral law, and then press on those whose
conscience tells them that they have broken that law, to embrace the
provision which revelation has made to meet the wants of humanity.
The space which I have occupied with the “Mental and Moral Phi-
losophy” precludes me from entering on the two volumes of “Political
Economy,” published partly from manuscripts left by Stewart himself,
and partly from notes by pupils. The views expounded will scarcely be
regarded as much advancing the science in the present day; but they did
good service when delivered for twenty years in lectures. They are still
worthy of being looked at on special topics; they may form an interest-
ing chapter in the history of the literature of political economy, and they
illustrate the character of Stewart’s intellect and philosophy.276/James McCosh
An estimate of the influence which has been exercised by Stewart
may form an appropriate close to this article.
In Scotland, he increased the reputation of the Edinburgh Univer-
sity. Horner speaks of “many young Englishmen who had come to
Edinburgh to finish their education,” and not a few of these had been
attracted by Stewart. He has had a greater influence than perhaps any
other, in diffusing through out Scotland a taste for mental and moral
science. I have referred to the power exercised on him by Reid; but, if
Stewart owed much to Reid, Reid owed nearly as much to his grateful
pupil, who finished and adorned the work of his master, and by his
classical taste has recommended the common-sense philosophy to many
who would have turned away with disdain from the simpler manner of
Reid. And here I am tempted to give utterance to the feeling, that Reid
has been peculiarly fortunate in those who have attached themselves to
his school. If Stewart helped to introduce Reid to polite society, Sir
William Hamilton, by his unmatched logic and vast erudition, has com-
pelled philosophers to give him—notwithstanding the some what
untechnical character of his writings—a place in their privileged circle.
By his expositions of Reid, and his own in dependent labors, Mr Stewart
aided in throwing back a tide of scepticism:—which had appeared in
France in the previous century; in England toward the beginning of the
eighteenth century, on the back of the licentious reigns of Charles II and
James II; and, in Scotland, about the middle of that century. This tide
came to a height about the time of the French Revolution, and it was one
of the avowed aims of Stewart, “to stem the inundation of sceptical, or
rather atheistical, publications which were imported from the Conti-
nent.” Nor is it to be forgotten, that Stewart, directly by his lectures and
indirectly by his pupils, contributed as much as any man of his age, to
diffuse throughout Scotland a taste for elegant literature, and enlarged
and liberal opinions in politics.
As to England, Sir J. Mackintosh, writing to Stewart in 1802, speaks
of the want of any thing which he could call purely philosophical think-
ing; and Horner, in 1804, declares, that the highest names in the estima-
tion of those in the metropolis, who felt any interest in speculative pur-
suits, were Hobbes and Hartley. Such works as the “Moral Philosophy”
of Paley, were fitted to lower still farther, rather than elevate, this taste.
It was altogether, then, for the benefit of English thought, that Stewart
did become gradually known in South Britain, where his elegant style,
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mended him to many who had imbibed as great an aversion to Scotch
metaphysics as ever George III had. There are still Englishmen who
abhor the infidelity of Hume, and who despise the plainness of Reid,
who suspect the rhetoric of Brown, and are frightened by the bristling
nomenclature and logical distinctions of Hamilton, but who are attracted
by the writings of Stewart, which are felt to be as pleasing and as regu-
lar as their own rich fields bounded by hedge-rows. In England he has
so far been of use in creating a philosophical spirit, where none existed
before, and in checking the utilitarianism of Paley. He is also entitled to
a share of the credit of the great measures of reform, which such pupils
as Horner, Brougham, Lord John Russell, Palmerston, Jeffrey, and
Lansdowne carried in Parliament. Perhaps these eminent men have never
estimated the amount of wholesome impulse which they received in early
life from the prelections and lofty character of the Edinburgh professor.
In France the influence of Reid and Stewart has been considerable,
and has been of the most beneficial character. In that country, Locke’s
philosophy, unfortunately introduced by Voltaire and accepted in its worst
side, had wrought only mischief, partly by its drawing away the atten-
tion of thinkers from the more spiritual philosophy of Descartes, and
partly by its tempting a set of speculators to derive all men’s ideas from
sensation, and to deny the existence of all ideas which could not be
derived from this source,—such as the idea of moral good, of infinity,
and of God. This wretched philosophy—if philosophy it can be called—
was one of the fatal powers which operated to give an evil issue to the
Revolution, and prevented good from coming out of it. After sensation-
alism-which used, but only to abuse, the name of Locke—had reigned
for more than half a century, there appeared a reaction led on by M.
Royer Collard, who began in 1811 to lecture at the Normal School. It is
a most interesting circumstance, that, in conducting this war against the
debasing systems which prevailed, he betook himself to the philosophy
of Reid and Stewart. Exercising a considerable influence in himself,
Royer Collard has had a more extended sway through his pupils, espe-
cially Victor Cousin and Theodore Jouffroy. In the course of years, the
works of Reid were’ translated into French, with an admirable histori-
cal and critical introduction, by Jouffroy. So early as 1808, the first
volume of Stewart’s “Elements” was translated into French by M. Prevost
of Geneva; and, at a later date, M. Peisse, has translated the other two
volumes of the same work. Stewart’s “Outlines” were translated into
the same tongue by Jouffroy, who has prefixed a preface of great judg-278/James McCosh
ment and acuteness. It thus appears, that the great reaction in favor of
sound philosophy, commenced by Royer Collard and conducted by
Cousin and Jouffroy, has made large and profitable use of the Scottish
school, and rejoices to acknowledge its obligations to Scotland. No doubt,
it has also called in aid from other quarters. Cousin has been indebted to
the school of Kant, as well as to the school of Reid, and has derived
some of his favorite principles immediately from the great metaphysi-
cian of his own country, Descartes; and he has besides carefully exam-
ined the human mind, in an inductive manner, and he has been able to
give a unity to these materials, because he is possessed of great original
genius, acuteness, and comprehensiveness of mind. I am sometimes in-
clined to think, however, that he has got the most precious element in his
eclectic system from the school of Scotland. I have been greatly grati-
fied to observe, that, after he had been drawn aside for a time from his
attachment to the Scottish philosophy, by a later affection for German
transcendentalism (this is very visible in his course of lectures delivered
in 1828 and 1829), he returned in his later years to his first love, and
this at a time when Scotland was rather forsaking the inductive method,
and turning its regards towards the a priori method of Germany.
I feel proud, I confess, of the eulogiums which have been pronounced
on Scotland, not only by Cousin, but by Jouffroy and Remusat. But
these philosophers have scarcely seen, after all, wherein lies the pecu-
liar strength of the Scottish nation. This is not to be found in its systems
of moral philosophy, but in its religion, of which the high moral tone of
its philosophy is but a reflection, which would soon wax dim and vanish
were the original light extinguished;—nay, in remembering that Kant
was descended from Scottish parentage, I have sometimes thought that
his high moral precepts may be also a reflection from the same light.
Often, I should think, when M. Cousin looked around him on these
scenes of revolution through which France has passed, must he have
seen that his country needs something deeper and more influential than
any system of moral science, even though it should be as pure and el-
evated as that which he inculcated.
In Germany Stewart has been little known, and has exercised no
power for good or for evil. The only English philosopher familiarly
referred to in that country is Locke, and even he is known, I suspect,
more through his French consequences than from the study of his work.
The German professors speak of him, under the name of Locke, as the
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he makes to reflection as a separate source of ideas, and to the length-
ened account which he gives of intuition,—a much juster account, in
some respects, of its function than that given by Kant or Schelling. The
great English ethical writer, Butler, who has established for ever the
great truth of the supremacy of conscience in the human constitution, is
either altogether unknown in Germany, or referred to by such writers as
Tholuck only to show that he is not understood or appreciated. The only
Scottish metaphysician thoroughly known in Germany is David Hume.
Reid is occasionally spoken of, only to be disparaged in his system and
its results. Stewart is scarcely ever named. I must be allowed to regret
this. Such a body of carefully inducted fundamental truth as we have in
the philosophy of Reid and Stewart is precisely what was and is needed
to preserve thought from the extravagances of the transcendental schools
in the last age, and now, in the natural recoil which has taken place,
since 1848, from the tide of materialism which is setting in so strongly,
and with no means or method of meeting it. The philosophy of Germany
must ever go by oscillations, by actions and reactions, till the critical
method of Kant is abandoned, and the inductive method is used to deter-
mine the rule and law of those a priori principles of which so much use
is made, while there has been so little careful inquiry into their precise
nature and mode of operation.
This may be the proper place for referring to the relation in which
Stewart stood toward Kant. I have already expressed my regret that
Stewart should have entered on a criticism of Kant without a deeper
acquaintance with his system. No doubt it might be retorted, that the
criticisms of Stewart upon Kant are not more ignorant and foolish than
those of the disciples of Kant upon Reid; but it is better to admit that
Stewart committed a blunder in his review of the Kantian system. Some
have supposed that, if he had known more of Kant, he would have formed
a totally different opinion of his philosophy. And I admit that a further
acquaintance with Kant’s works would have raised Kant in his estima-
tion; would have kept him from describing his nomenclature as “jar-
gon,” and his philosophy as “incomprehensible,” from affirming that
Kant has “thrown no new light on the laws of the intellectual world;”
would have shown him many curious points of correspondence between
the views of Kant and the profoundest of his own doctrines, and have
enabled him, when he did depart from Kant, to give fair and valid rea-
sons, and thus to help in what must be one of the tasks of philosophy in
this age,—the work of taking from Kant what is good and true, and280/James McCosh
casting away what is evil, because false. While I admit all this, I am
convinced at the same time that Stewart would never have given an
adhesion to the peculiarities of Kantism. He would have said, “My method
of induction is better than your method of criticism, and my account of
the intuitive convictions of the mind is correct when I represent them as
fundamental laws of thought and belief; whereas you are giving a wrong
account of them when you represent them as a priori forms imposing on
the objects in all cognition something which is not in the objects.” I
cannot conceive him, in any circumstances, allowing to Kant (as Hamilton
unfortunately did) that space and time and causation are laws of thought
and not of thought and may have merely a subjective existence. His
caution, his good sense, and his careful observation, would have pre-
vented him from ever falling into a system of nescience such as that to
which the relentless logic of Hamilton has carried him, founding, I ac-
knowledge, on premises which Stewart as well as Kant had furnished.
He would have adhered, after knowing all, to his decision: “We are
irresistibly led to ascribe to the thing itself (space) an existence indepen-
dent of the will of any being.” It is an “in comprehensible doctrine which
denies the objective reality of time.” “That space is neither a substance,
nor an accident, nor a relation, may be safely granted; but it does not
follow from this that it is nothing objective.” “Our first idea of space or
extension seems to be formed by abstracting this attribute from the other
qualities of matter. The idea of space, however, in whatever manner
formed, is manifestly accompanied with an irresistible conviction that
space is necessarily existent, and that its annihilation is impossible,”
etc. He adds, “To call this proposition in question, is to open a door to
universal scepticism.” (“Diss.,” pp. 596, 597.)
The great work which the school of Reid has done consists in its
careful investigation, in the inductive manner first, of the faculties of
the mind; and, secondly, and more particularly, of man’s primary and
intuitive convictions. For this they ought to be honored in all time. Kant
did a work similar to this last, but in a different manner. Rejecting (as
Reid had done) the combined dogmatic and deductive method of
Descartes, he introduced the critical method, affirming that reason can
criticise itself, and proceeding to criticise reason by a kind of logical
process of a most unsatisfactory kind. Criticism has succeeded criti-
cism, each new critic taking a new standing-point, or advancing a step
farther, till Hegel’s system became the reductio ad absurdum of the
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right in affirming that a priori principles should be examined before
they are assumed in philosophical investigation. We are not at liberty to
assume a first truth till we have shown it to be a first truth; and we have
no right to use it in argument or deduction till we have determined its
precise nature and law; but this is to be done, I maintain, in the induc-
tive manner, with its accompanying analysis and exclusions. The Scot-
tish school commenced this work, but they do not profess to have com-
pleted it. Stewart everywhere proclaims that it is to be done by the com-
bined efforts of successive inquirers, pursuing the same method for ages.
Reid and Stewart nowhere profess to give a full list, or even a rigid
classification, of the intuitive convictions of the mind. All that they af-
firm is, that those principles which they have seized for the purpose of
meeting the scepticism of Hume, are and must be intuitive. They do not
even pretend to give a full account of these, or to express them in their
ultimate form. They vacillate in the account which they give of them,
and in the nomenclature which they employ to denote them. They draw
no definite distinction between cognitions, beliefs, and judgments. They
treat of the faculties, and also of the principles of common sense, but
they do not tell us how the two stand related to each other. And here I
may be permitted to observe, that I look on these fundamental laws as
being the necessary laws of the faculties regulating all their exercises,
but not as laws or principles before the consciousness; and they are to
be reflexly discovered as general laws only by the induction of their
individual acts. Reid and Stewart do not even tell us what are the tests
by which their presence may be detected: these I hold to be, first, as
Aristotle and Locke have shown, self-evidence; and, second, as Leibnitz
and Kant have shown, necessity and universality. Such defects as these
they were quite willing to confess in that spirit of modesty which was
one of their highest characteristics; and to any one complaining that
they had not settled every point, they would, as it were, say, Go on in the
path which we have opened; we are sure that there is more truth yet to
be discovered, and rejoice we must and will if you succeed where we
have failed and raise a little higher that fabric of which we have laid the
foundation.
XLI. William Lawrence Brown
In 1785, Mr Burnett, a merchant in Aberdeen, bequeathed certain sums
to be expended at intervals of forty years in the shape of two premiums
for the best works furnishing “evidence that there is a Being, all power-282/James McCosh
ful, wise, and good, by whom every thing exists: and particularly to
obviate difficulties regarding the wisdom and goodness of the Deity;
and this, in the first place, from considerations independent of written
revelation, and. in the second place, from the revelation of the Lord
Jesus, and from the whole to point out inferences most necessary for
and useful to mankind.” This endowment has not called forth any one
great work; but, on each of the two occasions on which it has been
competed for, it has been the means of publishing two excellent trea-
tises. On the first competition, the first prize was awarded to Principal
Brown of Aberdeen, and the second to the Rev. John Bird Sumner, af-
terwards Archbishop of Canterbury.
Dr. Brown was born at Utrecht, 1755, and became minister of the
Scotch church there. He removed to Scotland in 1795, became profes-
sor of divinity in Aberdeen, and afterwards principal of Marischal Col-
lege. He lived till 1830. When in Holland he wrote an “Essay on the
Folly of Scepticism.” His Burnett Prize Essay, “On the Existence of a
Supreme Creator,” was given to the world in 1816. The work did not
produce much impression in its own age, and is now all but forgotten.
People wonder that so large a sum (upwards of £1,200) did not call
forth a more brilliant production; but the truth is, that money cannot
produce an original work, which can come only from the spontaneous
thoughts of the man of genius, that prize essays are commonly respect-
ably good and nothing more. and, while they may serve a good purpose
in their own day, are seldom valued as a legacy by posterity. The book is
in many respects the perfection of a prize essay. It conforms rigidly to
the conditions imposed by the donor; it is supremely judicious; it did not
startle the judges by any eccentricity or even novelty, and certainly not
by any profundity; and altogether is a clear and able defence of natural
and revealed religion. It interests us to notice that the principles of the
Scottish philosophy are here employed to support the great truths relat-
ing to the being of God and the destiny of man.
XLII. Archibald Alison
He was born in Edinburgh in 1757, studied at Glasgow University, went
thence to Oxford, where he matriculated in Baliol College. Taking or-
ders in the Church of England in 1784, he received several preferments;
such as, a prebendal stall in Salisbury, and the perpetual curacy of Kenley
in Shropshire. He married a daughter of John Gregory, and thus became
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reside, and where he discharged the duties of an Episcopal clergyman in
the Cowgate chapel from the year 1800 down to the time of his death in
1839. He was distinguished for his excessive politeness. He published a
volume of sermons, which had the good fortune (or the bad, for the
“Edinburgh had never a great reputation as a critic of sermons) to get a
laudatory notice in the Edinburgh Review, where they were compared to
the “Oraisons Funèbres” of Bossuet, and it was said of them: “We do
not know any sermons so pleasing or so likely to be popular, and do
good to those who are pleased with them. All the feelings are generous
and gentle, all the sentiments liberal, and all the general views just and
ennobling” But the work which lives is “Essays on the Nature and Prin-
ciples of Taste,” which was published in 1790, but seems to have passed
very much out of sight till the booksellers in 1810 told him that there
was a wish expressed for the second edition, which was reviewed by
Francis Jeffrey in 1811, and afterwards had an extensive circulation in
various countries.
The arrangement and manner of the work are admirable. The style
is distinguished by infinite grace, and is worthy of being compared to
that of Addison:—indeed I am not sure if we have a more beautiful
specimen of the last-century manner of composition, moulded on the
“Spectator,” on the French classics, and the wits of Queen Anne. Every
word is appropriate, and is in its appropriate place; and the sentences
glide along like a silvery stream. The descriptions of natural scenery,
which are very numerous, are singularly felicitous and gracefully: that
word graceful ever comes up when we would describe his manner. He
does not seem to have had an equal opportunity of studying beauty in
the fine arts, in architecture, statuary, and painting, though the allusions
to the universally known models of these are always appreciative and
discriminating.
Drawing a distinction, very essential in all such inquiries, he would
investigate, first, the nature of those qualities that produce the emotions
of taste, and then that faculty by which the emotions are received. This
distinction, clearly announced, is not thoroughly carried out. In the body
of the work, in inquiring into the faculty raising the emotions, he makes
the remark, that they are not “the objects of immediate observation,”
and that they are often obscured under the number of qualities with
which they are accidentally combined. He does not seem to have ex-
pounded his views as to the faculty. He opposes the theories which have
uniformly taken for granted the simplicity of the emotion, and espe-284/James McCosh
cially those which have made it a sense or senses. He endeavors to show
that it has no resemblance to a sense, and that it is finally to be resolved
into the more general principles of our constitution. He shows that “it is
not, in fact, a simple but a complex emotion: that it involves in all cases,
first, the production of some simple emotion or the exercise of some
moral affection; and, secondly, the consequent excitement of a peculiar
exercise of the imagination; that these concomitant effects are distin-
guishable and very often distinguished in our experience; and that the
peculiar pleasure of the beautiful or sublime is only felt when these two
effects are conjoined, and the complex emotions produced.”
In entering on his “Analysis,” he proceeds on the philosophic prin-
ciple, that we should consider the effects before we proceed to deter-
mine the cause. So he is to begin with considering the effect produced on
the mind when the emotions of beauty or sublimity are felt, and then go
on to investigate the causes which are productive of it, or, in other words,
the sources of the beautiful and sublime in nature.
I. “When any object either of sublimity or beauty is presented to the
mind, I believe man is conscious of a train of thought being immediately
awakened in his imagination analogous to the character or expression
of the original object. The simple perception of the object, we frequently
find, is insufficient to excite these emotions, unless it is accompanied
with this operation of mind; unless, according to common expression,
our imagination is seized and our fancy busied in the pursuit of all those
trains of thought which are allied to this character or expression. Thus,
when we feel either the beauty or sublimity of natural scenery, the gay
lustre of a morning in spring, or the mild radiance of a summer evening,
the savage majesty of a wintry storm, or the wild magnificence of a
tempestuous ocean,—we are conscious of a variety of images in our
minds very different from those which the objects themselves can present
to the eye. Trains of pleasing or of solemn thought arise spontaneously
within our minds: our hearts swell with emotions of which the objects
before us afford no adequate cause.” The state of mind most favorable
to the emotions of taste is one in which the imagination is free and un-
embarrassed; and the feeling is not interfered with by any thing which
interrupts the flow, is not interfered with in particular by the intrusion of
criticism. He shows that the exercise of imagination and the feeling of
beauty is increased by association, especially that of resemblance, and
enters upon the field which had been so cultivated by Beattie. He re-
marks very truly how an acquaintance with poetry in our earlier yearsThe Scottish Philosophy/285
has a powerful influence in increasing our sensibility to the beauties of
nature.
He then gives an analysis of the peculiar exercise of the imagina-
tion. There is, in all cases, the indulgence of a train of thought. But then,
every train of thought does not raise emotions of beauty; and so he
investigates the nature of those trains of thought that are produced by
object, of sublimity and beauty, and their difference from those ordinary
trains which are unaccompanied with such pleasure. This difference
consists in two things: first, in the nature of the ideas or conceptions
which compose such trains; and, secondly, in the nature of the law of
their succession. Some ideas are fitted to raise emotions: these he calls
“ideas of emotions;” and the train of thought which produces beauty is
in all cases composed of ideas capable of exciting some affection or
emotion.” Thus, the ideas suggested by the scenery of spring are ideas
productive of emotions of cheerfulness, of gladness, and of tenderness.
The images suggested by the prospect of ruins are images belonging to
pity, to melancholy, to admiration. The ideas in the same manner awak-
ened by the view of the ocean in a storm are ideas of power, of majesty,
and of terror. But farther the ideas themselves must have some general
principle of connection, subsisting through the whole extent of the train,
giving them a certain and definite character, and a conformity to that
peculiar emotion which first excited them. It appears, that “in every
operation of taste, there are thus two different faculties employed; viz.,
some affection or emotion raised, and the imagination excited to a train
of thought corresponding to this emotion. The peculiar pleasure which
attends and which constitutes the emotions of taste, may naturally be
considered as composed of the pleasures which separately attend the
exercise of those faculties, or, in other words, as produced by the union
of pleasing emotion with the pleasure which by the constitution of our
nature is annexed to the exercise of the imagination.” Our conscious-
ness testifies that there is truth and very important truth in all this. Ev-
ery form of beauty in nature and art, music for instance, raises a train of
ideas which are accompanied with emotions all of a certain kind. While
he has brought before us a body of facts, it may be doubted whether he
has seen himself, or exposed to the view of others, the whole of the
mental phenomena. The question arises, What starts the train? and a
farther question follows, What gives the unity and harmony to the train?
An answer to these questions, or rather to this question,—for the ques-
tions are one,—may disclose to our view an objective beauty and sub-286/James McCosh
limity very much overlooked by Alison, and the supporters of the asso-
ciation theory.
II. It is proper to state that Alison does speak in the second and
longest essay of the beauty and sublimity of the material world. He
treats of the beauty of sound, color, form, motion, and of the human
countenance and form. He says matter in itself is unfitted to produce
any kind of emotion, and can raise an emotion of beauty only by an
association with other qualities, and “as being either the signs or ex-
pressions of such qualities as are fitted by the constitution of our nature
to produce emotion.” To those who consider sounds simply as sounds
they have no beauty. There is surely an oversight here: for music has in
itself a beauty which can be mathematically expressed; but then the
feeling of beauty is prolonged and intensified by the train of emotional
ideas which is set a going. Alison traces the associations raised by sounds.
The sublimity of thunder is founded on awe and some degree of terror.
Sounds are no longer sublime when they do not awaken such feelings.
“There is nothing more common than for people who are afraid of thun-
der to mistake some very common and indifferent sound for it; as, the
rumbling of a cart, or the rattling of a carriage. While their mistake
continues, they feel the sound as sublime: the moment they are unde-
ceived, they are the first to laugh at their terror and to ridicule the sound
which occasioned it. Children, at first, are as much alarmed at the thun-
der of the stage as at real thunder. Whenever they find that it is only a
deception, they amuse themselves by mimicking it.” He represents the
real power of music as consisting in its imitation of those signs of emo-
tion or passion which take place in the human voice.
In respect of colors, he holds that they are not beautiful, except as
“expressive to us of pleasing or interesting qualities.” He is successful
in showing that there is a beauty of color arising from association of
color, as in dress for instance: but science announces that there is a
harmony of colors, as of complementary colors, that is, of colors mak-
ing up the white beam, which is beautiful physiologically. He maintains
that “the beauty of forms arises altogether from the associations we
connect with them,” or the qualities of which they are expressive to us.
Sublimity of forms arises from their suggesting ideas of danger or power,
or from their magnitude. Among natural objects, angular forms are as-
sociated with hardness, strength, or durability, suggesting force; and
winding forms, with freewill, fineness, delicacy, ease. He labors to prove
that proportion, as in architecture, is felt to be beautiful, because ex-The Scottish Philosophy/287
pressive of fitness. Aesthetic science maintains in opposition that there
are certain proportions in length and composition which to our eye have
a beauty in themselves. As to motion, it is felt to be beautiful, because
associated with power. Rapid motion in a straight line is simply expres-
sive of great power. Slow motion in curves is expressive of gentle power,
united with ease, freedom, and playfulness.
He dwells at length on the different sources of the beauty or sublim-
ity of the countenance of man. It arises, first, from physical beauty, or
the beauty of certain colors and forms considered simply as forms or
colors; secondly, from the beauty of expression and character, or that
habitual form of features and color of complexion which, from experi-
ence, we consider as significant of those habitual dispositions of the
human mind which we love or approve or admire; thirdly, from the
beauty of emotion, or the expression of certain local or temporary affec-
tions of mind which we approve or love or admire. Each of these species
of beauty will be perfect when the composition of the countenance is
such as to preserve, pure and unmingled, the expression which it pre-
dominantly conveys—and when no feature or color is admitted but which
is subservient to the unity of this expression. The last or highest degree
of beauty or sublimity of the human countenance will alone be attained
when all these expressions are united when the physical beauty corre-
sponds to the characteristic when the beauty of temporary emotion har-
monizes with the beauty of character; and when all fall upon the heart of
the spectator as one whole, in which matter, in all its most exquisite
forms, is only felt as the sign of one great or amiable character of mind.”
In criticising this theory, I am prepared to admit that the ingenious
author has seized and unfolded to our view a large body of truth which
had never been so fully developed before. He is surely right in saying
that there is a train of ideas in all those operations of mind in which we
contemplate what is called beautiful and sublime: it is so, as we listen to
music, grave or gay; as we gaze at a waterfall, or into the starry vault of
heaven. It is also certain that all these ideas are emotional: that is, ac-
companied with emotion; and that the ideas and emotions are all of a
connected kind, and thus produce the one effect. On these points his
views seem to me to be just, and they are to a great extent original. It
should farther be allowed that in all this there is the influence of associa-
tion of ideas, regulated by such principles as contiguity and resemblance:
this had been shown fully before his time by Hutcheson, by Beattie, and
others of the Scottish school. But is this all? It seems as if we needed,288/James McCosh
besides, both a start to the movement and a principle of connection to
make it proceed in one direction. In music there are sounds which pro-
duce a pleasant sensation: these are regulated, as has been known since
the time of Pythagoras, by mathematical relations. This pleasant sensa-
tion gives the impulse to the train of emotional thought, it sustains it,
and gives to it a congruity. Again, it has been shown that there are
melodious and harmonious colors, which are pleasing to the eye; and
these set out the mind on a pleasant train of association, and keep it on
the one tract. Attempts have been made, since the days of Plato, to
discover forms which are essentially beautiful; and these have so far
been successful. There are proportions and there are curves which are
adapted to the laws of light on the one hand, and to our sensory organs
on the other. Are not these the roots from which our associated ideas
and emotions spring? Are not the objects possessing them entitled to be
called beautiful and sublime?
While there is a beauty of sound, color, and form to act as the root
of the feeling, it is to be allowed to Alison that there is a train of ideas
and feelings which constitutes, is it were, the growing trunk. But, as
Alison has shown, it is not every train of idea, nor even every train of
emotional idea, that is fitted to raise emotions which are beautiful or
sublime. There is need of a bond of connection to raise the proper kind
of ideas, and to make them flow in one direction, so as to produce a
uniform result. The objective sound, color, form, proportion, expres-
sion, must not only start the association, but must so far guide it along
a consistent line; make the ideas and feelings, for instance, which are
raised as we stand gazing on a lovely countenance or a lofty waterfall,
all to be of a sort and to contribute to one emotional result.
There are two grand oversights in the explanations of Alison: he
overlooks the moving power which starts the train, and the guiding rails
which direct it. This leaves a very great gap in his theory: he has no
objective ground for beauty; and this has set against it both artists and
scientific investigators, who are apt to turn away from it with unbelief
or with scorn, saying that they are not to be taken in by this illusory
picture, for they are sure that beauty is a reality in the thing itself. It is
the business of science, by its own methods, to investigate the precise
objective nature of sounds, colors, and forms; and there is ground for
believing that the laws involved will at last be enunciated in mathemati-
cal expressions.
But there is a higher element than all this in beauty; an element seenThe Scottish Philosophy/289
by Plato and by those who have so far caught his spirit,—such as, Au-
gustine, Cousin, MacVicar, and Ruskin,—but commonly overlooked
by men of science and the upholders of the association theory. The mere
sensations or perceptions called forth by the presence of harmonious
sounds, colors, and proportional forms, is not the main ingredient in the
lovely and the grand. Beauty, after all, lies essentially in the ideas evoked.
I hold by an association theory on this subject. But the ideas entitled to
be called aesthetic should be of mind, and the higher forms of mind,
intellectual and moral. There was, therefore, grand truth in the specula-
tion of Plato, that beauty consists in the bounding of the waste, in the
formation of order out of chaos; or, in other words, in harmony and
proportion. There was truth in the theory of Augustine, that beauty con-
sists ill order and design; and in that of Hutcheson, that it consists in
unity with variety. Alison had, at times, a glimpse of this truth, but then
lost sight of it. He speaks with favor of the doctrine held by Reid, that
matter is not beautiful in itself, but derives its beauty from the expres-
sion of mind; he holds it true, so far as the qualities of matter are imme-
diate signs of the powers or capacities of mind, and in so far as they are
signs of those affections or dispositions of mind which we love, or with
which we are formed to sympathize. He thus sums up his views: “The
conclusion, therefore, in which I wish to rest is, that the beauty and
sublimity which is felt in the various appearances of matter are finally
to be ascribed to their expression of mind; or to their being, either di-
rectly or indirectly, the signs of those qualities of mind, which are fitted,
by the constitution of our nature, to affect us with pleasing or interest-
ing emotion.” There is a singular mixture of truth and error in this state-
ment: truth, in tracing all beauty and sublimity to the expression of
mind; but error, in placing it in qualities which raise emotion according
to our constitution. Beauty, and sublimity are not the same as the true
and the good; but they are the expression and the signs of the true and
the good, suggested by the objects that evidently participate in them.
XLIII. George Fardine
All throughout the seventeenth century, there was a strong reaction in
Great Britain against Aristotle, scholasticism, and formal logic gener-
ally. College youths everywhere were protesting against the syllogism,
moods and figures, and reduction. Unfortunately, logic—in Glasgow,
Edinburgh, and Saint Andrews,—came in the second year of the college
course; and youths of fifteen or sixteen groaned under the yoke, and290/James McCosh
longed for some thing more fascinating and less arduous. The professor
who did most to gratify this taste was Jardine, professor of logic and
rhetoric in the university of Glasgow.
For several sessions after his appointment, he followed the estab-
lished method, giving the usual course of logic and metaphysics, though
he says, “every day more and more convinced me that something was
wrong in the system of instruction; that the subjects on which I lectured
were not adapted to the age, the capacity, and the previous attainments
of my pupils.” “To require the regular attendance of very young men
two hours every day during a session of six or seven months, on lectures
which they could not understand, and in which, of course, they could
take no interest, had a direct tendency to produce habits of negligence,
indifference, and inattention, which, it is well known, frequently termi-
nate in a positive aversion to study of every description. The change
from the animated perusal of the Greek and Roman classics to the un-
fathomable depths of logic and metaphysics was far too abrupt.” The
fault evidently lay, not in having logic as a required branch of study, and
not in requiring it to be thoroughly learned, but in bringing it in too early
in the course, and in not having in the second year a course on English
literature and composition. Jardine did give a course of formal logic,
but it was very much pressed into a corner. His text-book, “Quaedam ex
Logicae Compendiis Selecta,” is a meagre abridgment carrying the stu-
dent among the bones of the study, without clothing them with life, and
fitted to leave the impression that the branch is as useless as it is dry. He
enlarged with much deeper interest on the human mind generally, and
the various faculties: on language, on taste, on beauty, on criticism,—
showing no originality or grasp of intellect, but furnishing a course of
great utility to young students, and felt to be interesting and stimulating.
His views were expounded in his “Outlines of Philosophical Educa-
tion, illustrated by the Method of Teaching the Logic Class in the Uni-
versity of Glasgow.” The work is still worthy of being looked into by all
who would study what the Germans call “Pedagogic.” He points out the
advantages of the lecturing system. “While listening to a discourse de-
livered with some degree of animation, the mind of the student is neces-
sarily more awakened, and feels a more powerful demand made upon its
energies, than when perusing a printed volume.” “In a class-room, a
sympathetic feeling pervades the whole; the glow of zeal and an expres-
sion of curiosity are perceived in almost every countenance; all the fac-
ulties of the mind are exerted; and powers unused before are awakenedThe Scottish Philosophy/291
into life and activity.” But he insists that the lecturing be accompanied
with regular examinations. The teacher “will not examine the class in
any stated order, but occasionally call upon the same individual at two
successive hours, or even twice in one hour; and, as a check upon open
negligence, he may sometimes select such as appear the least attentive,
and thereby expose their idleness to their fellow-students.” But the most
important part of his work is that in which he explains his views as to
themes for composition, recommending that some be presented as fitted
to enable the student to form clear and accurate notions and to express
his thoughts, others to give a power of analysis and classification, a
third to exercise and strengthen the reasoning faculties, and a fourth to
encourage processes of investigation. Under this fourth head, he sug-
gests as a theme, “There was fine linen in Egypt in the time of Moses,”
and would have the student thence determine the state of Egypt as to
government, science, and art.
Professor Jardine was born at Wandal, in the upper ward of
Lanarkshire, in 1742. He was educated at Glasgow College, and be-
came a licentiate of the Church of Scotland. In 1771, be became tutor to
two sons of Baron Mure, and travelled with them in France. On his
return in 1773, he was an unsuccessful candidate for the chair of hu-
manity in Glasgow; but, in 1774, he was appointed assistant and suc-
cessor to Mr Clow, professor or logic and rhetoric. In 1824,—he retired
from the teaching of logic, and died in 1827. His pupils acknowledged
their deep obligations to him in interesting them in study and imparting
to them a power of writing the English language. But certainly he did
not advance the science of logic, or help to promote the study of it among
young men. Francis Jeffrey, who was fond of expressing his gratitude to
him, may be taken as the representative pupil produced by him, capable
of thinking and expressing himself clearly and ably on every subject,
but not diving into the depths of any subject. It required all the ability
and energy of Sir William Hamilton to bring back Scottish youths to the
scientific study of logic.
XLIV  Thomas Brown83
In regard to the younger years of Thomas Brown, it is enough to men-
tion, that he was born at Kirkmabreck, in the stewartry of Kirkcudbright,
in January, 1778; that his father, who was minister of that place, died
soon after, when the family removed to Edinburgh; that he there re-
ceived the rudiments of his education from his mother, that, in his sev-292/James McCosh
enth year, he went to London, under the protection of a maternal uncle,
and attended successively schools at Camberwell, Chiswick, and
Kensington, down to the time of the death of his uncle, in 1792, when he
returned to Edinburgh, to reside with his mother and sisters, and begin
his collegiate course in the university. He is described as a precocious
child, and we can believe it. He was precocious all his life, and in every
thing. We have to regret that he did not take sufficient pains to secure
that the flower which blossomed so beautifully should be followed by
corresponding fruit. We can credit his biographer, when he tells us that
he learned the alphabet at a single lesson; but I suspect that there must
have been the prompting of some theological friend preceding the reply
which he gave, when he was only between four and five, to an inquiring
lady, that he was seeking out the differences in the narratives of the
evangelists. At school he was distinguished by the gentleness of his na-
ture and the delicacy of his feelings; by the quickness of his parts, and
particularly by the readiness of his memory; by his skill in recitation,
and his love of miscellaneous reading, especially of works of imagina-
tion. Nor is it to be forgotten that he also gave promise of his genius for
poetry, by verses which one of his masters got published, perhaps un-
fortunately for the youth, in a magazine. He read with a pencil in his
hand, with which he made marks; and, in the end, he had no pleasure in
reading a book which was not his own. He began his collegiate course in
Edinburgh by the study of logic under Finlayson; and having, in the
summer of 1793, paid a visit to Liverpool, Currie, the biographer of
Burns, introduced him to the first volume of Stewart’s “Elements.” The
following winter he attended Stewart’s course of lectures, and had the
courage to wait on the professor, so renowned for his academic dignity,
and read to him observations on one of his theories. Mr Stewart listened
patiently, and then read to the youth a letter which he had received from
M. Prevost of Geneva, containing the very same objections. This was
followed by an invitation to the house of the professor, who, how ever,
declined on this, as he did on all other occasions, to enter into contro-
versy. It is but justice to Stewart to say, that he continued to take a
paternal interest in the progress of his pupil, till the revolt of Brown
against the whole school of Reid cooled their friendship, and loosened
the bonds which connected them. In 1796 he is studying law, which,
however, he soon abandoned for medicine, and attended the medical
classes from 1798 till 1803. At college, he received instructions from
such eminent professors as Stewart, Robison, Playfair, and Black, andThe Scottish Philosophy/293
was stimulated by intercourse with college friends, such as Erskine,
Brougham, Reddie, Leyden, Horner, Jeffrey, and Sidney Smith,—all
precocious and ambitious like himself, and who, in the “Academy of
Sciences,” debated on topics far beyond their years and their knowl-
edge.
It was when Brown was at college, that Erasmus Darwin’s
“Zoonomia” was published. The work is filled with premature theories
as to life and mind, and proceeds on the method, as Brown calls it, of
“hypothetical reasoning,”—a method, I may remark, carried still fur-
ther, but with a more carefully observed body of facts to support it, by
his illustrious grandson, Charles Darwin. Brown read it at the age of
eighteen, was irritated by its materialistic tendency, and scribbles notes
upon it; these ripen into a volume by the time he is nineteen, and were
published by the time he was twenty,—“Observations on the Zoonomia
of Erasmus Darwin, M. D.” Brown was an excellent physiologist for
his day; but both the original work and the reply proceed on principles
now regarded as antiquated. But Brown’s criticism is a remarkable ex-
ample of intellectual precocity. In the midst of physiological discus-
sions, most of the metaphysical ideas which he developed in future years
are to be found here in the bud. He considers the phenomena of the mind
as mental states, speaks of them as “feelings,” delights to trace them in
their succession, and so dwells much on suggestion, and approaches
towards the theory of general notions, and the theory of causation, ex-
pounded in his subsequent works. It should be added, that the book
committed him prematurely to principles which he was indisposed to
review in his riper years. It appears from a letter to Darwin, that, at the
age of nineteen, he had a theory of mind which he is systematizing.
Out of the “Academy of Sciences” arose, as is well known, the
“Edinburgh Review,” in the second number of which there was a re-
view, by Brown, of Viller’s “Philosophie de Kant.” The article is char-
acterized by acuteness, especially when it points out the inconsistency
of Kant in admitting that matter has a reality, and yet denying this of
space and time, in behoof of the existence of which we have the very
same kind of evidence. But the whole review is a blunder, quite as much
as the reviews of Byron and Wordsworth in the same periodical. He has
no appreciation of the profundity of Kant’s philosophy, and no anticipa-
tion of the effects which it was to produce, not only on German but on
British thinking. Immersed as he was in medical studies, fond of French
literature, and tending towards a French sensationalism, he did not rel-294/James McCosh
ish a system which aimed at showing how much there is in the mind
independent of outward impression. The effects likely to be produced on
one who had never read Kant, and who took his views of him from that
article, are expressed by Dr. Currie “I shall trouble myself no more with
transcendentalism; I consider it a philosophical hallucination.” It is a
curious instance of retribution, that, in the succeeding age, Brown’s
philosophy declined before systems which have borrowed their main
principles from the philosophy of Kant, and deal as largely with a priori
“forms,” “categories,” and “ideas,” as Brown did with “sensations,”
“suggestions,” and “feelings.”
We feel less interest than he did himself in two volumes of poetry,
which he published shortly after taking his medical degree in 1803. His
next publication was a more important one. The chair of mathematics in
Edinburgh was vacant, and Leslie was a candidate. The city ministers
attached to the court party wished to reserve it for themselves, and urged
that Leslie was incapacitated, inasmuch as he had expressed approba-
tion of Hume’s doctrine of causation. It was on this occasion that Brown
wrote his “Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect,”—at first a
comparatively small treatise, but swolen, in the third edition (of 1818),
into a very ponderous one It is divided into four parts,—the first, on the
import of the relation; the second, on the sources of the illusion with
respect to it; the third, on the circumstances in which the belief arises;
and the fourth, a review of Hume’s theory. The work is full of repeti-
tions, and the style, though always clear, is often cumbrous, and wants
that vivacity and eloquence which so distinguish his posthumous lec-
tures. It is characterized by great ingenuity and power of analysis. He
has dispelled for ever a large amount of confusion which had collected
around the relation; and, in particular, he has shown that there is no link
coming between the cause and its effect. “The substances that exist in a
train of phenomena are still, and must always be, the whole constituents
of the train.” If the cause be A and the effect B, there is not a third thing
x necessary in order to A being followed by B. He agrees with Hume, in
representing the relation as consisting merely in invariable antecedence
and consequence. In this he has been guilty of a glaring oversight. It
may be all true, that there is nothing coming between the cause and its
effect, and yet there may be, what he has inexcusably overlooked, a
power or property in the substances acting as the cause to produce the
effect. He calls in substances, we have seen. “The cause must always be
a substance existing in a certain state, and the effect, too, a substanceThe Scottish Philosophy/295
existing in a certain state;” —he does not see that in material action
there are substances two or more in the cause, and substances two or
more in the effect. But he fails to enquire what is involved in substances,
and the qualities of substance, and does not discover that power is in-
volved in substance and properties. It is but justice to Brown to add,
that, in one very important particular, he differs from Hume; that is, in
regard to the mental principle which leads us to believe in the relation.
This, according to Hume, is mere custom; whereas, according to Brown,
it is an irresistible intuitive belief. By this doctrine, he attached himself
to the school of Reid, and saved his system from a sceptical tendency,
with which it cannot be justly charged. This irresistible be lief, he shows,
constrains us to believe that the universe, as an effect, must have had a
cause. It is to be regretted that he did not inquire a little more carefully
into the nature of this intuitive belief which he is obliged to call in, when
he would have found that it constrains us to believe not only in the
invariability of the relation but in the potency of the substances operat-
ing as causes to produce their effects.
We are not concerned to follow him in his medical career, in which
he became the associate of the famous Dr. Gregory in 1806. We are
approaching a more momentous epoch in his life. Dugald Stewart being
in a declining state of health, Brown lectured for him during a part of
sessions 1808–9 and 1809–10; and, in the summer of 1810, Stewart
having expressed a desire to this effect, Brown was chosen his colleague,
and, from that time, discharged the whole duties of the office of Profes-
sor of Moral Philosophy.
Even those who have never seen him can form a pretty lively image
of him at this time, when his talents have reached all the maturity of
which they are capable, and his reputation is at its height. In person, he
is about the middle size; his features are regular, and in the expression
of his countenance, and especially of his eye, there is a combination of
sweetness and calm reflection. His manner and address are somewhat
too fastidious, not to say finical and feminine, for a philosopher; but the
youths who wait on his lectures are disposed to, over look this, when
they fall under the influence of his gentleness, so fitted to win, and of the
authority which he has to command. Expectation was on the tiptoe, and
he fully met and gratified it. His amiable look, his fine elocution, his
acuteness and ingenuity, his skill in reducing a complex subject into a
few elements, his show of originality and independence, the seeming
comprehensiveness of his system, and, above all, his fertility of illustra-296/James McCosh
tion, and the glow, like that of stained glass, in which he set forth his
refined speculations, did more than delight his youthful audience,—it
entranced them; and, in their ecstasies, they declared that he was supe-
rior to all the philosophers who had gone before him, and, in particular,
that he had completely superseded Reid, and they gave him great credit,
in that he generously refrained from attacking and overwhelming Stewart.
He had every quality fitted to make him a favorite with students. His
eloquence would have been felt to be too elaborate by a younger audi-
ence, and regarded as too artificial and sentimental by an older audi-
ence, but exactly suited the tastes of youths between sixteen and twenty.
A course so eminently popular among students had not, I rather think,
been delivered in any previous age in the University of Edinburgh, and
has not, in a later age, been surpassed in the fervor excited by Chalmers
or Wilson. In the last age you would have met, in Edinburgh and all over
Scotland, with ministers and lawyers who fell into raptures when they
spoke of his lectures, and assured the younger generation that in com-
parison with him Wilson was no philosopher, and Hamilton a stiff ped-
ant. It should be added, that, when the students attending him were asked
what they had got, not a few could answer only by exclamations of
admiration, “How fine!” “How beautiful!” “How ingenious!” In those
large classes in the Scottish colleges which are taught exclusively by
written lectures, large numbers, including the dull, the idly inclined, and
the pleasure-loving, are apt to pass through without receiving much
benefit,—unless, indeed, the professor be a very systematic examiner
and laborious exacter of written exercises; and this, I rather think, Brown
was not. As he left the impression on his students, that there was little
wisdom in the past, and that his own system was perfect, he did not
create a spirit of philosophic reading such as Hamilton evoked in select
minds in a later age. But all felt the glow of his spirit, had a fine literary
taste awakened by his poetical bursts, had their acuteness sharpened by
his fine analysis, went away with a high idea of the spirituality of the
soul, and retained through life a lively recollection of his sketches of the
operations of the human mind. This, I venture to affirm, is a more whole-
some result than what was substituted for psychology in the succeeding
age,—a priori discussions derived from Germany or demonstrated ide-
alisms spun out by an exercise of human ingenuity.
His biographer tells us that, on his appointment to the chair, he had
retired into the country in order that fresh air and exercise might
strengthen him for his labors, and that, when the session opened, he hadThe Scottish Philosophy/297
only the few lectures of the previous winters; but such was the fervor of
his genius and the readiness of his pen, that he generally commenced the
composition of a lecture after tea and had it ready for delivery next day
by noon, and that nearly the whole of the lectures contained in the first
three of the four-volumed edition were written the first year of his pro-
fessorship, and the whole of the remaining next session. Nor does he
appear to have rewritten any portion of them, or to have been disposed
to review his judgments, or make up what was defective in his philo-
sophic reading. He seems to have wasted his life in sending forth vol-
ume after volume of poetry, which is, doubtless, beautifully and artisti-
cally composed, after the model of the English poets of the eighteenth
century, but its pictures are without individuality, and they fail to call
forth hearty feeling. Far more genuine poetical power comes out inci-
dentally in some of the bursts in his philosophic lectures than in whole
volumes of his elaborate versification.
The incidents of his remaining life are few, but are sufficient to
bring out the lineaments of his character. His chief enjoyments lay in his
study, in taking a quiet walk in some solitary place, where he would
watch the smoke curling from a cottage chimney, or the dew illuminated
with sunshine on the grass, and in the society of his family and a few
friends. Never had a mother a more devoted son, or sisters a more affec-
tionate brother. In his disposition there is great gentleness, with a ten-
dency to sentimentality:—thus, on the occasion of his last visit to his
native place, he is thrown into a flood of sensibility, which, when it is
related in future years to Chalmers, on his happening to be in the place,
the sturdier Scotch divine was thrown into a fit of merriment. We per-
ceive that he is fond of fame and sensitive of blame, but seeking to
cherish both as a secret flame; and that he is by no means inclined to
allow any one to offer him counsel. In 1819, he prepared his “Physiol-
ogy of the Mind,” as a text-book for his students, and put it into the
press the following winter. By the Christmas of that year he was rather
unwell; in spring he removed for the benefit of his health to London, and
died at Brompton in April, 1820. His remains were deposited in the
churchyard of his native place, beside those of his father and mother.
His lectures were published shortly after his death, and excited an
interest wherever the English language is spoken, quite equal to that
awakened by the living lecturer among the students of Edinburgh. They
continued for twenty years to have a popularity in the British dominions
and in the United States greater than any philosophical work ever en-298/James McCosh
joyed before. During these years most students were introduced to meta-
physics by the perusal of them, and attractive beyond measure did they
find them to be. The writer of this article would give much to have
revived within him the enthusiasm which he felt when he first read them.
They had never, however, a great reputation on the Continent, where the
sensational school thought he had not gone sufficiently far in analysis;
where those fighting with the sensational school did not feel that he was
capable of yielding them any aid; and where the transcendental school,
in particular, blamed him for not rendering a sufficiently deep account
of some of the profoundest ideas which the mind of man can entertain,
such as those of space, time, and infinity. His reputation was at its greatest
height from 1830 to 1835, from which date it began to decline, partly
because it was seen that his analyses were too ingenious, and his omis-
sions many and great; and partly because new schools were engaging
the philosophic mind; and, in particular, the school of Coleridge, the
school of Cousin, and the school of Hamilton. Coleridge was supersed-
ing him by views derived from Germany, which he had long been incul-
cating, regarding the distinction between the understanding and the rea-
son Cousin, by a brilliant eclectic system, which professedly drew largely
from Reid and Kant; and Hamilton, by a searching review of Brown’s
theory of perception, and by his own metaphysical views promulgated
in his lectures and his published writings. The result of all this was a
recoil of feeling in which Brown was as much undervalued as he had at
one time been overrated. In the midst of these laudations and condemna-
tions, Brown’s psychological system has never been completely reviewed.
Now that he has passed through a period of undeserved popularity, and
a period of unmerited disparagement, the public should be prepared to
listen with candor to an impartial criticism.
The psychology of Brown may be summarily described as a combi-
nation of the Scottish philosophy of Reid and Stewart, and of the analy-
ses by Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, and the higher philosophers of the
sensational school of France, together with views of the association of
ideas derived from a prevailing British school. To Reid and Stewart he
was indebted more than he was willing to allow, and it would have been
better for his ultimate reputation had he imbibed more of their spirit,
and adhered more closely to their principles. He admits everywhere with
them the existence of principles of irresistible belief; for example, he
comes to such a principle when he is discussing the beliefs in our per-
sonal identity, and in the invariability of the relation between cause andThe Scottish Philosophy/299
effect. But acknowledging, as he does, the existence of intuitive prin-
ciples, he makes no inquiry into their nature and laws and force, or the
relation in which they stand to the faculties. In this respect, so far from
being an advance on Reid and Stewart, he is rather a retrogression. His
method is as much that of Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, and the ideolo-
gists of France, as that of Reid and Stewart. He is infected with the
besetting sin of metaphysicians,—that of trusting to analyses instead of
patient observation; and, like the French school, his analysis is exer-
cised in reducing the phenomena of the mind to as few powers as pos-
sible, and this he succeeds in doing by omitting some of the most char-
acteristic peculiarities of the phenomena. His classification of the facul-
ties bears a general resemblance to that of M. de Tracy, the metaphysi-
cian of the sensational school. The Frenchman’s division of the faculties
is—sensibility, memory, judgment, and desire Brown’s is—sensation,
simple and relative suggestion, and emotion.
In estimating the influences exercised from without on Brown, we
must further take into account, that ever since the days of Hartley there
had been a great propensity in Britain to magnify the power and impor-
tance of the association of ideas. Not only habit but most of our concep-
tions and beliefs had been referred to it: Beattie and Alison, followed by
Jeffrey, ascribed to it our ideas of beauty; and, in a later age, Sir James
Mackintosh carried this tendency the greatest length, and helped to bring
about a reaction, by tracing our very idea of virtue to this source. It is
evident that Brown felt this influence largely. Our intelligence is re-
solved by him into simple and relative suggestion. There is a flagrant
and inexcusable oversight here. All that association, or, as he designates
it, suggestion, can explain, is the order of the succession of our mental
states; it can render no account of the character of the states themselves.
It might show, for example, in what circumstances a notion of any kind
arises, say our notion of time, or space, or extension, but cannot explain
the nature of the notion itself.
But it will be necessary to enter a little more minutely into the sys-
tem of Brown. From the affection which I bear to his memory, and
remembering that his views have never been used by himself or others to
undermine any of the great principles of morality, I would begin with
his excellences.
1. In specifying these, I am inclined to mention, first, his lofty views
of man’s spiritual being. He everywhere draws the distinction between
mind and body very decidedly. In this respect, he is a true follower of the300/James McCosh
school of Descartes and Reid, and is vastly superior to some who, while
blaming Locke and Brown for holding views tending to sensationalism,
or even materialism, do yet assure us that the essential distinction be-
tween mind and matter is now broken down.
2. I have already referred to the circumstance, that Brown stands up
resolutely for intuitive principles, and in this respect is a genuine dis-
ciple of the Scottish school. He calls them by the very name which some
prefer as most expressive,—“beliefs;” and employs the test which
Leibnitz and Kant have been so lauded as introducing into philosophy.
He everywhere characterizes them as “irresistible,”—a phrase pointing
to the same quality as “necessary,”—the term used by the German meta-
physicians. No one, not even Cousin, has demonstrated, in a more effec-
tive manner, that our belief in cause and effect is not derived from expe-
rience. “When we say, then, that B will follow A to-morrow, because A
was followed by B to-day, we do not prove that the future will resemble
the past, but we take for granted that the future is to resemble the past.
We have only to ask ourselves why we believe in this similarity of se-
quence; and our very inability of stating any ground of inference may
convince us that the belief, which it is impossible for us not to feel
(observe the appeal to necessity, but it is an appeal to a necessity of
feeling), is the result of some other principle of reasoning.” (“Cause and
Effect,” p. 111) “In ascribing the belief of efficiency to such a principle,
we place it, then, on a foundation as strong as that on which we suppose
our belief of an external world, and even of our own identity, to rest.
What daring atheist is he, who has ever truly disbelieved the existence
of himself and others? For it is he alone who can say, with correspond-
ing argument, that he is an atheist, because there is no relation of cause
and effect.” “The just analysis, then, which reduces our expectation of
similarity in the future trains of events to intuition, we may safely ad-
mit, without any fear of losing a single argument for the existence of
God.” By this doctrine he has separated himself for ever from sensa-
tionalists, and given great trouble to those classifiers of philosophic
systems who insist, contrary to the whole history of British philosophy,
that all systems must either be sensational or ideal. It is quite obvious
that such men as Butler, Brown, and Chalmers, cannot be included in
either of the artificial compartments, and hence one ground of their ne-
glect by the system-builders of our age.
3. His account of sensation is characterized by fine analysis: in
particular, his discrimination of the sensations commonly ascribed toThe Scottish Philosophy/301
touch, and his separation of the muscular sense from the sense of touch
proper. About this very time Charles Bell was establishing the distinc-
tion of the nerves of sensation and motion. “I was finally enabled,” says
Sir Charles, to show that the muscles had two classes of nerves; that on
exciting one of these the muscles contracted, that on exciting the other
no action took place. The nerve which had no power to make the muscle
contract was found to be a nerve of sensation.” Contemporaneously,
Brown was arguing, on psychological grounds, that by the muscular
sense we get knowledge which cannot be had from mere feeling or touch.
“The feeling of resistance is, I conceive, to be ascribed not to our organ
of touch but to our muscular frame.” Hamilton, by his vast erudition,
has been able (note appended to Reid’s works) to detect anticipations of
these views; but they were not so clearly stated, and they were not con-
clusively demonstrated. Brown started, and carried a certain length, those
inquiries regarding the variety of sensations commonly ascribed to touch,
which have ever since had a place in psychological treatises.
4. Nor must we omit his ingenious and felicitous mode of illustrat-
ing the succession of our mental states, called by him “suggestion,” to
intimate that there is no connection in the nature of things between the
ideas, and not “association,” which might leave the impression that there
was a nexus joining them. He is particularly successful in showing how
by association the various ideas and, he adds, feelings blend, and, as it
were, coalesce. He has called attention to an important phenomenon,
which has been little noticed ever since he brought it out to view, and
which he himself did not see the significance of. “In our mental se-
quences, the one feeling which precedes and induces another feeling
does not necessarily on that account give place to it; but may continue in
that virtual sense of combination, as applied to the phenomena of the
mind, of which I have often spoken, to coexist with the new feeling
which it excites, outlasting it, perhaps, and many other feeling to which,
during its permanence, it may have given rise. I pointed out to you how
important this circumstance in our mental constitution is to us in vari-
ous ways: to our intellectual acquirements, since without it there would
be no continued meditation, but only a hurrying confusion of image
after image, in wilder irregularity than in the wildest of our dreams; and
to our virtue and happiness, since, by allowing the coexistence and con-
densation of various feelings in one complex emotion, it furnishes the
chief source of those moral affections which it is at once our happiness
to feel and our virtue to obey.” He has here got a glimpse of a great302/James McCosh
truth, which needs to be developed more fully than it has yet been it is
the power of a motive principle, and of a strong purpose and resolution
abiding in the mind to sway the train of thoughts and feelings. Had he
followed out his own hint, it would have led him to discover deep springs
of action directing the flow of suggestions.
While he illustrates the laws of suggestion under the three Aristote-
lian heads of contiguity, resemblance, and contrast, he intimates his be-
lief that they may all be reduced to a finer kind of contiguity. As the
latest speculations have not yet got down to the depths of this subject, it
may be useful to know the hints thrown out by Brown, who seems to me
to be so far on the right track, but not to have reached the highest foun-
tain from which the stream issues:—
“All suggestion, as I conceive, may, if our analysis be sufficiently
minute, be found to depend on prior existence, or at least on such
immediate proximity as is itself very probably a modification of
coexistence.” He begins with resemblance: “if a portrait be faith-
fully painted, the effect which it produces on the eye that per-
ceives it is the same, or very nearly the same, as the effect pro-
duced on the eye by similar light reflected from the living object;
and we might therefore almost as justly say, that when any indi-
vidual is seen by us repeatedly he suggests himself by resemblance,
as that he is thus suggested by his portrait.” This surely comes
very close to Hamilton’s principle, that resembling objects, so far
as they are alike, are the same, and to his law of repetition or
identity. The following brings us quite as near his law of redinte-
gration In many other cases, in which the resemblance is less com-
plete, its operation may, even without such refinement of analysis
as that to which I have alluded, be very obviously brought under
the influence of contiguity. Thus, as the drapery forms so impor-
tant a part of the complex perception of the human figure, the
costume of any period may recall to us some distinguished person
of that time. A ruff like that worn by Queen Elizabeth brings be-
fore us the sovereign herself, though the person who wears the
ruff may have no other circumstance of resemblance: because the
ruff and the general appearance of Queen Elizabeth, having formed
one complex whole in our mind, it is necessary only that one part
of the complexity should be recalled—as the ruff in the case sup-
posed—to bring back all the other parts by the mere principle of
contiguity. The instance of drapery, which is but an adjunct or
accidental circumstance of the person, may be easily extended to
other instances, in which the resemblance is in parts of the real
and permanent figure.” “In this manner, by analyzing every com-The Scottish Philosophy/303
plex whole, and tracing, in the variety of its composition, that
particular part in which the actual similarity consists,—and which
may therefore be supposed to introduce the other parts that have
formerly coexisted with it,—we might be able to reduce every case
of suggestion from direct resemblance—to the influence of mere
contiguity.” “By the application of a similar refined analysis to
other tribes of associations, even to those of contrast, we may per-
haps find that it would be possible to reduce these also to the same
comprehensive influence of mere proximity as the single prin-
ciple on which all suggestion is founded.” I am far from holding
that this analysis into parts of the concrete idea starting the sug-
gestion, furnishes a complete solution of the difficulties connected
with fixing on one ultimate law; but it seems to set us on the right
track.
He gives us a somewhat crude, but still important, classification of
what he calls the secondary laws of suggestion, which induce one asso-
ciate conception rather than another. He mentions longer or shorter con-
tinuance; more or less liveliness; more or less frequently present; more
or less purity from the mixture of other feelings; differences of original
constitution; differences of temporary emotion; changes in the state of
the body; and general tendencies produced by prior habits. Had this
arrangement been presented by another he would have proceeded to
reduce it to simpler elements.
5. His distribution of the relations which the mind can discover is
worthy of being looked at: they are—
I. Coexistence.
1. Position.
2. Resemblance or Difference.
3. Degree.
4. Proportion.




This classification is worthy of being placed along side that of Locke
and Hume. It may be compared with Kant’s “Categories of the Under-
standing;” but it should be observed that the German metaphysician304/James McCosh
makes his categories forms imposed by the mind on things, whereas the
Scotch psychologist simply gives to the mind the power of discerning
the relations in things. The arrangement of Brown is superior to that of
Hamilton, to be afterwards discussed, and vastly more comprehensive
and just than that of those later physiological psychologists who reduce
the relations which the mind can perceive to the single one of resem-
blance and difference, thus restricting the powers of intelligence within
far narrower limits than have been assigned by nature, and all to make it
somewhat easier to account for the whole on materialistic principles.
6. His biographer declares his account of the general notion to be a
great advance on all that had been proposed by previous philosophers.
Brown states the process to be the following: “We perceive two or more
objects,—this is one state of the mind. We are struck with the feeling of
their resemblance in certain respects,—this is a second state of the mind.
We then, in the third stage, give a name to these circumstances of felt
resemblance, a name which is, of course, applied afterwards only where
this relation of similarity is felt.” He has here seized some of the charac-
teristic steps in the process of forming the general notion. He is right in
giving a prominent place to the discovery of resemblance, but he should
have called it a perception of resemblance, and not a feeling of resem-
blance,—language which seems to ascribe the whole to the emotive rather
than the cognitive part of our nature. And he has missed, after all, the
essential, the consummating step,—the placing of the objects under a
head or in a class which embraces all the objects possessing the resem-
bling qualities, to which class thus formed the name is given. He has a
searching review of nominalism, which be charges with overlooking the
resemblance. He asks, “Why do I class together certain objects, and
exclude certain others from the class which I have formed?” He shows
that the infant must reason before it has acquired language, “He has
already calculated distances long before he knew the use of a single
word expressive of distance.”
7. He has some fine remarks on beauty. He separates from Alison,
who resolves it into the general feelings of our nature, and argues reso-
lutely that there is an original and unresolvable class of feelings excited
by the beautiful. He remarks that in the emotion of beauty, “by a sort of
reflex transfer to the object which excited it, we identify or combine our
agreeable feeling with the very conception of the object, whether present
or absent.” He is able to come to the conclusion: “It is mind alone that is
the living fountain of beauty, because it is the mind which, by reflectionThe Scottish Philosophy/305
from itself, embodies in the object or spreads over it its own delight.”
He overlooks, however, the objective beauty arising from the harmony
of sounds and colors, and from proportion and harmony.
8. Some place higher than any of his other excellencies his eloquent
exposition of the emotions,—an exposition which called forth the lau-
dations both of Stewart and Chalmers, the latter of whom wrote a pref-
ace to that part of his lectures which treats of the feelings. He is particu-
larly successful in showing that man is not by his nature and constitu-
tion a selfish being, but is possessed of social and benevolent affections.
His lectures on the emotions are radiant all over with poetry, and will
repay a careful reading much better than many of the scholastic discus-
sions or anatomical descriptions which are furnished in some of the
chairs of mental science.
9. It would be injustice not to add that he has some very splendid
illustrations of natural theism, fitted at once to refine and elevate the
soul. I have never heard of any youth being inclined towards scepticism
or pantheism, or becoming prejudiced against Christian truth, in conse-
quence of attending or reading the lectures of Brown. In note E, ap-
pended to his work on “Cause and Effect,” he has a powerful argument
in favor of the possibility of a miracle, showing that it is not inconsistent
with the intuitive law of cause and effect. “There is no violation of a law
of nature, but there is a new consequent of a new antecedent.”
Over against these excellencies I have to place certain grave defi-
ciencies and errors.
1. I take exception to the account which he gives of the very object
and end of mental science. According to him, it is to analyze the com-
plex into the simple, and discover the laws of the succession of our
mental states. There is a great and obvious oversight here. The grand
business of the science of the human mind is to observe the nature of our
mental states, with the view of co-ordinating them and rising to the
discovery of the laws which they obey and the faculties from which they
proceed. Taking this view, analysis becomes a subordinate though of
course an important instrument; and we have to seek to discover the
faculties which determine the nature of the states as well as the laws of
their succession.
2. In his analysis he often misses the main element of the concrete or
complex phenomena. In referring ideas to sensation he neglects to con-
sider how much is involved in body occupying space, and how much in
body exercising property; and the account of memory he fails to dis-306/James McCosh
cover how much is implied in recognizing the event remembered as hav-
ing happened in time past,—that is, he omits the idea of time. Often,
too, when he has accomplished an analysis of a complex state, does he
forget the elements, and reminds us of the boy who imagines that be has
annihilated a piece of paper when he has burnt it, forgetting that the
elements are to be found in the smoke and in the ashes. It is by a most
deceitful decomposition—it is by missing the very differentia of the
phenomena—that he is able to derive all our intellectual ideas from
sensation and simple and relative suggestion.
3. He grants that there are intuitive principles of belief in the mind;
but he has never so much as attempted an induction of them, or an
exposition of their nature and of the laws which regulate them, or a
classification of them. In this respect he must be regarded as falling
behind his predecessors in the school, and behind Hamilton, who suc-
ceeded him in the estimation of students of mental science. The intelli-
gent reader is greatly disappointed to find him, after he has shown so
forcibly that there is an intuition involved in our belief in personal iden-
tity and in causation, immediately dropping these intuitions and inquir-
ing no more into their nature. He takes great credit for reducing the
faculties and principles enumerated by Reid to a much smaller number;
but if we gather up all the elements which he is obliged to bring in, we
shall find the list to be as large as that of Reid or Stewart.
4. Thus he represents consciousness as merely a general term for all
the states and affections of mind; and then, in order to account for our
belief in the sameness of self, he is obliged to call in a special instinct.
“We believe our identity, as one mind, in our feelings of to-day and our
feelings of yesterday, as indubitably as we believe that the fire which
burned yesterday would in the same circumstances burn us to-day, not
from reasoning, but from a principle of instinct and irresistible belief,
such as gives to reasoning itself all its validity.” It is this irresistible
belief, involved in the very nature of consciousness, this belief in self
and the identity of self, which makes consciousness—I mean self-con-
sciousness (and not a vague consciousness)—a separate faculty. This
faculty is a source to us of a separate set of cognitions and ideas, the
knowledge of self and of the states of self,—such as thinking, feeling,
resolving.
5. According to Brown, in perception through the senses we look
immediately on a sensation in the mind, and not on any thing out of the
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discriminately searching classification of the forms. which ideal sense-
perception bad assumed, and he makes Brown’s theory one of the forms
of idealism. But the truth is, Brown’s doctrine can scarcely be called
idealism. It might be appropriately called inferentialism. It is the same
substantially as that of Destutt de Tracy and the French ideologists,
who, maintaining the existence of body, argued that infants reach a knowl-
edge of it by a process of inference. The argument is unfolded by Brown
at great length and with much ingenuity. The mind can never perceive
any thing directly but the sensation, but then this sensation as a—phe-
nomenon must have a cause. He argues this on the principle, perceived
to be intuitively certain, that every effect has a cause. The sensation
then must have a cause; but then it has not, like some other of our men-
tal states and affections,—such as our sentiments and perceptions of
duty,—a cause within the mind itself; it must therefore have a cause
without the mind, and this cause is matter. It is clear as to this inference,
that it will be acknowledged frankly only by those who look on causa-
tion as an intuitive conviction. If belief in causation be merely experi-
mental, it is doubtful whether we should ever discover the law to be
universal, for by far the greater number of our sensations would be
phenomena of which we could discover no cause. We might group the
phenomena in some way, but we should not be able to say logically
whether they have a cause or not. But leaving this, as perhaps only a
doubtful point, we can affirm confidently that even if, by such a pro-
cess, we could infer that these sensations have a cause, it must be an
unknown cause, a cause of which we have no experience. But matter
seems to be something known. We certainly have an idea of extension,
or rather of something extended—I would add, a belief in an extended
substance. Our belief is not in an unknown cause, but in a known exist-
ence,—known as existing and extended. But we never could reach the
belief, we never could reach even the idea of space which we certainly
have, by any logical process proceeding on the existence of a sensation.
From a sensation, which is unextended, we cannot rise to the idea of an
extended thing. Logically and consequentially, Brown’s theory of the
cognition of matter prepared the way for that of J. S. Mill, who makes
our idea of body to be of a mere possibility of sensations.
6. He overlooks some of the distinguishing attributes of the repro-
ductive powers of the mind. Conception, memory, and imagination are
merely exercises of simple suggestion. He does not give the phantasy or
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faculty, but is merely conception or suggestion combined with the feel-
ing of a particular relation,—the relation to which we give the name of
priority.” Observe what confusion of things we have here: memory is a
“suggestion,” but implies a “relation, “which is represented as a “feel-
ing;” and “priority,” implying the idea of time past, present, and future,
comes in so quietly that we are not expected to notice it, though it is one
of the most profound of our ideas. In imagination, he overlooks that
high intellectual power which binds the scattered images in a unity, of-
ten of a very grand character. A simplification gained by overlooking
these characteristic qualities is altogether illusive.
7. In his account of the faculties of relative suggestion, he mixes up
two things which ought to be carefully distinguished,—the suggestion,
which is a mere law of the succession of our ideas, and comparison, by
which we discover the relations of things. He cannot make these one by
calling them by the one name of relative suggestion.
8. He has discovered an important element in the process of reason-
ing. He sees that in reasoning there is the explication of what is involved
in the conceptions; but he does not notice the laws of comprehension
and extension involved in drawing one conception from another or oth-
ers.
9. He has a fine exposition of the emotions, dividing them according
to the principle of time,—as immediate, retrospective, and prospective;
but be overlooks two essential elements. One is, the idea or phantasm as
the basis of the emotion. We cannot have a feeling towards a mother
unless we have an idea of her. He is guilty of a greater oversight: he has
taken no notice of those springs of action or motive principles, dwelt on
by Stewart,-such as the love of self, of our neighbors of society, of
power,—which call forth and guide the emotions in certain channels.
10. He does not distinguish between our emotions on the one hand
and the wishes and volitions on the other,—a distinction always drawn
in one form or other by our highest moralists, and strongly insisted on
by Kant and his school in Germany. Surely there is a difference in kind
between such an emotion as that of hope or fear on the, one hand and a
purpose or determination to act on the other. With Brown, will is merely
the prevailing desire, and desire an emotion.
11. His view of the moral faculty is very defective. It is represented
by him as a mere class of emotions. He calls them “emotions of appro-
bation and disapprobation.” The very epithets employed by him, “ap-
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involved. Conscience is not only an emotive, it is a cognitive power,
revealing to us what ought and ought not to be done. Dr. Chalmers
shows that be has overlooked the great truth brought out by Butler, that
conscience is a power in the mind, not simply co-ordinate with the oth-
ers, but authoritative and supreme, claiming subjection from all the vol-
untary powers. Nor ought it to be omitted that be does not bring out
fully that the moral faculty declares man to be a sinner. He thus con-
structed an ethical system, and delivered it in Edinburgh,—which some-
times claims to be the metropolis of evangelical theology, without a
reference to redemption or grace. No teachers ever inculcated a purer
moral system than Reid, Stewart, or Brown; but they do not seem will-
ing to look at the fact that man falls infinitely beneath the purity of the
moral law. They give us lofty views of the moral power in man, but
forget to tell that this power condemns him. Taking up the demonstra-
tions of the Scottish metaphysicians in regard to the conscience, an in-
quiry should be made,—How are they affected by the circumstance that
man is a sinner? This was the grand topic started by Chalmers, and by
which he effected a reconciliation between the philosophy and the theol-
ogy of Scotland.
12. He has not been able to give an adequate account of some of the
profoundest ideas which the mind of man entertains; such as, that of
personal identity, of power in substances, of infinity and moral good.
The tendency of his philosophy was counteracted in the next age by
Coleridge, Cousin, and Hamilton, drawing largely from German sources.
XLV. Francis Jeffrey84
Francis Jeffrey was not specially a metaphysician, but he studied meta-
physics and wrote upon them, and so deserves a passing notice. He was
the son of a depute clerk of the Court of Session, and was born on a
“flat” in Charles Street, Edinburgh, October 23, 1773. At the age of
eight, he entered (in an intensely excited state) the high school, at that
time presided over by Dr. Adam, a scholar and a man of character; and
at fourteen be entered Glasgow College with some idea of getting an
Oxford exhibition, and there he was under Jardine, the professor of
logic and rhetoric, of whom he says: “It is to him and his most judicious
instruction I owe my taste for letters, and any literary distinction I may
since have been enabled to attain.” A fellow-student, afterwards Princi-
pal Macfarlan of Glasgow, reports of him that in the first year “he ex-
hibited nothing remarkable, except a decree of quickness, bordering, as310/James McCosh
some thought, on petulance;” and another fellow-student, afterwards
Principal Haldane of St. Andrews, describes him as a little black crea-
ture whom he had not observed, but was noticed by him as haranguing
some boys on the college green against voting for Adam Smith as lord
rector, and who was opposed by young Jeffrey because he was the can-
didate of the professors. In the second year he broke upon them very
brilliantly as one of the most acute and fluent speakers, his favorite
subjects being criticism and metaphysics. While at college be was most
diligent in writing, in a terribly illegible hand, whole volumes of notes of
his professors’ lectures, mixed with remarks of his own, and innumer-
able essays, most of them of a critical character. Francis Jeffrey was
absolutely destined to be a critic. Any one might have seen this in these
restless eyes, ever scintillating, and might have argued it from his quick
and clear apprehension, from his searching spirit and his sound judg-
ment on all subjects not requiring wide comprehension or original ge-
nius. On leaving Glasgow, he went home to the “dear, retired, adored
little window” of his Lawnmarket garret, and again scribbled papers,
sixty of which remained in the time of his biographer. Jeffrey was the
genuine product of the lecture-hearing, essay-writing, debating-society
privileges of the Scottish colleges. In 1791 he went up to Oxford, the
instruction in which, as requiring quiet study and no writing, he did not
enjoy so much as that of Glasgow, and he describes his fellow-students
as “pedants, coxcombs, and strangers.” He eagerly sought when in En-
gland to get rid of his Scotch pronunciation, and succeeded in acquiring
a clipped and affected English. At the end of the academic year, he went
back to Scotland, where he got into the heart of a body of clever and
ambitious youths. His peculiar talents were specially called forth by the
“Speculative Society,” which had been instituted in 1764, and which
reached its highest reputation at the time he attended it; and there he had
to wrestle with such men as Francis Horner, Henry Brougham, Lord
Lansdowne, and David Boyle, afterwards president of the Court of Ses-
sion; and Henry Cockburn tells us how enraptured he was with speeches
by him on national character, by Horner on the immortality of the soul,
and Brougham on the power of Russia. I doubt much whether any of
them threw much light on these subjects; but they discussed them ably,
and to the great delight of the aspiring youths of Edinburgh. His busi-
ness consisted in attending law lectures, and his amusement in writing
thousands of lines of poetry, the moon being the special object of his
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like, therefore, to be the rival of Smith and Hume.” He joined conscien-
tiously and eagerly the Whig party, which included such men as James
Gibson (afterwards Sir James Gibson Craig), the Rev. Sir Henry
Wellwood Moncreiff, John Allen, John Thomson in the medical profes-
sion, and Dugald Stewart and John Playfair in the college and in doing
so he knowingly cut himself off from all hope of receiving government
patronage.
We now come to the most important event in his life,—the estab-
lishment of the “Edinburgh Review,” the first number of which appeared
in October, 1802. The account is given by Sydney Smith: “One day we
happened to meet on the eighth or ninth story or flat [it was actually the
third, but the whole party wished to make their descriptions lively and
telling] in Buccleuch Place, the elevated residence of the then Mr Jef-
frey. I proposed we should set up a Review: this was acceded to with
acclamation. I was appointed editor (not formally), and remained long
enough in Edinburgh to edit the first number.” The most influential writers
were Jeffrey, Smith,85 Brougham, and Horner; but the ruling spirit and
the guiding hand was Jeffrey, who now found the sphere for which he
was fitted by native taste and capacity, and for which he had been pre-
pared by his whole training in reading miscellaneously and writing sys-
tematically, and in his legal learning. Horner describes him at this pe-
riod, “when the genius of that little man was almost unknown to all but
his roost intimate acquaintances. His manner is not at first pleasing;
but, what is worse, it is of that cast which almost irresistibly impresses
upon strangers the idea of levity and superficial talents. Yet there is not
any man whose real character is so much the reverse. He has, indeed, a
very sportive and playful fancy; but it is accompanied with an extensive
and varied information, and a readiness of apprehension almost intui-
tive, with judicious and calm discernment, with a profound and pen-
etrating understanding.”
The starting of the “Edinburgh Review,” with its blue and yellow
cover, undoubtedly constituted an era in the history of literature. There
had been magazines and even reviews, such as the earlier “Edinburgh
Review,” but none of the same comprehensive, independent, and fear-
less character. Hitherto literary periodicals had been very much the or-
gans of booksellers; but these bold youths undertook to make the pub-
lisher their mere agent, and required him to pay decently for the articles.
In the first number seven articles were written by Smith, four by Horner,
four commonly ascribed to Brougham, and five by Jeffrey. None of the312/James McCosh
writers were learned, in the proper sense of the term none of them were
engaged in profound investigations: but they were all well informed men,
and possessed of brilliant talents, if not of genius. They wrote quickly,
easily, clearly, pungently, with quite as much information as their read-
ers wished. The early writers did little fitted to advance science, or the
higher forms of literary genius; but they cut down pretension of every
kind unmercifully, and they were ever in favor of good taste and good
sense. They have left nothing permanent themselves; but they produced
a mighty influence on their own age and through it on the succeeding
age. They failed to discover the rising genius of Byron; they did not
appreciate Wordsworth; they did not encourage the study of Goethe,86
and of the great German writers; they ridiculed missionary effort when
it appeared in the churches, and proclaimed that heathen nations must
be civilized before they can be Christianized,—as if to teach men that
they have a soul were not the most potent means of awakening thought
and thereby starting civilization. But the “Review” promoted a healthy
tone of writing and a liberal spirit in politics, and helped more than any
other literary organ to effect a reform in the legislature. From this time
forth, Francis Jeffrey became the terror of all authors about to publish,
and of all bigoted Tory politicians. While thus an object of dread to
strangers, be seems to have been loved by all who knew him. He was
editor of the “Review” for twenty-seven years, and wrote two hundred
and sixty-one articles. He published a selection from these in 1843.
Though obnoxious to the government of the day, and without politi-
cal or family patronage, and not a favorite with some of the old writers
to the signet who had the means of sending cases to him or keeping them
back, he rose steadily at the bar, and in the course of years stood in the
first rank. He was well read in law, was particularly fitted to discuss
questions of right and equity, was clear and philosophical in his ar-
rangement, ingenious in his arguments, fluent in utterance, tasteful in
language, ready at reply, poignant in repartee, and sharp in his strokes
of with judges came to appreciate his legal ability, juries liked his point
and life, and church courts enjoyed his ingenious defences of bad causes,
which he was often called to defend.
We are now arrived at the second great literary epoch of the capital
of Scotland. In the first, that of the last half of the previous century, had
appeared a number of grave and thinking men, each striking out a path
for himself. This second consisted of a brilliant circle of writers, critics,
and talkers. They formed a club of which Scott, Jeffrey, Stewart, Playfair,The Scottish Philosophy/313
Sydney Smith, Brougham, the “Man of Feeling,” Cockburn, Horner,
Alison, and Thomas Brown were members. In this circle, the two most
eminent men were Walter Scott, the poet and reputed novelist, and Francis
Jeffrey, the critic. “Edinburgh was at that time, to a far greater extent
than it is now the resort of the families of the gentry, who used to leave
their country residences and enjoy the gayety and the fashion which
their presence tended to promote. Many of the curious characters and
habits of the preceding age—the last purely Scotch age that Scotland
was destined to see—still lingered among us.” After this time the ambi-
tious youths of Scotland trooped to London, and left Edinburgh as spe-
cially a lawyers’ city, relieved by a healthy mixture of university profes-
sors, of eminent doctors, and high-class teachers. When Jeffrey’s pro-
fessional income became large, he had as his residence Craigcrook, three
miles north west of Edinburgh, on the eastern slope of the Corstorphine
Hill, and he lived there thirty-four seasons. Thither a select but miscel-
laneous band of visitors resorted on the Saturday afternoons “The
Craigcrook party began to assemble about three, each taking to his own
enjoyment. The bowling-green was sure to have its matches in which
the host joined with skill and keenness; the garden had its loiterers; the
wall, not forgetting the wall of yellow roses, their worshippers; the hill
its prospect seekers. The banquet that followed was generous; the wines
never spared, but rather too various; mirth unrestrained except by pro-
priety; the talk always good, but never ambitious, and those listening in
no disrepute.”
As he had promoted the cause of parliamentary reform so steadily
and consistently, there was an appropriateness in his being sent to the
House of Commons, where he spoke in behalf of the Reform Bill, and,
after the Reform Bill passed, in his being the representative of the city
of Edinburgh. One of the great speeches in behalf of the bill was by him,
and he carried through the Scotch Reform Bill and the Borough Reform
measure. Still his career in Parliament was not eminently successful. I
remember that, when he was first sent to St. Stephen’s, the question was
eagerly discussed in Edinburgh, whether their great literary critic was
likely to prove a parliamentary states man and orator, when Chalmers
decided, “he wants momentum.” He retired from the House of Com-
mons in 1834, and became a judge, his decisions being always wise and
weighty. In particular he defended the ancient rights and the indepen-
dence of the church of Scotland in a very able paper, showing that he
had a very clear apprehension of the distinction between the spiritual314/James McCosh
and temporal powers. When between four and five hundred ministers
threw up their livings rather than submit to have the spiritual privileges
of the church and the liberties of the people trampled on, he exclaimed:
“I am proud of my country.” He died January, 1850, giving so far as is
known no religious sign either in life or in death.
In his “Contributions to the Edinburgh Review,” he has a number of
articles on metaphysical subjects. He has a long review, afterwards re-
published in the “Encyclopaedia Britannica,” of Alison on Taste. He
argues against the notion of beauty being a simple sensation, or the
object of a separate and peculiar faculty, and urges the difference of
tastes as a proof of this: an analogous argument might show that there
was no faculty to discern truth or moral good. He also opposes the idea
of beauty being a real property of objects. He then expounds his own
theory. “In our opinion, then, our sense of beauty depends entirely on
our previous experience of simpler pleasures or emotions, and consists
in the suggestion of agreeable or interesting sensations with which we
had formerly been made familiar by the direct and intelligible agency of
our common sensibilities; and that vast variety of objects to which we
give the name of beautiful become entitled to that appellation, merely
because they all possess the power of recalling or reflecting those sensa-
tions of which they have been the accompaniments, or with which they
have been associated in our imagination by any other more casual bond
of connection.” This theory differs slightly from that of Alison; but is
not an improvement of it, and is liable to the same objections. In one
point, he seems to have the advantage of the author he reviews. Jeffrey
holds the perception of beauty “to be, in most cases, quite instanta-
neous, and altogether as immediate as the perception of the external
qualities of the object to which it is ascribed.” I believe that Alison is
right when he says that there is a flow of imagination; but then there
must be something to start it, and this something—be it a color, a form,
a sound, a harmony—raises a feeling at once, and is entitled to be called
beautiful. He maintains that objects are sublime or beautiful when, along
with other qualities, they act as “natural signs and perpetual concomi-
tants of pleasurable sensations, or, at any rate, of some lively feeling or
emotion in ourselves, or in some other sentient beings.” I am inclined to
think that beautiful objects act as signs, but they do so by suggesting
ideas of the true and the good.
He has a review of Priestley, and in it examines materialism. He
shows that “the qualities of matter are perceived, but perception cannotThe Scottish Philosophy/315
be perceived.” “If the eye and the ear, with their delicate structures and
fine sensibility, are but vehicles and apparatus, why should the attenu-
ated and unknown tissues of the cerebral nerves be supposed to be any
thing else?” “Their proposition is, not that motion produces sensation,—
which might be as well in the mind as in the body,—but that sensation is
motion, and that all the phenomena of thought and perception are intel-
ligently accounted for by saying that they are certain little shakings in
the pulpy part of the brain.” There may be little shakings in the brain for
any thing we know, and there may even be shakings of a different kind
accompanying every act of thought or perception; but that the shakings
themselves are the thought or perception we are so far from admitting
that we find it absolutely impossible to comprehend what is meant by
the assertion.”
He has a review of Stewart’s “Life of Reid” and of Stewart’s “Philo-
sophical Essays.” He writes in the most laudatory terms of both, and of
the Scotch philosophy generally. But he ventures to criticise them, and
blames Reid for multiplying without necessity the number of original
principles and affections: he sees no reason for admitting a principle of
credulity or a principle of veracity in human nature, or for interpreting
natural signs. He commends his exemplary diligence and success in sub-
verting the ideal system, but adds: “We must confess that we have not
been able to perceive how the destruction of the ideal can be held as a
demonstration of the real existence of matter,”—as if Reid had ever
claimed that it did so, or as if he had not expressly rested our belief on
body on the principle of common sense. He labors to show that mental
science cannot bring with it any solid issues, and represents “the lofty
estimate which Mr Stewart has made of the practical of his favorite
study as one of those splendid visions by which men of genius have been
so often misled in the enthusiastic pursuit of science and virtue.” No
doubt psychology cannot directly add to our animal comforts, as chem-
istry can, but surely when we know approximately and provisionary
(which is all we know in chemistry) the laws of the senses, of memory,
of association, imagination, judgment, reasoning, feeling, and conscience,
we may get practical benefits of another kind in being better able to
regulate our own minds and influence the minds of others. On one point
he seems rather to have the advantage of Stewart. In his review of
Stewart’s “Life and Writings of Reid,” he maintains that it is principally
by experiment, and not by mere observation, that those “splendid im-
provements have been made which have erected so vast a trophy to the316/James McCosh
prospective genius of Bacon.” Stewart replied, in his “Philosophical
Essays” and “Dissertation,” showing that experiment is a species of
observation and that mind can be and has been experimented on: “Hardly
any experiment can be imagined which has not already been tried by the
hand of nature.” But Jeffrey has a truth which however, he has not
elaborated successfully. The physical investigator has much more accu-
rate tests than the mental philosopher in the means which modern sci-
ence has provided for weighing and measuring the results; and this, I
apprehend, is the main reason for the fact that there is less disputing
about physical than mental laws. On the other hand, we have more im-
mediate, constant, and familiar access to our thoughts and feelings than
we have to any facts of natural philosophy; and thus our knowledge of
mind, scientific and practical, may, without being so much observed by
the vulgar, be as useful as our knowledge of physics, as it may at all
times be restraining and constraining us, though unconsciously, and
enabling us to sway the minds and actions of others.
XLVI. Sir James Mackintosh87
“I was born,” he tells us, “at Aldowrie, on the banks of Loch Ness
within seven miles of the town of Inverness, in Scotland, on the 26th of
October, 1765.” His father was a subaltern and younger brother, pos-
sessed of a small family property, and his mother was pressed with
many anxieties; but she and the whole female kindred combined to lav-
ish kindness upon the child and possibly fondled him too much. In 1775,
he was sent to the school at Fortrose. The boarding mistress was very
pious and orthodox, and at times rebuked the usher who was suspected
of some heretical opinions. He betook himself early to reading thought-
ful works, some of them beyond his years, such as Burnet on the Thirty-
Nine Articles, and he formed opinions of his own, and became a warm
advocate for free-will.
“About the same time,” he says, “I read the old translation (called
Dryden’s) of Plutarch’s ‘Lives’ and Echard’s ‘Roman History.’ I
well remember that the perusal of the last led me into a ridiculous
habit. from which I shall never be totally free. I used to fancy
myself emperor of Constantinople. I distributed offices and prov-
inces amongst my school fellows; I loaded my favorites with dig-
nity and power, and I often made the objects of my dislike feel the
weight of my imperial resentment. I carried on the series of politi-
cal events in solitude for several hours;. I resumed them, and con-The Scottish Philosophy/317
tinued them from day to day for months. Ever since, I have been
more prone to building castles in the air than most others. My
castle-building bas always been of a singular kind. It was not the
anticipation of a sanguine disposition, expecting extraordinary
success in its pursuits. My disposition is not sanguine, and my
visions have generally regarded things as much unconnected with
my ordinary pursuits and as little to be expected as the crown of
Constantinople at the school of Fortrose. These fancies, indeed,
have never amounted to conviction, or, in other words, they have
never influenced my actions; but I must confess that they have
often been as steady and of as regular recurrence as conviction
itself, and that they have sometimes created a little faint expecta-
tion, a state of mind in which my wonder that they should be
realized would not be so great as it rationally ought to be. The
indulgence of this dreaming propensity produces good and bad
consequences. It produces indolence, improvidence, cheerfulness;
a study is its favorite scene; and I have no doubt that many a man,
surrounded by piles of folios and apparently engaged in the most
profound researches, is in reality often employed in distributing
the offices and provinces of the empire of Constantinople.”
The instruction he received at school was loose and far from accu-
rate. “Whatever I have done beyond has been since added by my own
irregular reading But no subsequent circumstance could make up for
that invaluable habit of vigorous and methodical industry which the
indulgence and irregularity of my school life prevented me from acquir-
ing, and of which I have painfully felt the want in every part of my life.”
In 1780 he went to college at Aberdeen. “I bought and read three or four
books this first winter, which were very much out of the course of boys
of fifteen anywhere, but most of all at Aberdeen. Among them was
Priestley’s “Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion,” and Beattie’s
“Essay on Truth,” which confirmed my disposition to metaphysical in-
quiries, and Warburton’s “Divine Legation,” which delighted me more
than any book I had yet read, and which perhaps tainted my mind with
a fondness for the twilight of historical hypothesis, but which certainly
inspired me with that passion for investigating the history of opinions
which has influenced my reading through life. At the college he formed
an intimacy with a most engaging and promising youth, Robert Hall,
who afterwards became the most brilliant preacher of his age. “His so-
ciety and conversation had a great influence on my mind; our controver-
sies were almost unceasing. We lived in the same house, and we were318/James McCosh
both very disputatious. He led me to the perusal of Jonathan Edwards’s
book on Free Will, which Dr. Priestley had pointed out before. I am
sorry that I never got the other works of that most extraordinary man,
who, in a metaphysical age or country, would certainly have been deemed
as much the boast of America as his great countryman Franklin.” In
their joint studies the two youths read much of Xenophon and Herodotus
and more of Plato; and so well was this known—exciting admiration in
some, in others envy—that it was not unusual, as they went along, for
their class-fellows to point at them and say: “There go Plato and
Herodotus.” But the arena in which they met most frequently was that
of morals and metaphysics. “After having sharpened their weapons by
reading, they often repaired to the spacious sands upon the sea-shore,
and still more frequently to the picturesque scenery on the banks of the
Don above the old town, to discuss with eagerness the various subjects
to which their attention had been directed. There was scarcely an impor-
tant position in Berkeley’s “Minute Philosopher,” or Butler’s “Anal-
ogy,” or in Edwards on the Will, over which they had not thus debated
with the utmost intensity. Night after night, nay month after month, for
two seasons, they met only to study or dispute, yet no unkindly feeling
ensued.” (Gregory’s “Memoir of Robert Hall.”)
In 1784 he entered on the study of medicine, and was under the
famous Dr. Cullen, but attached himself to the fancies of John Brown,
author of the Brunonian system, which had its little day. At Edinburgh
he became a member of the famous Speculative Society, which did so
much to stimulate the intellectual life of young men. He is able to testify
of Edinburgh University, “that it is not easy to conceive a university
where industry was more general, where reading was more fashionable,
and where indolence and ignorance were more disreputable. Every mind
was in a state of fermentation. The direction of mental activity will not
indeed be universally approved. It certainly was very much, though not
exclusively, pointed towards metaphysical inquiries.” To the “Royal
Physical Society,” he read a paper on the instincts and dispositions of
animals, and showed that animals had memory, imagination, and reason
in different degrees; declining to enter on the difficult question: “To
what circumstance are we to attribute the intellectual superiority of man
over other animals?” He took his medical degree with credit, but it does
not appear that he ever had the taste for the patient observation of physi-
ological facts which would have made him eminent in the profession. It
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cesses for which the Edinburgh lawyers and students were noted at that
period. It is proper to add that, when in Edinburgh, he attended the
lectures of Dugald Stewart, with whom he carried on an occasional
correspondence through life.
He was now seized with the disposition attributed to his country-
men of going south when they have to seek a settlement for life, and he
went to London in the spring of 1788. There he meant to follow the
medical profession, but he was easily turned aside from it. He became
deeply interested in the politics of the time, which took their direction
from the revolt of the American colonies, and from the fermentation
preceding the revolutionary outburst in France. He listened eagerly to
the orations of Burke and Sheridan; and became a speaker him self in
one of the numerous political societies of the period. He was led by his
social dispositions to mingle in the society that was open to him. “His
company was sought after, and few were the occupations which induced
him willingly to decline a pleasant invitation.” Feeling a difficulty in
sustaining him self, he sold his little highland estate, and bravely entered
into the state of matrimony. He now betook himself to the study of the
law, and, had he kept to it steadily, would undoubtedly have risen to
great eminence in certain departments of it requiring thought and lofty
eloquence. But an opportunity now presented itself to call forth his spe-
cial gifts, and enable him at once to rise to distinction.
About this time there was a wide difference of opinion in England in
regard to the tendency and influence of the French Revolution. Young
minds of a liberal tendency were strongly impressed with the need of
political reformation in France. But, as the revolution advanced, not a
few who at first favored it became alarmed at the infidelity and the cruel
excesses. Burke, in particular, denounced the whole movement in lan-
guage of extraordinary power and eloquence in his “Reflections.” But
multitudes were not disposed to abandon the hope which they cherished.
Many were the replies to Burke, but they were all feeble compared with
that now issued, in April, 1791,—the “Vindiciae Gallicae,” by Mackin-
tosh. The work has not the magnificent glow of Burke; but it is philo-
sophical and eloquent, and had a rapid and wide circulation. At a later
date, when some Frenchmen at Paris complimented him on the “Vindiciae
Gallicae,” he replied: “Messieurs, vous m’avez si bien réfuté.”
In 1795 he was called to the bar, and gradually acquired a consider-
able practice. But his native tendency was still toward speculation, and
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Nature and Nations.” This work does not exhaust the grand topic of
which it treats; but it was a most important contribution to the science
of natural and international law, and furnished ample evidence of the
eminently philosophical mind of the author. “The foundation of moral
government and its tests he examined at great length and with much
acuteness; he entered into a question which, many years after, received
from him almost as much elucidation as can be hoped,—the relation of
conscience and utility as the guides of moral conduct; he showed the
vanity of every system that would sacrifice the particular affections to
general benevolence; the origin and use of rules and of habits to the
moral being.” Parr wrote him a characteristic letter: “You dog, nobody
can do it better; nobody I say,—not Hume, not Adam Smith, not Burke,
not Dugald Stewart; and the only exception I can think of is Lord Ba-
con. Yet, you dog, I hate you, for you want decision. O Jimmy! feel your
own powers, assert your dignity, out upon vanity and cherish pride.” In
writing to Dugald Stewart about the state of philosophical opinion at
this time (1802), he says: “One might give a just account of the state of
learning at Paris, by saying that the mathematical and physical sciences
were very actively and successfully cultivated, polite literature neglected,
erudition extinct, and that moral and political speculation were discoun-
tenanced by the government and had ceased to interest the public.” “Ger-
many is metaphysically mad. France has made some poor efforts which
have ended in little more than the substitution of the word ideology for
metaphysics.”
His next great effort was his defence of M. Peltier, an emigrant
royalist, for a libel on Napoleon Bonaparte, at that time first consul of
France. His oration is regarded by some as one of the most eminent
displays of forensic eloquence which modern times have produced. But
he has now to consider two very important points,—one is how he is to
execute what he intends to make his life-work, and the other is how is he
to get a living suited to his tastes and habits. He has all along been
cherishing ambitious literary projects, not always very clearly defined,
but pointing towards a great work on moral philosophy and a history of
England or certain eras of it. But these schemes could not very well be
carried into execution by one who had to toil at the bar. And then he was
fond of society, and had not sufficient moral restraint to curb expendi-
ture. In these circumstances he was led to accept (1804) the office of
Recorder of Bombay, which was handsomely offered by the tory gov-
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now be able to undertake and complete, as he expressed it, “my intended
work on morals and politics, which I consider as the final cause of my
existence.” But his hopes were not realized. He had not sufficient deci-
sion to contend with the relaxing influence of the climate. “Our climate
may be endured: but I feel that, by its constant though silent operation,
existence is rendered less joyous and even less comfortable. I see around
me no extraordinary prevalence of disease, but I see no vigorous cheer-
ful health.” He longed for letters from England and wrote letters to his
friends which are full of thought. Philosophy is my trade, though I have
hitherto been but a poor workman, I observe you touch me with the spur
once or twice about my book on morals; I felt it gall me, for I have not
begun; and I shall not make any promises to you till I can say that it is
well begun: but I tell you what has either really or apparently to myself
retarded me; it was the restless desire of thoroughly mastering the ac-
cursed German philosophy.” “It is vain to despise them. Their opinions
will, on account of their number and novelty, occupy more pages in the
history of philosophy than those of us humble disciples of Locke and
Hartley. Besides, their abilities are not really contemptible. It seems to
me that I am bound not only to combat these new adversaries, but to
explain the principle and ground of their hostility, which is in itself a
most curious confutation in detail.”
He discharges the duties of his office, and instituted the Literary
Society at Bombay and had a plan for forming a comparative vocabu-
lary of Indian languages, read a great number and variety of books, and
often writes critiques upon them, some of them distinguished by great
ability and worthy of being preserved in a more permanent form than in
the memoir written by his son. In philosophy, he reads Reinhold,
Tiedemann, and says: “I shall begin with Descartes” ‘Meditations’ and
‘Objections,’ Spinoza, Hobbes on ‘Human Nature,’ Berkeley’s ‘Prin-
ciples’ and ‘Dialogues,’ Hume on ‘Human Nature,’ then Kant.” “The
German philosophy, under its present leader Schelling, has reached a
degree of darkness in comparison of which Kant was noonday. Kant,
indeed, perplexed all Europe; but he is now disdainfully rejected by his
countrymen as a superficial and popular writer”! While engaged in this
reading, he says: “My nature would have been better consulted, if I had
been placed in a quieter situation, where speculation might have been
my business, and visions of the fair and good my chief recreation.” I
venture to affirm that, if be had been placed in such a position, he would
not have remained in it a month. He remembers the feelings and projects322/James McCosh
of his youth, when “my most ardent ambition was to have been a profes-
sor of moral philosophy.” He writes to Dugald Stewart: “I am now em-
ployed in attempting to throw into order some speculations, on the ori-
gin of our notions of space and time, of poor Tom Wedgwood.” “I am
very desirous of seeing what you say on the theory of ethics. I am now
employed on what the Germans have said on that subject. They agree
with you in rejecting the doctrine of personal or public interest, and in
considering the moral principle as an ultimate law. I own to you that I
am not a whit more being a Kantian than I was before; yet I think much
more highly of Kant’s philosophical genius than I did when I less com-
prehended his writings.” He reads one hundred pages of Fichte’s Lec-
tures on “The Characteristic Features of the present Age,” “a very inge-
nious book with most striking parts.” “Finished Fichte,—a book, cer-
tainly, of extraordinary merit, but so mysterious and dogmatical as to be
often unintelligible and often offensive. Read one hundred pages of
Kieswetter’s ‘Introduction to the Kantian Philosophy.’ It is the first clear
book on this subject which I have seen.” I have given so many extracts
from his journal and letters, because they exhibit so vividly the process
through which in that age many a young mind had to pass, in trying to
cross from the British to the German philosophy.
Thus did he pass eight years of his life. He returned to England in
1812; and, as his opinions had undergone considerable modification
since he wrote against Burke, he had flattering political offers from
Perceval and Canning. But he conscientiously stuck by his whig friends
and whig principles. He was soon in the whirl of London society, the
charms of which he could not resist. He and Madame de Stael became
for a season the most brilliant conversers in the literary and political
circles. “She treats me as the person whom she most delights to honor:
I am generally ordered with her to dinner, as one orders beans and ba-
con; I have in consequence dined with her at the houses of nearly all the
cabinet ministers.” Through the influence of his whig friends, he be-
came M. P. for the County of Nairn, and in the House of Commons
promoted every liberal measure, and, from time to time, made speeches
of a very high order,— in thought, expression, in tone, far above the
ordinary level of statesmen. He also wrote miscellaneous articles in the
“Edinburgh Review.” But what of his cherished work? He had not for-
mally abandoned it. But he had not the courage to resist the pleasures of
society, and the excitement of politics, and devote himself to what he
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Two opportunities presented themselves for returning to his favor-
ite philosophic pursuits. In 1818 he was appointed professor of law and
general politics in the college instituted for the education of the civil
servants of the East India Company at Haileybury. There he treated of
moral science, dividing it into ethics and jurisprudence; and of law, civil,
criminal, and constitutional. He did not commit his lectures to writing,
and nothing is preserved of them but the barest outline. Another oppor-
tunity, and the last, presented itself. On the death of Thomas Brown in
May, 1820, he was offered the chair of moral philosophy, in the univer-
sity of Edinburgh. It was the very place for him. He would have been
one of the three mighty men in the capital of Scotland, the others being
Walter Scott and Francis Jeffrey. He would have been constrained to
complete his philosophical reading, and thoroughly work out his sys-
tem, and might have left works worthy of being ranked with those of
Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton, though not equal to the first and last of
these in originality. But he is sucked back into the amenities of London
society and the agitations of politics.
He was the favorite of every society he entered, by his good-nature,
his urbanity, his extensive knowledge, his keen sense of the ludicrous,
his pleasant humor, his good-natured wit, and his profound wisdom. As
a parliamentary orator, he was thoughtful, always thoughtful; and
thoughtful bearers were pleased to notice that he was evidently thinking
as he spoke. His speeches had also the charm of elegant diction and
brilliant illustration. But for popular effect they were too candid, and
wanted coarseness, invective, satire, and passion. His whig friends never
made him a member of the cabinet, and Sir James Scarlet commented:
“There is a certain degree of merit which is more convenient for reward
than the highest.” The students of Glasgow University paid him an ap-
propriate honor when they elected him lord rector. At length be set him-
self vigorously to write a history of England. The work is calm, candid,
full of fine generalizations and analyses of character; but wants liveli-
ness of narrative, and a searching detection of motives, especially bad
motives,—he was too charitable, or, rather, too genial, to believe in
human wickedness. His greatest work might have been a “History of the
Revolution in England,” as he had such a sympathy with the wisdom
and moderation of the event, but he left the book unfinished. He was
persuaded with some difficulty to write a “Dissertation of the Progress
of Ethical Philosophy,” for a new edition of the “Encyclopedia
Britannica.” He took an active part in promoting Catholic emancipation324/James McCosh
and the Reform Bill. He was now evidently hastening to fulfil the grand
work which he had allotted to himself. But he was seized with illness ere
he completed it. He had not identified himself much with the religion of
Jesus in his life, but he turned to it at his dying hours. His son reports:
“He would speak of God with more reverence and awe than I have
almost ever met with.” “Our Lord Jesus was very frequently the subject
of his thoughts; he seemed often perplexed and unable to comprehend
much of his history. He once said to me: ‘It is a great mystery to me,—
I cannot understand it.’” “His difficulty lay in the account given of the
manner in which he became the Saviour of men.” “I said to him at one
time: ‘Jesus Christ loves you;’ he answered slowly and pausing between
each word: ‘Jesus Christ—love—the same thing.’ After a long silence,
he said: ‘I believe—‘ We said, in a voice of inquiry: ‘In God?’ He an-
swered: ‘In Jesus.’ He spoke but once more after this.”
We have very imperfect means of knowing what his philosophy would
have been had he fully formed it. We can judge of it only by the skeleton
of his lectures at Haileybury, preserved in the Memoir, and by his his-
torical and critical dissertation in the Encyclopaedia. He has a clear
idea of the end to be served by ethical science “Not what is, but what
ought to be. Here a new world opens on the mind: the word, the idea,
ought has no resemblance to any object of natural science; no more than
colors to sound, not so much. Both are phenomena. The question by
what rules the voluntary actions of men ought to be governed. This
important word ought, which represents no fact, is yet intelligible to all
mankind; a correspondent term in every language,—the terms ‘right,’
‘wrong,’ ‘moral,’ ‘immoral,’ ‘duty,’ ‘crime,’ ‘virtue,’ ‘vice,’ ‘merit,’
‘demerit,’ distinguished and contrasted.” He has evidently kept three
ends before him in his “Dissertation: “The progress of the science, espe-
cially during the two previous centuries a critical examination of the
more eminent ethical writers and an exposition of his own views. These
three ends are not kept separate, but run through the whole work. We
may first take a cursory view of the historical exposition, and then criti-
cally examine his own theory.
He has a retrospect of ancient ethics. His sketches are not equal to
those of Adam Smith in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments,” but are
worthy of being placed near them. They are not very erudite or very
profound, but they are by no means superficial. He can sketch admira-
bly the practical tendency of a philosophic system such as that of the
Stoics. He has then a retrospect of scholastic ethics. It could scarcely beThe Scottish Philosophy/325
expected of a whig that he should have much reverence for mediaeval
times; but, in his treatment of the schoolmen, he is appreciative in the
highest degree of their excellencies. It is evident that he has not that
thorough acquaintance with their discussions and individual opinions
which later research on the part of historians of philosophy and of the
church might have enabled him to attain. He enters on a more congenial
theme when he comes to modern times.
He begins with Grotius and Hobbes, of both of whom he has a high
admiration, but remarks of Hobbes’ system, that “a theory of man which
comprehends in its explanations neither the social affections nor the
moral sentiments must be owned to be sufficiently defective.” He then
enters on the controversies concerning the moral faculties and social
affections, and gives a critical exposition of Cumberland, Cudworth,
Clarke, Shaftesbury, Bossuet, Fenelon, Leibnitz, Malebranche, Edwards,
and Buffier. He has formed a higher estimate of the merits of Edwards
than most Europeans, whether British or German. He had studied the
“Treatise on the Will” when a student in Aberdeen, and he favors the
view taken by Edwards that virtue consists in love to being as being,
according as being has claims on it. But whence the claims of being? An
answer to this question must bring us, whether we wish or no, to an
ethical principle guiding the direction and flow of the affection. The
discussion by Edwards is certainly a very profound one, and he brings
out deep truths of which Mackintosh did not discover the importance.
He goes on to men who are represented as laying the foundations of
a more just theory of ethics; that is, as approaching nearer the theory of
Mackintosh. He gives just and valuable accounts of the systems of But-
ler, Hutcheson, Berkeley, Hume, Smith, Price, Hartley, Tucker, Paley,
Bentham, Stewart, and Brown. He perhaps, exaggerates the originality
of Butler, who was much indebted to Shaftesbury, but passed far be-
yond him in maintaining the supremacy of conscience. “In these ser-
mons he has taught truths more capable of being exactly distinguished
from the doctrines of his predecessors, more satisfactorily established
by him, more comprehensively applied to particulars, more rationally
connected with each other, and, therefore, more worthy of the name of
discovery, than any with which we are acquainted; if we ought not, with
some hesitation, to accept the first steps of Grecian philosophy towards
a theory of morals.” Mackintosh does not seem to be aware that, lofty
as was Berkeley’s idealism in its moral tone, his ethical system is based
on pleasure as the ultimate good. “Sensual pleasure is the summum326/James McCosh
bonum. This is the great principle of morality. This once rightly under-
stood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the gospels, may clearly be
demonstrated. Sensual pleasures, qua pleasure, is good and desirable
by a wise man. But if it be contemptible, ‘tis not qua pleasure, but qua
pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure.” (“Berkeley’s
Works, by Fraser, vol. iv. 457). He has a great admiration of Hartley,
but points out his defects. “The work of Dr. Hartley entitled ‘Observa-
tions on Man’ is distinguished by an uncommon union of originality
with modesty in unfolding a simple and fruitful principle of human na-
ture. It is disfigured by the ab surd affectation of mathematical forms
then prevalent; and it is encumbered by a mass of physiological specu-
lations, ground less, or at best uncertain.” He was particularly struck
with the shrewdness and graphic though homely illustrations of Tucker,
who was always a great favorite with him. He criticises Bentham at
considerable length. He blames him, in particular, for maintaining that,
“because the principle of utility forms a necessary part of every moral
theory, it ought therefore to be the chief motive of human conduct.” But
he has not seized on the fundamental defect in Bentham’s theory, for he
himself has so far given in to it by reckoning tendency to produce hap-
piness as the constituent of virtue. As setting so high a value on the
social affections, he was specially offended with Mr James Mill, who
“derives the whole theory of government from the single fact that every
man pursues his interest when he knows it.”
Altogether, these sketches have not the calm wisdom nor some of
the other admirable qualities of those drawn by Dugald Stewart, who
had evidently devoted his life to the study, and contemplated the subject
on all sides. But they are often searching, generally just, and always
candid, sympathetic, and comprehensive.
He criticises the ethical writers, as we might expect, by a standard
of his own, which is ever cropping out, and at the close of his disserta-
tion he expounds his own theory. He insists, very properly, on a distinc-
tion being drawn between the inquiry into right and wrong, and into the
mental power which discerns them. In answer to the first, he maintains
that virtue consists in beneficial tendency, and to the second that it con-
sists of a class of feelings gendered by association. In both these points,
he goes a step in the descending progress beyond Brown, who makes
moral good a simple unresolvable quality, and the feeling of moral ap-
probation an original one. I propose to consider both these points in the
reverse order to that which he follows.The Scottish Philosophy/327
(1) He lays down the principle that morality is not affected by the
way in which we explain the rise of the moral emotion, whether we trace
it to moral reason, to an original feeling, or to association. I am not
prepared to give in to this. If it is to be ascribed with Brown to mere
feeling, it will always be competent to argue that the distinction between
good and evil depends on human temperament, and does not imply an
original, a necessary, and eternal distinction between good and evil. If it
is regarded with Mackintosh, as a mere feeling gendered by association,
then it is simply the product of circumstances, and may shift with cir-
cumstances. It is vain on this theory to appeal, as Mackintosh would
wish to do, to conscience as having authority, and supreme authority; it
has merely the authority of association, and cannot claim the authority
of God, or even of our essential constitution. I rather think that Mackin-
tosh would have shrunk from his doctrine, had he foreseen how physi-
ologists, by means of heredity and undesigned natural selection, manu-
facture moral feeling out of animal sensations. The authority of con-
science depends on the source from which it is derived.
According to Brown, conscience is a mere class of feelings, and
Mackintosh follows him. But Mackintosh makes the feelings to be
gendered by association. In order to support this theory, he is obliged to
give to association a larger power than was given to it even by Brown.
He correct, “the erroneous but prevalent notion, that the law of associa-
tion produces only such a close union of thought as gives one the power
of reviving the other;” and insists that “it forms them into a new com-
pound, in which the properties of the component parts are no longer
discoverable, and which may itself become a substantive principle of
human nature. They supposed the condition, produced by its power, to
resemble that of material substances in a state of mechanical diffusion;
whereas, in reality, it may be better likened to a chemical combination
of the same substances from which a totally new product arises”
(Sect.VII). But what does he mean by association? I suppose merely the
succession of ideas. The laws of the association of ideas are merely the
laws of their succession. It is quite a straining of the word to give asso-
ciation the power of creating a new idea. We place oxygen and hydrogen
in a certain relation to each other, and water is the product; and the
water possesses properties not discernible in the elements separately.
But chemists do not ascribe this to the mere association of the two: they
derive it from the properties of the oxygen and the hydrogen. In like
manner when a new idea springs up, we are not to attribute it to the328/James McCosh
association of feelings, but to a property of the feelings, a property
proceeding from a power actual or potential. We have thus to go back to
a power deeper and more fundamental, and to get a source of ideas, not
in mere association, but in the intellectus ipse of Leibnitz, or in the
feelings themselves; and this is the moral power.
(2) If we thus prove that there is an original moral faculty of the
nature of moral perception, discerning between good and evil, we are in
a position to settle the further question: Whether virtue can be resolved
into benevolence? Mackintosh stands up for the existence and authority
of conscience as a class of feeling. He holds that our business is to
follow conscience, even when we do not see the consequences of the
acts we perform. But what is the common quality in the acts which
conscience approves of? He maintains that, in the last resort, it is ben-
eficial tendency which distinguishes virtuous acts, and dispositions from
those which we call vicious. He allows that the virtuous man may not
see the beneficial consequences of the acts he performs, that the man
who speaks truth may never think that to speak truth leads to happiness:
he does it simply because it is right. Still, if we inquire into it, it will be
found that beneficial tendency is the essential quality in virtuous acts. I
dispute this statement, appealing to conscience as the arbiter. For con-
science affirms that justice, that veracity, that candor, are good, quite as
much so as benevolence itself, and it is difficult, I believe impossible, to
resolve justice and the virtues embraced under it, such as veracity and
the love of truth, into benevolence.
Altogether Sir James Mackintosh never fulfilled the expectations
that were formed by Robert Hall and his other friends. He went from
medicine to law, and from law to politics; and with first-rate intellectual
powers, failed to reach the highest positions in any one of these depart-
ments. He was without firmness of purpose to resist temptation and
concentrate his energies on what he acknowledged to be his life-work,
and so was at the mercy of circumstances, and attained the highest emi-
nence only as a talker in the best social circles of London, where he had
a perpetual stimulus to excel. If he had only had the courage to devote
himself to what he knew to be his forte, but which could not bring him
immediate fame; had he read systematically, instead of discursively, and
made himself as well acquainted with the higher forms of the Greek and
German philosophy, as he did with the later forms and of British phi-
losophy,—he might have ranked with the highest thinkers of his age, As
it is he has left us little that will endure beyond these able and candidThe Scottish Philosophy/329
sketches of ethical writers.
XLVII. Henry (Lord) Brougham88
Lord Brougham was born in Scotland, was the son of a Scotch mother,
was trained in the Scotch metaphysics, and employed them with advan-
tage in his work on natural theology, and was swayed by them, often
unconsciously, in his addresses at scientific associations, in his speeches,
his sketches of statesmen and philosophers, and in his legal opinions
and decisions which, when they relate to moral themes, are evidently
founded on sound ethical principles, caught from Stewart and the Scot-
tish professors. We are therefore entitled to claim him as belonging to
the fraternity.
He was born in Edinburgh, September, 1779. His father was Henry
Brougham, of Brougham Hall, Westmoreland, who came to Edinburgh
after the death of his first wife, and there married Eleanor Lyme, a niece
of Principal Robertson, the historian. He was educated at the high school
of Edinburgh, where he early showed his great capacity and his power
of application. At the university he devoted himself closely and system-
atically to higher learning, and at times took excessive fits of study. If
tradition speaks true, he had also fits of drinking, from the visible ef-
fects of which he was kept by his strong mind and bodily constitution.
He attended Dugald Stewart’s lectures; and we see traces of a happy
influence produced on his restless temper by the calm, moral wisdom of
that true philosopher and great teacher. But he was specially addicted to
physical and mathematical studies, and profited greatly by the instruc-
tions of Play fair, Black, and Robison. “Great as was the pleasure and
solid advantage of studying under such men as Playfair and Stewart, the
gratification of attending one of Black’s last courses exceeded all I ever
enjoyed.” At a very early age, from sixteen to twenty, he had papers on
optics and porisms inserted in the “Philosophical Transactions” of
Edinburgh. He acquired at this time an immense body of information
which be turned to profitable use as a pleader and a statesman, and
which greatly increased his usefulness. No doubt his admirers ascribed
to him, and he probably ascribed to himself, a larger amount of learning
than he really possessed: still he had attained and mastered a vast amount
of real knowledge. He continued all his life an ardent and laborious
student; and he had laid, in his college days, a solid foundation on which
to build his acquirements.
He became, as we might expect, a stirring member of the Specula-330/James McCosh
tive Society, which at that time embraced, among its younger members,
Jeffrey, Horner, Murray, Moncreiff, Miller, Loch, Adam, Cockburn,
Jardine, Charles (afterwards Lord) Kinnaird, Lord Webb Seymour, and
at a some what later date the two Grants, Glenelg and his brother Sir
Robert. “After the day’s work we would adjourn to the Apollo Club,
where the orgies were more of the ‘high jinks’ than of the calm or philo-
sophical debating order, or to Johnny Dow’s, celebrated for oysters.
Sometimes, if not generally, these nocturnal meetings had endings that
in no small degree disturbed the tranquillity of the good town of
Edinburgh.” He became a member of the Society of Advocates in 1800,
and in 1808 he was called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn, London. The
profession was at first distasteful to him in the highest degree, but he
soon got reconciled to it when it brought him into scenes of excitement,
as when he became counsellor to the Princess Caroline, and earned such
fame by his defence of her.
There would be no propriety in our entering into the details of his
London life, where he espoused the liberal side in politics, became member
of parliament, and compelled all men to acknowledge at once that he
was a debater of extraordinary power. His eloquence was of a very
marked kind, full, elaborate, yet pointed and telling. His sentences were
complex, often taking in a mighty sweep of arguments and facts; and
people wondered how he was ever to get out of the labyrinth in which he
had involved himself, but in the end he always came out perspicuous.
His clear arrangement of a difficult subject, the fulness of his informa-
tion, gained the judgment, while his massive language made the whole
argument come down with the power of a sledge-hammer, His speeches
did resemble thunder quite as much as those of any modern orator; and
if Demosthenes “fulmined” over Greece, Brougham “fulmined” over
Westminster Hall and St. Stephen’s, and popular meetings all over En-
gland. His sarcasm was very biting and his invective terrific, and the
effect was increased by a nervous curl of the lip, resembling the snarl of
a dog. He had every quality of a great orator except tenderness and
pathos.
He was a powerful (the most powerful in his day) advocate of every
measure of reform, political and social. He uttered the most withering
denunciations of slavery; he advocated law reform, and parliamentary
reform, and took a deep interest in education and in all social ques-
tions,—becoming president of the Social Science Congress. But per-
haps his greatest work was the formation of the Society for the Diffu-The Scottish Philosophy/331
sion of Useful Knowledge, which did so much to extend a knowledge of
literature and science and promote reading among the people.
His vast powers, however, were greatly marred by certain weak-
nesses. He was impelled by a fiery intellect to constant labor, and was
often busy when he might have carried his point more effectively by
retiring. He was intensely fond of popular applause,—partly through
his sympathy with man kind, and often sought fame in quarters where
he got only infamy. All this wrought in him a restlessness and an in-
equality of temper; and his party, even his friends, complained that they
could not trust him. When the Whigs carried the Reform Bill he was
made Lord Chancellor,—unfortunately for himself, for be had not all
the qualities necessary to make a dignified and a wise supreme judge in
a great country with such complicated interests. His predecessor, Lord
Eldon, had hesitated and delayed in his judgments, so that there was an
immense accumulation of undecided cases; and Brougham cleared them
all off in an amazingly brief time. Many of his decisions were reckoned
rash by the wisest lawyers; but his opinions in all cases involving eq-
uity—in which he had been instructed by his ethical training in
Edinburgh—will ever be reckoned of great value. As he had excessive
self-will and little prudence, his colleagues were in a constant state of
alarm as to what he might do next. They felt that he was dragging the
Great Seal through the dirt in a tour which he took through Scotland,
receiving congratulations from quarters which did not add to his dig-
nity.89 At one of his meetings he boasted that he would write that evening
to his sovereign, King William, telling him how great was the honor
which bad been conferred on him. His colleagues took advantage of the
occasion to part with him, and henceforth he held a somewhat ambigu-
ous position in political life; cast off by the liberals and not willing to
join the tories, not withstanding his excessive admiration of the Duke of
Wellington and Lord Lyndhurst. Still he led a useful life, helping on
every educational cause, such as Mechanics’ Institutes and the London
University.
He was elected, as so many eminent men have been, lord rector of
Glasgow University, and delivered, in 1825, a very able and elaborate
defence of learning; but declared that man is no more responsible for his
belief than for the color of his skin. He may have imagined that the
supporters of Calvinism would not frown on such a doctrine; but he was
immediately met by Chalmers, Wardlaw, and a host of others, who could
not stand such a perversion of the doctrine of necessity, and who showed332/James McCosh
that the will had much to do with the formation of opinions, for which
man, therefore, was responsible, if not to his neighbors, at least to God.
Prompted by a boundless ambition and activity of mind, he threw
him self into an infinite number and variety of works, in no one of which,
except oratory, did he reach the highest eminence. He continued to cul-
tivate science, physical and mathematical, but had not leisure nor pa-
tience to widen the boundaries of any one department. He wrote innu-
merable articles and papers, especially sketches of statesmen and phi-
losophers. These are always able, candid, kindly, but are deficient in
delicate appreciation of character and motive. In his later years he em-
ployed a portion of his time in writing an autobiography.
He had been all along an able defender of the great truths of natural
religion. He had spoken with reverence of the scriptures, and delighted
to show that the theology of nature had sustained revelation. But it was
only in his later days that be seemed thoroughly to bow down before
God. it is believed that he was much affected by a change which bad
taken place in the character of Lord Lyndhurst, whose clear and sharp
intellect he so much admired. Certain it is that in old age he gave forth
utterances which show that be was thoroughly penetrated with the im-
portance of divine realities. He spent a good deal of his later life at
Cannes, and died there May 9, 1868.
I believe that there is a philosophy-underlying most of the criti-
cisms, and even the orations, of Brougham. His metaphysical principles
especially appear in his “Discourse on Natural Theology,” prefixed to
his edition of Paley a work executed when he held the Great Seal of
England. This discourse professes to be logical, but does not throw much
light on the method of inquiry, or on the nexus of the parts of the theistic
argument. He professes to proceed throughout on the method of Bacon,
of whom he entertained, as all the Scottish metaphysicians did, a high
admiration. He maintains that natural theology “is strictly a branch of
inductive theology, formed and supported by the same kind of reasoning
upon which the physical and psychological sciences are founded.” He
argues that “the two inquiries, that into the nature and constitution of
the universe and that into the evidence of design which it displays, are to
a large extent identical.” Turning to psychology, he expresses his won-
der that writers in modern times have confined themselves to the proofs
afforded by the visible and sensible works of nature, while the evidence
furnished by the mind and its operations has been neglected. “The struc-
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dence of the most skilful contrivance. All that adapts it so admirably to
the operations which it performs, all its faculties, are plainly means
working to an end.” He refers in proof to the processes involved in
reasoning, association, habit, memory, and to the feelings and affections
so adapted to their end. In speaking of habit, he gives a powerful de-
scription of what no doubt was his own experience as a speaker. “A
practised orator will declaim in measured and in various periods; will
weave his discourse into one texture; form parentheses within parenthe-
ses; excite the passions or move to laughter; take a turn in his discourse
from an accidental interruption, making it the topic of his rhetoric for
five minutes to come, and pursuing in like manner the new illustrations
to which it gives rise; mould his diction with a view to attain or to shun
an epigrammatic point, or an alliteration, or a discord; and all this with
so much assured reliance on his own powers, and with such perfect ease
to himself, that be will even plan the next sentence while he is pronounc-
ing off-hand the one be is engaged with, adapting each to the other, and
shall look forward to the topic which is to follow, and fit in the close of
the one he is handling to be its introducer; nor will any auditor be able to
discover the least difference between all this and the portion of his speech
he has got by heart or mark the transition from the one to the other.” I do
believe that there is proof of design in the structure of a mind that is
capable of bringing forth such products; but to ascribe all this to habit
while there are a great many other principles involved, argues a defec-
tive power of mental analysis on the part of our author. He thinks to the
ordinary argument an addition of great importance remains to be made.
“The whole reasoning proceeds necessarily upon the assumption that
there exists a being or thing separate from and independent of matter
and conscious of its own existence, which we call mind.” So he sets him
self against materialism.
He sets no great value on the argument a priori, and examines it,
not very powerfully, in the form in which it is put by Clarke. He admits,
how ever, that, after we have, by the argument a posteriori, “satisfied
ourselves of the existence of the intelligent cause, we naturally connect
with this cause those impressions which we have derived from the con-
templation of infinite space and endless duration, and hence we clothe
with the attributes of immensity and eternity the awful Being whose
existence has been proved by a more vigorous process of investigation.”
Brougham, it is evident, was ignorant of the terrible criticism to which
the theistic argument bad been subjected half a century before by Kant,334/James McCosh
with whose philosophy he seems to have been utterly unacquainted. He
does not see clearly what Kant bad proven, that the a priori principle of
cause and effect is involved in the argument from design. We look on
design as an effect, and infer a designer as a cause, on the principle that
every effect has a cause. At the same time he treats of cause and effect.
“Whence do we derive it? I apprehend only from our consciousness. We
feel that we have a will and a power; that we can move a limb, and
effect, by our own powers excited after our own volition, a change upon
external objects. Now from this consciousness we derive the idea of
power, and we transfer this idea and the relation on which it is founded,
between our own will and the change produced, to the relations between
events wholly external to ourselves, assuming them to be connected as
we feel our volition and our movements are mutually connected. If it be
said that this idea by no means involves that of necessary connection,
nothing can be more certain. The whole is a question of fact,—of con-
tingent truth.” This statement is exposed to criticism. Whence this trans-
ference of what we feel, or rather the legitimate application of it, to the
objective world? If there be not a necessary principle involved, how are
we entitled to argue that world-making, of which we have no experi-
ence, implies a world-maker. He argues in behalf of the immortality of
the soul, and that it is quite possible to prove a miracle. It has to be
added that be has some papers on instinct, on which he throws no great
light as he had not caught the idea that instinct is the beginning of intel-
ligence, and that it is capable, within a limited degree, of being culti-
vated and made hereditary.
XLVIII. James Mylne
It is a curious circumstance that systems of philosophy so like each
other should have been formed, simultaneously in the end of last cen-
tury, and propounded at the beginning of this, by three men so different
in temperament as James Mylne of Glasgow, Thomas Brown of
Edinburgh, and James Mill of London. But the phenomenon can be ex-
plained. They could not have borrowed from each other, but they felt a
common influence. All felt that Hume had undermined a great many
received principles, that Hartley had resolved into association many
operations of the mind before referred to independent faculties; all three,
but especially Mylne and Brown, were acquainted with the analyses of
Condillac, De Tutt Tracy, and the ideologists of France; and all lived
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by Reid and Stewart. Of the three, Brown had the greatest genius and
the keenest analytical power; Mill, of London, the greatest tenacity of
purpose, of consistency, and in the end of influence: but, Mylne, of
Glasgow, had quite as much of searching ability as either of the others.
He died without publishing any philosophic work but for upwards of
forty years he delivered to large classes in Glasgow a course of lectures
which set many minds a working There was nothing attractive, cer-
tainly nothing stimulating, in his manner, his language, or his system;
but the author of this work remembers him, as he lectured every winter
morning at half-past seven in the dingy old class-room in Glasgow Col-
lege, as the very embodiment and personification of wisdom, which had
viewed a subject on all sides and looked it through and through.
He was the son of the Rev. James Mylne, of Kinnaird, near Dundee;
was born in the same shire as James Mill of London; was licensed to
preach in 1779; was soon after ordained as deputy chaplain of 83d Foot;
and admitted minister of the Abbey Church, Paisley, in 1783. He was
appointed professor of philosophy in Glasgow College in 1797, resigned
on the 3d and died on the 21st Of September, 1839. His business was to
preach or provide preachers for the students in the college chapel. The
students felt his preaching and that of his substitutes to be cold, and
regarded him as secretly a rationalist or a Socinian. After the revival of
evangelical faith in the city of Glasgow under Chalmers, loud com-
plaints were uttered as to the doctrine taught in the college chapel.
Opposed to the national creed of Scotland, and an adherent of lib-
eral principles, he was regarded as a dangerous man by the government
of the day. On Sunday, March 26, 1815, news came of the escape of
Bonaparte from Elba, and in the chapel he happened to give out the
paraphrase used in the Scotch worship, “Behold, be comes! your leader
comes! “and it was interpreted as a welcome to the restored emperor,
and he was subjected to a prosecution by the Lord Advocate. He an-
swered with spirit in a pamphlet, “Statement of the Facts connected
with a Precognition taken in the College on March 30 and 31, 1815.”
He speaks of Bonaparte as “a man whom he had long regarded with
sentiments of the deepest abhorrence and detestation, not only as the
disturber of the peace and happiness of nations, but as the greatest en-
emy to the civil and political liberties of mankind.”
His philosophy was a sufficiently simple one: he made it very clear,
and he saw no difficulties. There are three, and only three, faculties of
the mind,—sensation, memory, and judgment. With certain explana-336/James McCosh
tions he adopts the principle “nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in
sensu.” He sees that it may be necessary to have a separation of the
senses usually represented as touch, gone sense to receive sensations
from solids, and another from such qualities as heat. He does not get rid
of memory so readily as Brown and Mill. He opposes the theory of the
French philosophers who affirm that memory is a mere modification of
former impressions, and from Hume who makes conceptions differ merely
in degrees from sensation. The eye, indeed, after long looking at a bright
object, when shut retains the brightness; but this, he argues, is a proof
that memory is not a sensation, for frequently, at the very time the spec-
trum, as it is called, remains in the eye, we can remember that it is not
the same. He is obliged to make judgment a separate faculty; but then it
consists merely in perceiving the difference of feelings. He starts the
question, whether our ideas are images of external objects, and answers
that external objects are rather pictures of our sensations. He distin-
guishes between ideas and sensations. An idea is a feeling in the mind
which it has distinguished and recognized as different from the other
feelings, and feeling becomes an idea as soon as this distinction is made.
It seems to him easy to explain all the operations of the mind by
these three faculties. He accounts for attention by showing that some of
our sensations and feelings are more strong and lively than others. He
thinks the laws of association may be reduced to two,—contiguity and
(taking the hint from Stewart) relationship. As most of our perceptions
are furnished in combinations, no wonder that they are again brought
together before the mind in combination. But the associations of rela-
tionship are much more numerous than those of contiguity. Abstraction
is nothing more than the attention directed in a particular way. He ex-
plains the peculiarity of habit by the circumstance that, by the frequent
repetition of an action, we become acquainted with all the means neces-
sary towards its accomplishment. This is surely not the whole truth, for
habit is often carried on without any exercise of will; but there may be
some truth in his idea that there may be volitions which are not remem-
bered. Feelings are nothing but modifications of sensation,—the effect
of sensations. Conscience is a decision of the judgment, accompanied in
many cases by strong and vivid emotions. Desire is the conception of an
object as good, as absent, and as attainable. He succeeds in this cool
way to account for all the deeper and higher acts and ideas of the mind;
but it is by simply overlooking their Peculiar and distinguishing proper-
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He dwells at length on principles of action. The ultimate principle is
a desire to secure pleasure and avoid pain. He traces the intellectual
operation of conception in all affections and passions, following out the
Stoic resolution of passion as developed by the representative of Sto-
icism in Cicero’s “Tusculan Disputations” (lib. iv.),90 and by which they
thought that passion might be brought thoroughly under the control of
judgment by a proper regulation of the conception. The Stoic moralists
and Mylne did service to philosophy by giving the proper place to the
idea or conception; but then he does not see that the conception must be
of something appetible or inappetible, derived from a spring of action in
the heart or will. He has a good division of the affections into: 1. Those
in which the object of them is regarded as in possession, including joy
and all its modifications; 2. Those in which the object is absent, though
attainable: this produces desire; 3. Those in which the object either al-
ready attained, or about to be attained, is produced by ourselves, which
produces self-satisfaction; 4. Those in which the agency of others is
concerned, giving rise to affection and esteem.
He held firmly by the doctrine of philosophical necessity in its sternest
and most unrelenting form. Altogether, he had much of the character of
an old Stoic philosopher, but without those lofty ideas about following
nature and the will and decree of God which elevated the systems of
Zeno, Cleanthes, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.
XLIX. John Young91
Two pupils of Professor Mylne’s created and sustained for a number of
years a strong taste for mental science in the Irish province of Ulster,
from which the founder of the Scottish philosophy bad come. These
were professors in the Belfast College, which imparted a high and use-
ful education to the young men of the north-east of Ireland for a consid-
erable number of years, and till it gave way to Queen’s College, Belfast.
One of these was John Young, professor of moral philosophy, and the
other William Cairns, professor of logic and belles-lettres.
John Young was the son of a seceder elder, and was born in
Rutherglen in the neighborhood of Glasgow in 1781. He early showed,
in the midst of business pursuits, a taste for reading of a high order, for
composition, and for spouting. He had difficulties n getting a learned
education; but he taught a school, became a clerk in a bleach-field in the
neighborhood, and then in a mercantile house in Glasgow; and struggled
on, as many a Scotch youth has done, till in 1808, at the age of twenty-338/James McCosh
seven, he became a student in the University of Glasgow, where he dis-
tinguished himself in the classes of logic and moral philosophy, taught
by Professors Jardine and Mylne, and took an active part in the college
societies, where be displayed, as was thought, extraordinary eloquence.
He next attended the divinity hall in the university, and, losing his faith
in the stern principles of the seceders, bad his thoughts directed towards
the ministry in the established church. But his destination was fixed
when, in 1815, the spirited inhabitants of Belfast set up the Belfast
Academical Institution, embracing a college. Mr Young, on the recom-
mendation of the Glasgow professors, was appointed professor of moral
philosophy.
Belfast was at that time a much smaller place than it is now, but a
place of great enterprise; and among its merchants, its flax spinners, its
linen manufacturers, and its ministers of religion, it had a body, if not of
very refined yet of very intelligent men, many of them inclined to the
Unitarian, or non-subscribing faith; and these men desired to have a
good education for their sons, and were proud of the pleasant, the ac-
complished, and public-spirited man who now came to live among them.
His manners were genial; he had acquired a very varied knowledge; he
was a ready and instructive talker and an eloquent speaker. The conse-
quence was that he became a favorite in the best society of the place,
and, it is to be added, spent too much of his time in dining out, and in
entertaining the citizens by his humor and his sparkling conversation.
But he was an able and a most successful teacher, expounding his
views with great clearness and fire, and creating a taste for the study,
even among the mercantile classes, but especially among the ministers
of religion, subscribing and non-subscribing, in Ulster. His lectures were
at first carefully written out; but, as years rolled on, he became less
dependent on his papers, and expanded like a flood on his favorite top-
ics, and had difficulty in compressing his superabundant matter in the
limited course allowed him. He collected for the college a vast number
of books published from the time of Locke down to his own day in
mental philosophy: these were subsequently bought by the Queen’s Col-
lege. He continued a popular and useful member of society and of his
college down to his death, March 9, 1829. His lectures were edited by
his colleague, Dr. Cairns, and published in 1834. These published lec-
tures scarcely do justice to him, as they are taken from his manuscripts
written in the early years of his college life, and do not contain the oral
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from day to day in his class-room.
At the basis of his whole system, we discover the threefold division
of the intellectual faculties by Mylne into sensation, memory, and judg-
ment. Yet his lectures were of a more quickening and comprehensive
character than those of his preceptor. We discover, too. that as Dr.
Brown’s views were given to the world, Professor Young grafted many
of the living buds of that ingenious analyst on the old and drier stock.
He is obliged like Stewart, and unlike Mylne,—who used to speak of
that “undescribed and undescribable faculty of the mind” denominated
common sense,—to call in fundamental laws of belief, and places among
these causation and personal identity. “Experience itself does not reveal
to reason the relation of cause and effect.” “Cause is not that only which
in a particular instance precedes a change; but that which, in similar
circumstances, we believe must always have been followed by a similar
change, and will always be so followed in future: our belief in the rela-
tion of cause and effect thus presents us with a universal truth.” “The
belief is irresistible and is derived from an instinctive principle in our
nature.” He says “another important idea connected with the fundamen-
tal laws of belief is that of personal identity.” “If we ask why each of us
believes in his own identity, or regards the feelings which he formerly
experienced as belonging to the same person which he now calls him-
self, does not the very statement of the question show its absurdity? Is it
not obvious that, even in the casual expressions which we employ, we
take the fact for granted by the use of the pronouns, I and he? It is to be
referred. therefore, to a primary law of our nature.”
He dwells fondly on the senses, in the operation of which he took a
keen interest. He holds that, in perception, there is involved sensation,
memory, and judgment. There are sensations; they are remembered; and
then a judgment pronounced that the sensations must have a cause, which
cause is body. “All our sensations are connected with the conviction of
certain external things as their cause; and things which are independent
of us, because we cannot command their existence by our volition.”
“We not only believe that, in the act of perception, we are conscious of
knowing two different things, matter and mind, which are at the moment
distinct; but we believe that they are permanently distinct and indepen-
dent.” It is not very clear to me how he reaches this result. He seems to
refer it, like Reid and Hamilton, to an original belief. “The belief is of
the same kind and rests on the same grounds with our belief in the per-
manence of the laws of nature.” (Lect. L.) I believe the principle he340/James McCosh
appeals to, is that of cause and effect. and he hold—that we are bound
by our very constitution to believe that every effect has a cause. This
might entitle him to argue, by this instinctive principle of causation, that
our sensations, having no cause within the mind, must have a cause
without the mind; if indeed we could in such circumstances rise to the
idea of a without. But he knows that what a cause is we must learn from
experience; and from a sensation, which is unextended, we could never
reach the idea of any thing extended. But our idea of body is of some-
thing extended; and we never can reach this except by some original
perception as is maintained by Reid and Hamilton. He is thus in all the
difficulties of the inferential theory, in the illogical process of arguing
from something unextended within to an extended existence without.
He argues powerfully that our knowledge of motion is prior to our
knowledge of extension, and that, in motion, there is implied time and
the observation of the succession of our thoughts.
L. William Cairns
The Belfast College was modelled on the Scotch colleges, and was meant
to give a liberal education to a large body of students. Dr. Cairns was
the professor of logic and belles-lettres. He was born in Calton, in the
suburbs of Glasgow, about 1780–85. His father was so anxious he should
be a scholar that he carried him in his arms to his first school. He re-
ceived his higher education in the grammar-school and the college of
Glasgow, took license as a preacher in connection with the secession
church about 1804, and was ordained a minister in Johnshaven in 1806.
From his known intellectual ability, he was appointed professor of Belfast
in 1815, and continued to give instruction there till his death in 1848.
His knowledge of English and classics was extensive, his taste pure and
highly refined, and his reading and elocution of a high order. He was
greatly respected by all for his talents and accomplishments; he endeared
himself to his friends, and was greatly beloved in his family circle. He
took great pains in instructing his pupils in the art of English composi-
tion, and helped to produce a fine taste among the ministers of religion
and the educated men of Ulster. His nature was too sensitive, and the
younger pupils took advantage of this infirmity to irritate him and dis-
turb the class. In his later days the institution with which he was con-
nected was greatly disquieted by disputes between the Trinitarians, who
composed the great body of the people, and the Unitarians, who had the
chief control of the school and college; and Dr. Cairns was often in greatThe Scottish Philosophy/341
perplexity, as he was a man of liberal spirit on the one hand, and a firm
supporter of evangelical religion on the other. The breach was not heated
till the institution of Queen’s College, in 1849.
He published an elaborate treatise on “Moral Freedom,” 1844. It is
not easy to give an analysis of it: in fact it is not easy to understand it.
He starts with the very defective view, for which the teaching of Mylne
of Glasgow had prepared him, that all the mental phenomena consist of
sensations and ideas, a doctrine which James Mill of London was con-
temporaneously turning to a very different purpose. He finds a diffi-
culty in rearing his loftier view of man’s spiritual nature on such a ba-
sis. He dwells fondly on a principle of particular reference and com-
parative survey as the highest intellectual exercises, carrying us upward
to volition, motive, and moral freedom. He is resolute in claiming for
man an essential freedom; and opposes Edwards and those divines who,
as Chalmers, were connecting the philosophical doctrine of necessity
with the Scripture doctrine of predestination. He regards it as a con-
tracted view to indentify moral freedom and freedom of will. He finds
moral freedom not in mere volition, but in the great influential principle
of comparative survey. He unfolds, not very clearly, a whole theory of
human nature. The truth in his system seems to be, that more is involved
in moral freedom than mere volition , that the whole soul, including the
intellect, is involved in it; and that a preferential feeling, as he calls it, is
an essential part of it,—pointing to the fact that there may be preference
or choice not amounting to full volition, but implying responsibility. He
shows that the freedom he advocates may be compatible with divine
foreknowledge.
LI. James Mill92
The author, as he writes this article, has before him a photograph of a
house which stood at Upper North Water Bridge, on the south side of
the North Esk River, which there divides Angus from Mearns, and flows
into the German Ocean a few miles below. The house consists of two
apartments “a but and a ben,” with possibly a closet, and a lower addi-
tion at one end for a workshop. Here, a hundred years ago, lived a
shoemaker, named James Mill, with several men under him; he was also
a crofter farming some acres of land. His wife was Isabel Fenton, said
to have been a woman of superior manners and intelligence, the daugh-
ter of a farmer who was out in the “forty-five” on the pretender’s side.
In this house on April 6, 1773, was born James Mill, destined to exer-342/James McCosh
cise such an influence on thought. He was one of a family of three,
having a brother William, who died young; and a sister Marjory, who
married William Greig, who succeeded to her father’s trade and left
descendants in the district. He seems to have been educated at the school
of his native parish, Logie-Pert. His abilities were discovered by his
minister, Rev. Dr. Peter, of Logie-Pert, and by Rev. James Foote,93 of
Fettercairn, some miles off, where was the family seat of Sir John Stuart,
to whose notice Dr. Foote introduced him; and he was sent to the univer-
sity of Edinburgh, his son says, “at the expense of a fund established by
Lady Jane Stuart [the wife of Sir John Stuart], and some other ladies for
educating young men for the ministry.” In the university of Edinburgh,
he pursued the usual course in arts and theology, and attended the lec-
tures of Dugald Stewart. We have no account of his student’s life or his
preacher’s life;94 for he became a licentiate of the Church of Scotland.
“For a few years he was a private tutor in various families in Scotland,
among others that of the Marquis of Tweeddale.” He expected, it is said,
to receive a presentation to the parish church of Craig, which, however,
was given to Dr. James Brewster, brother to (the afterwards) Sir David
Brewster. People may speculate as to what sort of minister in faith and
practice he would have become, had he been settled in that country
parish of farmers and fishers.
We may believe that at no time had the ministry of the gospel any
particular charm for him. In the year 1800, he went to London, where it
is said that he preached in the Presbyterian churches. But he soon de-
voted himself to literature and authorship. We do not know to which of
the two strong parties in the church of Scotland he had attached himself,
whether to the moderate or rationalistic,—which Burns and most liter-
ary men favored,—or to the evangelical, to which Dr. Peter and Mr
James Foote belonged. It is not uncommon for Scotchmen, when they
bury themselves in London, to lose their religious faith, which is so
sustained by public opinion—as Mill would have said by association of
ideas—in their native land. With his usual reticence he has not fur-
nished us with any account of the struggle which must have passed in
his mind when he abandoned his belief, not only in the Bible, but in the
very existence of God and providence. Such a record would have given
us a deeper insight into the depths of human nature than all his refined
metaphysical analyses. If he ever belonged sincerely to the evangelical
party, there must have been a tremendous revulsion of feeling in the
change. If he belonged to the moderates, he had little to abandon beyondThe Scottish Philosophy/343
the doctrines of natural religion.
He married—it is curious that the son never refers to the lady—not
long after his settlement in London, and when he had no resource but the
precarious one of writing in periodicals. He must have had a hard struggle
in these times, but he bore it resolutely. A writer in the “Edinburgh
Review” (July, 1873) describes him. “In appearance he was strikingly
like the portraits of Charles XII of Sweden, with a lofty forehead, a keen
and cutting face. His powers of conversation were extraordinary; but,
both in his family and among his disciples, he was to the last degree
tyrannical, arbitrary, and impatient of contradiction.” “He was a harsh
husband and a stern father.” The first great literary work planned by
him was the “History of British India,” which he commenced and com-
pleted in about ten years, and published in 1817–18. In 1819 the Court
of Directors of the India Company appointed him to the high post of
assistant examiner of India correspondence, and he held this office till
within four years of his death. He wrote articles in the “Encyclopaedia
Britannica,” on government, education, jurisprudence, law of nations,
liberty of the press, colonies, and prison discipline. He was also a con-
tributor to the “Westminster Review,” and the “London Review,” which
after a few months was merged in the “London and Westminster.” In
1821–22 he published his “Elements of Political Economy;” in 1829 his
“Analysis of the Human Mind;” and in 1835 the “Fragment on Mackin-
tosh,” being the last work before his death, which took place 23d June,
1836.
For the last fifteen or twenty years of his life he was an important
member of a thinking and writing circle, he himself being the centre of a
smaller circle within that circle. In morals and politics he attached him-
self to Bentham, at that time obnoxious in the extreme to many, but
adored by a select few. “Mr Bentham,” says Mrs. Grote, “being a man
of easy fortune, kept a good table, and took pleasure in receiving guests
at his board, though never more than one at a time. To this one guest he
would talk fluently, yet not caring to listen in his turn.” James Mill was
often the one guest so highly favored. “Bentham lived in Queen’s Square
Place, Westminster, close to the residence of Mill and his family, and his
house was lent to the historian of India.” Acquainted with mental sci-
ence (at that time not studied in London), through his training in Scot-
tish philosophy, and his reading of Hartley, he became the leader in
metaphysical thought in the metropolis. He had qualities which fitted
him to influence young men. He was earnest; he was clear; he was strongly344/James McCosh
impressed with the evils of the past and present; he spoke authorita-
tively and dogmatically, and with contempt of those who opposed him,
and facile minds bent before him. We have a friendly picture of him
drawn by Mrs. Grote as he began to exercise a powerful influence over
her husband. “Before many months the ascendancy of James Mill’s pow-
erful mind over his younger companion made itself apparent. George
Grote began by admiring the wisdom, the acuteness, the depths of Mill’s
intellectual character. Presently he found himself enthralled in the circle
of Mill’s speculations; and, after a year or two of intimate commerce,
there existed but little difference, in point of opinion, between master
and pupil. Mr Mill had the strongest convictions as to the superior ad-
vantages of democratic government over the monarchical or the aristo-
cratic; and with these he mingled a scorn and hatred of the ruling classes
which amounted to positive fanaticism. Coupled with this aversion to
aristocratic influence (to which influence he invariably ascribed most of
the defects and abuses prevalent in the administration of public affairs),
Mr Mill entertained a profound prejudice against the Established Church,
and, of course, a corresponding dislike to its ministers. These two vehe-
ment currents of antipathy came to be gradually shared by George Grote,
in proportion as his veneration of Mr Mill took deeper and deeper root.
Although his own nature was of a gentle, charitable, humane quality,
his fine intellect was worked upon by the inexorable teacher with so
much persuasive power that George Grote found himself inoculated, as
it were, with the conclusions of the former almost without a choice,
since the subtle reasonings of Mr Mill appeared to his logical mind to
admit of no refutation. And thus it came to pass that, starting from
acquired convictions, George Grote adopted the next phase; viz., the
antipathies of his teacher,—antipathies which colored his mind through
the whole period of his ripe meridian age, and may be said to have
inspired and directed many of the important actions of life. Originating
in an earnest feeling for the public good, these currents gradually as-
sumed the force and sanction of duties, prompting George Grote to a
systematic course both of study, opinion, action, and self-denial, in which
be was urgently encouraged by the master-spirit of James Mill, to that
gentleman’s latest breath in 1836. This able dogmatist exercised con-
siderable influence over other young men of that day as well as over
Grote. He was indeed a propagandist of a high order, equally master of
the pen and of speech. Moreover, he possessed the faculty of kindling in
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politics and social theories; leading them at the same time to regard the
cultivation of individual affections and sympathies as destructive of lofty
aims and indubitably hurtful to the mental character.” Mr Grote says in
1819: “I have met Mill often at his (Ricord’s) house, and hope to derive
great pleasure and instruction from his acquaintance, as he is a very
profound-thinking man and seems well disposed to communicate, as
well as clear and intelligible in his manner. His mind has indeed all that
cynicism and asperity which belong to the Benthamian school; and what
I chiefly dislike in him is the readiness and seeming preference with
which he dwells on the faults and defects of others, even of the greatest
of men. But it is so very rarely that a man of any depth comes across my
path, that I shall almost assuredly cultivate his acquaintance a good
deal farther.” We have a less favorable picture in an article in the
“Edinburgh Review” (July, 1873), which says of the son: “His fine and
loving temper was constantly struggling against the imperious dictates
of his master, who had taught him to regard, as Mr Grote tells us, the
cultivation of individual affections and sympathies as destructive of lofty
aims, and hurtful to the mental character. In the course of years several
young men devoted to the study of metaphysics and mental philosophy
were accustomed to meet twice a week at Mr Grote’s in the city, at half-
past eight in the morning, for an hour or two. Jeremy Bentham was
regarded by them as a kind of deity, whose utterances were closely
watched and reverently received. James Mill was their prophet, who
exercised uncontrolled sway over their minds.” Mrs. Grote gives an
account of the men and their studies. “They read Mr Mill’s last work,
“The Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind,” Hartley “On
Man,” Dutrieux’s “Logic,” Whately’s works, etc., discussing as they
proceeded. Mr John Stuart Mill, Mr Charles Buller, Mr Eyton Tooke,
(son of Mr Thomas Tooke), Mr John Arthur Roebuck, Mr G. H. Gra-
ham, Mr Grant, and Mr W. G. Prescott formed part of their class.”
He now became a leader of opinion, and imparted his own character
to a whole school. His intellect was clear, but not comprehensive; was
strong, but one-sided. He saw what he wished to see, and did not go
round the object to view the other side. Hence be was not troubled with
uncertainties or doubts, and he laid down his opinions coolly and dog-
matically, wondering how every man did not see as he did, and bearing
no contradiction. The school of which he was a leader—or, rather, I
believe, the leader—came to be called “Philosophical Radicalism,” or
sometimes the “Westminster Review” school, from that review being its346/James McCosh
organ. It was founded on Utilitarianism in morals and on sensational
empiricism in philosophy; and Mill gave it its earnestness, its narrow-
ness, its exclusiveness, and its fanaticism. The school had at first the
general sentiment against them; but they persevered, and came in a few
years to exercise a potent influence, which is felt at this day, in conse-
quence mainly of the able men, then young, but now old or deceased,
who became attached to it.
He has left us no account of the religious crisis through which he
passed, but his son has told us the results which he reached: “The turn-
ing point of his mind on the subject—as reading Butler’s ‘Analogy.’
That work, of which he always continued to speak with respect, kept
him, as he said, for some considerable time a believer in the divine au-
thority of Christianity, by proving to him that, whatever are the difficul-
ties in believing that the Old and New Testaments proceed from, or
record the acts of, a perfectly wise and good Being, the same and still
greater difficulties stand in the way of the belief that a Being of such a
character can have been the Maker of the universe. He considered Butler’s
argument as conclusive against the only opponents for whom it was
intended. Those who admit an omnipotent as well as perfectly just and
benevolent Maker and Ruler of such a world as this can say little against
Christianity but what can, with at least equal force, be retorted against
themselves. Finding, therefore, no halting place in deism, he remained
in a state of perplexity, until, doubtless after many struggles, he yielded
to the conviction that, concerning the origin of things, nothing whatever
can be known. This is the only correct statement of his opinion; for
dogmatic atheism he looked upon as absurd, as most of those whom the
world has considered atheists have always done.” “He found it impos-
sible to believe that a world so full of evil was the work of an Author
combining infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness.” He
saw, what natural religion shuts its eyes to, that there were manifold
evils in the world; so say the Scriptures, and tell us how they sprang up,
and point to the remedy,-a remedy which Mr Mill was not pre pared to
adopt, and so was left without any relief from the dark prospect. We do
not wonder in these circumstances that “he thought human life a poor
thing at best, after the freshness of youth and of unsatisfied curiosity
had gone by.”
He was thoroughly discontented with the education commonly given
to the young. “In psychology his fundamental doctrine was the forma-
tion of all human character by circumstances, through the universalThe Scottish Philosophy/347
principle of association, and the consequent unlimited possibility of
improving the moral and intellectual condition of mankind by educa-
tion.” So he took the education of his oldest son into his own hand. At
three he taught him Greek; and by the age of eight the boy had read “the
whole of Herodotus, of Xenophon’s ‘Cyropaedia’ and ‘Memorials of
Socrates,’ some of the ‘Lives of the Philosophers’ by Diogenes Laertius,
part of ‘Isocrates ad Demonicum’ and ‘Ad Nicoclem.’” At the age of
nine he had read the first six Dialogues of Plato, from the “Euthyphron”
to the “Theaetetus” inclusive. He was made to begin Latin in his eighth
year; and from his eighth to his twelfth year he read the “Bucolics” of
Virgil and the first six books of the “Aeneid,” all Horace except the
“Epodes,” the “Fables” of Phaedrus, the first five books of Livy, with
the remainder of the first decade, all Sallust, a considerable part of Ovid’s
“Metamorphoses,” some plays of Terence, two or three books of
Lucretius, several of the orations of Cicero and of his writings on ora-
tory and his “Letters to Atticus;” and this while he was adding largely to
his Greek and devouring elaborate volumes of history. At the age of
twelve he entered on the study of logic, beginning with the “Analytics”
of Aristotle. Everybody feels that it was a dangerous thing to lay such a
load on the mind of one so young; and that there was an imminent risk
either of his brain being overworked or of his being turned into a pedant.
The success of the trial proves that a boy of good ability may learn
much more by systematic teaching than most people imagine. In the
morning walks with the father the boy was induced to give an account of
what he had read the day before.
There were surely great oversights in this training, as, for instance,
in not allowing him to mingle with other boys, and in restraining natural
emotions. “For passionate emotions of all sorts, and for every thing that
has been said or written in exaltation of them, he expressed the greatest
contempt. He regarded them as a form of madness. The intense was
with him a byword of scornful disapprobation.” In respect of religion
the son says: “I am thus one of the very few examples of one who has
not thrown off religious belief, but never had it: I grew up in a negative
state with regard to it.” The father “looked forward to a considerable
increase of freedom in the relations between the sexes, though without
pretending to define exactly what would be or ought to be the precise
conditions of that freedom.” A writer in the “Quarterly” (July, 1873)
says: “He was full of what we should call the fanaticism of Malthusian-
ism; to such a degree that he risked his own fairly earned reputation348/James McCosh
with decent people, and involved in the like discreditable danger the
youth of his son, by running a Malay muck against what he called the
superstitions of the nursery with regard to sexual relations, and giving
the impulse to a sort of shameless propaganda of prescriptions for arti-
ficially checking population. We should not even have alluded to this
grave offence against decency, on the part of the elder and younger Mill,
had it not been forced on our notice by recent events.” The result was
what might have been expected. We can understand how the son’s natu-
ral feelings, so repressed, should have been ready to flow forth towards
a lady who entered thoroughly into his peculiar views on all subjects,
and that he did not seek to restrain these feelings, and had no compunc-
tions of conscience, though that lady was married to another man. I
believe we can see the result of the training in a younger son, repre-
sented as an engaging youth, who went to a warm climate for his health,
and when there insisted on the physician telling him whether there was
any hope of his recovery, and, on receiving an unfavorable reply, went
and shot himself to avoid a lingering death.95
The work with which we have to do, is his “Analysis of the Human
Mind.” The title indicates the aim of the treatise. It is not an inductive
observation of facts; it is not a classification of facts in a cautious and
careful manner: it is a determined attempt to resolve the complex phe-
nomena of the mind into as few elements as possible. Mental analysis,
called by Whewell the decomposition of facts, is undoubtedly a neces-
sary agent in all investigation: but it should be kept as a subordinate
instrument; and it requires to be preceded, accompanied, and verified
throughout, by a microscopic and conscientious inspection of facts, with
particular attention to residuary phenomena and apparent exceptions; if
this is neglected the whole process may lead to most fallacious results.
Thomas Brown had proceeded very much in the method of analysis, and
accomplished a great many feats in the way of decompounding the fac-
ulties enumerated by Reid and Stewart; and, encouraged by his success,
Mill advances a great way further on the same route. Brown had stood
up resolutely for the existence and validity of intuition, maintaining in
particular that we have an intuitive belief in cause and effect; had allot-
ted a place, though an inadequate one, to judgment, under the name of
“relative suggestion;” had poured forth a most eloquent exposition of
the emotions, and defended the great truths of natural religion, includ-
ing the existence of the deity and the immortality of the soul. Mill re-
solves all mental exercises into sensations and ideas, with laws of asso-The Scottish Philosophy/349
ciation connecting and combining them , and has left himself avowedly
no religious belief whatever.
Dugald Stewart’s teaching seems to have exercised little influence
on his mind except to suggest the order in which he takes up his topics.
I suspect he derived more from Hume than from Stewart. With Hume
there is nothing in the mind but impressions and ideas; with Mill, only
sensations and ideas; and both undermine our belief in the reality either
of mind or body. He took advantage of all that has been done, in illus-
trating the influence Of association, by Hutcheson, Smith, Hume, Beattie,
Alison, and Brown, and accounted by it for principles which these men
reckoned original. He had also profoundly studied Hartley (“Observa-
tions on Man”), who had accounted for our complex mental feelings by
sensations, ideas of sensations and association, connecting the whole
with a theory of nerve vibrations, which Mill, following the Scottish
school, abandoned.
Following the sensational school of France and Brown, he calls all
the exercises of the mind “feelings.” He begins with sensations, and
goes over (Chap. I) smell, hearing, sight, taste, touch, carefully separat-
ing from touch as Brown had done, and as Mr Bain has since done, the
feeling of resistance, extension, and figure, which he refers to muscular
sensation; he also dwells fondly, as Mr Bain has done, on the sensations
of disorganization in the alimentary canal. He then treats of idea (Chap.
II); and now “we have two classes of feelings, one which exists when
the object of sense is present, another that exists after the object of sense
has ceased to be present. The one class of feelings I call sensations; the
other class of feelings I call ideas.” At this stage we wonder where or
how he has got objects of sense with nothing but sensations and ideas.
“As we say sensation, we might also say ideation:” “sensation would in
that case be a general name for one part of our constitution, ideation for
another.” It is clear that Mill’s analysis has been the main book, or the
only book on mental science, care fully studied by a certain class of
London physiologists,—such as Carpenter, Huxley, and Maudesley,—
who seldom rise above the contemplation of sensations and sensations
reproduced. Verily it is an easy way of enunciating and unfolding all the
varied processes of the mind to represent them as feelings, and put them
under two heads, sensations and ideas; the ideas being copies of sensa-
tions, so that he is able to say: “There is nothing in the mind but sensa-
tions and copies of sensations.” There is no room left for knowledge of
objects or belief in objects, internal and external, no judgment or rea-350/James McCosh
soning, no perception of moral good and evil. It is a more inadequate
resolution than that of Condillac, who called in a sort of alchemical
power, and spoke of “transformed sensations.” Mr Grote writes to the
younger Mill: “It has always rankled in my thoughts that so grand and
powerful a mind as he should have left behind it such insufficient traces
in the estimation of successors.” I do not wonder that such a meagre
exposition should not have carried with it the highest minds of the age,
which turned more eagerly towards the German speculators, and to-
wards Cole ridge, Cousin, and Hamilton. But his book has had its influ-
ence over the school to which he belonged, including Mr Grote, and
over certain physiologists, who, if they have only sensations and copies
of sensations to account for, are tempted to imagine that they can ex-
plain them all by organic processes. His son, John Stuart, and Mr Bain,
have been greatly swayed by the elder Mill, but have clearly perceived
the enormous defects of the analysis, which they have sought to rectify
in the valuable edition of the work published in it; the fundamental de-
fects however remain, and the corrections admit principles which these
authors have not dared to avow or to carry out, as they involve so many
other mental operations beyond sensations and ideas.
In Chap. III he goes on to his favorite subject, association of ideas.
“Ideas have a synchronous and a successive order. When sensations
have occurred synchronically, the ideas also spring up synchronically,”
and thus he fashions many of our complex ideas, as of a violin with a
certain figure and tone. He resolves the ideas of successive associations
into the one law of contiguity. This resolution has been criticised by
Hamilton (“ Reid’s Collected Works “Note D. ... §2), and also by his
son (Note to Chap. III), who endeavor to show that the suggestion of
similars cannot be thus accounted for, which they certainly cannot be
unless we call in some intermediate processes. He shows how, by these
associations, we get certain complex ideas, as the ideas of metals from
the separate ideas of several sensations,—color, hardness, extension,
weight. In illustrating this point, he says, that “philosophy has ascer-
tained that we draw nothing from the eye whatever but sensations of
color.” In opposition to this, Hamilton has demonstrated that, if we per-
ceive color, we must also perceive the line that separates one color from
another (Met. Lect. 27). The result he has reached is summed up: “We
have seen first that we have sensations secondly, that we have ideas, the
copies of these sensations thirdly, that those ideas are sometimes simple,
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sensations so combined as to appear not several ideas but one idea and,
fourthly, that we have trains of these ideas, or one succeeding another
without end.”
He turns to naming (Chap. IV), and treats of the various parts of
speech, but throws little light on them. He goes on to explain the various
processes of the mind, beginning with consciousness (Chap. V). “To
say I feel a sensation, is merely to say I feel a feeling, which is an
impropriety of speech; and to say I am conscious of a feeling is merely
to say that I feel it. To have a feeling is to be conscious, and to be
conscious is to have a feeling.” “In the very word ‘feeling’ all that is
implied in the word ‘consciousness’ is involved.” There is a palpable
oversight here. When I feel a sensation it is of a sensitive organ as af-
fected, and knowledge is involved in this. To be conscious is to know
self as feeling or in some other state. “When I smell a rose, I am con-
scious.” True, but I am conscious not of the rose, but of self as having
the sensation. In explaining consciousness, he overlooks the very pecu-
liarity of the thing to be explained.
He then (Chap. V, VI, VII, VIII, IX) treats of conception, imagina-
tion, classification, abstraction. “Conception applies only to ideas and
to ideas only in a state of combination. It is a general name, including
the several classes of complex ideas.” But the question arises, What
intellectual bond combines things generally? and we have no satisfac-
tory answer. He thus misses one of the most important capacities of our
mental nature. “An imagination is the name of a train but what com-
bines so many scattered things into one image, often so grand? He has a
long disquisition on classification. The word ‘man,’ we shall say, is first
applied to an individual it is first associated with the idea of that indi-
vidual, and acquires the power of calling up the idea of him; it is next
applied to another individual, and acquires the power of calling tip the
idea of him, so of another and another, till it has become associated with
an infinite number, and has acquired the power of calling up an indefi-
nite number of these ideas indifferently.” “It is association that forms
the ideas of an indefinite number of individuals into one complex idea.”
Here again he has explained every thing by overlooking the differentia
of the process,—the resemblance between the individuals; the percep-
tion of the resemblances; the placing the resembling objects into a class
of which so many predications may be made; and, as might be expected,
he has no idea that there is such a thing as classes in nature. By taking a
superficial view, he is able to throw ridicule on the theory of ideas by352/James McCosh
Plato, by Philo, by Cudworth, and Harris, in which there is no doubt
much mysticism, but also much truth, which it should be the business of
a correct analysis to bring out to view. The father thus set his son to
what he is so fond of in his “Logic” and other works,—the exposure of
the error of looking on concepts as if they were individual existences.
True, universals are not the same as singulars, yet they may have a
reality which we should try to seize: some of them ante rem, in the
Divine mind arranging classes in nature; in re, in the common attributes
which join the objects in the class; and post rem, in the concepts formed
by the mind, and performing most important functions in thought. Both
Mr Grote and Mr John Stuart Mill in their notes have tried to improve
Mill’s doctrine of generification, but have left it, and their own doctrine
as well, in a most unsatisfactory state. Abstract terms “are simply the
concrete terms with the connotation dropped,” whereon his son anno-
tates. “This seems a very indirect and circuitous mode of making us
understand what an abstract name signifies. Instead of aiming directly
at the mark, it goes round it. It tells us that one name signifies a part of
what another name signifies, leaving us to infer that part.” Neither fa-
ther nor son has seen that abstraction in all cases implies a high exercise
of judgment or comparison, in which we perceive the relation of a part
to a whole, a process which is the basis of so many other intellectual
exercises.
He turns (Chap. X) to memory, which has so puzzled the son, who
says: “Our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate: no
reason can be given for it which does not presuppose the belief and
assume it to be well grounded.” The subject presents no difficulties to
the father. He acknowledges that in memory there is not only the idea of
the thing remembered; there is also the idea of my having seen it: and he
shows that this implies “the idea of my present self, the remembering
self; and the idea of my past self, the remembered or witnessing self?
“But where has he got self? Where a past self? He brings in, without
attempting to explain them, self, and time present, and past, which are
not sensations nor copies of sensations. All that is done is “to run over a
number of states of consciousness called up by the association.” There
is here, as in so many other cases, simply the shutting of the eye to the
main element in memory, the recognition of an object as having been
before the mind in time past: in which there is involved, first, belief,
and, secondly, time in the concrete, from which the mind forms the idea
of time in the abstract.The Scottish Philosophy/353
There follows (Chap. XI) an elaborate discussion of belief, which
both his son and Mr Bain have been seeking to amend without success;
because their own views, starting from those of the older Mill, are radi-
cally defective. In all belief, as it appears to me, there is a conviction of
the reality of the object believed in. When the object is present, I would
be disposed to call this knowledge; but, if any one calls it belief, the
question between him and me would be simply a verbal one, provided he
acknowledges the existence of a conviction. In other cases the convic-
tion or belief is the result of judgment or reasoning. Let us now look at
the account given by Mill. “A sensation is a feeling, but a sensation and
a belief of it is the same thing. The observation applies equally to ideas.
When I say I have the idea of the sun, I express the same thing exactly
as when I say that I believe I have it. The feeling is one: the names only
are different.” Here again the resolution is accomplished so dexterously,
because the main elements of the thing resolved are not noticed. In a
sensation I have not only a feeling, but a belief in the existence of a
sentient organ. To have a belief in the existence of the sun is something
more than merely to have an idea of the sun. The belief, be it intuitive,
or be it derivative, is a different thing from the sensation and the idea,
and should have a separate place in every system of psychology.
It is at this place that he develops most fully the principle for which
he has received such praise from his son,—the principle of inseparable
association. “In every instance of belief, there is indissoluble associa-
tion of the ideas,” and he defies any one to show that there is any other
ingredient. But, surely, there is often belief without any inseparable as-
sociation: thus I may believe that a friend is dead, though in time past all
my associations have been of him as alive. But, even in cases of indis-
soluble association, the belief is different from the association. One of
the grand defects of the whole theory consists in accounting by associa-
tion of ideas for what is assuredly a different process, for judgment, for
judgment proceeding on a knowledge of things. At no other point do we
see so clearly the tendency of the whole school to degrade the dignity
and undermine the trustworthiness of the human intellect.
By this indissoluble association he can account easily for our belief
in causation. “I hear words in the street—event; some one of course is
making them,—antecedent. My house is broken and my goods are
gone,—event; a thief has taken them,—antecedent. This is that remark-
able case of association in which the association is inseparable.” “We
cannot think [in the sense of having an idea] of the one without thinking354/James McCosh
of the other.” Once more the essential element is left out; we not only
have an idea, we judge, decide, and believe; and when we judge, decide,
and believe, that everywhere, at all times, and for ever, an event has and
must have a cause, the process seems to me to be justifiable, but to
involve an intuitive principle. Mr John Stuart Mill is only following out
the principles advocated by his father, when he holds that there may be
worlds in which two and two make five, and in which there may be an
effect without a cause. In another subject James Mill has led his son to
a point where the father has stopped, while the son has gone on. “In my
belief, then, of the existence of an object, there is included the belief
that, in such and such circumstances, I should have such and such sen-
sations. Is there any thing more?” “I not only believe that I shall see St.
Paul’s church-yard, but I believe that I should see it if I were in St.
Paul’s church-yard this instant.” This is on the very verge of the son’s
definition of body and of mind. We see how needful it is to examine the
fundamental assumptions of a philosophy which has culminated in such
results, and is undermining our belief in the reality of things.
In Chap. XII we have a short and feeble account of ratiocination, in
which he proceeds on the syllogistic analysis without comprehending
the principles involved in it. He takes as his example, “All men are
animals. Kings are men. Therefore kings are animals; “and he shows
that in all this there is only association, and the belief which is part of it.
In the proposition “kings are men,” the belief is merely the recognition
that the individuals named kings are part of the many of whom men is
the common name. “Kings” is associated with “all men,” “all men” with
“animals;” “kings,” therefore, with animals. The account of evidence,
in the short chapter which succeeds, is merely a summation of what had
gone before, and is exceedingly meagre.
He now turns (Chap. XIV) to “names requiring particular explana-
tions,” and explains, according to his theory of sensations and ideas,
such profound subjects as relations, numbers, time, motion, identity.
Mr Bain represents him as here “endeavoring to express the most fun-
damental fact of consciousness, the necessity of change or transition
from one state to another, in order to our being conscious. He approaches
very near to, without exactly touching, the inference, that all conscious-
ness, all sensation, all knowledge, must be of doubles,” as if we could
not have a sensation of pain till there is a change into pleasure, or of
pleasure till we have also pain. This is to reverse the natural process in
which we have first the individuals, and thus and then discover relationsThe Scottish Philosophy/355
between them,—it may be, many and varied, according to the knowl-
edge we previously have of the individuals. According to Mill, that a
feeling of red and a feeling of blue is “different and known to be so, are
not two things but one and the same thing;” thus doing away with all
relation, in fact with all comparison and judgment, and reasoning as
founded on comparison. “Space is a mere abstract term formed by drop-
ping the connotation. Linear extension is the idea of a line, the connota-
tion dropped; that is, the idea of resisting dropped.” We ask what is the
line? Infinite is the concrete term, here denoting line: drop the connota-
tion, and you have infinity, the abstract.” It is a convenient but certainly
a most fallacious way of reducing realities to nonentities. Time is
“pastness, presentness, and futureness” joined by association; but he
can render no account of pastness, presentness, and futureness. The
idea of motion and the idea of extension are the same. Identity is merely
the name of a certain case of belief. “Reflection (Chap. XV) is nothing;
but consciousness is the having the sensations and ideas:” most people
would say it is a knowledge of self, as having an idea, a sensation, or
some other mental exercise.
He treats from Chap. XVI–XXII of the active powers of the mind,
or the powers which excite to action. All throughout, he gains a delusive
simplicity, simply by overlooking an element, commonly the main ele-
ment, in the phenomenon. Desire is the same thing as the idea of a plea-
sure, “and the number of our desires is the same with that of our plea-
surable sensations; the number of our aversions, the same with that of
our painful sensations.”I hold that desire is something superadded to
mere sensation, and indicating a higher capacity, and that we may and
ought to desire many things beside mere sensations of pleasure. He then
proceeds to show us in the way the Scottish metaphysicians had done,
from Hutcheson and Turnbull downwards; how the desire of pleasure
gives rise to other impulses, which may by association become ends,
and not mere means; such as, wealth, power, dignity, friendship, kind-
ness, family, country, party, mankind. A man looks upon his child as a
cause to him of future pains and pleasures, much more certain than any
other person; “and thus gathers round it a whole host of associations
that constitute parental love. All this I admit will mingle with and
strengthen family affection; but in the heart of the affection there is a
natural love on the part of parents for their children. In accounting for
the love of beauty, he takes advantage of Alison’s theory, a theory not
favored by those who have discovered mathematical relations in beauti-356/James McCosh
ful forms. The following quotation will enable us to understand what he
means by motives: “As every pleasure is worth having,—for otherwise
it would not be a pleasure,—the idea of every pleasure associated with
that of an action of ours as the cause is a motive; that is, leads to the
action. But every motive does not produce the action. The reason is, the
existence of other motives which prevent it. A man is tempted to commit
adultery with the wife of his friend: the composition of the motive is
obvious. He does not obey the motive. Why? He obeys other motives
which are stronger. Though pleasures are associated with the immoral
act, pains are associated with it also; the pains of the injured husband,
the pains of the injured wife, the moral indignation of man kind, the
future reproaches of his own mind. Some men obey the first rather than
the second motive. The reason is obvious. In them the association of the
act with the pleasure is, from habit, unduly strong: the association of the
act with the pains is, from want of habit, unduly weak. This is a case of
education.” I believe that if men were trained to think that chastity has
no other foundation than Mr Mill has given it, the husband would be
little attended to when he claimed to be injured, and the wife would
cease to believe that she had injured any one, and the moral indignation
of mankind would disappear; thus perilous would it be to remove mo-
rality from its foundation in moral principle, and place it on the shifting
sand of association.
We are prepared for his analysis of the moral sense. “It is interest-
ing here to observe by what a potent call we are summoned to virtue. Of
all that we enjoy more is derived from those acts of other men on which
we bestow the name ‘virtue,’ than from any other cause. Our own virtue
is the principal cause why other men reciprocate the acts of virtue to-
wards us: with the idea of our own acts of virtue there are naturally
associated the ideas of all the immense advantages we derive from the
virtuous acts of our fellow-creatures. When this association is formed
in due strength, which it is the main business of a good education to
effect, the motive of virtue becomes paramount in the human breast.”
By all means let us try to collect good associations round virtuous acts;
but, as the centre and bond of the whole, let us have the principle that
virtuous acts should be done because they are right. Discard this re-
straint, and attractive associations will be sure to gather round vice. He
tells us (“Fragment on Mackintosh”), that his analysis of virtue into the
love of pleasure and association does not lessen the influence of the
motive. “Gratitude remains gratitude, resentment remains resentment,The Scottish Philosophy/357
generosity, generosity in the mind of him who feels them, after analysis,
the same as before.” Yes in the mind of him “who feels them;” but the
feeling may be undermined, and remorse for sin be quieted.
He closes the work with a discussion as to will and intention. Will is
the peculiar state of mind or consciousness by which action is preceded.
He treats of its influence over the actions of the body, and over the
actions of the mind. He shows that sensations and ideas are the true
antecedents of the bodily actions, and so he does not need to call in a
separate capacity called the will. He then turns to the power which the
mind seems to possess over its associations. He proves, as Brown and
others had done, that we cannot will an absent idea before us,—for to
will it is already to have it; and the recalling is always a process of
association. He does not see that, by a stern act of will, we can detain a
present thought, and thus gather around it a whole host of associations.
He speaks of ends, but has no idea of the way in which ends spring up
and influence the mind. He takes no notice of the essential freedom be-
longing to the will, and thus leaves no ground on which to rear the
doctrine of human responsibility.
LII. John Ballantyne96
He was born at Piteddie, parish of Kinghorn, Fifeshire, May 8, 1778,
and received his early education in the village school of Lochgelly. He
matriculated in the university of Edinburgh in 1795, and seems there to
have enjoyed the privilege of sitting under the instructions of Dugald
Stewart. His parents belonged to the church of Scotland, but from con-
scientious motives, and from perceiving the want of religion in the stu-
dents intending for the ministry in that body, he joined the burgher branch
of the seceders, and attended their theological hall, where his metaphysical
abilities were noticed by his professor Dr. Lawson. After being licensed
to preach the gospel, he taught schools at Lochgelly, and at Colinsburgh.
In 1805, he was settled as minister in the shire of Kincardine, at
Stonehaven, a some what exposed place on the German ocean, but made
interesting by bold rocks in the neighborhood, and a grand old ruined
castle where the covenanters had been imprisoned. There he ministered
to a small congregation of fifty members, and specially exerted himself
in establishing sabbath schools, at that time very much unknown in the
district. He lived a sly and retired life, cheerful in his own home, but not
much known beyond, except by a few who noticed him taking his soli-
tary walk daily along the links of Cowie, with tall and well-propor-358/James McCosh
tioned frame, and high capacious forehead, pondering, they supposed,
some deep ecclesiastical or philosophic subject. In 1824, he published
anonymously, “A Comparison of Established and Dissenting Churches
by a Dissenter,” and, in 1830, an enlarged edition of the same with his
name prefixed. This work may be regarded as starting the voluntary
controversy, which was carried on vigorously by the religious body to
which he belonged, for years agitated Scotland from one end of it to the
other, in the course of time spread into England, and, directly or indi-
rectly, has been followed by far-reaching results, that have not yet ex-
hausted themselves. There is reason to believe that he foresaw the con-
sequences; he told his friend, Mr Longmuir, that he expected to see him
out of the established church and a dissenting minister like himself.
But he was also speculating on other topics. In 1828, he published
“An Examination of the Human Mind.” It should be interesting to any
one who has had to contend with adverse circumstances to contemplate
this man in his quiet seceder manse on that bare coast, and among a
people who appreciated his piety and devotedness, but had no compre-
hension of his philosophy, devoting himself so earnestly to the original
study of the human mind. He could have been swayed by no inferior
hope in the shape of an expected chair in one of the Scottish colleges;
for these, while open to persons adhering really or nominally to estab-
lished-church Presbyterianism and Episcopacy were practically closed
to a dissenting minister. This was doubtless one of the rankling causes
that prompted the seceders to espouse the voluntary side so eagerly.
They felt, in an age which was moving on towards the reform bill, that
they had a title to complain of being consigned to an inferior position: it
should be added that they felt that they had to abandon their strict
covenanting principles, which were seen to be exclusive. Nor was this
man or his book likely to get a favorable. hearing from the literary or
metaphysical readers in Scotland, where the influential thinkers were
James Mylne and Thomas Brown, to whose philosophy he was entirely
opposed; and, as to England, it felt little interest in such inquiries. The
work, though clearly written, has no such literary beauties as drew many
towards the writings of Stewart and Brown, and it had some difficulty
in getting into notice. There is no evidence that any of the professors in
the chairs of mental science took any interest in it, or were disposed to
lift the author out of his obscurity. Nevertheless there were some in his
own religious communion, and beyond it, who perceived the merit of the
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the philosophy of his time. “A gentleman,” says Mr Longmuir, “emi-
nent both for his wealth and literary distinction, (the late Mr Douglas of
Cavers?) having seen the manuscript, and been informed of the limited
means of the author, kindly offered to run the risk of its publication; but
Mr Ballantyne, having found that he had accumulated sufficient means
to publish it himself, gratefully declined the generous offer. Some time
after, a considerable sum of money was sent by the same gentleman,
and placed entirely at Mr Ballantyne’s disposal. Instead of applying it,
however, to the publication of his book, he paid it over for the benefit of
the missionary operations that his presbytery was then promoting.” A
disparaging notice of his work appeared in “The Edinburgh Literary
Journal,” a periodical long since consigned to oblivion, but he was not
moved by it: he had done his work, and left it to speak for itself. Thus
lived, and thus died, Nov. 5, 1830, one who was, above all things, reso-
lute in maintaining his independence, both of action and thinking,—
independence not of God, but of man.
He finds it necessary to criticise Dr. Brown, and has anticipated
some of the objections, afterwards propounded more formally by
Hamilton. “The system of Dr. Brown certainly discovers great ingenu-
ity, and is expounded with great eloquence; but it appears to betray a
want of that persevering diligence and scrupulous caution, without which
metaphysical enquiries are in a great measure unavailing.” He begins
with a discussion of the “sensitive principle.” He distinguishes between
sensations and ideas of sensation. “The sensations and ideas of exten-
sion, as far as can be ascertained, are suggested at the very same in-
stant,” where, it may be observed, that he uses the very objectionable
word “suggest.” Almost the whole of the body, whether external or in-
ternal, is sensitive and an impression on every sensitive part, whether
occasioned by an external or internal influence, is accompanied with a
sensation.” “It is also accompanied, I imagine. with an idea of extension
corresponding to the form and magnitude of the impression.” “We al-
ways find that an impression on the organ of taste is accompanied not
only with a sensation, but with an idea of the part of the organ affected.”
“It is highly probable that the organ of smell also affords ideas of exten-
sion.” “The sense of hearing seems to be governed by the same laws.”
Locke taught that we get our ideas of extension solely from sight and
touch. Ballantyne maintains that we have them from all the senses, be-
cause by all the senses we have “an idea of the part of the organ af-
fected,” here anticipating favorite positions of Hamilton and the physi-360/James McCosh
ologist Müller.
He criticises the doctrine of Brown, that by the eye we discern only
color, not in so climbing a manner as Hamilton, but in a like spirit.
Some indeed contend that sight affords only sensations of color, and no
idea of extension at all; but this opinion has never been established by
adequate evidence and appears to be incompatible with not a few phe-
nomena. At any rate, in the present state of our knowledge, we certainly
have by sight ideas of extension and ideas of greater or smaller portions
of it, other things being equal, according to the impression on the organ,
and are bound, therefore, to regard this as an ultimate principle, till it be
traced to one more general. This, so far as I know, has never yet been
done, and I am utterly unable to perceive how it can be done.”
“ We never but find that an impression on a sensitive organ is ac-
companied with an idea of duration, as well as with a sensation and an
idea of extension.” “Every impression, besides suggesting a sensation
and an idea of extension, suggests in connection with them an idea of a
portion of duration corresponding to the duration of the impression.”
And here he has again to criticise Brown, and by anticipation Mill.
“There are no doubt many analogies between duration and extension;
but to assume that they are literally one and the same thing, as Dr.
Brown most evidently does, is one of the most unwarrantable assump-
tions that ever was hazarded.” “That doctrine is, that duration and ex-
tension are substantially one and the same thing, and that a cubical foot,
or a cubical yard, is not essentially different from an hour or a day.” The
sensations and ideas of extension “will give rise to the notion of length
of duration as occurring in different points of duration, and of course as
occurring in succession; but, unless length of duration be the same thing
with length of extension, they can evidently give us no manner of notion
of this latter species of length at all.”
He has a very elaborate inquiry into the associative principle, “a
branch of our constitution still involved in considerable obscurity.” As I
believe him to be right in affirming that at this point there are many
unsettled questions, and as his observations are original and indepen-
dent, I will quote from him at considerable length. He shows that ideas
suggest each other, not according to relation among their objects, but
among the ideas themselves. He dwells on what he calls the law of pre-
cedence. “One idea acquires power to suggest another by immediately
preceding it,” using the word “power” in the sense in which it is com-
monly used in physical inquiries. It follows, (1) “If one idea acquireThe Scottish Philosophy/361
power to suggest another by immediately preceding it, the greater the
number of ideas that it immediately precedes, the greater the number it
will acquire the power of suggesting.” (2) If one idea acquire power to
suggest others by immediately preceding them, the more frequently it
precedes, the greater power it must acquire to suggest them. He thus
explains the circumstance that, when we meet with a person whom we
have formerly seen only in one particular place, there is usually, to our
recollection, a very distinct idea of that place; but when we meet with a
person whom we have seen in a great many different places, there is
seldom recalled an idea of any of them. (3) If an idea acquire power to
suggest others by immediately preceding them, the greater the number
of ideas that immediately precede any others, the greater will be their
power when they recur to suggest these ideas. (4) If an idea acquire
power to suggest another by immediately preceding it, the more vivid
the idea that precedes any other, the greater will be its power when it
recurs in a state equally vivid to suggest it.
He says that the law of contiguity in point of time is really three
laws,—that “an idea will acquire power to suggest another by immedi-
ately preceding it, by existing at the same with it, and by immediately
following it.” The first of these laws is that of precedence, and into it he
resolves all the others. Thus he resolves the law of coexistence into
precedence. “Let A and B be two ideas which coexist for two sensible
points of time, then A, while existing in the first point, precedes B while
B is existing in the second; and B, while existing in the first point, pre-
cedes A while A is existing in the second point.” Proceeding on the
principle that the greater the number of ideas that coexist with any other,
the greater the number afterwards suggested by it, he explains how the
longer an idea continues in the mind, the more readily will it afterwards
recur; how the more frequently it has been in the mind, it will come up
the more readily; how the longer it continues, it will be the more likely to
recur; and how the more frequently it has been in the mind, it will be the
more likely to continue. He resolves in the same way the law of contigu-
ity in place, and the law of cause and effect; and affirms that the idea of
cause has no power, independently of the law of precedence, to suggest
the idea of an effect. He tries hard to explain in the same way the law of
similarity. “Yesterday I saw a winged animal, to-day a winged animal of
the same species.” “When I yesterday saw the first animal, I obtained
ideas of its peculiar qualities, and likewise of those common to it with
all the individuals of the species to which it belonged. To-day, when I362/James McCosh
saw the other animal, I also obtained ideas of its peculiar properties,
and of those common to it with all the species to which it belonged, that
is, along with the ideas of the peculiar properties of the second animal,
I obtained a number of ideas which coexisted with those of the peculiar
properties of the first. According to the doctrine of coexistence, for-
merly explained, they would suggest ideas of the peculiar properties of
the first. When they do so, I have ideas both of the common and of the
peculiar properties of the first animal; in other words, I have an idea of
the first animal itself, for that idea can be nothing but the aggregate of
the ideas of its common and peculiar properties.” He explains the law of
contrast by showing that, in every case where contrasted ideas suggest
one another, it will be found that there is a considerable degree of simi-
larity along with the contrast. He accounts by the same law of prece-
dence for the secondary laws of Brown. Some of these resolutions seem
to me over subtle, but they are worthy of consideration by those who
would sound the depths of the subject.
He treats at length of the voluntary principle, and offers many judi-
cious remarks. He criticises Stewart’s doctrine of power, according to
which “the author of nature has bestowed on matter no powers at all, of
course never preserves its powers in being, nor even employs them in
accomplishing his purposes, as there are no powers to be exercised. In
the second volume (Part II), he treats of moral law, of right, jurispru-
dence, and politics, somewhat after the manner of Stewart, with consid-
erable sweep of style, but no great power of metaphysical analysis.
LIII. Thomas Chalmers97
Hitherto there has been a severance, at times an opposition, if not avowed
yet felt, between the Scottish philosophy and the Scottish theology. The
one had magnified human nature, and tended to produce a legal, self-
righteous spirit; whereas the other humbled man and exalted God, en-
joining such graces as faith, humility, and penitence. But there never
was any real opposition between the facts gathered by the one and the
truths taken out of God’s Word by the other. The metaphysicians had
shown that there is such a faculty in man as the conscience; and the
conscience proclaims that man is a sinner, while the Bible provides a
forgiveness for the sinner in a way which honors the moral law. The
reconciliation between the philosophy and the religion was effected by
Thomas Chalmers, who has had greater influence in moulding the reli-
gious be lief and character of his countrymen than any one since theThe Scottish Philosophy/363
greatest Scotchman, John Knox.
He was born at Anstruther, in the “East Neuk” of Fife, and was the
son of a reputable merchant there. In his boyish days he had to suffer
not a little from a nurse and from a teacher who ruled by the rod; but he
was “joyous, vigorous, and humorous.” He manifested his natural char-
acter from an early age, being eager and impetuous in pursuing his
favorite ends. He was not a very diligent pupil, but was a leader in fun
and frolic. At the age of twelve he entered the University of St. Andrews,
which about that time had such pupils as John (afterwards Sir John)
Leslie, James Mylne, and John (afterwards Chief Justice) Campbell. He
is described as “enthusiastic and persevering in every thing he under-
took, giving his whole mind to it, and often pursuing some favorite and
even, as we thought, some foolish idea, whilst we were talking around
him and perhaps laughing at his abstraction, or breaking in upon his
cogitations and pronouncing him the next thing to mad;98 and then he
would good-naturedly join in the merriment with his common affection-
ate expression ‘very well, my good lads.’” It was in 1793 that he was
awakened intellectually, and became excited with and absorbed in ge-
ometry, for which he had a strong taste and talent.
“St. Andrews,” he tells us in after years, “was at this time overrun
with moderatism, under the chilling influence of which we inhaled not a
distaste only, but a positive contempt, for all that is properly and pecu-
liarly gospel; insomuch that our confidence was nearly as entire in the
sufficiency of natural theology as in the sufficiency of natural science.”
He has left it on record that he profited by the debating societies of the
college. At this time he studied Godwin’s “Political Justice,” and was
staggered by Mirabaud’s “System of Nature.” His friend, Professor
Duncan, tells us that , he studied Edwards on Free Will with such ardor
that he seemed to regard nothing else, could scarcely talk of any thing
else, and one was almost afraid of his mind losing its balance.” His
favorite study, however, continued to be mathematics, towards which,
as the science of quantity, he had a strong predilection, as shown in his
propensity to count his steps as he walked. Still, even at this time, he
had aspirations after something higher. One common expression in his
college prayers was Oh! give us some steady object for our mind to rest
on.” I remember when a student of divinity, and long ere I could relish
evangelical sentiment, I spent nearly a twelvemonth in a sort of mental
Elysium, and the one idea which ministered to my soul all its rapture,
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all things to the one great principle for which he evolved and was sup-
porting creation. I should like to be impressed over again, but with such
a view of the Deity as coalesced and was in harmony with the doctrine
of the New Testament.”
He was licensed to preach the gospel in 1799. His brother writes:
“We are at some pains in adjusting his dress, manner, etc.; but he does
not seem to pay any great regard to himself.” Mathematical studies con-
tinue to engross his attention. He spent a winter in Edinburgh, studied
under Robison, for whom he entertained a profound reverence, and
Stewart, and devoted himself to chemistry and moral philosophy. Of
Stewart he says: “I have obtained a much clearer idea than I ever had of
the distinctive character of Reid’s philosophy. I think it tends to a use-
less multiplication of principles, and shrinks even from an appearance
of simplicity.” He was ordained minister at Kilmany, in his native county,
in 1803. He still contrived to teach mathematics and chemistry in St.
Andrews,—a divided work from which be would have shrunk in later
years, when he attained a higher idea of the importance of the ministe-
rial office. In 1806, Napoleon Bonaparte issued his famous Berlin de-
cree, shutting continental ports to British goods. Chalmers had all along
a predilection for political economy: he was convinced that Great Brit-
ain had resources which made it in dependent of any other country, and
in 1807 he published “An Inquiry into the Extent and Stability of Na-
tional Resources.”
We are now approaching the crisis of his life. In 1818 he was re-
quired to write an article for the “Edinburgh Encyclopedia,” at that time
under the editorship of Dr. Brewster, on the “Evidences of Christian-
ity,” and he had to study the Christian religion and the proof which can
be adduced in its favor more carefully and earnestly than he had ever
done before. Meanwhile there occurred a number of deaths among his
relatives, and he was deeply affected. He now felt himself called on to
strive after a pure and heavenly morality. “March 17, 1810,—I have
this day completed my thirtieth year; and, upon a review of the last
fifteen years of my life, I am obliged to acknowledge that at least two-
thirds of that time have been uselessly or idly spent, sometimes to while
away an evening in parish gossip or engaging in a game at cards.” A
change has evidently come over him he did not yet open it fully, but he
made allusions to it. I find that principle and reflection afford a feeble
support against the visitations of melancholy.” He was subjected to a
period of confinement, and was led to read Wilberforce’s “PracticalThe Scottish Philosophy/365
View.” “The conviction was now wrought in him that he had been at-
tempting an impossibility; that he had been trying to compound ele-
ments which would not amalgamate; that it must be either on his own
merits wholly or on Christ’s merits wholly he must lean.” He now be-
took himself in earnest to the study of the Bible. A visible change ap-
peared in him. He became more diligent in the visitation of his parish,
and his sermons had a power over his people such as they never had
before.
One so able, so earnest, must take an active part in the affairs of his
country and of his age. He sets out with an excessive admiration of the
parochial system of Scotland, not just as an end in itself, but as fitted to
accomplish the ends which his great heart cherished. It seemed to him to
provide every thing which the good and the elevation of a country re-
quired. It secured a school in every parish, and a minister to preach to
and to visit every man and woman, and a body of assistant elders to
watch over the morals of the community. It provided, too, for the wants
of the poor by a voluntary relief which did not interfere with their spirit
of independence. The whole system bulked in magnificent proportions
before his splendid imagination. No doubt he saw that the church was
not realizing this pattern: he knew that there were ministers around him
who were not fulfilling these high ends. But then the church, by the
exercise of the high prerogatives given it by Christ, could restrain the
evils of patronage, and carry out thoroughly the original design of the
Church of Scotland. He did not foresee the difficulties he would have to
meet in carrying out his grand ideal,—difficulties arising from the State,
which did not wish too zealous and too powerful a Church, and on the
part of the people, who were jealous of too strong an ecclesiastical orga-
nization.
He was called to Glasgow in 1815, and there labored with all his
might to put his idea in execution, first in the Tron Church and then in
St. John’s Church,—built expressly for him. He preached as no man in
Glasgow had ever preached before. He visited from house to house, and
thus became aware of, and hastened to proclaim to all men, the awfully
degraded condition to which Glasgow, and, as was soon discovered by
others, to which all the great cities in Scotland and England had been
reduced. The world, as well it might, was startled and awed by the scene
disclosed. The philosophers had made no inquiry into the subject, and
had no remedy for the evil. The refined city ministers were satisfied with
preaching well-composed sermons, moral or evangelical, to the better366/James McCosh
classes. The dissenters ministered zealously to their own select congre-
gations, but were not able for the Herculean task of cleansing the impu-
rity which had been accumulating for ages. But the evils must be rem-
edied. So he set about erecting chapels, and called on the paternal gov-
ernment to endow them. But he met with opposition from statesmen not
willing to tax the community for the benefit of one sect, and from dis-
senters who believed that their own method of spreading the gospel was
the better. The voluntary question was started, and he threw himself into
the fight, and defended religious establishments on the ground that man,
being carnal, would not seek for spiritual things, which could not, there-
fore, be left to the ordinary political principle of demand and supply,—
thereby, as some of us think, overlooking the power in the living con-
verted members of the church, who are more likely than the State to
supply what is wanted to the careless and the outcast. He certainly did
not estimate, as he ought to have done, the enmity of the world toward
the church,—an enmity which met him at every point. But he perse-
vered manfully, never losing sight of his grand aim. His course may
seem an inconsistent one to a superficial observer; but there was a unity
given to it by the end which he pursued as steadfastly as the sun moves
in the heavens above the winds and clouds of the earth. He must have
the glorious gospel of Jesus Christ preached to every creature, and he
supported the Established Church as fitted to accomplish this end, at the
same time holding resolutely by the spiritual independence of the church
as given it by Christ, and as necessary to enable it to fulfil its grand
ends. And when he found that the church he so loved was interfered with
in carrying out its designs, he went on bravely to the disruption of 1843,
and amidst convulsions led on an exodus towards a land which he saw
before him, but into which he could scarcely be said to enter. Ere he
departed in 1847, he had by his wisdom established a sustentation fund
for the benefit of the ministers of religion, which he hoped would secure
the stability and other benefits of an established church without its temp-
tations. He lived to see churches multiplied by means of the secession
far beyond his most sanguine expectations; but he did not live to see
such a union among churches as is fitted to secure the grind end which
he kept ever before him,—the spread of the gospel in all the destitute
and depraved districts of the land.
I regard Chalmers as the greatest preacher which Scotland has pro-
duced. Those who have heard him can never forget the impression he
produced. As he spoke, he stood firm upon his legs, and looked with aThe Scottish Philosophy/367
broad, honest face on his audience. At first there was a flabbiness, a
sort of cheesiness, about his look and a blankness in his expression; but
he uttered a clear, broad, emphatic sentence, and gained the attention of
his hearers; and as he advanced he was evidently interested him self and
thoroughly interested the congregation; and soon he became absorbed
as did all who listened to him; and in the end there was mind and heart
manifested in every member and in every action (often uncouth) of his
body, and the people were carried along to the close by a torrent which
they could not resist, and to which they enthusiastically yielded. His
pronunciation was Scotch,—provincially Scotch. His style was not pure,
not classical, was scarcely English; but it was his own, as is Thomas
Carlyle’s. It was clear, manly, broad, and massive. But when he spoke
no one ever thought of his manner or language: everybody was so car-
ried along by his earnestness and his matter. He commonly began by a
clear enunciation of some philosophic or moral principle of great prac-
tical moment, and then proceeded to unfold and illustrate it. He did not
turn aside himself and he did not distract his hearers by the introduction
of a variety of topics; he keeps to his one principle, but he presents it
under a vast variety of aspects, all contributing towards the one impres-
sion. He is marching up a hill, and he takes us with him; he often lingers
by the way and gives us glorious retrospects of the ground we have
traversed and glorious prospects of the heights to which he is to conduct
us, and he carries us at last to a lofty height with a magnificent scene
spread all around. The result is that he has gained our convictions: he
has done more, we are ready, by the impulse he has given, to execute
what he proposes. At the close, as we feel that he has forgot himself, so
we forget our selves, and forget him as a speaker in an admiration of the
truth he has expounded or an eager desire to perform what he has incul-
cated. What he has said has become incorporated with us, like food to
strengthen us and go with us. He has planted a principle in the heads and
hearts of his hearers to continue there for ever, to send out roots down-
ward and stems and branches upward. The consequence was, that, if be
was not the most intellectual or emotional speaker of his age, he was the
most practically influential, spreading his power over the length and
breadth of Scotland.
Even in the most active operations, and the keenest controversies
thereby excited, he retained his academic and philosophic tastes. He
delivered in 1815–16 his “Astronomical Discourses,” which drew on
week-days the busiest Glasgow merchants from their offices and368/James McCosh
warerooms. In these discourses he obviates the prepossession apt to be
created and fostered in intelligent and refined minds by the Scripture
doctrine of the Son of God dying for man, and he does so by showing
how great care God takes of the most minute objects and events. In most
of his sermons he proceeds upon and unfolds some important philo-
sophic principle. In his “Mercantile Discourses” he lays down the moral
principles of business transactions, and shows how a rigid attention to
them would restrain injurious speculation and promote a healthy trade.
In those on “Human Depravity,” he proves that there may be the deepest
sinfulness in hearts which yet have many amiabilities. In his “Commen-
tary on the Epistle to the Romans,” he is not always able to enter into the
thoughts of the apostle, or follow him in his subtle transitions; but he
powerfully defends the grand doctrines of revelation by showing that
they are sustained by a profound philosophy. His doctrine, drawn from
Scripture, is substantially that of the old Scotch divines from Knox
downwards: but every one feels that it is pervaded by a new and fresh
spirit; it has less of a stern aspect; it is tolerant; it is catholic. The stream
has descended from the stern rocks of the sixteenth, and is sweeping
along amid the fertility of the nineteenth, century.
I never met any man who had so large a veneration for all that is
great and good. It was primarily a veneration of God, and derivatively
for all excellence. He had a profound reverence for royalty, for great-
ness, for rank and station; was essentially a conservatist in politics; and
felt very keenly when by his unflinching adherence to principle he seemed
to be separating the upper classes from the Church of Scotland. Without
being a hero-worshipper, for he worshipped God only, he had a great
admiration of intellectual greatness, at least when it was associated with
humility. He never wearied to dilate on the greatness of Sir Isaac New-
ton, and often introduced him some what inappropriately. Jonathan
Edwards he admired for his profound metaphysical ability and his con-
suming piety; and he employed the arguments of that great man on be-
half of philosophical necessity to support, what is a different thing the
Scripture doctrine of predestination. But the author from whom he de-
rived most, and who again was indebted to him for eloquent expositions
of his philosophy, was Bishop Butler. He was vastly impressed with his
enlarged views and with his cautious, practical wisdom; and learned
from him the habit of connecting nature and revelation.
With such tastes and aims we can conceive that he would look with
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tion. So in 1823 he accepted the call to become professor of moral phi-
losophy in the University of St. Andrews. Here he exercised a very great
influence in attracting students, in exciting a prodigious enthusiasm
among them, and in setting them forth with high purposes to noble works.
He gained the position of highest influence when he was appointed in
1827 to the chair of theology in the University of Edinburgh. I am not
sure that Scotland has ever had a higher instructor than Chalmers, in
respect of all the qualities that go to constitute a successful teacher. He
was always well prepared: he was as orderly as a mathematician could
be; even his very prayers were often written out. He was a very me-
thodical examiner on his text- books and his lectures, having his very
questions ready, but departing from his prepared queries when circum-
stances required. As a lecturer he did more than delight his audience: he
entranced them. They gazed upon him; and at times had difficulty in
taking notes, they were so moved and elevated. He did not carry on his
students very rapidly or over much ground; but he made them thorough
masters of the subject, and imparted an impulse which led them to enter
fields of their own. He was particularly interesting and successful when
he was expatiating in the border country which lies between theology
and philosophy. His course of moral philosophy in St. Andrews, and
that on natural theology in Edinburgh, were particularly relished by all
students capable of appreciating high truth. He expatiated with great
delight on the analogies between natural and revealed religion. His spe-
cial lectures on the “Evidences of Christianity” were not so eminently
successful, though they were very valuable. In his early and immature
work on the “Evidences,” he was particularly anxious to make the whole
proof inductive, and missed some of those great principles of our moral
nature, which, how ever, he afterwards expanded so fully and so effec-
tively in the work as it took its later forms. The student feels that he is
deficient in scholarship, and that he gives us metaphysics when he should
have presented us with history. In his theology proper, it is evident that
he is not specially an exegete. No one would reckon him a high authority
in the exposition of a passage of Scripture. But he presents the great
truths of the Bible in noble and attractive forms. His creed is essentially
Calvinistic; that is, he holds by the same views as Calvin drew out of the
Scriptures; but they appear with a more humane and benignant aspect,
and with a more thorough conformity to the principles of man’s nature.
In his philosophical works he unfolds and enforces a number of
very important principles, not, it may be, absolutely original, but still370/James McCosh
fresh and independent in his statement and illustration of them, and set-
ting aside error on the one side or other. His “Sketches of Moral and
Mental Philosophy” cannot be said to be a full work on ethics, but it
enforces great truths in a very impressive and eloquent way. He draws
the distinction between mental and moral philosophy: the one has to do
with quid est, and the other with quid oportet. He holds by the distinc-
tion between will and desire, maintaining that the former may be moral
or immoral, whereas the latter is not. It seems to me that he has scarcely
hit on the essential ethical distinction, which is not between will and
desire, but between emotion and will; the latter of which may embrace
not only volition, but wishes; in short, every thing optative, every thing
in which is choice. He treats of the emotions, and shows that there is
always a conception (the better expression is phantasm) involved in
them. He dwells on the command which the will has over the emotions
and of the morality of the emotions. Nothing is either virtuous or vicious
unless the voluntary in some way intermingles with it; but then the will
has influence over a vast number of the operations of the mind. “It may
be very true that the will has as little to do with that pathological law by
which the sight of distress awakens in my bosom an emotion of pity, as
with that other pathological law by which the sight of a red object im-
presses on my retina the sensation peculiar to that color; yet the will,
though not the proximate, may have been the remote, and so the real
cause both of the emotion and sensation notwithstanding. It may have
been at the bidding of my will that, instead of hiding my self from my
own flesh, I visited a scene of wretchedness, and entered within the
confines, as it were, of the pathological influence, in virtue of which,
after that the spectacle of suffering was seen, the compassion was un-
avoidable.” He has very just remarks, propounded with great eloquence,
on the final cause of the emotions.
His views on natural theology appeared first in the “Bridge water
Treatise,” on “The Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral and
Intellectual Constitution of Man.” The feeling of admiration excited was
mingled with disappointment. The bulk was too great for the matter,
and the work had the appearance of a hasty recooking of his old thoughts
which were grand in themselves, but were not formed into a duly pro-
portioned whole. His arguments and his illustrations have a much better
form given them in his subsequently published work, “Natural Theol-
ogy.” He begins with a discussion of the a priori argument for the exist-
ence of God, and examines Samuel Clarke’s “Demonstration.” He ob-The Scottish Philosophy/371
jects that Clarke would make the test of a logical and mathematical
truth to be also the test of a physical necessity in the existent state of
actual nature, and that he confounds a logical with a physical impossi-
bility. He turns to the a posteriori argument, but is obliged, without his
being aware of it, to call in an a priori principle. “The doctrine of innate
ideas in the mind is totally different from the doctrine of innate tenden-
cies in the mind, which tendencies may be undeveloped till the excite-
ment of some occasion have manifested or brought them forth.” He pro-
ceeds, as every one must, in constructing the argument from design, on
the principle of cause and effect, but identifies that principle with what
is surely a different thing,—with the expectation of a uniformity in the
succession of events. At this point he draws the distinction, which has
been accepted by J. S. Mill, and has ever since been identified with
Chalmers’s name, between the laws of matter and the collocations of
matter. It is from the collocations of matter rather than the laws of mat-
ter that he draws his argument for the divine existence. The distinction
seems to be deep in the constitution of things, but might be better repre-
sented, perhaps, as the distinction between the properties of matter and
the dispositions of matter, these dispositions manifesting design, and
consequently intelligence.
He is most successful when he is arguing from the constitution of
the human mind. He dwells with great fondness and force on the su-
premacy of conscience and the inherent pleasure of virtuous and the
misery of vicious affections, and gives a powerful exposition of the law
of habit. He has a clear, masterly, and eloquent exposition of Leibnitz’s
theory of the origin of evil, not positively adopting it, but using it as an
hypothesis to obviate objections. Here and elsewhere he unfolds a very
favorite principle, that hypotheses may be advanced in theology to an-
swer objections even when they do not establish positive truth. The logi-
cal meaning of this principle is that the hypothesis sets aside the unlim-
ited major premise necessary to establish the infidel objection. He seeks
to answer the objection to prayer drawn from the uniformity and fixed
character of the laws of nature by showing that we can trace the agen-
cies of nature only a little way back, and that interferences may take
place in that outer region which lies beyond the ken of man. It may be
replied that, by just inference, we can trace the agencies far beyond the
immediate inspection of man, and that we find them everywhere uni-
form. It might be wiser in these circumstances to trace up both the prayer
and its answer to the pre- established harmony of things appointed by372/James McCosh
God. He closes his work by showing that natural theology is as useful in
exhibiting man’s needs, and thus preparing him to receive the remedial
complement supplied by the Bible, as even in the positive truths which it
has established.
We have seen in the cases of Stewart, Brown, and Mackintosh what
difficulties those trained in the Scottish metaphysics had in compre-
hending the German philosophy and accepting the truth. Hamilton, we
shall find, labored to combine the two. Chalmers, meanwhile, was en-
grossed with philanthropic work; he did not understand the German
language, and it was not till the last year of his life, when he got a little
lull in 1847 after the disruption storm, that he became acquainted with
the German philosophy, to which he was introduced by Mr J. D. Morell’s
well-written and interesting work, “An Historical and Critical View of
the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century.” He
entered on the study with a youthful enthusiasm, and reviewed the work
in the “North British Review.” “It is long since any work has made its
appearance before a public in a state of greater expectancy and readi-
ness for its lessons.” With a mind of similar openness and candor, he is
ready to receive whatever truth Kant and the Germans may offer. He
confesses his gratification on finding, “amid all these conflicting sys-
tems and speculations, that our theology is safe.” He rejoices to find
profound points of agreement between Reid and Kant, and is willing to
take the truth in either form. “Now, for comparing the Scottish and
German philosophies, whether as it respects their similarities or their
differences, it is of importance to mark how these primary beliefs of Dr.
Reid are at one with the primitive arguments of Kant, or with his forms
of the understanding. They may have been the better named by the latter
of these two philosophers he may have probed more deeply into their
foundations, or, rather, perhaps, into their method of development; he
may have constructed a fuller and more accurate list of them, and, with-
out pronouncing on his scheme for their application, or by which he
would bring his categories to bear on the objects of the external world,
it might be fully conceded that, altogether, be has enlarged and in some
respects amended the philosophy of Dr. Reid. Yet let us not, because of
the altered nomenclature, or of the new garb that has been thrown over
them, overlook the substantial identity, and that, in respect of almost all,
between the principles of the Scottish school and those from which Kant
has earned his chief reputation.” It is clear that he was not sufficiently
far advanced in his knowledge of Kant and of the German philosophy toThe Scottish Philosophy/373
discover that there was a subtle scepticism in the philosophy which made
the forms of the reason merely subjective; whereas Reid gave them an
objective validity, an external validity when they related to external ob-
jects.
With great shrewdness he seizes on an incipient error, which has
since grown into a formidable error. “We demur to the proposed substi-
tution of Mr Morell for Dr. Reid’s account of perception, that it is alto-
gether an act of the mind. He affirms that the very essence of perception
consists in the felt relation between mind and matter. And what we af-
firm is, that matter might be perceived, and, with the strongest sense and
conviction in the mind of its reality, when the mind itself is altogether
out of the reckoning.” “It is not more necessary to be conscious of the
mind in the business of perceiving than to be conscious of the eye in the
business of seeing.” “We can perceive without thinking of the mind, as
we can perceive without thinking of the eye; and he complains of the
“undue mixing up of the subjective with the objective, in which chiefly
it is that the erratic movements of the German philosophy have taken
rise.” He here opposes at the entrance that doctrine of relativity which
was developed by Hamilton, and has been applied by Herbert Spencer.
He also makes good use of the distinction, as drawn by M. Cousin,
between the spontaneous and the reflex exercises of the human under-
standing. “We have long been in the habit of recognizing these under the
title of the mind’s direct and reflex processes, and we shall continue so
to name them.” Though it be only by looking inwardly or looking back
upon ourselves that we take cognizance of our various beliefs, these
beliefs must be formed so as to exist ere they can be recognized or
reflected on.” So he blames Mr Morell for constantly “mixing up con-
sciousness and the facts of consciousness,” and M. Cousin for finding
the ground of our belief in an external world in a subjective act. “He
looks for it, and imagines that he has got his first hold of it among the
reflections of the psychological tablet within, whereas, if it is to be had
at all, spontaneous as it is, it will be the primary act of looking direct on
that radiance that cometh from the object of contemplation without.” In
following this train of thought he comes near to, and yet does not reach,
a distinction on which I set great value,—the distinction between our
primitive apperceptions or intuitions as they spontaneously act and as
they are generalized into maxims, axioms, or fundamental truths by the
metaphysician. Considered under the first aspect, they act whether we
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of breathing, they are not noticed, and they cannot in any circumstances
be supposed to err; whereas under the other aspect they are the result of
a discursive process of abstraction and generalization, in which there
may be much error, by our adding to, or taking from, or mutilating the
spontaneous process in the reflex account given of it by those who would
put what is concrete and individual into a universal form.
This was one of the last compositions of Thomas Chalmers, who
was found dead in his bed on the morning of May 31, 1847. His soul
was transparently ready for the new truth to be disclosed to him in heaven,
where what he saw as through a glass darkly on earth, appeared to him
face to face.
LIV.  John Abercrombie
Can mental science be made popular and practical? It is certainly desir-
able that it should become so. It is of moment that the great body of
educated men and women, in knowing something of history and phys-
ics, should also be acquainted with the laws of their own mind, and this
though they have no predilection for the abstruse discussions of meta-
physics. We have admirable compends of physical science made com-
prehensible to the common understanding. If we are to preserve the in-
telligent mind of the country from falling under the influence of the
advancing materialism, we should have like expositions of mental and
moral investigation for the use of upper schools, male and female, and
the reading population who have not the advantage of a collegiate edu-
cation. We have such works in Abercrombie’s “Intellectual Powers”
(1830), and his “Philosophy of the Moral Feelings” (1833). He pro-
ceeds throughout on the method of Reid, and his treatises summarize
some of the best results of the philosophy of Scotland. They are also
valuable for the admirably reported cases illustrative of the influence of
mind on body and body on mind. Nor is it to be omitted that there runs
through all his works a vein of evangelical piety, decisive and outspoken
without being offensive.
He was the son of a minister of the Church of Scotland, and was
born at Aberdeen in 1780. He studied medicine in the University of
Edinburgh, and became, after the death of Dr. Gregory, the most emi-
nent Scotch physician of his time, being distinguished for his great skill
and judgment. He wrote a number of medical works, treating of the
brain, spinal cord, and of disease. He died in 1844.
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as the object of science: it is to observe facts and trace their relations.
He here treats of cause and effect, which he confounds with the unifor-
mity of nature. He makes our belief in it an original instinct, but awk-
wardly brings observation and inference as involved in it. He distin-
guishes, in the manner of Reid and Stewart, between physical and effi-
cient cause, regarding the former as the only object of philosophic in-
quiry. He opposes materialism, but not very effectively. He then treats
of the faculties of the mind arranging them: sensation and perception,
consciousness and reflection, memory, abstraction, imagination, reason
or judgment. Under the last he treats of first truths. But by far the most
interesting and useful parts of his works are those in which he treats of
the practical application of metaphysical subjects, as, for instance, of
the laws of investigation, of fallacies, attention. He is in his own field
when he is illustrating dreaming, somnambulism spectral illusions, and
insanity. He makes a most useful application of the whole to the study of
medicine. His statement of cases may always be depended on for its
accuracy. I may give a few examples. He says of Dr. Leyden that he
could repeat correctly a long act of parliament, or any similar docu-
ment, after having once read it. When he was on one occasion congratu-
lated by a friend on his remarkable power in this respect, he replied that
instead of an advantage, it was often a source of great inconvenience.
This he explained by saying that when he wished to recollect a particu-
lar point in any thing which he had read, he could do it only by repeating
to himself the whole from the commencement till be reached the point
which be wished to recall. Again, “a distinguished theatrical performer,
in consequence of the sudden illness of another actor, had occasion to
prepare himself in a few hours’ notice for a part which was entirely new
to him, and the part was long and rather difficult. He acquired it in a
very short time, and went through it with perfect accuracy, but immedi-
ately after the performance forgot it to such a degree that, though he
performed the character for several days in succession, he was obliged
every day to study it anew. Characters which he had acquired in a more
deliberate manner he never forgets, but can perform them at any time
without a moment’s preparation. When questioned respecting the men-
tal process which he employed the first time he performed this part, he
says that he lost sight entirely of the audience, and seemed to have noth-
ing before him but the pages of the book from which he had learned, and
that if any thing had occurred to stop this illusion, he should have stopped
instantly.” I may give another instance. “A lady, in the last stage of376/James McCosh
chronic disease, was carried from London to a lodging in the country;
there her infant daughter was taken to visit her, and, after a short inter
view, carried back to town. The lady died a few days after, and the
daughter grew up without any recollection of her till she was of mature
age. At this time she happened to be taken into the room in which her
mother died without knowing it to have been so. She started on entering
it, and, when a friend who was along with her asked the cause of her
agitation, replied—“I have a distinct impression of having been in this
room before, and that a lady who lay in that room, and seemed very ill,
leaned over me and wept.”’
The work on the “Moral Feelings” does not seem to me so valuable,
and this because he cannot in treating of such a subject, have so many of
those cases which he as a medical man had so carefully noted. But it is
characterized by a fine spirit, and it has a useful tendency. He has some
important remarks on the “Analogy between first Truths or Intuitive
Principles of Belief in Intellectual and Moral Science.” “In applying to
these important articles of belief the name of first truths or primary
principles of moral conviction, I do not mean to ascribe to them any
thing of the nature of innate ideas. I mean only that they come with a
rapid or instantaneous conviction, entirely distinct from what we call a
process of reasoning in every well- regulated mind, when it is directed
by the most simple course of reflection to the phenomena of nature with-
out and to the moral feelings of which it is conscious within.” In his
analysis of man as a moral being, he includes: 1. The desires, the affec-
tions, and self-love; 2. The will; 3. Moral principle or conscience; 4.
The moral relation of man towards the Deity. The discussion of these
subjects is not very deep or original, but it is commonly correct and
always useful.
LV. David Welsh99
At the time we have now reached there was a strong reaction against
moderatism and rationalism, and a tendency to return to the simple faith
of the Bible; and a reconciliation of Scotch philosophy and evangelism
was openly proclaimed. Ministers from the pulpit, and theologians in
the divinity halls, were employing the principles of the mind and of
morality to support the peculiar truths of Christianity. If there be a moral
law, it points to a law-giver. If that law be immutable and unbending it
shows that man is a sinner; it points to the need of an atonement, and
requires such evangelical graces as humility, faith, and repentance. WeThe Scottish Philosophy/377
have a fine exemplification of this union of philosophy and evangelism
in Dr. David Welsh. He belonged to a “God-fearing” family residing in
that somewhat bare but romantic sheep country in which the rivers Clyde,
Tweed, and Annan rise. He was born Dec. 11, 1793, was educated first
by a private tutor, next at the parish school of Moffat, then at the high
school of Edinburgh, and thence went to the university. There he fell, in
1808–9, under the attractive influence of Dr. Brown, “who admitted
him to much and intimate intercourse, directed him in his private stud-
ies, discussed with him the subjects of his reading, and aided in cultivat-
ing his taste for polite literature.” When in the university he devoted
himself carefully to composition, and afterwards recommended the habit
to his pupils. “I cannot conceive it possible for a young man to think
very closely or profoundly upon any subject if he does not commit his
thoughts to paper. A confused idea, a kind of half comprehension, a
partial glimpse of any subject, will satisfy every person—I mean every
young person—who has not to make an immediate use of his informa-
tion upon that subject. But if you have to write upon the subject, an
indefinite conception will not suffice: the cur rent of your thoughts is
arrested; you are compelled calmly and deliberately to revolve and to
consider, and the consequence necessarily must be that you arrive at
clear and comprehensive views.”
He was licensed to preach in 1816, but in these days of patronage
did not get a church till 1821, when he was settled in Crossmichael, a
peaceful country parish among the hills of Galloway. There he was a
much beloved and respected pastor for six years, and there he wrote his
life of Dr. Brown. In 1827 he became minister of St. David’s, Glasgow,
and was soon very influential as a preacher. “His delivery wanted some
of those outward graces which often gloss over defect in matter. He was
far from fluent; and indeed he preached apparently with effort. In conse-
quence of the weakness of his chest, there was often a straining in the
getting out his words, which was at times painful to the listener; though
it added to, rather than detracted from, the earnestness with which his
discourses were delivered.” He gathered a large congregation of thought-
ful people, including not a few students of Glasgow University, who
were delighted with his clear, chaste language, his fine reflection, and
his warm piety. He was a noble example of a philosopher, teaching, not
philosophy, but the doctrines of the cross, always in a philosophic man-
ner and spirit. In 1831 he was elected professor of church history in the
university of Edinburgh, where he was a conscientious, careful teacher,378/James McCosh
and a discerner and patron of young men of promise. He did not take a
very prominent part in church politics, but was a consistent opponent of
church patronage, and a firm supporter of popular rights and the spiri-
tual independence of the church. He was moderator of the general as-
sembly of the Church of Scotland in 1842, which passed a solemn “claim,
declaration, and protest against the encroachment of the civil courts.” In
1843 he had to preach at the opening of the assembly, and took as his
text, “Let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind;” and delivered
a sermon, through which there runs a vein of fine philosophy. After
reading the protest he headed the imposing procession of ministers, who
marched through the streets of Edinburgh to the Canon Mills Hall. In
the Free Church of Scotland he especially interested himself in the cause
of education. He died April 24, 1845.
In his life of Brown we have a very interesting account of the man,
and an able abstract of his philosophy. He gives a full and fair statement
of the favorite tenets of Brown, and defends them from objections which
have been taken to them. He dwells with fondness on the additions which
Brown is regarded as making to philosophy by his theory of causation,
by his analysis of the faculties, by his account of suggestion simple and
relative, and specially of generalization. As might be expected of one
who had felt the fascination and enjoyed the eloquence of his master, be
over-estimates his merits. “In the philosophic love of truth, and in the
patient investigation of it, Dr. Brown may be pronounced as at least
equal, and in subtlety of intellect and powers of analysis as superior, to
any metaphysician that ever existed. Or if there ever was any philoso-
pher who might dispute with him the palm for any one of these qualities,
of this at least I am certain,—that no one ever combined them all in
equal perfection.”
It was hoped by many that Dr. Welsh would write a philosophic
work of his own. But he became “fully convinced of the substantial
truth of the doctrines originally published by Dr. Gall.” He is careful to
explain: “The cerebral organs are not the mind, nor is any state of these
organs the mind. The mind we believe to be a simple and indivisible
substance.” In a sketchy article in an early number of the “North British
Review,” of which he was editor at the time, he showed that he was able
to grapple with the deeper problems of the day. We see in all his sermons
and papers an underlying philosophy gendered by the study of the Scot-
tish school. But his energy was directed to preaching, to lecturing on
church history, and to philanthropic objects.The Scottish Philosophy/379
LVI. John Wilson100
At the end of last century, Paisley had a considerable body of high-class
citizens who made money and benefited their town by turning cotton
into gauze and other useful products. John Wilson was the son of one of
these, and was born in 1785 in by no means a poetical spot in a dingy
court at the head of the High Street. We can believe that the boy was “as
beautiful and animated a creature as ever played in the sunshine.” He
received his education first in his native town, and then at the manse of
Mearns,—a bare, wild upland district fitted to call forth a sense of free-
dom, but with nothing grand or romantic in its scenery. On the death of
his father he entered as a student in Glasgow University, and continued
there till 1803. In future years he acknowledged in “Blackwood” his
obligations to Jardine as “a person who, by the singular felicity of his
tact in watching youthful minds, had done more good to a whole host of
individuals, and gifted individuals too, than their utmost gratitude could
ultimately repay. They spoke of him as a kind, intellectual father, to
whom they were proud of acknowledging the eternal obligations of their
intellectual being.” He indulged freely in dinners, balls, and parties; but
Glasgow College made its students work, and Wilson was an ardent
student He began to keep a diary, and we have an entry: “Prize for the
best specimens of the Socratic mode of reasoning given out in the logic.”
“Got the first prize in the logic class.” Prizes have always been numer-
ous, often not very discriminating in their subjects, in Glasgow College,
and he records: “Prizes distributed; got three of them.”
In all his youthful days he luxuriated in fishing and field sports, and
nobody could match him at “hop, step, and jump.” At an early age,
when the “Edinburgh Review” was ridiculing Wordsworth, Wilson was
seized with an admiration of him, and wrote him: “In all your poems
you have adhered to natural feelings, and described what comes within
the range of every one’s observation. It is from following this plan that,
in my estimation, you have surpassed every poet both of ancient and
modern times.” Yet he ventures to hint a fault. “No feeling, no state of
mind, ought, in my mind, to become the subject of poetry that does not
please.” In 1803 he entered, as a gentleman commoner, Magdalen Col-
lege, Oxford, and participated ardently both in the high studies and in
the boating and physical sports. Here he began a common-place book,
which was doubtless of great use to him: “In the following pages I pro-
pose to make such remarks upon the various subjects of polite literature
as have been suggested to my mind during the course of my studies by380/James McCosh
the perusal of writers on the different branches of human knowledge;
reflections upon law, history, philosophy, theology, and poetry, will be
classed under separate heads.” With regard to the department of poetry,
original verses of my own composition will be frequently introduced.”
“Should any reflections upon men and authors occur in my mind, even
with regard to the general characters of mankind, or the particular dis-
positions of acquaintances and friends, they shall be written down as
they occur, without any embellishment. In short, this commonplace book,
or whatever else it may be called, will contain, so far as it goes, a faith-
ful representation of the state of my mind, both in its moments of study
and retirement.”
At the close of his Oxford life he passed, in 1806, a brilliant exami-
nation. “Sotheby was there, and declared it was worth while coming
from London to hear him translate a Greek chorus.” On leaving college,
having, as he believed, an independent fortune, he betook himself to the
Lake country of England, and purchased Elleray, within nine miles of
Wordsworth, and henceforth may be regarded as one of the Lake poets.
He now divided his activities between poetry and rural sports, and “had
a small fleet on Windermere.” By 1810 he had written as many poems
“as will make a volume of 400 pages,” of which the principal was “The
Isle of Palms,” descriptive of sea and island scenery, with a love story.
In 1811 he was married to Miss Penny. A few years later he lost sud-
denly the fortune which his father had laid up for him so industriously.
He bore the trial manfully, but had to remove to Edinburgh to the home
of his mother, and he became an advocate. He did not acquire a large
practice at the bar, and had time to write novels and poems, which were
noticed favorably in the “Edinburgh Review.”
Jeffrey asked him to write for the “Edinburgh,” and he furnished an
article on Byron. But Wilson was destined to occupy a place of his own.
“Blackwood’s Magazine” was started in 1817 by others, but did not
become a power till it came under the control of Wilson. He was never
formal editor. Blackwood retained the management in his own hand;
and, knowing that literary men were commonly both needy and dilatory,
he kept them to punctuality by not remunerating them till they produced
the articles, and then paying them handsomely. But the winds and the
sails were given to the vessel by Wilson, and “Blackwood” immediately
became the best literary magazine of its day.
So that city of Edinburgh is still maintaining its high literary repu-
tation. In Jeffrey they have a representative of the talent, and in Scott,The Scottish Philosophy/381
with Wilson in an inferior degree, representatives of the genius of their
country. The “blue and yellow” is the organ of the one and old “ebony”
of the other. The one favors taste and judgment; the other originality and
literary beauty. The one is seeking to improve things, has no great rev-
erence for the wisdom of the ancients, looks forward to the future, and is
considerably cool and indifferent towards religion; the other likes things
as they are, has a profound reverence for old customs and feudal castles,
and speaks highly of the forms of religion as established by law and
custom,
“Blackwood’s Magazine” is the great work of Wilson. his tales are
full of sentiment too; much in the manner of Mackenzie,—so much so
as to be at times cloying as treacle. He professes to describe the trials
and sorrows of the poor; but it is clear that he paints them as one who,
with a warm heart, has viewed them at a distance, and who has never
truly be come one of them. His poor are certainly not the Scotch poor,
with their deep feeling, which oppresses them all the more that it cannot
get an out let except in brief and restrained phrases, showing that they
are repressing what should be allowed to flow out. His poetry is cer-
tainly beautiful in imagery and expression, but has too redundant foli-
age in proportion to the stem and branches which support it, and often
wants a healthy air and a manly bearing. But the whole soil of Wilson
comes out in the “Noctes Ambrosianae.” We have here an extravaganza
full of all excellencies and defects, of fun and frolic, wit and humor,
fancies and imaginations, shrewd wisdom and ingenious nonsense, of
offensively personal comment and genuine pathos, of drinking, swear-
ing, morality, and religion,—which, however, always smells of the whis-
key punch of the tavern. The whole is a sort of rhapsody which reads
like an inspiration, but breathing more of the soil of earth than the air of
heaven. It is a waste, newly turned up, and yielding an exuberance of
seeds and trees, flowers and fruit; but with weeds and chills and fevers.
In 1820, when Brown died, there was a keen struggle for the chair
of moral philosophy. Sir James Mackintosh might have had it, but could
not resist the temptations of politics and London society. The contest
lay between Wilson and Sir William Hamilton known already as a scholar,
but not as an author. The town council was unreformed; the tories had
the political power of the city; they were annoyed by the attacks of
Jeffrey and jealous of the growing liberal spirit fostered by the philo-
sophical professors of the University. So Wilson was started and warmly
supported by the government. Scott, the literary genius of Edinburgh,382/James McCosh
threw himself thoroughly into the canvass for Wilson, who received the
appointment. Every one felt that Scottish metaphysics had suffered a
reverse; but some rejoiced at this, as feeling that the Scottish colleges
were too exclusively metaphysical, and introduced students to philoso-
phy at too early an age, and they expected Wilson to give an impulse to
literary culture.
We have a record in the “Memoir” of the attempts of the literary
man and the poet to produce a course of lectures on philosophy. He
would commence with some attractive and eloquent introductory lec-
tures of a “popular though philosophical character, so as to make a
good impression at first on his students and also on the public,” and so
he proposes to give eight or ten lectures on the moral systems of ancient
Greece. Then he is to have six or more lectures on the physical nature of
man. And now the difficulties meet him. Must he tread in the steps of
Reid and Stewart “which to avoid would be of great importance”?
“Surely,” he says, “we may contrive to write with more spirit and effect
than either of them; with less formality, less caution; for Stewart seems
terrified to place one foot before another.” Then he would branch forth
on taste and genius, which he was glad to find had been treated of by the
Scotch moralists. Then comes the moral nature, the affections, and con-
science, or whatever name that faculty may be called; and he anticipates
that the passions and affections will furnish fine ground for description.
Then there is the will and all its problems; “but here I am also in the
dark.” One more lecture on man’s spiritual nature will make fifty-eight
in all. “I would fain hope that something different from the common
metaphysical lectures will produce itself out of this plan.” Then he would
treat of duties to God and man; of virtues and vices,—in all, 108 lec-
tures. Such was his projected plan. In later years he modified it, giving
more time to the moral faculty, on which he did not throw any light.
He was never very systematic in his course. He enlarged on subjects
suited to him, and was always poetical, often eloquent. The writer of
this article remembers the impression left as he passed one day into his
class-room. The students received him with applause.—I believe they
always did so; and he advanced in a rapid, genial manner, fresh as if he
had just come from the Highlands or Lake country. He produced a roll
of papers, some of them apparently backs of letters. I could not discover
where he was in his course, but I soon found myself carried along pleas-
antly but irresistibly by a glowing description of faith, of its swaying
and elevating influence. On another occasion I found him enlarging onThe Scottish Philosophy/383
the place which association has in forming our imaginations. I am not
able to give his theory, but it seemed to me at the time fresh and original.
His pupils felt that it was a stimulating thing to be under such a man.
“One indubitable advantage,” says Mr Hill Burton, “was possessed by
all Professor Wilson’s students who had ‘eyes to see and ears to hear,’
viz., the advantage of beholding closely the workings of a great and
generous mind swayed by the noblest and sincerest impulses, and of
listening to the eloquent utterances of a voice which, reprobating every
form of meanness and duplicity, was ever raised to its loftiest pitch in
recommendation of high-souled honor, truth, virtue, disinterested love,
and melting charity.” Another pupil, Mr A. Taylor Innes, describes him:
‘His appearance in his class-room it is far easier to remember than for-
get. He strode into it with the professor’s gown hanging loosely on his
arms, took a comprehensive look over the mob of young faces, laid
down his watch so as to be out of the reach of his sledge-hammer fist,
glanced at the notes of his lecture (generally written on the most won-
derful scraps of paper), and then, to the bewilderment of those who had
never heard him before, looked long and earnestly out of the north win-
dow towards the spire of the old Town Kirk, until, having at last got his
idea, he faced round and uttered it with eye and hand and voice and soul
and spirit, and bore the class along with him. As he spoke, the bright
blue eye looked with a strange gaze into vacancy, sometimes sparkling
with a coming joke, sometimes darkening before a rush of indignant
eloquence, the tremulous upper lip curving with every wave of thought
or hint or passion, and the golden-gray hair floating on the old man’s
shoulders.” He had no philosophy himself, and so could not impart it to
his pupils. But at times he made a profound remark, as when, in the
“Noctes,” he says: “Honesty is the best policy, but it is only the honest
man who will discover this.” Hamilton, who was ardently attached to
the man praises his metaphysical acuteness as shown in a review of
Brown’s theory of cause and effect in “Blackwood” for 1837.
But his true merit consisted in creating a literary taste among his
students. He was not a very rigid examiner or exacter of essays, and idle
students passed through his class without much severe study. But he
read conscientiously the papers given in to him, and was a discerning
critic, particularly appreciative of excellence. The more ambitious youths
cherished secretly or avowedly the idea that they might be asked by him
to write a communication to dear old North for “Blackwood;” but Wil-
son had to consult the tastes of his readers, and their hopes had often to384/James McCosh
be disappointed.
Thus did he pass his rather lengthened life, ever looking after the
magazine with which he identified himself, lecturing all winter to his
students, taking excursions in the summer, and very often dining in com-
pany in the evening where the wine and the wit flowed freely, and where
he was always the favorite. In 1850 his health began to break down. He
retained his universal sympathy all along. His ruling passion was strong
in death. “It was an affecting sight to see him busy, nay, quite absorbed,
with the fishing tackle scattered about his bed where he lay propped up
with pillows.” “How neatly he picked out each elegantly dressed fly
from its little bunch, drawing it out with trembling hand along the white
coverlet, and then replacing it in his pocket-book; he would tell ever and
anon of the streams he used to fish in of old.” The prospect of death
produced more solemn feelings, and he betook himself to the Bible, “for
is not all human nature and all human life shadowed forth in these pages?
“The tender and anxious question which he asked concerning Robert
Burns, “Did he read his Bible?” may, perhaps, by some be asked about
himself. On a little table near his bedside his Bible lay during his whole
illness, and was read morning and evening regularly. His servant also
read it frequently to him. Thus departed John Wilson, April 2, 1853.
LVII. Sir William Hamilton101
He is the most learned of all the Scottish metaphysicians. Not that the
Scottish school ought to be described, as it has sometimes been, as igno-
rant. Hutcheson was a man of learning, as well as of accomplishment,
and visibly experienced great delight in quoting the Greek and Roman
philosophers, as he walked up and down in his class-room in Glasgow.
Adam Smith had vast stores of information; and the ground-plan which
he has left of departments of ancient philosophy, and the sketch of the
sects which he has given in his “Moral Sentiments,” show that he was
more competent, had he devoted his attention to the subject, than any
man of his age to write a history of philosophy. Hume had extensive
philosophic, as well as historical, knowledge; but he was so accustomed
to twist it to perverse uses, that we cannot trust his candor or accuracy.
Reid was pre-eminently a well-informed man. His first printed paper
was on quantity. He taught in Aberdeen College, according to the sys-
tem of rotation which continued even to his day, natural as well as moral
philosophy; and continued, even in his old age, to be well read on all
topics of general interest. Beattie and Campbell were respectable schol-The Scottish Philosophy/385
ars, as well as elegant writers; and the former was reckoned at Oxford,
and by the English clergy, as the great expounder, in his day, of sound
philosophy. Lord Monboddo was deeply versed in the Greek and Ro-
man philosophies, and in spite of all his paradoxes has often given ex-
cellent accounts of their systems. Dugald Stewart was a mathematician
as well as a metaphysician; and, if not of very varied, was of very cor-
rect, and, altogether, of very competent, ripe, and trustworthy scholar-
ship. Brown was certainly not widely or extensively read in philosophy;
but, besides a knowledge of medicine, he had an acquaintance with Roman
and with modern French literature. Sir James Mackintosh was familiar
with men and manners, was learned in all social questions, and had a
general, though certainly not a very minute or correct, knowledge of
philosophic systems. But, for scholarship, in the technical sense of the
term, and, in particular, for the scholarship of philosophy, they were all
inferior to Hamilton, who was equal to any of them in the knowledge of
Greek and Roman systems, and of the earlier philosophies of modern
Europe; and vastly above them in a comprehensive acquaintance with
all schools; and standing alone in his knowledge of the more philosophic
fathers, such as Tertullian and Augustine; of the more illustrious
schoolmen, such as Thomas Aquinas and Scotus; of the writers of the
Revival, such as the elder Scaliger; and of the ponderous systems of
Kant, and the schools which ramified from him in Germany.
When he was alive, he could always be pointed to as redeeming
Scotland from the reproach of being without high scholarship. Oxford
had no man to put on the same level. Germany had not a profounder
scholar, or one whose judgment in a disputed point could be so relied
on. Nor was his the scholarship of mere words: he knew the history of
terms, but it was because he was familiar with the history of opinions.
In reading his account, for example, of the different meanings which the
word “idea” has had, and of the views taken of sense-perception, one
feels that his learning is quite equalled by his power of discrimination.
No man has ever done more in clearing the literature of philosophy of
commonplace mistakes, of thefts and impostures. He has shown all of
us how dangerous it is to quote without consulting the original, or to
adopt, without examination, the common traditions in philosophy; that
those who borrow at second hand will be found out; and that those who
steal, without acknowledgment, will, sooner or later, be detected and
exposed. He experiences a delight in stripping modern authors of their
borrowed feathers, and of pursuing stolen goods from one literary thief386/James McCosh
to another, and giving them back to their original owner. For years to
come, ordinary authors will seem learned by drawing from his stores. In
incidental discussions, in foot-notes, and notes on foot-notes, he has
scattered nuts which it will take many a scholar many a day to gather
and to crack. It will be long before the rags which shine from him will be
so scattered and diffused through philosophic literature as the sunbeams
are through the atmosphere—that they shall become common property,
and men shall cease to distinguish the focus from which they have come.
The only other decided lineament of his character that I shall men-
tion is his logical power, including therein all such exercises as abstrac-
tion, generalization, division, definition, formal judgment, and deduc-
tion. In this respect he may be placed along side of those who have been
most distinguished for this faculty such as, Aristotle, Saint Thomas,
Descartes, Spinoza, Samuel Clarke, Kant, and Hegel. In directing his
thoughts to a subject, he proceeds to divide, distribute, define, and ar-
range, very much in the manner of Aristotle: take, as an example, his
masterly analysis of the primary qualities of matter. He pursues Much
the same method, in giving the history of opinions, as on the subjects of
the principles of common sense and perception. No man ever displayed
such admirable examples of Porphyry’s tree, reaching from the sum-
mum genus to the infirma species. It is quite clear that, had he lived in
the days of the schoolmen, he would have ranked with the greatest of
them,—with Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and
Abelard,—and would have been handed down to future generations by
such an epithet as Doctor Criticus, Doctor Doctissimus, or Doctor
Indomitabilis.
Here, however, his strength is his weakness. He attempts far too
much by logical differentiation and formalization. No man purposes
now to proceed in physical investigation by logical dissection, as was
done by Aristotle and the schoolmen. I have at times looked into the old
compends of physical science which were used in the colleges down
even to an age after the time of Newton. Ingenious they were beyond
measure, and perfect in form far beyond what Herschel or Faraday have
attempted. I am convinced that logical operations can do nearly as little
in the mental as they have done in the material sciences. I admit that Sir
William Hamilton had deeply observed the operations of the mind, and
that his lectures contribute more largely to psychology than any work
published in his day. But his induction is too much subordinated to logi-
cal arrangement and critical rules. His system will be found, when fullyThe Scottish Philosophy/387
unfolded, to have a completeness such as Reid and Stewart did not pre-
tend to, but it is effected by a logical analysis and synthesis, and much
that he has built up will require to be taken down.
We may compare him with the Scotch metaphysician who had the
greatest reputation when Hamilton determined to claim a place for him-
self. Brown and Hamilton are alike in the fame which they attained, in
the influence which they exercised over young and ardent spirits, in the
interest which they excited in the study of the human mind, and in their
success in upholding the reputation of the Scottish colleges for meta-
physical pursuits: each had an ambition to be independent, to appear
original and establish a system of his own; both were possessed of large
powers of ingenuity and acuteness, and delighted to reduce the com-
pound into elements; and each, we may add, had a considerable ac-
quaintance with the physiology of the senses: but in nearly all other
respects they widely diverge, and their points of contrast are. more marked
than their points of correspondence. They differed even in their natural
disposition. The one was amiable, gentle, somewhat effeminate, and
sensitive, and not much addicted to criticism; the other, as became the
descendant of a covenanting hero, was manly, intrepid, resolute,—at
times passionate,—and abounding in critical strictures, even on those
whom he most admires. As to their manner of expounding their views,
there could not be a stronger contrast. Both have their attractions; but
the one pleases by the changing hues of his fancy and the glow of his
sentiment, whereas the other stimulates our intellectual activity by the
sharpness of his discussions, and the variety and aptness of his erudi-
tion. The one abounds in illustrations, and excites himself into eloquence
and his readers into enthusiasm: the other is brief and curt; seldom giv-
ing us a concrete example; restraining all emotion, except it be passion
at times never deigning to warm the students by a flash of rhetoric and
presenting only the naked truth, that it may allure by its own charms. If
we lose the meaning of the one, it is in a blaze of light, in a cloud of
words, or in repeated repetitions: the quickest thinkers are not always
sure that they understand the other, because of the brevity of his style,
and the compression of his matter; and his admirers are found poring
over his notes, as the ancients did over the responses of their oracles.
The one helps us up the hill, by many a winding in his path, and allows
us many a retrospect, when we might become weary, and where the
view is most expanded; whereas the other conducts us straight up the
steep ascent, and, though be knows all the paths by which others have388/James McCosh
mounted, he ever holds directly on; and if there be not a path made for
him, he will clear one for himself. Both were eminently successful lec-
turers: but the one called forth an admiration of himself in the minds of
his whole class; whereas the other succeeded in rousing the energies of
select minds, in setting them forth on curious research, and in sharpen-
ing them for logical dissection. One feels, in reading Brown, as if he
were filled and satisfied but sometimes as he finds in the digestion, the
food has been far from substantial: whereas we are forced to complain,
in regard to Hamilton, that he gives us the condensed essence, which the
stomach feels great difficulty in mastering. The one never coins a new
technical word, when the phrases in current use among the British and
French philosophers of the previous century will serve his purpose; the
other delights to stamp his thoughts with a nomenclature of his own,
derived from the scholastics or the Germans, or fashioned out of the
Greek tongue: and so the one feels soft as a bird of delicate plumage,
whereas the other is bristling all over with sharp points like a porcupine.
The works of the one remind us of Versailles, with its paintings, its
woods, its fountains,— all somewhat artificial, but beautiful withal;
those of the other are ruled and squared like the pyramids, and look as if
they were as lofty, and must be as enduring.
Both were extensive readers: but the reading of the one was in the
Latin classics, and the works of the well-known authors of England and
France in the last century; whereas the other ranged over all ancient
literature, and over the philosophic systems of all ages and countries;
delighted supremely in writings which had never been read since the age
in which they were penned; troubled many a librarian to shake the dust
from volumes which no other man had ever asked for; and must, we
should think, have gratified the dead, grieving in their graves over ne-
glect, by showing them that they were yet remembered. The one delights
to show how superior he is to Reid, to Stewart, to the Schoolmen, to the
Stagyrite; the other rejoices to prove his superior learning by claiming
for old, forgotten philosophers the doctrines attributed to modern au-
thors, and by demonstrating how much we owe to the scholastic ages
and to Aristotle.
Both departed so far from the true Scottish school: but the one went
over to France for refinement and sentiment, the other to Germany for
abstractions and erudition. If Brown is a mixture of the Scottish and
French schools, Hamilton is a union of the schools of Reid and Kant.
Brown thought that Reid’s influence was too high, and had a secretThe Scottish Philosophy/389
desire to undermine him and Stewart with him; Hamilton thought that
Brown was over-rated, and makes no scruple in avowing that he labors
to strip him of the false glory in which he was enveloped; and he took up
Reid at the time he was being decried in Scotland, and allowed no man—
but himself—to censure the commonsense philosopher. Brown had no
sense of the merits of Kant, and did his best (along with Stewart) to keep
him unknown for an age in Scotland; Hamilton was smitten with a deep
admiration of the great German metaphysician, helped to introduce him
to the knowledge of Scottish thinkers, was caught in his logical net-
work, and was never able thoroughly to extricate himself.
As to their method of investigation, both employ analysis as their
chief instrument, but the one uses a retort and proceeds by a sort of
chemical composition, while the other employs a lens and works by
logical division. In comparison with Reid and Stewart, both erred by
excess of decomposition and overlooked essential parts of the phenom-
enon; but the object of the one was to resolve all mental states into as
few powers as possible, whereas the aim of the other was to divide and
subdivide a whole into parts, which be again distributes into compart-
ments of a framework provided for them. The one has added to the body
of philosophy mainly by his acute analyses of concrete phenomena and
by his illuminated illustrations of psychological laws; the other by his
vast erudition, which enabled him to dispose under heads the opinions
of all philosophers, and by his skill in arranging the facts of conscious-
ness by means of logical division and distribution.
Brown acquired a wide reputation at an early date; but, like those
showy members of the female sex who have many admirers but few
who make proposals of union, he has had scarcely any professing to
follow him throughout. His most distinguished pupil, Dr. Welsh, was
possessed of a fine philosophic spirit, but abandoned Scotch metaphys-
ics for phrenology and for theological and ecclesiastical studies. Sev-
eral eminent men, not pupils, have been influenced by Brown. Payne’s
work on Mental and Moral Science is drawn largely from his lectures.
Isaac Taylor, in his “Elements of Thought,” has adopted some of his
peculiarities. Chalmers had to prepare his lectures on moral philosophy
when Brown’s name was blazing high in Scotland, and, feeling an in-
tense admiration of his eloquence and of the purity of his ethical system,
has followed him perhaps further than he should have done, but has
been kept from following him in several most important points by his
attachment to Reid and Butler. John Stuart Mill has got the very defec-390/James McCosh
tive metaphysics which underlies and weakens much of his logic from
his father, James Mill, from Brown, and from Comte. Still, Brown has
no school and few professed disciples. It is different with Hamilton. His
influence, if not so extensive—to use a favorite distinction of his own—
has been more comprehensive. His articles in the “Edinburgh Review”
were above the comprehension, and still further above the tastes, of the
great body even of metaphysical students in Great Britain when they
appeared between 1829 and 1833. But they were translated by M. Peisse
into the French language, and there were penetrating minds in Britain,
America, and the Continent which speedily discovered the learning and
capacity of one who could write such dissertations. By the force of his
genius he raised up a body of pupils ready to defend him and to propa-
gate his influence. He has had a school and disciples, as the Greek phi-
losophers had in ancient times, and as such men as Descartes, Leibnitz,
and Kant have had in modern times. His pupils employ his distinctions
and delight in his nomenclature: their speech everywhere “bewrayeth”
them. Some of them, it is true, remind us of a modern soldier in mediae-
val coat of mail, and move very cumbrously under the ponderous armor
of their master; but, as a whole, they constituted an able and influential
school of abstract philosophy. Some of them seem incapable of looking
on any subject except through the well-cut lenses which Hamilton has
provided for them others seem dissatisfied with his negative conclu-
sions, and with his rejection a la Kant of final cause as a proof of the
divine existence, but then, do not seem to have the courage to examine
and separate the truth from the error in that doctrine of relativity on
which his whole system is founded.
While Hamilton has thus been establishing a school and acquiring
an authority, it has not been without protest. In saying so, I do not refer
to the criticisms of his attacks on the character and doctrines of Luther,
which have been repelled by Archdeacon Hare and others, but to oppo-
sition offered to his philosophic principles. There has been a general
dissent even by disciples, such as Mansel, from his doctrine of causa-
tion, and, if this tenet is undermined, his elaborate scheme of system-
atized “Conditions of the Thinkable” is laid in ruins. Dr. Calderwood
has opposed his negative doctrine of the infinite. Others, not pupils,
have expressed doubts of his whole theory of relativity. Ulrici, in the
leading philosophic journal of Germany, “Zeitschrift fur Philosophie”
(1855), has charged him with departing in his method from the stand-
point of Scotland, with giving in to the critical method of Kant, andThe Scottish Philosophy/391
ploughing with the German heifer, and alleges that he or his school must
advance with Germany. As the unkindest cut of all, Mr Ferrier, who
was supported by Hamilton in the competition for the moral philosophy
chair in Edinburgh when Professor Wilson retired, and with whom
Hamilton (as he assured the writer of this article) was long in the habit
of consulting, published the “Institutes of Metaphysic,” which is a com-
plete revolt against the whole Scottish philosophy; and Kant was not
more annoyed with the idealism of Fichte than Hamilton was with the
“Object plus Subject “of Ferrier. There has been an able review of him
from the stand-point of Hegel by Mr Sterling. But the most formidable
attack was made on him in 1865 by John Stuart Mill in his “Examina-
tion of the Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton.” The physiological psy-
chologists and materialists of the present day are seeking to turn away
the attention from him.
William Hamilton was born in the dingy Professors’ Court of
Glasgow College, March 8, 1791. He was the son of Dr. Thomas
Hamilton, professor of anatomy and natural history in that college, and,
it is worthy of being noted, physician to the family of Thomas Reid. He
was the lineal descendant of Sir Robert Hamilton, the not very wise
commander of the Covenanters at Drumclog, and through him, of the
Hamiltons of Preston, who claim to be descended from the second son
of the progenitor of the Duke of Hamilton; and he succeeded in estab-
lishing his claim to the title of Sir William Hamilton. Having lost his
father in early life, he was boarded for some time with the Rev. Dr.
Summers, the parish minister at Mid Calder, and was afterwards sent to
a school at Bromley, where he was taught classics in the thorough old
English style. He entered the University of Glasgow in 1803, attended
three winters, and there studied logic under Jardine, and moral philoso-
phy under Mylne, standing at the head of his class in both departments,
by the votes of his fellow-students—the method of determining honors
at that time when competitive examinations had not been exalted into so
exclusive a place. By this time he had become an irregular, but most
insatiable devourer and also an eager collector of books—in the end his
library amounted to nearly ten thousand volumes. In 1807 he was sent
up on the Snell foundation to Oxford, and entered Balliol College. Here
he took his share in the boating and other gymnastic exercises, but en-
tered with far more eagerness into the study of Aristotle, the favorite of
Oxford at that time. “His manner of reading was characteristic. He had
his table, chairs, and generally his floor strewed with books; and you392/James McCosh
might find him in the midst of this confusion studying with his foot on a
chair, poising one great folio on his knee, with another in his hand. His
mode of ‘tearing out the entrails of a book,’ as he termed it, was remark-
able. A perusal of the preface, table of contents, and index, and a glance
at those parts which were new to him, which were few, were all that was
necessary.” The paper which he gave in at his examination for the de-
gree was preserved as being singular:—
“Divinity: Aristotle’s Philosophy of Man.
“Theoretical: De Anima, etc.
“Practical-Moral-Ethic: Nic., Mag., Cic. Op. Ph. Domestic: Oecon.
Civil: De Republ.
“Instrumental: Logic: Organon. Rhetoric: Ars. Rhet., Cic. Op. Rhet
Poetic: De Poetica Pindar, Aeschylus.”
“He allowed himself to be examined on more than four times the
number of philosophical and didactic books ever wont to be taken up
even for the highest honors; and those, likewise, authors far more ab-
struse than had previously been attempted in the schools; while at the
same time he was examined in more than any ordinary complement of
merely classical works.” In 1812 he went to Edinburgh, and in the fol-
lowing year, he became an advocate. He lived in the house of his mother,
and married an estimable lady, Miss Janet Marshall, a niece of his
mother’s. In 1820, when Brown died, he became a candidate for his
chair, and had the support of Dugald Stewart, who was greatly im-
pressed with his learning and philosophical ability. He was not particu-
larly successful at the bar, and every one rejoiced when, in 1821, he was
appointed professor of universal history by the faculty of advocates, the
patrons of the chair. His class was not a language one; but he studied
and expounded rare and profound subjects. About this time phrenology,
as expounded by George Combe, was favored by a considerable body
of people in Edinburgh; and Hamilton set himself determinedly against
it. He conducted numerous experiments with his own hands, sawing
open skulls, dissecting and testing the weight of brains: he is said to
have weighed one thousand brains belonging to above fifty species of
animals. In 1827, he published in the “Edinburgh Review,” his famous
article on Cousin and the philosophy of the conditioned. This was fol-
lowed in 1830 by an article on perception, and on Reid and Brown; and
in 1833 by an article on Whately and on logic. In 1836 he was ap-
pointed professor of logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh,
in opposition to Isaac Taylor, supported by the religious public, andThe Scottish Philosophy/393
George Combe, supported by the phrenologists. He has now a large
class of students, numbering from perhaps one hundred and twenty to
one hundred and fifty, and he prepared for them the courses of lectures
in logic and metaphysics, which he, or his assistants for him, delivered
each successive session, till his decease. Having occasion to prelect on
Reid, his labors led, in 1856, to his edition of Reid’s “Collected Works,
with Notes and Dissertations,” which was left unfinished by him, but
had additions made to it after his death by papers which he had written.
In 1852 the articles in the “Edinburgh were republished in the “Discus-
sions on Philosophy,” with large additions on university education, in-
cluding his vehement and senseless diatribe against mathematics. Some
years before his death he had a stroke of paralysis, which partially af-
fected his speech and his power of using his pen, and his lectures had to
be read in part or in whole by an assistant, while his lady acted as his
amanuensis. A second attack carried him off, after a few days’ illness,
May 6, 1856.
Mr George Moir describes his person: “The massive though well-
cut features, the firm compressed mouth, and the eagle-looking eye, of
which the whole pupil was visible, created a feeling akin to awe. But in
proportion to this apparent sternness was the charm of his smile and of
his whole manner when animated.” Though a most devoted reader, he
never liked composition, and commonly wrote under pressure. There
were stories told in Edinburgh of the nervous agitation into which he
wrought himself when he had to prepare his lectures for his class. His
style was always clear and clinching, but gives evidence that the writer
composed painfully and elaborately, and was unwilling to waste a single
unnecessary word. His temper was keen and vehement, but never mean
or vindictive. When he could not carry his purposes, he might break off
in a passion. He was appointed secretary to the college senatus, and
there he had a great many projects for elevating the university scholar-
ship, and often came into collision with his colleagues.
Of all thinkers Hamilton is the least disposed to call any man mas-
ter; still there were forces operating upon him and making his native
tendencies take the particular direction which they did. I am convinced
that a wholesome tone was given to his mind by the philosophy of Reid,
the metaphysician of his native college, and who died six years after
Hamilton was born. Had he been trained exclusively in Oxford, he might
have spent his powers in mere notes and comments on others, and we
should have been without his profound original observations. Had he394/James McCosh
been reared in Germany, his speculative spirit might have wasted itself
in a hopelessly entangled dialectic, like that of Hegel. To Glasgow and
to Reid he owes his disposition to appeal, even in the midst of his most
abstract disquisitions, to consciousness and to facts. To Oxford we may
trace his classical scholarship and his love of Aristotle, the favorite for
long ages with technical Oxonian tutors. We only wish that he had been
led to drink as deep into Plato as he did into Aristotle: it would have
widened his sympathies, and rubbed off some acute angles of his mind,
and made his philosophy less cold and negative. A third master mind
exercised as great a power over him as either Reid or Aristotle. In pros-
ecuting his researches, he was necessarily led beyond the narrow schol-
arship of Britain into the wide field of German learning, and while rang-
ing there could not but observe that there was a constant reference to the
name of Kant. The logical power of the author of the “Critic of Pure
Reason” at once seized his kindred mind, and he eagerly took hold of his
critical method, and adopted many—I think far too many of his distinc-
tions. Kant exercised as great an influence over him as even Reid did.
His whole philosophy turns round those topics which were discussed in
Kant’s great work; and he can never get out of those “forms” in which
Kant set all our ideas so methodically, nor lose sight of those terrible
antinomies, or contradictions of reason which Kant expounded, in order
to show that the laws of pure reason can have no application to objects,
and which Hegel gloried in and was employing as the ground principle
of his philosophy. From Kant he got the principle that the mine begins
with phenomena instead of things, and builds thereon by forms or laws
of thought; and it was as he pondered on the sphinx enigmas of Kant
and Hegel, that he evolved his famous axiom about all positive thought
lying in the proper conditioning of one or other of two contradictory
propositions, one or other of which must, by the rule of excluded middle,
be void. Fortunately he fell in, at the same time, with the less hard and
more genial writings of Jacobi, who taught him that there was a faith
element as well as a rational element in the human mind; but, unfortu-
nately, Jacobi thought that faith was opposed to reason, and had no
distinct views as to the nature of faith, or as to the harmony between
faith and reason. To this source we may trace those appeals which
Hamilton is ever making to faith, but without specifying what faith is.
To his legal studies we may refer somewhat of his dry manner and his
disputatious spirit. His readings in connection with the chair of history
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opinions of philosophers were given forth. The catholic views which his
extensive reading led him to adopt set him in determined opposition to
the miserably narrow sensational school of France, and to Professor
Mylne, of Glasgow, and Dr. Thomas Brown, who had given way too
much to that school. The lofty spiritual views which he had caught from
Reid and Kant set him against materialism; and his medical studies, to
which his father’s profession may have directed him, enabled him to
meet phrenology, and to give an admirable account of the physiology of
the senses. Such was the course of training which he had gone through
when he was asked to write a review of Cousin, and found himself face
to face with the philosophy of the absolute.
In contemplating these two eminent philosophers,—Hamilton and
Cousin,—then brought into collision, it is difficult to say whether one is
most struck with their resemblances or their differences. They are alike
in respect of the fulness and the general accuracy of their scholarship.
Both are alike distinguished for their historical knowledge and critical
power. Even here, however, we may observe a contrast,-Cousin being
the more universal in his sympathies, and Hamilton being the more dis-
criminating and the more minutely accurate in his acquaintance with
rare and obscure authors. Both, perhaps, might have had some of their
views expanded, if, along with their scholarship, they had entered more
thoroughly into the inductive spirit of modern physical researches. But
the age of universal knowledge is past, and it is vain to expect that any
human capacity will contain all learning. Both are original, vigorous,
and independent thinkers; and both are distinguished by a catholic spirit
in philosophy: but the one is more Platonic, and the other more Aristo-
telian, in his tastes and habits. The one delights to show wherein he
agrees with all others, the other is more addicted to show wherein he
differs from all others. Both are clear writers: but the one is distin-
guished by the eloquence of his composition and the felicity of his illus-
trations; the other, by the accuracy and expressiveness of his, at times,
harsh nomenclature. Cousin is, undoubtedly, the man of finest genius
and most refined taste; the other appears to me to have been the man of
coolest and most penetrating intellect. The one makes every subject of
which he treats irridescent by the play of his fancy; the other bands it
into a structure of great solidity by the rigidity of his logic. Both were
admirers of the German as well as the Scottish schools of philosophy;
but Cousin’s predilections were at one time more towards the former,
and of a later date he became more attached to the latter; whereas396/James McCosh
Hamilton started more in the Scottish spirit, and swung latterly towards
the German method. The two came into collision when the Scotchman
reviewed the Frenchman in the “Edinburgh Review.” But when Hamilton
became a candidate for the chair of moral philosophy in Edinburgh he
received powerful and generous aid from his rival; and when Hamilton
published his edition of Reid, he dedicated it to M. Victor Cousin.
The writer of this article has a very vivid recollection of Sir William
in happening to pass into his class-room a year or two after his appoint-
ment. There was an evident manliness in his person and his whole man-
ner and address. His features were marked, he had an eye of a very deep
lustre, and his expression was eminently intellectual. He read his lecture
in a clear, emphatic manner, without show, pretension, or affectation of
any kind. His nomenclature sounded harsh and uncouth to one unac-
quainted with it, but his enunciations were all perspicuous and explicit.
The class was a large one, numbering I should suppose 150. At the
opening there was a furious scribbling, visible and audible, by all the
students in their notebooks; but I observed that, as the lecture proceeded,
one after another was left behind, and, when it was half through, at least
one-third had ceased to take notes, and had evidently lost their interest
in, or comprehension of, the subject. Unfortunately for the Scottish col-
leges, unfortunately for the youth attending them, students enter the logic
class in the second year of their course, when the majority are not ripe
for it. A course of lectures, like that given by Jardine of Glasgow, might
be fit for such a class, but not a rigid course like that of Hamilton, who
did, indeed, make his thoughts as clear as such profound thoughts could
be made, but could not bring them down to the comprehension of a
promiscuous class, of which many are under seventeen, and some under
sixteen, or even fifteen years of age. But even among second year stu-
dents there were every year a larger or less number who rejoiced to find
that he first awakened independent thought within them, and who were
ready to acknowledge ever afterwards that they owed more to him than
to any other professor, or to all the other professors under whom they
studied.
In his examinations be expected a sort of recitation of his lectures
from the students. He also encouraged his pupils to submit to voluntary
examinations on private studies undertaken by them. He prescribed es-
says on subjects lectured on, and in these essays he allowed great lati-
tude in the expression of opinions, and some of his students, out of a
spirit of independence or contradiction, would at times take up the de-The Scottish Philosophy/397
fence of Dr. Brown, and were not discouraged. All students of high
intellectual power, and especially those of a metaphysical taste, received
a stimulus of a very lofty kind from his lectures, and these examinations
and essays. I suspect that some of the duller and idler passed through
the class without getting much benefit. In his whole intercourse with
young men there was great courtesy and kindness, and a readiness to
appreciate talent and independent thinking wherever he found it. For a
number of years before his death, Sir William was oppressed with infir-
mities, and had to employ an assistant; and it was characteristic of him
that he was in the habit of selecting for the office some one of those who
had been his more distinguished students. We may now look at his meta-
physics and his logic.
Metaphysics. The first of the volumes is on philosophy generally
and on mental philosophy in particular. He begins by recommending the
study, gives the definitions, unfolds the divisions, explains the terms
with amazing erudition and unsurpassed logical precision, and dwells
largely on consciousness, its laws and conditions. The reading of this
volume will prove as bracing to the mind as a run up a hill of a morning
on a botanical or geological excursion is to the body. We especially
recommend the study of it to those whose pursuits are usually of a dif-
ferent character, as, for example, to those who are dissipating their minds
by light literature, or whose attention has been directed exclusively to
physical facts, and who have thus been cultivating one set of the facul-
ties which God has given them, to the neglect of others, and have thus
been putting their mental frame out of proper shape and proportion,—
as the fisher, by strengthening his chest and arms in rowing, leaves his
lower extremities thin and slender. There is a fine healthy tone about his
defence of the liberal as against the more lucrative sciences, which latter
Schelling called Brodwissenchaften, which Hamilton wittily translates,
the bread and butter sciences. He quotes with approbation the well-
known sentiment of Lessing, “Did the Almighty, holding in his right
hand Truth, and in his left Search after Truth, deign to tender me the one
I might prefer,—in all humility, but without hesitation, I would request
Search after Truth.” But we should concur in such statements as these
only with two important explanations or qualifications; the one is, that
the search be after truth, which we must value when we find it; and the
other is, that it be after attainable and useful truth. It has been the great
error and sin of speculative philosophy that it has been expending its
strength in building in one age ingenious theories which the next age398/James McCosh
takes down. I maintain that such activity wastes the energy without
increasing the strength. He who thus fights is like one beating the air,
and his exertion ends, not in satisfaction, but in weariness and restless-
ness. The admirable test of Bacon here comes in to restrain all such
useless speculation, viz., that we are to try them by their fruits. Had this
been the proper place we could have shown that Bacon’s doctrine on
this subject has often been misunderstood. He does not say that science
is to be valued for its fruits, but it is to be tested by its fruits; just as
faith, which, however, is of value in itself, is to be tried by the good
works to which it leads. Thus limited and thus understood, there is pro-
found wisdom in the caution of Bacon, which will not discourage an
inductive inquiry into the human mind, its laws and fundamental prin-
ciples, but will lay a restraint on the profitless metaphysical theories
which have run to seed prematurely in Germany, where thinkers are sick
of them, and are now being blown into our country and scattered over it
like the down of thistles.
This volume is full of brief and sententious maxims. Take the fol-
lowing as examples:—
“It is ever the contest that pleases us, and not the victory. Thus it is
in play; thus it is in bunting; thus it is in the search after truth;
thus it is in life. The past does not interest, the present does not
satisfy, the future alone is the object which engages us.” “What
man holds of matter does not make up his personality. They are
his, not be; man is not an organism,—he is an intelligence served
by organs.” “I do not mean to assert that all materialists deny or
actually disbelieve a God. For in very many cases this would be at
once an unmerited compliment to their reasoning, and an unmer-
ited reproach to their faith.” “Wonder has been contemptuously
called the daughter of ignorance; true, but wonder we should add
is the mother of knowledge” “Woe to the revolutionist who is not
him self a creature of the revolution! If he anticipate he is lost, for
it requires what no individual can supply, a long and powerful
counter-sympathy in a nation to untwine the ties of custom which
bind a people to the established and the old.”














Immortality of the Soul, etc.
I set little value on this division. The same topics would require to
be discussed under more than one head. In his lectures Sir William has
taken up only one of the three grand general groups, viz., Empirical
Psychology, and even this he has discussed only in part. A portion of the
second group is treated of in his lectures on logic. On the others he never
entered.
It will be seen from the above table that he followed Kant in giving
a threefold distribution of the mental faculties into the Cognitive, the
Emotive, and the Conative. This is an improvement on the old division
by Aristotle into the cognitive and motive, or of that of the schoolmen
into the understanding and the will. Still it is not complete and exhaus-
tive. He is obliged to include the imagination in the first head, and yet it
can scarcely be called a cognitive power, though, of course, it implies a
previous cognition. The conscience comes in under the conative pow-
ers; but, in fact, the conscience partakes of the nature both of a cogni-
tive and conative power. It is one of the defects of the arrangement that
it does not allot a clearly separate place to the conscience.




2. Conservative = Memory
3. Reproductive = Without Will = Suggestion
With Will = Reminiscence
4. Representative = Imagination
5. Elaborative = Comparison = Faculty of Relation
6. Regulative = Reason = Common sense400/James McCosh
The account of the cognitive powers in the first 332 pages of the
second volume, down to the regulative powers, not included, will be
regarded in the end, if I do not mistake, as the most valuable part of Sir
William Hamilton’s metaphysics. His pupils will probably fix on the
very part I have designedly excepted, viz., the regulative faculties, as
being the most important. Farther on in this article I mean to show that
he has greatly misapprehended the nature of these regulative powers.
Meanwhile let us look at the account which he has given of the other
mental faculties.
1. Like the Scotch metaphysicians he paid great attention to the
Senses. His views were first given to the world in his article in the
“Edinburgh Review,” republished in the Discussions, and have been
expanded in his notes on Reid and in his class lectures. He has a famous
arrangement of the various forms which have been taken by the ideal
theory of sense-perception. Realists are either natural, who maintain
that we know the external thing directly; or hypothetical (cosmothetic
idealists), who suppose that there is a real world not directly known.
Idealists are absolute or presentative, who suppose that there is only the
idea; or cosmothetic or representative (hypothetical realists) who bold
that we know the external thing by a representation. The possible forms
of the representative hypothesis are three: (1) The representative object
not a modification of mind, but an extra-mental object, physical or hy-
perphysical; (2) The representative object a modification of mind, de-
pendent for its apprehension, but not for its existence, on an act of con-
sciousness, say an idea in the mind, as was held apparently by Locke;
(3) The representative object a modification of mind, non-existent out
of consciousness, the idea and its perception only different relations of
an act (state) really identical; the view taken by Arnauld and Brown.
The distinctions thus drawn are of great importance, and should be kept
steadily in view in judging of theories. But his divisions do not embrace
all cases. Dr. Brown does not bold by the ideal, but the causal or infer-
ential, theory; and Hamilton has missed the mark in his criticism of him.
I am inclined to agree with him that our original perceptions are
probably of our organism, or of objects in immediate contact with it.
This doctrine seems to have been expounded simultaneously by Hamilton;
by Saisset, the French metaphysician; and by John Muller, the physiolo-
gist. On one small point I would differ from Hamilton. Our original
perceptions through the eye do not seem to me to be points of light, but
of a colored surface affecting our organism, but at what distance weThe Scottish Philosophy/401
cannot say till experience comes to our aid. But the doctrine identified
with his name is that of immediate perception. He intended to take the
same view as Reid did, and, when he began to edit Reid’s works, he
thought that their opinions were the same. But, as he advances, he sees
that they differ; and he ends by doubting whether Reid was after all a
realist. Reid’s doctrine is, that there is first an organic affection; then a
sensation in the mind; and, thirdly, a perception suggested by an unrea-
soning and instinctive process. Hamilton’s doctrine is, that, following
the organic affection, there is simultaneously a sensation and percep-
tion, the one being strong as the other is weak, and vice versa; that is,
when the sensation is lively the perception is faint, and when the percep-
tion is prominent the impression is feeble. Both, however, agree in the
main point, that the process is intuitive and that there is no reasoning
involved. Hamilton’s doctrine is specially that of immediate perception;
that is, of perception without a medium.
It is objected to Hamilton’s theory, that he overlooks the numerous
intermediate processes revealed by physiology. In vision there are the
rays of light; the reflection and refraction of them, the picture on the
retina, an action along the optic nerve to the seat of sensation, an action
thence we know not how to the brain, an action in the cells which consti-
tute the gray matter surrounding the brain, and then, or perhaps not
even then, but only after some farther steps, the perception of the object,
say a tree, from which the rays of light come. How it is asked can per-
ception be immediate, when all these media are evidently implied? To
this the followers of Hamilton might reply, that he never thought of
disputing the existence of steps between the external object and the per-
cipient mind, which, when it comes into exercise, contemplates the tree,
and not an image or representation of it in the mind, in the body or out of
the body. But the objection may now take a somewhat different form. It
may be urged that, after all, we do not see the tree, and it will be asked,
What do we perceive intuitively? Certainly not the brain cells, or the
influence transmitted to them, or the action of the sensorium, or even the
image on the retina, or the coats and humors of the eye, or the vibrations
that constitute the light. What, then, do we perceive? Hamilton. allowed
that it was not the distant tree; for he adopted the Berkleian theory of
vision, and held that we are immediately percipient of distance by the
eye. What, then, do we see immediately? Hamilton was helped here by
another doctrine of his, that the mind may be said to be indiscriminately
in the brain and in the whole nervous apparatus, so long as it keeps up402/James McCosh
its connection with the centre; and by the further doctrine that our pri-
mary perceptions are of our bodily frame and of objects in contact with
it. In taste, smell, and hearing, we perceive the palate, nostrils, ear; in
feeling, our extended frame; and by the muscular sense an extra-organic
object resisting our energy. The proper account is, that in sense-percep-
tion, when formed, we perceive our frame as affected or objects affect-
ing the frame. I am ready to allow as many processes as the physiologist
can prove to exist in the nervous system and brain prior to perception.
But I hold that perception is a mental and not a bodily act. We hold
further that nervous action, and brain action and cellular, do not consti-
tute perception, which is knowledge. I assert that, while there may be
bodily antecedents, they are not properly the causes of perception or
any proper mental act, such as the perception of beauty or of moral
excellence. I may add that I have no objections to find them represented
as the occasions or conditions of sense-perception, not therefore of our
higher mental acts. If we hold, as I hold, that in creature action all
causes are concauses, that is composed of more than one agent, then the
brain action may be an agent, a necessary but inferior agent, in produc-
ing perception, the main agency being a capacity of the mind. I am
inclined to go a step further, and to allow that the defenders of natural
realism might admit for the sake of argument, and admit out and out if
proven, that there is a process of reasoning in every perceptive opera-
tion, even in such an operation as perceiving snow as a colored sur-
face—just as all admit that there is inference when we place that snow
on a mountain too at a distance. But still they will insist that when mind
perceives matter, it perceives it as out of itself, and as extended; that it
cannot infer this from a nervous action, or from an unextended sensa-
tion or impression within the mind; and that the perception of an exter-
nal, extended object, be it in the body or beyond the body, must be
immediate, intuitive, and original.
2. Sir William Hamilton has been much landed for the view which
he has given of Consciousness. In this I cannot concur. He avows that
he uses consciousness in two distinct senses or applications. First, he
has a general consciousness treated of largely in the first volume. This
he tells us cannot be defined. (Vol. I. p. 158) “But it comprehends all the
modifications,—all—the phenomena of the thinking subject.” (p. 183.)
“Knowledge and belief are both contained under consciousness.” (p.
191) Again, “consciousness is co-extensive with our cognitive facul-
ties.” “Our special faculties of knowledge are only modifications of con-The Scottish Philosophy/403
sciousness.” (p. 207) He shows that consciousness implies discrimina-
tion, judgment, and memory. (p. 202–206) This is wide enough: still he
imposes a limit; for consciousness “is an immediate not a mediate knowl-
edge.” (p. 202) Already, as it seems to me, inconsistencies are beginning
to creep in—for he had told us first that consciousness includes “all the
phenomena of the thinking subject;” now be so limits it as to exclude
“mediate knowledge,” which is surely a modification of the thinking
subject. Consciousness is represented as including belief; and yet it must
exclude all those beliefs in which the object is not immediately before
us. He stoutly maintains what no one will deny, that this general con-
sciousness is not a special faculty; but when he comes to draw out a list
of faculties in the second volume, he includes among them a special
faculty, which he calls consciousness, but to which, for distinction’s
sake, he prefixes self, and designates it self-consciousness. It is the of-
fice of this special faculty to afford us a knowledge of the phenomena of
our minds.” (Vol. II. p. 192) He justifies himself in drawing a distinction
between sense-perception and self-consciousness on the ground that,
“though the immediate knowledge of matter and of mind are still only
modifications of consciousness, yet that their discrimination as subal-
tern faculties is both allowable and convenient.”
Such is the doctrine and such the nomenclature of Hamilton on this
subject. I confess that I have great doubts of the propriety of applying
the phrase “consciousness,” both in this general and specific way. In the
first sense “Consciousness constitutes, or is co-extensive with all Our
faculties of knowledge,” and he speaks of our being endowed with a
faculty of cognition or consciousness, in general (Vol. 2. p. 10), and
says that “consciousness may be regarded as the general faculty of knowl-
edge.” Now it is certainly desirable to have a word to denote our facul-
ties of knowledge, or of immediate knowledge but why not call them
knowing powers, or cognitive powers, and their exercise or energy, knowl-
edge or cognition, and then the word “consciousness “would be reserved
unambiguously for the cognizance which the mind takes of self in its
particular states. The word (from con scio to know together with) seems
the appropriate one to denote that knowledge of self which co exists
with all our other knowledge of things material or things spiritual; and
indeed with all our other mental exercises, such as feelings and voli-
tions. It is certainly in this sense that the term is employed by Hutcheson,
by Reid, by Stewart, by Royer Collard; and all Hamilton’s vehement
criticisms of these men are inapplicable and powerless, for this very404/James McCosh
obvious reason, that they use the word consciousness as he uses self-
consciousness, acknowledged by him to be a special faculty. It is an
inevitable result of using the phrases in two senses, a wider and a straiter,
that we are ever in danger of passing inadvertently from the one mean-
ing to the other, and making affirmations in the one sense which are true
only in the other. I rather think that Hamilton himself has not escaped
this error, and the confusion thence arising. He is ever appealing to
consciousness, as Locke did to ideal and Brown did to suggestion; but
we are not always sure in which of the senses, whether in both, or in
one, or in which one. He is ever ascribing powers to consciousness,
which he would have explained, or modified, or limited, if the distinc-
tion had been kept steadily in view. Thus he is often announcing that
consciousness is the universal condition of intelligence; if this is meant
of the general consciousness, it can mean no more than this, that man
must have knowing powers in order to know; if meant of the special
consciousness, it is not true; it is rather true that there must be some
mental exercise as a condition of the knowledge of self. He calls the
principles of common sense the facts of consciousness, emphatically;
whereas these principles, as principles, are not before the consciousness
as principles at all. The individual manifestations are of course before
the consciousness (though not more so than any other mental exercise),
but not the principles themselves, which are derived from the individual
exercises, by a reflex process of abstraction and generalization. He speaks
everywhere as if we must ever be conscious at one and the same time of
subject and object,—meaning external object; whereas we may be con-
scious of the subject mind thinking about some state of self present or
absent. His quondam friend, Professor Ferrier, carried the doctrine a
step farther, and maintained that a knowledge of self is a condition of all
knowledge of not self, whereas it is merely a fact that the one co-exists
with the other in one concrete act, in which we know not self to be
different from self, and independent of self.
3. The Conservative, Reproductive, and Representative faculties
might all have been included, I think, under one head, with subdivisions.
The account which he gives of this group is upon the whole the best
which we have in our language. Still there are oversights in it. Thus, in
order to make the analysis complete, I should have had the recognitive
power, or that which recognizes the object recalled as having been be-
fore the mind in time past. Had he given this power a separate place, he
would have seen more clearly than he does how the idea of time arises.The Scottish Philosophy/405
Along with the mere representative power he should have mentioned the
compounding or grouping power of imagination, which combines the
scattered images into one new whole. He refers at times to man’s native
power of using signs; why not specify a symbolic power, enabling man
to think by signs standing for notions.
In explaining the nature of the conservative or retentive faculty, and
elsewhere, he has unfolded some peculiar views which I consider to be
as correct as they are profound, but he carries them to a length which I
am not prepared to allow. What is the state of an idea when not falling at
the time under consciousness? This is the question which has often been
put. Thus having seen the Crystal Palace of 1851, the question is put,—
what place has that idea in my mind, when I am not precisely thinking
about the object? Is it dead or simply dormant? We must of course an-
swer that the idea can have no existence as an idea, when not before the
consciousness. Still it must have some sort of existence. There exists in
the mind a power to reproduce it according to the laws of association.
The writer of this article having had occasion, years ago, to pass over
the plains of Lombardy, is not therefore always imaging them, but he
has the power of recalling them, and finds that they are recalled every
time he hears of the jealousies between Austria and Italy. It is a great
truth that the mind is ever acquiring potency, is ever laying up power.
We have something analogous in the physical world. Thus a power com-
ing from the sun in the geological age of the coal-measures was laid up
in the plant, went down into the strata of the ground, and comes up now
in our coals ready to supply us with comfortable heat in our rooms, and
with tremendous mechanical force for our steam-engines. This is the
doctrine of all the physicists of our day. But there is a similar laying up
of power in the mind, of intellectual, and we may add, of moral or im-
moral power. Aristotle had certainly a glimpse of some such doctrine,
and spoke of a dunamis, an entelecheia, and an energeia; the first de-
noting the original capacity, the second—the capacity in complete readi-
ness to act, and the third the capacity in act or operation. Modern me-
chanical science is enunciating this doctrine in a more definite form, and
distinguishing between capacity and potential energy and actual energy.
Sir William Hamilton, taking the hint from Aristotle, has adopted the
views of the German Schmid (who again had certain speculations of
Leibnitz before him), who declares that the energy of mind which has
once been cannot readily be conceived as abolished, and that “the prob-
lem most difficult of solution is not how a mental activity endures, but406/James McCosh
how it ever vanishes.” (Vol. II. p. 212)
So far I can concur; but when he maintains that there are in the
mind, acts, energies, and operations, of which it is not conscious, I hesi-
tate and draw back. His doctrine on this subject is founded on the views
of Leibnitz, as to there being perceptions below consciousness. The class
of facts on which he rests his opinion seem to me to be misapprehended.
“When we hear the distant murmur of the sea, what are the constituents
of this total perception of which we are conscious?” He answers that the
murmur is a sum made up of parts, and that if the noise of each wave
made no impression on our sense, the noise of the sea as the result of
these impressions could not be realized. “But the noise of each several
wave at the distance, we suppose, is inaudible; we must, how ever, ad-
mit that they produce a certain modification beyond consciousness, on
the percipient object.” (Vol. I. p. 351) He speaks of our perception of a
forest as made up of impressions left by each leaf, which impressions
are below consciousness. There is an entire misinterpretation of the facts
in these statements, and this according to Hamilton’s own theory of the
object intuitively perceived. The mind is not immediately cognizant of
the sound of the sea or of its several waves; nor of the trees of the forest
and their several leaves. All that it knows intuitively is an affection of
the organism as affected by the sound or sight. The impression made by
the distant object is on the organism, and when the impression is suffi-
ciently strong on the organism, the mind is called into exercise, and
from the organic affections argues or infers the external and distant
cause. Thus there is no proof of a mental operation of which we are
unconscious.
He explains by these supposed unconscious acts a class of mental
phenomena with which every one who has ever reflected on the opera-
tions of his own mind is familiar. The merchant walks in a brown study
from his house to his place of business; there must have been many
mental acts performed on the way, but they are now all gone. The ques-
tion is, were they ever before the consciousness? Hamilton maintains
that they never were; Dugald Stewart maintains that they were for the
time, but that the mind cannot recall them. Notwithstanding all the acute
remarks of Hamilton, I adhere to the theory of Stewart. I do so on the
general principle that in devising a theory to explain a set of phenomena
we should never call in a class of facts, of whose existence we have no
other proof, when we can account for the whole by an order of facts
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denly awakened during sleep (and to ascertain the fact I have caused
myself to be roused at different seasons of the night), I have always
been able to observe that I was in the middle of a dream;” but adds,
“that he was often scarcely certain of more than the fact that he was not
awakened from an unconscious state, and that we are often not able to
recollect our dreams.” He gives, as the peculiarity of somnambulism,
that we have no recollection when we awake of what has occurred dur-
ing its continuance. (Vol. I. p. 320–322) Every one will admit that we
are often conscious of states at the time, which we either cannot remem-
ber at all, or (what will equally serve our purpose) more probably can-
not remember, except for a very brief period after we have experienced
them. We have thus an established order of facts competent to explain
the whole phenomenon without resorting to a Leibnitzian doctrine, which
has been applied by certain later German pantheists to show how exist-
ence may rise gradually from deadness to life, and from unconscious-
ness to consciousness.
Under the head of the reproductive faculties he has two profound
lectures on the Association of Ideas. In the close of his edition of Reid
there is a learned disquisition on the well-known passage of Aristotle, in
which he gives, with his usual brevity, a classification of. laws which
regulate the train of our thoughts. Hamilton so interprets that passage
as to make Aristotle announce one generic law and three special ones. I
am unwilling to set my authority against so accurate a scholar as
Hamilton; but I have often looked into that passage, and can find no
evidence of Aristotle having resolved all into one law. In the same note
Hamilton had begun to expound his own theory, but broke off, and closed
the book in the middle of a sentence. Most readers will feel that the
account given in these lectures, though somewhat fuller, is far too brief,
and illustrated by too few examples to be easily understood. His pupils
could not be more profitably employed than in fully unfolding the doc-
trine of their master on this subject, and applying it to explain the well-
known phenomena. He thinks that the whole facts can be explained by
one great law, which he calls the law of redintegration, which he finds
incidentally expressed by Augustine. This law may be thus enounced,—
“Those thoughts suggest each other which had previously constituted
parts of the same entire or total act of cognition.” (Vol. II. p. 238) He
again quotes Schmid: “Thus the supreme law of association,—that ac-
tivities excite each other in proportion as they have previously belonged
as parts to one whole activity,—is explained from the still more univer-408/James McCosh
sal principle of the unity of all our mental energies in general.” (p. 241)
I am inclined to look on this as, on the whole, the most philosophical
account which has been given of the law of association. It at once ex-
plains the cases of simple repetition in which one link of a chain of ideas
which had previously passed through the mind, being caught, all the rest
come after; as when we have got the first line of a poem committed to
memory, and the others follow in order. It easily explains, too, all cases
in which we have had a variety of objects before us in one concrete
act,—thus if we have passed along a particular road, with a certain
person, observing the mountain or river in front, and talking on certain
objects,—we find that when any one of these recurs it is apt to suggest
the others. It is thus if we have often heard in youth the cry of a particu-
lar animal, goose or grouse, turkey or curlew, the cry will ever bring up
afresh the scenes of our childhood. It is more doubtful whether the law
can explain a third class of cases when it is not the same which suggests
the same, but an object suggests another object which has never been
individually associated with it, but is like it, or is otherwise correlated
with it; as when the conqueror Alexander suggests Julius Caesar or
Bonaparte. It needs an explanation to show how the law can cover such
a case, which, however, I rather think it can, though I am by no means
inclined to admit the explanations of the Hamiltonians proceeding on
their narrow and peculiar view of correlates.
4. This leads us to refer to the next faculty,—the Elaborative, equal
to Comparison,—that is the Faculty of Relations. The phrase elabora-
tive is an expressive epithet, but is not a good special denomination, as
there is elaboration in other exercises as well as in this. Comparison, or
the correlative faculties, or the faculties of relation, is the better epithet.
Under this head he has some learned and acute remarks on the abstract
and the general notion, and on language, and is terribly severe, as usual,
on Dr Thomas Brown. I am of opinion that Brown’s views on this sub-
ject are, in one or two points, more enlarged than those of Hamilton
himself, who has overlooked essential elements. “In so far,” he says, “as
two objects resemble each other, the notion we have of them is identical,
and, therefore, to us, the objects may be considered as the same.” (Vol.
II. pp. 294) I cannot give my adherence to this doctrine of the identity of
resembling objects. Altogether his account of the relations which the
mind can discover is narrow and exclusive. He specifies first the judg-
ment virtually pronounced in an act of perception of the non-ego, or an
act of self-consciousness of the ego; then secondly the something ofThe Scottish Philosophy/409
which we are conscious and of which the predicate existence is twofold,
the ego and the non-ego; thirdly, the recognition of the multiplicity of
the co-existent or successive phenomena, and the judgment in regard to
their resemblance or dissimilarity; fourthly, the comparison of the phe-
nomena with the native notion of substance; fifthly, the collection of
successive phenomena under the native notion of causation. He might
have seen a much broader and more comprehensive account of the rela-
tions which the mind can perceive in Locke’s “Essay” (B. II. C. 28); in
Hume’s “Treatise on Human Nature” (B. I. p. i, sect. 5); or in Brown’s
Lectures (Lect. xlv) I am surprised he has never made a reference to
such relations—on which the mind so often dwells—as those of space,
time, quantity, properties of objects, cause and effect, and moral good.
5. We have now only to consider, and in doing so have to discuss,
the Regulative Faculties of the mind. I like the phrase regulative, only
we must dissociate it from the peculiar sense in which it is used by Kant
(from whom Hamilton has borrowed it), who supposes that the mind in
judging of objects imposes on them a relation not in the objects them-
selves. The epithet expresses that such principles as substance and quality,
cause and effect, are “the laws by which the mind is governed in its
operations” (Vol. II, p. 15), which laws I may add—but Hamilton would
not—are not before the consciousness as principles when we exercise
them. In calling them faculties, he acknowledges that he uses the word
in a peculiar signification. (p. 347) The truth is Hamilton does not see
the relation in which they stand to the faculties: they are not separate
faculties, but are involved in all the faculties, being, in fact, the neces-
sary laws which spontaneously and unconsciously guide their exercise.
His treatment of this subject in a more elaborate manner, in the “Condi-
tions of the Thinkable Systematized, or the Alphabet of Human Thought,”
appended to the Discussions, and in a somewhat more popular manner
in his Lectures, was probably regarded by himself, and is certainly re-
garded by his admiring pupils, as the most important contribution made
by him to philosophy. On the other hand, I look on the system as being,
on the whole, a failure. He has labored to combine the philosophies of
Reid and Kant; but we see everywhere the chinks at the line of junction.
The principles of common sense looking at objective truth, will not join
on to the empty forms which imply and—guarantee no reality. In the
construction of his philosophy of the relative or conditioned, as he calls
it, he has expended an immense amount of logical ability; but he has lost
himself in Kantian distinctions, giving in to Kant’s theory as to space410/James McCosh
and time, making them, and also cause and effect, merely subjective
laws of thought and not of things; and the system which be has reared is
an artificial one, in which the flaws and oversights and rents are quite as
evident as the great skill which he has shown in its erection. I dispute
three of his fundamental and favorite positions.
(1) I dispute his theory of relativity. I acknowledge that there is a
sense in which human knowledge is relative. There is a sense in which
all thinkers, except those of the extravagant schools of Schelling and
Hegel, hold a doctrine of relativity; but this is not the same as that
elaborated by Hamilton: “From what has been said you will be able to
understand what is meant by the proposition that all our knowledge is
only relative. It is relative,—first, because existence is not cognizable
absolutely and in itself, but only in special modes; second, because these
modes can be known only if they stand in a certain relation to our facul-
ties, and, thirdly, because the modes thus relative to our faculties are
presented to, and known by, the mind only under modifications deter-
mined by these faculties themselves.” (Vol. I, p. 148)
In these three general propositions, and in the several clauses, there
are an immense number and variety of assertions wrapped up: to some
I assent, from others I as decidedly dissent. I acknowledge, first, that
things are known to us only so far as we have the capacity to know
them; in this sense, indeed, even the divine knowledge is relative. I ac-
knowledge, secondly, that we do not know all things; nay, that we do not
know all about any one thing. Herein human knowledge differs from the
divine: but the word relative is not the phrase to attach to human knowl-
edge; in order to point out the difference, it would be better to say that
man’s knowledge is partial or finite as distinguished from perfect or
absolute. I may admit, thirdly, that man discovers external objects un-
der a relation to himself and his cognitive mind. So much, then, I freely
allow. But, on the ether hand, I demur, first, to the statement that we do
not know existence in itself, or, as he expresses it elsewhere in Kantian
phraseology, that we do not know the thing in itself (Ding an sich). I do
not like the language: it is ambiguous. I doubt whether there be such a
thing as “existence in itself and, of course, what does not exist cannot be
known. If he mean to assert that we do not know things as existing, I
deny the statement. Every thing we know, we know as existing; not only
so, but we know the thing itself,—not all about the things, but so much
of the very thing itself. Then I demur secondly, to the statement, which
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own: as he expresses it elsewhere, “Suppose that the total object of
consciousness in perception = 12; and suppose that the external reality
contributes 6, the material sense 3, and the mind 3; this may enable you
to form some rude conjecture of the nature of the object of perception.”
(Vol. II, p. 129) I allow that sensations, feelings, impressions associate
themselves with our knowledge: but every man of sound sense knows
how to distinguish between them, and it is surely the business of the
philosopher not to confound them, but to point out the essential differ-
ence. To suppose that in perception, or cognition proper, the mind adds
any thing, is a doctrine fraught with perilous consequences; for, if it
adds one thing, why not two things, or ten things, or all things, till we
are landed in absolute idealism, or, what is nearly allied to it, in absolute
scepticism?
The defective nature of the whole Hamiltonian philosophy comes
out in its results. Comparing his philosophy with that of Germany he
says: “Extremes meet. In one respect both coincide, for both agree that
the knowledge of nothing is the principle or the consummation of all
true philosophy, ‘Scire nihil,—studium quo nos laetamur utrique.’ But
the one doctrine openly maintaining that the nothing must yield every-
thing, is a philosophic omniscience, whereas the other holding, that noth-
ing can yield nothing, is a philosophic nescience In other words: the
doctrine of the unconditioned is a philosophy confessing relative igno-
rance, but professing absolute knowledge; while the doctrine of the con-
ditioned, is a philosophy professing relative knowledge, but confessing
absolute ignorance.” (Dis. p. 609.) Surely this is a pitiable enough con-
clusion to such an elaborate process. A mountain labors, and something
infinitely less than the mouse emerges.
I suspect that Sir William Hamilton was wont to meet all such ob-
jections, and try to escape from such a whirlpool as that in which Ferrier
would engulf him, by taking refuge in belief,—in faith. And I am thor-
oughly persuaded of the sincerity of his faith, philosophic and religious.
But it is unsatisfactory, it is unphilosophic, to allow that cognition and
intelligence may lead to nihilism, and then resort to faith to save us from
the consequences. Surely there is faith involved in the exercises of intel-
ligence; there is faith (philosophical) involved, when from a seen effect
we look up to an unseen cause. I am sure that human intelligence does
not lead to absolute knowledge, but as little does it lead to scepticism or
to nothing. Of this I am further sure, that the same criticism which
pretends to demonstrate that intelligence ends in absolute ignorance,412/James McCosh
will soon—probably in the immediately succeeding age—go on to show
with the same success, that our beliefs are not to be trusted.
The same doctrine of relativity carried out led him to deny that there
could be any valid argument in behalf of the divine existence, except the
moral one. I acknowledge that the moral argument, properly enunci-
ated, is the most satisfactory of all. I admit that the argument from order
and adaptation (the physico-theological) can prove no more, than that
there is a living being of vast power and wisdom, presiding over the
universe; but this it can do by the aid of the law of cause and effect
properly interpreted. The proof that this Being is infinite must be de-
rived from the mental intuition in regard to the infinite. Hamilton has
deprived himself of the power of using the arguments from our belief in
causation and infinity by what I regard as a defective and mutilated
account of both these intuitions. He has nowhere stated the moral argu-
ment which he trusts in. I suspect that the criticism which cuts down the
argument from intelligence, needs only to be carried a step further to
undermine the argument from our moral nature. This process has actu-
ally taken place in German), and I have no desire to see it repeated
among metaphysical youths in this country. It is on this account, mainly,
that I have been so anxious to point out the gross defects in the account
given by Hamilton of our necessary convictions.
(2) I dispute his doctrine of causation. It is so lamentably defective
in the view taken of the nature of cause, and so perversely mistaken in
the theory grounded on this view, that several of his most distinguished
disciples have been obliged to abandon it. The following is his account
of effect and cause “An effect is nothing more than the sum or comple-
ment of all the partial causes, the concurrence of which constitutes its
existence.” I remember no eminent philosopher who has given so inad-
equate a view of what constitutes cause. It leaves out the main ele-
ment,—the power in the substance, or, more frequently, substances, acting
as the cause to produce the effect. It leads him to represent the effect as
an emanation from previously existing elements, a doctrine which he
turns to no pantheistic use, but which has, undoubtedly, a pantheistic
tendency. Taking such a view it is no wonder that he should represent
creation as inconceivable; for the only creation which he can conceive,
according to his theory, is not a creation of a new substance by God, but
a creation out of God. Thus defective is his view of cause in itself. His
view of the internal principle, which leads us, when we discover an
effect to look for a cause is equally inadequate. According to him it is aThe Scottish Philosophy/413
mere impotence to conceive that there should not be something out of
which this effect is formed; and, to complete the insufficiency of his
theory, he makes even this a law of thought and not of things. Surely all
this is in complete opposition to the consciousness to which he so often
appeals. Our conviction as to cause is not a powerlessness, but a power;
not an inability, but an ability. It is an intuitive and necessary belief that
this effect, and every other effect, must have a cause in something with
power to produce it.
(3) I dispute his theory as to our conviction of infinity. “We are,” he
says, “altogether unable to conceive space as bounded—as finite; that
is, as a whole beyond which there is no farther space.” “On the other
hand, we are equally power less to realize in thought the possibility of
the opposite contradictory: we cannot conceive space infinite or without
limits.” (Vol. II, p. 369, 370.) The seeming contradiction here arises
from the double sense in which the word “conceive” is used. In the
second of these counter propositions the word is used in the sense of
imaging or representing in consciousness, as when the mind’s eye pic-
tures a fish or a mermaid. In this signification we cannot have an idea or
notion of the infinite. But the thinking, judging, believing power of the
mind is not the same as the imaging power. The mind can think of the
class fish, or even of the imaginary class mermaid, while it can not
picture the class. Now, in the first of the opposed propositions the word
“conceive” is taken in the sense of thinking, deciding, being convinced.
We picture space as bounded, but we cannot think, judge, or believe it to
be bounded. When thus explained all appearance of contradiction dis-
appears indeed all the contradictions which the Kantians, Hegelians,
and Hamiltonians are so fond of discovering between our intuitive con-
victions, will vanish if we but carefully inquire into the nature of these
convictions. Both propositions, when rightly understood, are true, and
there is no contradiction. They stand thus:—“We cannot image space as
without bounds:” “we cannot think that it has bounds or believe that it
has bounds.” The former may well be represented as a creature impo-
tency; the latter is, most assuredly, a creature potency, is one of the most
elevated and elevating convictions of which the mind is possessed,—
and is a conviction of which it can never be shorn.
It will be seen from these remarks that I refuse my adherence to his
peculiar theory of relativity, and to his maxim that “positive thought lies
in the limitation or conditioning of one or other of two opposite ex-
tremes, neither of which, as unconditioned, can be realized to the mind414/James McCosh
as possible, and yet of which, as contradictions, one or other must, by
the fundamental laws of thought, be recognized as necessary.” (Reid’s
“Works,” p. 743) It fails as to causation and as to infinity, and he has
left no formal application of it to substance and quality, where, as Kant
showed, there is no such infinite regressus, as in infinite time and space
or cause. He would have found himself in still greater difficulties had he
ventured elaborately to apply his theory to moral good. As I believe him
to have been on the wrong track, I scarcely regret that he has not com-
pleted his system and given us a doctrine of rational psychology or on-
tology. Indeed I have no faith whatever in a metaphysics which pretends
to do any more than determine, in an inductive manner, the laws and
faculties of the mind, and, in doing so, to ascertain, formalize, and ex-
press the fundamental principles of cognition, belief, judgment, and moral
good. The study of logic began to revive from the time that Archbishop
Whately constrained it to keep to a defined province. The study of meta-
physics would be greatly promoted if the science would only learn to be
a little more humble and less pretending, and confine itself to that which
is attainable.
Logic. We may now look at his work on Logic, which is a very
elaborate one, and contains very able discussions and learned notes. It
proceeds upon a very thorough acquaintance with Aristotle and his com-
mentators, with the schoolmen and the logical writers of the seventeenth
century; but was directly suggested by the Kantian criticism and amend-
ment of logic, and by the works of such men as Esser, Fries, Krug, and
Drobisch, who carried out the principles of the great German metaphy-
sician. just as the “Port Royal Logic” has all the excellencies and de-
fects of the philosophy of Descartes, so the logic of Hamilton has the
combined truth and error of the metaphysics of Kant. It should be added,
that his analytic; so far drawn from German sources in some of its
fundamental views, is, after all, Hamilton’s own, in the way in which it
is wrought out and applied. Logic is defined as “the science of the laws
of thought as thought.” It is represented to be an a priori science. “It
considers the laws of thought proper as contained a priori in the nature
of pure intelligence.” He does not state, and evidently does not see, that
these laws of thought, while not the laws of the objects of thought, are
laws of thought as employed about objects, and can be discovered not a
priori, but simply by an observation of the workings of thought.
He reviewed the not very philosophical but very shrewd and useful
work of Whately, in the “Edinburgh Review” for 1833, criticising itThe Scottish Philosophy/415
with terrible severity, and giving indications of his own views. He was
already cogitating his system, he expounded it to his class after he be-
came professor, and he gave it to the public in “An Essay toward a new
Analytic of Logical Forms,” being that which gained the prize proposed
by Sir William Hamilton, in the year 1846, for the best exposition of the
new doctrine propounded in his lectures, with an historical appendix, by
Thomas Spencer Baynes. It would require a treatise as elaborate as
Hamilton’s two volumes to state and examine it in detail, but I may
notice some of the fundamental points.
The Concept. It proceeds on the distinction between the extension
and comprehension of a term or notion. He makes no pretensions to the
discovery of this principle. He knew that it was stated in the “Port Royal
Logic,” and that it was taught in Glasgow University by Hutcheson.
Professor Baynes has shown in his translation of the “Port Royal Logic”
that there were anticipations of it in earlier works. Hamilton carries out
the distinction more thoroughly than it had ever been before. “The com-
prehension of a concept is nothing more than the sum or complement of
the distinguishing characters or attributes of which the concept is made
up; and the extension of a concept is nothing more than the sum or
complement of the objects themselves, whose resembling characters were
abstracted to constitute the concept.” (Vol. I, p. 148) If we except his
exposition of this distinction, he does not seem to me to throw much
light, otherwise, on the first part of logic,—the part as it appears to me
which has most need to be cleared up. He draws no distinction between
the general notion and the abstract notion, but treats of both under the
one designation, concept. But surely there is a distinction between two
such notions as “animal” on the one band, embracing an indefinite num-
ber of objects, and “life,” which has not a complement of objects, but is
only an attribute of objects.
Judgment. He claims originality chiefly for his doctrine of the thor-
ough quantification of the predicate. “Touching the principle of an ex-
plicitly quantified predicate, I had by 1833 become convinced of the
necessity to extend and correct the logical doctrine on this point.” “Be-
fore 1840 I had become convinced that it was necessary to extend the
principle equally to negatives.” (Vol. II, p. 209.) This doctrine, as Pro-
fessor Baynes shows, had been partially anticipated, but had never been
fully carried out. I am inclined to admit that the credit, if there be any
credit, in the thorough quantification of the predicate belongs to Hamilton.
But I set no value on the supposed improvement. It proceeds on the416/James McCosh
simple logical postulate, “to state explicitly what is thought implicitly.”
I admit the principle, but deny that it requires the predicate to be univer-
sally quantified. When we say “the dog barks,” we make the predica-
tion, without inquiring in thought whether there are or are not other
dogs that bark, whether dogs are all or only some barking animals.
When we say “man is rational,” we do not determine whether or no
there are other creatures that are rational; whether, for example, angels
may be called rational, whether men are “all” or only “some” rational.
As the predicate is not always or even commonly quantified in sponta-
neous thought, so we do not require always to quantify it in the logical
enunciation. At the same time, it is of importance to be able to quantify
it on demand, and thus to see reflectively what is involved in every
proposition. In carrying out his principles, he adds to the four classes of
propositions acknowledged in the received logic A, E, I, O, other four,—
U. Common salt is chloride of sodium.
Y. Some stars are all the planets.
h. No birds are some animals.
w. Some common salt is not some chloride of sodium.
I do regard it as of moment to place in a distinct class those propo-
sitions which assert the equivalence of subject and predicate (U). But
the others seem to me to be converted or rather perverted forms that
never do present themselves in spontaneous thought: in which we say
instead “all the planets are stars,” and “some animals are not birds,”
and that “chloride of sodium in this cellar is not the same as chloride of
sodium in that salt-cellar.”
It is one of the supposed advantages of his analytic that it reduces
the conversion of propositions from three species to one,—that of simple
conversion. This holds true after we have converted the proposition into
the form in which Hamilton has put it. When we say, “The bird sings,”
which is the form in spontaneous thought, Hamilton insists that logi-
cally it is, “The bird is some singing animal;” and after we have thus
converted it once, the second conversion follows simply, “Some singing
animals are birds.” But there is nothing saved by requiring us to put
every proposition in a form so different from that which it assumes in
spontaneous thought.
Hamilton has done service to logic by unfolding more fully than had
been done before what Kant called “syllogisms of the understanding,”
and which he calls immediate inferences, that is, inferences without a
middle term, as when, from the proposition “All men have a conscience,”The Scottish Philosophy/417
we infer that some men have a conscience. He includes very properly
under this head every form of conversion and opposition; and it has
been shown by him and others that it includes other immediate infer-
ences which it is important to spread out to view. But instead of placing
them under reasoning, they might be allowed to remain where conver-
sion and opposition have usually been placed, in the second part of
logic.
Reasoning. It is an alleged advantage of his analytic that it is, the
revocation of two terms of a proposition to their true relation; a propo-
sition being always an equation of its subject and predicate.” So he says
the proposition all men are mortal, means “all men = some mortal.”
That in some propositions the subject and predicate are equivalent may
be allowed; and in such cases there may be no impropriety in using the
mathematical equation, though generally it is better to allow mathema-
ticians to keep their own symbols, as in their science they have a definite
meaning, a meaning in regard to quantity; and if we introduce symbols
into logic, let us introduce new symbols appropriated to the ideas. Hu-
man thought is employed about a great many other objects as well as
quantity. When we say, “Virtue leads to happiness,” we are not uttering
a quantitative statement, “Virtue = some things that lead to happiness;
“but primarily an attributive assertion, that virtue has the attribute of
leading to happiness, and by implication in extension, “among the things
that lead to happiness is virtue.”
The new analytic claims that it reduces all the general laws of cat-
egorical syllogisms to a single canon. But what is that canon? I confess
I have difficulty in finding it. Mr Baynes states it “A syllogism is the
product of that act of mediate comparison” by which we recognized that
two notions stand to each other in the relation of whole and part, through
the recognition that these notions severally stand in the same relation to
a third. This canon is vague enough till it is explained what is meant by
the relation of whole and parts. There is valid ratiocination where the
relationship does not seem that of whole and parts.
Chloride of sodium is not common salt;
Pepper is not chloride of sodium;
Therefore pepper is not common salt.
In many cases the relation is one of whole and parts. But of what
kind of whole? Hamilton says that it is first one of comprehension, and
complains that logicians have overlooked it. Thus (Vol. I., p. 272):—
Every morally responsible agent is a free agent;418/James McCosh
Man is a morally responsible agent;
Therefore man is a free agent,—
which is thus explained: The notion man comprehends in it the notion
responsible agent; but the notion responsible agent comprehends in it
the notion free agent; therefore, on the principle that a part of a part is a
part of a whole, the notion man also comprehends in it the notion free
agent.
But it is clear to me that in every one of these propositions there is
generalization or extension implied. We have “every responsible agent,”
“every man,” and in the class of “free agents,” or “some free agents.” I
acknowledge that there is also comprehension involved, for all exten-
sion involves comprehension. But the uppermost thought seems to me to
be in extension: Man is in the class responsible; which again is in the
class free agent; consequently man is in the class free agent. Unless our
knowledge of attributes is such as to enable us thus to form classes, the
reasoning is not valid; and the best form in which to brand out the prin-
ciple involved is,
All responsible agents are free agents;
But man is a responsible agent
Therefore he is a free agent.
But if this be so, then we are back to the dictum, “Whatever is true
of a class is true of all the members of the class.” But as all extension
involves comprehension, it is of moment to be able on demand to put
reasoning in the form of comprehension.
It is urged in favor of the practical value of the analytic, that it
makes figure unessential and reduction unnecessary. But it enlarges the
number of legitimate moods, making them 36 under each figure, or in
all 108,—a number which is apt to frighten the student.
He vacillates in his account of hypotheticals and disjunctives. His
final opinion is given (Vol. II, 370–378—“Hypotheticals (conjunctive
and disjunctive), April 30, 1849”). “These syllogisms appear to be only
modifications or corruptions of certain immediate inferences, for they
have only two terms, and obtain a third proposition only by placing the
general rule of inference (stating, of course, the possible alternatives),
disguised, it is true, as the major premises.
He had divided logic into pure and modified, and he treats of the
latter in Vol. II. He doubts whether there can be a modified logic; and is
ever striving to impart to what he says under that head a rigidly techni-
cal form. The remarks which he throws out are often characterized byThe Scottish Philosophy/419
much intellectual ability, and some of them are of great value. But most
of the topics discussed do not admit of so formal a treatment as he
would give them. His account of the Baconian induction is a failure.
The truth is, he never appreciated or understood the method pursued in
the physical sciences.
The appendix contains a miscellaneous but very valuable set of
papers on logical subjects. I doubt much whether Hamilton’s system of
logic will ever as a whole be adopted by our colleges. We have, how-
ever, two admirable text-books founded on it:—Thomson’s “Outline of
the Laws of Thought” and Bowen’s “Logic.” It will be acknowledged
by all, that the discussions he has raised have done more to clear up
unsettled points in formal logic than any work published since the days
of Kant. These discussions will be looked at by writers on logic in all
coming ages.
In parting with this great man, now gone from our world, it is most
satisfactory to notice what was the professed aim of all his philoso-
phy,—it was to point out the limits to human thought, and thereby to
teach man the lesson of intellectual humility. It is instructive to find that
this has been the aim of not a few of the most profound philosophers
with which our world has been honored. The truth is, it is always the
smallest minds which are most apt to be swollen with the wind engen-
dered by their own vanity. The intellects which have gone out with greatest
power to the farthest limits are those which feel most keenly the barriers
by which man’s capacity is bounded. The minds that have set out on the
widest excursions, and which have taken the boldest flights, are those
which know best that there is a wider region beyond, which is altogether
inaccessible to man. It was the peculiarly wise man of the Hebrews who
said, “No man can find out the work that God maketh from the begin-
ning to the end.” The Greek sage by emphasis declared that if he ex-
celled others it was only in this, that he knew that he knew nothing. It
was the avowed object of the sagacious Locke to teach man the length
of his tether,—which, we may remark, those feel most who attempt to
get away from it. Reid labored to restrain the pride of philosophy, and to
bring men back to a common sense in respect of which the peasant and
philosopher are alike. It was the design of Kant’s great work to show
how little the speculative reason can accomplish. And now we have Sir
William Hamilton showing within what narrow limits the thought of
man is restrained; and the metaphysician, par excellence, of Oxford
has, in the Bampton lectures, employed this philosophy to lay a restraint420/James McCosh
on the rational theology of Britain, and the speculative theology which
is coming like a fog from the German Ocean. It is pleas ant to think that
Sir William Hamilton ever professed to bow with reverence before the
revelations of the Bible, and takes delight in stating it to be the result of
all his investigations, “that no difficulty emerges in theology which had
not previously emerged in philosophy.” In one of the letters which the
author of this article has had from him he proceeds on the great Bible
doctrines of grace; and from all I know of him personally, I am prepared
to believe in the account which I have heard from what I reckon compe-
tent authority, that the prayer which came from him at his dying hour
was, “God be merciful to me, a sinner.” It is most instructive to perceive
the publican and the philosopher thus made to stand on the same level
before the all-righteous Judge.
LVIII. The Metaphysics of The Future
What are we to make in these times of metaphysics? It is quite clear that
this kind of investigation has lost, I suspect for ever, the position once
allowed it, when it stood at the head of all secular knowledge, and claimed
to be equal, or all but equal, in rank to theology itself. “Time was,” says
Kant, “when she was the queen of all the sciences; and if we take the
will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high im-
portance of her object-matter, this title of honor. Now it is the fashion to
heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns forlorn and
forsaken like Hecuba.” Some seem inclined to treat her very much as
they treat those de jure sovereigns wandering over Europe whom no
country will take as de facto sovereigns,—that is, they give her all out-
ward honor, but no authority; others are prepared to set aside her claims
very summarily. The multitudes who set value on nothing but what can
be counted in money never allow themselves to speak of metaphysics
except with a sneer. The ever-increasing number of persons who read,
but who are indisposed to think, complain that philosophy is not so
interesting as the new novel, or the pictorial history, which is quite as
exciting and quite as untrue as the novel. The physicist, who has kept a
register of the heat of the atmosphere at nine o’clock in the morning, for
the last five years, and the naturalist, who has discovered a plant or
insect, distinguished from all hitherto known species by an additional
spot, cannot conceal their contempt for a department of inquiry which
deals with objects which can neither be seen nor handled, neither weighed
nor measured.The Scottish Philosophy/421
In the face of all this scorn I boldly affirm that mental philosophy is
not exploded, and that it never will be exploded. Whatever men may
profess or affect, they cannot, in fact, do without it. It often happens
that a profession of contempt for all metaphysics, as being futile and
unintelligible, is often an introduction to a discussion which is meta-
physical without the parties knowing it (just as the person in the French
play had spoken prose all his life without being aware of it); and of such
metaphysics it will commonly be found that they, are futile and unintel-
ligible enough. Often is Aristotle denounced in language borrowed from
himself, and the schoolmen are disparaged by those who are all the
while using distinctions Which they have cut with sharp chisel in the
rock, never to be effaced. There are persons speaking with contempt of
Plato, Descartes, Locke, and all the metaphysicians, who are taking
advantage of the great truths which they have discovered. Perhaps these
individuals are telling you very solemnly that they prefer the practical
to the theoretical, or that they care little for the form if they have the
matter, and are profoundly ignorant that they are all the while using
distinctions introduced by the Stagyrite, and elaborated into their present
shape by the scholastics. But surely, they will tell you, the discovery of
a new species of an old genus is a more important event than all your
philosophic discoveries; and they will be surprised to learn that we owe
the introduction of the phrases genus and species to Plato or to Socrates.
Or perhaps they boast that they can have ideas without the aid of the
philosophers, forgetting that Plato gave us the word idea, while Descartes
and Locke brought it to its present signification. “Ah, but,” says our
novel reader, eager to discover whether the heroine so sad and forlorn in
the second volume is to fall in with her lover, and be married to him
before the close of the third, “metaphysics are associated in my mind
with a dreary desert without and a headache within;” and is quite un-
aware that he is able so to express himself, because philosophers have
explained that ideas are associated. I could easily show that in our very
sermons from the pulpit, and orations in the senate, and pleadings at the
bar, principles are ever and anon appealed to which have come from the
heads of our deepest thinkers in ages long gone by, and who may now be
forgotten by all but a few antiquarians in philosophy. Our very natural
science, in the hands of such men as Faraday and Mayer, is ever touch-
ing on the borders of metaphysics, and compelling our physicists to rest
on certain fundamental convictions as to extension and force. The truth
is, in very proportion as material science advances, do thinking minds422/James McCosh
feel the need of something to go down deeper and mount up higher than
the senses can do; of some means of settling those questions which the
mind is ever putting in regard to the soul, and the relation of the universe
to God; and of a foundation on which the understanding can ultimately
and confidently repose.
II. Metaphysics may have now to take anew start by taking advan-
tage of physiological research. The Scottish school has never been slow
to profit by the discoveries of science as to the brain, the nerves, the
senses. From the first, and all along, they embraced and used all that
was established in regard to the eye not being originally percipient of
distance, to the distinction between the nerves of sensation, and to the
reflex system in the human body; and they set themselves against pre-
mature and rash hypotheses by Hartley, by Erasmus Darwin, and by the
phrenologists. But physiology in its natural and necessary progress is
coming nearer and closer to the line which divides mind from matter,
and in these circumstances mental science has both to watch and profit
by the investigations which are being so diligently pursued.
First, metaphysics must restrain the rash inferences of mere physi-
ologists, as Reid did the vibration theory of Hartley, as Brown did the
hypotheses of Darwin as to life, and as Hamilton did the pretended sci-
ence of craniology. They must make the whole educated community
know, believe, and realize, that such physical actions as attraction, re-
pulsion, and motion are one set of phenomena, and perception, reason-
ing, desire, and moral discernment another and a very different set of
phenomena. We can trace so far into the brain what takes place when
the mother sees her son thrown out from a boat on the wild waves; we
can follow the rays of light through the eye on to the retina, to the senso-
rium, possibly on to the gray matter in the periphery of the brain; and in
the end physiology may throw some light on the whole cerebral action.
But in the end, as at the beginning, we are in the domain of matter and
motion; we have only the same action as takes place in the brain of the
dog as it looks on. But when the mother’s affection rises up, when she
forgets herself in thinking of her boy, when she uses expedients for res-
cuing him, when she resolves to plunge into the water and buffets the
billows till she clasps her boy and lavishes her affection on him, we are
in a region beyond that reached by the physiologist,—a region which I
believe he can never reach; and it is of importance to tell him so. But the
psychologist can reach that region by consciousness, and ought dili-
gently to explore it. Whatever be the pretensions it makes, physiologyThe Scottish Philosophy/423
has hitherto thrown little light on purely mental phenomena, and none
whatever on higher mental action, such as ratiocination, the idea of the
good, and resistance to temptation.
Secondly, the metaphysician must enter the physiological field. He
must, if he can, conduct researches; he must at least master the ascer-
tained facts. He must not give up the study of the nervous system and
brain to those who cannot comprehend any thing beyond what can be
made patent to the senses or disclosed to the microscope. I do cherish
the hope that physiological psychology may in the end be rewarded by
valuable discoveries. Light may be thrown on purely mental action by
the fact that sensory action travels to the brain at the rate of 144.32 feet
in the second, and from the brain at the rate of 108.24; that the move-
ment is slowest in the case of the sense of sight and quickest in touch;
and by what is alleged by Donders that a thought requires 1/26 of a
second. There are mental actions which cannot well be explained by
mental laws, such as the rise of certain states and the association of
certain states; the rise, for instance, and the association of cheerful
thoughts in the time of health, and of gloomy thoughts when we are
laboring under derangement of the stomach. There may here be latent
processes which do not fall under consciousness, but may be detected
by the microscope or chemical analysis. By such researches the results
reached by the psychologist may be so far modified on the one hand and
considerably widened on the other. But all such investigations should be
conducted by those who can understand and appreciate the peculiar nature
of mental phenomena, and allow them their full and legitimate space.
No physiologist can talk of, or so much as refer to, mental action with-
out speaking of feelings, affections, thoughts, fancies, imaginations,
desires, purposes, resolves; but no eye, no mechanical instrument, can
detect these. They cannot be weighed in the balance or measured by the
line. There is a division of the mental faculties commonly adopted in the
present day into the senses and the intellect, the emotions and the will;
but this distribution is suggested by the inward sense, and could never
be discovered by an inspection of the compartments of the brain.
III. Metaphysics will now require to determine by the aid of physi-
cal science what truth there is in idealism. All is not real that may seem
or be declared to be so. The sky is not a vault; color is produced on the
visual organism by vibration in a medium; the pleasure is not in the
musical sounds. To save realism we are obliged to draw distinctions,
say with Aristotle, between common and proper percepts, or with Locke424/James McCosh
and the Scottish school, between the primary and secondary qualities of
matter. But I have a strong conviction that all such distinctions may
only be partially correct, and are only provisionally applicable. But as
physical and physiological science make farther progress, we may as-
certain the exact truth, and find that it clears up many obscure points.
As the facts are ascertained, metaphysics should take them up, and,
combining our intuitive perceptions with them, may determine precisely
what we are entitled to affirm of matter. In the end some of the state-
ments of the Scottish school as to the precise nature of the external
reality may be modified or even set aside. But the great truths pro-
pounded by such men as Hamilton will only be established, and seen to
rest on a basis which can never be moved. It will be acknowledged that
there is an external thing independent of mind, and that this is extended,
and has a passive potency. However much we may refine it, enough will
be left of matter to undermine Berkleianism and every form of idealism.
IV. Metaphysics may be able to give a more accurate expression of
fundamental truth. It is one of the peculiar excellencies of the Scottish
school that they stand up for first truths which cannot be proven on the
one hand nor set aside on the other. They are not just agreed as to the
form which they should take, or the language in which they should be
expressed. Mr J.S. Mill and Mr Herbert Spencer think that they can
account for all or many of these by the association of ideas or heredity.
But neither of these thinkers is so bold as to maintain that he has done
away with all fundamental truth. It can be shown that Mr Mill is for
ever appealing to truths which he assumes and regards himself as en-
titled to assume. (See “Examination of the Philosophy of J.S. Mill.”)
Mr Spencer falls back on a law of necessity which testifies to a great
unknown, which he allots as a territory to faith and to religion. I do not
admit that he has given a proper expression to the fundamental verity or
fundamental verities which he assumes. He starts on the principle of
relativity, as expounded by Hamilton and Mansel, the authoritative meta-
physicians when he began to speculate. I do not admit that the known
logically or metaphysically implies the unknown. I am sure that his fol-
lowers will leave behind them as they advance this unknown region of
faith. Following out his own method, they will account for it all by
circumstances working from generation to generation. But as Mill and
Spencer have not been able to get rid of first truths, so no others will and
this whether they avow it or no. All processes must conduct to some-
thing ultimate. Thought requires a final resting- place, which will beThe Scottish Philosophy/425
found self-evident, necessary, universal. The age demands that the whole
subject be rediscussed, with the view of determining what are the first,
the last, and the everlasting principles of thought and truth. Some of
those defended by the Scottish metaphysicians may be derivative, but
they will be found to imply a root from which they are sprung.
Appendix
ART. 1. Extracts from MS. Letters of Francis Hutcheson to the Rev.
Thomas Drennan, Minister of First Presbyterian (unsubscribing) Con-
gregation, Belfast; lent me by his grandson, Dr Drennan (see p. 64)
Glasgow, Jan. 31, 1737.—I am glad your present situation is agree-
able to you. I must insist on your promise of a visit whenever you find
honest Mr Haliday (Mr Drennan’s colleague) in good health, so that he
could take the whole bur den for a month or six weeks. Robert Simson,
with you and Charles Moor, would be wondrous happy till three in a
morning; I would be with you from five to ten. I can write you little
news. Our college is very well this year as to numbers and quality of
scholars, but the younger classes are less numerous as people here grow
less set on a college education for lads designed for business.... I must
tell you a shameful story of our college. My letter I wrote from Dublin
stopped Clotworthy O’Neal getting his degree upon his first applica-
tion. He got some folks in this country who are tools of the court to
recommend the matter to our principal. He made a compliment of twenty
guineas to the college library, and the principal watched an opportunity
when there was a thin meeting, but his tools all present, and carried to
him a degree in ——; that too, only an honorary one, and declared so in
the diploma without any certificate for his learning or manners. My
dissent is entered in the books, and four more masters decline signing
it.”
April 17, 1738—Robert Simson, if he were not indolent beyond
imagination, could in a fortnight’s application finish another book which
would surprise the connoisseurs. About November last, I sent a manu-
script to Will Bruce chiefly for his and Mr Abernethy’s perusal. He
showed it to the Bishop of Derry, who, it seems, is much pleased with it,
and promises me a long epistle soon. I heartily wish you had seen it, but
it did not get to Dublin till February, and was in the bishop’s hands till
the beginning of this month. I believe Will is perusing it now. I am not426/James McCosh
expecting it back again speedily. During our college session I get noth-
ing done, but if I get them back during our vacation, with remarks of my
friends, I shall endeavor to put the last hand to them. If I can get leisure
next month, I shall endeavor to send you such a letter as I once gave you
an imperfect promise of, if my hand be not gone out of use. We have at
last got a minister in Glasgow to my taste. As I know your laziness, I
really wish you and he could interchange sermons now and then. I am
surprised to find some people of very good sense, laymen more than
clergy, here not a little pleased with some of the notions of the foreign
mystics; they have raised my curiosity of late to look into these books. I
shall, sometime or other, let you know the result of my reading that way.
I am persuaded their warm imaginations would make them moving
preachers. I am going to read Madame Bourignon when I have leisure.
You’ll make Sam Haliday laugh heartily by telling him this particular.
My most hearty respects to him.
Glasgow, March 5, 1738–39—I had yours of the 26th of February
on Friday, and could not answer sooner. I had resolved, when I first read
yours, to have wrote you in the negative, being in as Much hurry at
present as I have been this session by many letters of business as well as
by my ordinary work. I have got on my hands almost the whole paternal
care of my old pupil Lord Kilmarnock’s three sons here. But upon read-
ing over your letter this morning, with the deepest concern for that wor-
thy, friendly, generous man, I could not refuse you altogether what you
desire; though I concluded it must be either an unreasonable diffidence
in yourself or an unjust value your friendship makes you put upon what
comes from me, that occasions such requests. I shall be forced to work
in starts, with many interruptions, which never succeeds right with me;
and beseech you be as busy as you can in some scheme of your own, and
don’t take any sudden interrupted attempts of mine as fit for all the
purposes you say are expected by friends on this occasion. I hint to you
my plan that you may work upon it, and be the readier to patch up a
right thing out of the two:—“A consideration of what sort of life is most
worthy and best suited to a being capable of such high endowments, and
improvements, and actions destined to an immortal existence, and yet
subjected for a certain space to a mortal existence in this world, and
then without drawing a character, leaving it to the audience to recollect
how much of this appeared in our friend’s life.”
I hope Jack Smith has sent down to your town a “Serious AddressThe Scottish Philosophy/427
to the Kirk of Scotland,” lately published in London; it has run like
lightning here, and is producing some effect; the author is unknown; he
wrote with anger and contempt of the Kirk and Confession; but it has a
set of objections against the Confession which I imagine few will have
the brow to answer.
I really suffer with you heartily in the loss of your worthy friend;
you will miss him exceedingly, and so will your cause.
A worthy lad in this town, one Robert Foulis, out of a true public
spirit, undertook to reprint for the populace an old excellent book, “A
Persuasive to Mutual Love and Charity,” wrote by White, Oliver
Cromwell’s chaplain; it is a divine old-fashioned thing. Some are cast
off in better paper, sold at 5d. in marble paper; the coarse ones are sold
at 5d. in blue paper, and at 4d. to book sellers. I wish your booksellers
would commission a parcel of both sorts. There has been some whimsi-
cal buffoonery about my heresy, of which I will send you a copy.
Glasgow, June 1, 1741.102—your countrymen very generally have
such an affectation of being men and gentlemen immediately, and of
despising every thing in Scotland, that they neglect a great deal of good,
wise instruction they might have here. I am truly mortified with a vanity
and foppery prevailing among our countrymen beyond what I see in
others; and a softness and sauntering forsooth which makes them inca-
pable of any hearty drudgery at books. We had five or six young gentle-
men from Edinburgh, men of fortune and fine genius at my class, and
studying law; our Irishmen thought them poor book-worms.
Glasgow, June 15, 1741.—The wretched turn their minds take is to
the silly manliness of taverns.... I shall not leave Glasgow except about
three weeks in July for this whole vacation, but have more avocations
by too numerous an acquaintance than you can imagine. In short, Tom,
I find old age not in gray hairs and other trifles, but in an incapacity of
mind for such close thinking or composition as I once had, and have
pretty much dropped the thoughts of some great designs I had once
sketched out. In running over my papers I am quite dissatisfied with
method, style, matter, and some reasonings, though I don’t repent my
labor, as by it and the thoughts suggested by friends,—a multitude of
which I had from W. Bruce and Synge, and still more in number from
some excellent friends here,—I am fitter for my business; but, as to
composing in order, I am quite bewildered, and am adding confusedly to428/James McCosh
a confused book all valuable remarks in a farrago, to refresh my memory
in my class lectures on several subjects. You’ll find the like. Pray lay up
a good stock of sermons. You would see a noble one by one of my
Scotch intimates, who sees all I do, Mr Leechman.
Glasgow, April 12, 1742—You are such a lazy wretch that I should
never write you more. Not one word of answer to my congratulatory
epistle you got six weeks before you were married. Not one word of
godly admonitions about spending an evening with friends at the Welshes
Head, and other pious sentiments about the vanity and folly of staying
at home in the evenings.
Glasgow, May 31, 1742. The bearer, Mr Hay, takes over some cop-
ies of a new translation of Antoninus, the greater half of which, and
more, was my amusement last summer for the sake of a singular worthy
soul, one Foulis; but I don’t let my name appear in it, nor indeed have I
told it to any here but the man concerned: I hope you’ll like it. The rest
was done by a very ingenious lad, one Moore. Pray try your critical
faculties in finding what parts I did, and what he did. I did not translate
books in suite; but I one or two, and he one or two. I hope if you like it
that it may sell pretty well with you about Belfast. I am sure it is doing
a public good to diffuse the sentiments; and, if you knew Foulis, you
would think he well deserved all encouragement.
Date cut off.—Having this opportunity, I must trouble you with a
small affair. Upon conversation with Mr Brown, who came lately from
Ireland, along with Mr Alexander Haliday, about the circumstances of
some ministers, very worthy men, in your presbytery, it occurred to me
that a little liberality could not be better exercised than among them. I
am concerned that in my prosperous circumstances I did not think of it
sooner. If you have any little contributions made towards such as are
more distressed than the rest, you may mark me as a subscriber for £5
per annum, and take the above ten pounds as my payment for the two
years past. Alexander Young will advance it immediately, as I wrote
him lately that I would probably draw such a bill, without telling him
the purposes. I think it altogether proper you should not mention my
name to your brethren, but conceal it. I am already called New Light
here. I don’t value it for myself, but I see it hurts some ministers here,
who are most intimate with me. I have been these ten days in great hurryThe Scottish Philosophy/429
and perplexity, as I have for that time foreseen the death of our profes-
sor, who died last Wednesday, and some of my colleagues join me in
laboring for Mr Leechman to succeed. We are not yet certain of the
event, but have good hopes. If he succeeds, it will put a new face upon
theology in Scotland. I am extremely concerned for your divisions in
Belfast. I find they talk of Jack Maxwell of Armagh or young Kennedy.
The talents of this latter I know not, but believe he has a very honest
heart. Jack Maxwell is an ingenious, lively fellow, for any thing I could
discover. That presbytery will miss him much. Pray write me now some-
times. I am sorry the event in your family made some hints in my last so
seasonable. But your son is now as well as if he had lived sixty years a
Plato or a Caesar, or if he is not, life is scarce worth spending under
such a Providence: we should all long Ûdwr ka gaa gnesfai.
Glasgow, August 5, 1743—I have had two letters of late from Mr
Mussenden; one about five weeks ago, with an invitation to Mr Leechman
to succeed Dr. Kilpatrick. Leechman was then just upon his marriage. I
concluded the matter quite impracticable, and returned an answer to
that purpose; and, upon conversing, Leechman found I was not then
mistaken. He was lately very ill treated by our judges in a discretionary
augmentation he applied for, which they could have given with full con-
sent of parties. His wife is not so averse to removal as formerly. Indeed
the difficulty is with himself. You never knew a better, sweeter man,—
of excellent literature, and, except his air and a little roughness of voice,
the best preacher imaginable. You could not get a greater blessing among
you of that kind. As I have heard nothing from other hands, I want fuller
information. Are the people generally hearty for Leechman upon the
character they hear? Is there no other worthy man on the field? Unless
these points be cleared. He will take no steps. I remember one Millan,
an assistant. Pray is he to be continued, and no way affronted or ne-
glected in this design? Leechman is well as he is, and happy, though
preaching to a pack of horse-copers and smugglers of the rudest sort.
He would do nothing hard or disagreeable to any worthy man, and has
no desire of change. But if the field be clear, it were peccare in publica
commoda not to force him out of that obscure hole where he is so much
lost. He was the man I wished in the first place to be our professor of
theology. ... I have no news but that we expect immediately from Robert
Simson a piece of amazing geometry, reinventing two books of
Appollonius, and he has a third almost ready. He is the best geometer in430/James McCosh
the world, reinventing old books, of which Pappius preserves only a
general account of the subjects.
Glasgow, Sept. 20, 1743.—I had the favor of yours by Mr Blow,
but could not return an answer by him, being much employed in pro-
moting the affair you wrote about. I had also very urgent letters from
Messrs. Mairs and Duchals to the same purpose. ‘Tis very difficult to
persuade a modest worthy man who is tolerably settled, to adventure
upon a new scene of affairs among strangers. I shall use my utmost
endeavors to prevail upon him as I have been doing for some time past.
I am sorry I cannot give you great hopes of success , but I don’t yet so
despair as to quit solicitation, as he is exceedingly moved with the affec-
tion and generosity of that people. My most humble and hearty respects
to your brethren of your presbytery, whom I shall always remember
with the greatest esteem and affection.
Glasgow, Feb. 20, 1743–44—am not a little surprised that I have
not heard from you these four months past, though there were some of
my letters which any other person would have thought required an an-
swer. I could tell you a good deal of news upon the unexpected election
of a professor of divinity, and the furious indignation of our zealots; but
you deserve no news from anybody. We have our own concern about the
settlement in Belfast, but we are to expect no accounts from you of any
thing. Pray tell Mrs Haliday her son is doing very well. . . . I was never
more honored than since our late professor’s death. Our hearty respects
to Mrs Drennan, and sympathy on the loss of her boys.
Dicimus autem hos quoque felices qui ferre incommoda vitae
Nec jactare jugum vita dedicere magistra
Glasgow, April 16, 1746.—Our public news of the 15th from
Edinburgh was, that the duke had passed the Spey, that 2,000 rebels on
the banks fled precipitately upon his pointing his cannon at them. They
may reassemble, and, as they are very cunning, may have some artifice
to surprise; but I cannot but hope they are dispersing, and their chiefs
making their escape. You have heard no doubt of our taking from them
the “Hazard” sloop they had taken at Montrose. She returned from France
with 150 men and arms and ammunition, and had landed them; but Lord
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prisoners with £13,000 sterling. The same man-of-war took another of
their ships, with arms and ammunitions, which had seized twelve small
merchant. men in Orkneys for their use. The duke has endeared himself
to some of his very enemies by his good sense and humanity, void of all
state or pride.
I had this day a letter from a presbytery of Pennsylvania, of a very
good turn, regretting their want of proper ministers and books, expect-
ing some assistance here; it was of a very old date of October last. I
shall speak to some wise men here, but would as soon speak to the
Roman conclave as our presbytery. The Pennsylvanians regret the want
of true literature; that Whitfield has promoted a contempt of it among
his followers, and bewailing some wretched contentions among them-
selves. The only help to be expected from you is sending some wise men
if possible. I shall send them my best advice about books and philoso-
phy, and hope to be employed to buy them books cheaper here than they
are to be got anywhere. I long for a. fuller letter about all your chat and
news. I am in a great deal of private distresses about Jo Wilson and his
sister,—the latter in the utmost danger, the other scarce recovered from
death, my wife too very tender; but by a set of most intricate business,
upon which the soul of this college depends, and all may be ruined by
the want of one vote, I cannot leave this till after the 26th of June, and
we go to Dublin first.
ART. II. Questions proposed in the Philosophical Society in Aberdeen.
1. President.—Whether the greatest part of the matter that com-
poses the bodies of vegetables and animals is not air or some substance
that is mixed with the air and floats in it. Handled, Feb. 8.
2. Dr. Skene.—What are the proper characters of enthusiasm and
superstition, and their natural effects upon the human mind? Handled,
Jan. 25.
3. Mr Trail.—What are the proper methods of determining the sun’s
parallax by the transit of Venus over his disk in 1761? Handled, April
12.
4. Mr Campbell.—What is the cause of that pleasure we have from
representations or objects which excite pity or other painful feelings?
Handled, Feb. 8.
5. What is the true cause of the ascent, suspension, and fall of va-
pors in the atmosphere? Mr Stewart. Handled, Feb. 22.
6. Mr Reid.—Whether some part of that food of plants which is432/James McCosh
contained in the air is not absorbed by the earth, and in the form a
watery fluid conveyed into the vessels of plants. And whether any thing
can enter into the vessels of plants that is not perfectly soluble in water.
Handled, March 8.
7. President.—Is there a standard of taste in the fine arts and in
polite writing; and how is that standard to be ascertained? Handled,
March 22, and May 10.
8. Dr. Skene.—How far human actions are free or necessary.
Handled, May 24, and June 14.
9. How far the motion of the earth and of light accounts for the
aberration of the fixed stars. Mr Trail. Handled, April 12.
10. Mr Campbell.—Can the generation of worms in the bodies of
animals be accounted for on the common principles of generation.
Handled, June 28
11. Is the human soul confined to any part of the human body; and,
if so, to what part? Mr Stewart. Handled, June 28.
12. Mr Reid.—Are the objects of the human mind properly divided
into impressions and ideas? And must every idea be a copy of a preced-
ing impression. Handled, July 13 and 26.
Jan. 25, no questions. Feb. 8, 22. March 8, none. March 22,
1758.
13. Mr Gordon.—What is the origin of polytheism? Handled, Aug.
10.
14. Mr Gerard.—What are the proper subjects of demonstrative
reasoning? Handled, Aug. 23, and Sept. 13
April 12.
15. Mr Farquhar.—Upon what the characters of men chiefly de-
pend? Nov. 15
16. What is the apparent figure of the heavens, and what are the
causes of it? Humanist, Nov. 15
17. Whether justice be a natural or artificial virtue. Nov. 22.
April 22.
18. Mr Farquhar.—In the perfection of what faculty does genius
consist? Or if in a combination of faculties what are they? Superseded,
because the subject of Mr Gerard’s discourses.
19. What are the parts of the body so connected with the several
faculties of the mind that the destruction of those parts brings on a de-
struction of the exercise of those faculties. Dec. 13.
20. Dr. Gregorie.—What are the plants that enrich a soil and whatThe Scottish Philosophy/433
are those that impoverish it, and what are the causes of their enriching
it, and impoverishing it? Feb.11, 1759
21. Dr. Skene.—Wherein does happiness consist? March 28.
22. Whether the ideas of mixed modes are to be considered as the
mere creatures of the mind, or are formed after patterns, as well as the
ideas of the substances whereof they are modes. Mr Trail, Feb.11, 1759.
23. Mr Campbell.—Whether matter has a separate and permanent
existence. The nature of contrariety. May 30.
24. Mr Stewart.—Whether the sense of hearing may not be asserted
by act, in like manner as that of seeing is by optical glasses. April 11.
25. Mr Reid.—Whether mankind with regard to morals always was
and is the same. June 12.
26. In what cases and for what causes is lime a proper manure? Mr
Thos. Gordon. July 24, and Aug. 14
27. Mr Gerard.—What is the origin of civil government? June 26.
28. Mr Farquhar.—What is the foundation of moral obligation?
Sept. 26.
29. Mr Ross.—How can it be accounted for that an inflammable
spirit is obtained from regenerated tartar (vinegar saturated with chalk
or saccharum saturne by distillation)? Or how comes it about that vin-
egar is restored to the state of an ardent spirit by being distilled with
fixed alkali, chalk, or lead? Oct. 16, 1759
30. Dr. Gregorie.—Whether the Socratic method of instruction or
that of prelection is preferable. Jan. 8, 1760.
31. How far the ancient method of education in public seminaries
from earliest infancy was preferable or inferior to the modern practice.
By Dr. Skene, Nov. 27, 1759
32. Mr Trail.—What is the Agrian law which will conduce most to
the populousness of a nation? Or what is the maximum of estates fittest
for that purpose?
33. Whether education in public schools or by private tutors be
preferable. Principal Campbell, Dec. 11, 1759, and Feb. 26, 1760.
34. Mr Stewart.—Whether the time allotted for teaching Greek in
the universities of Scotland be not too short, and, if so, what would be
the proper remedy. Feb. 26, 1760.
35. Mr Reid.—Whether it is proper to educate children without
instilling principles into them of any kind whatsoever. April 1, 1760.
36. Mr Gordon.—Whether there be not, in the very nature of our
reaching societies, a tendency to stop farther advancement in those434/James McCosh
branches of learning which they profess. And, if it is so, what is the best
remedy. June 24, and July 9, 1760.
37. Prof. Gerard.—In what manner the general course of education
may be conducted so as it may answer best as a preparation for the
different businesses of life. Aug. 12, 1760.
38. What is the best method for training to the practice of virtue?
Mr Farquhar. Dec. 9, 1760.
39. What are the natural consequences of high national debt; and
whether, upon the whole, it be a benefit to a nation or not? Dr Gregorie.
Jan. 13, 1761.
40. Whether paper credit be beneficial to a nation or not. Dr. Skene,
Feb. 24.
41. What is the cause of the apparent color of the heavens? Or what
is properly the object to which that color can be attributed? Principal
Campbell, March 10.
42. Whether the idea of cause and effect include in it any thing more
than their constant conjunction. And, if so, what it is that it includes.
Prof. Stewart. March 10th and 31st
43. Mr Trail.—Whether the substituting of machines instead of men’s
labor, in order to lessen the expense of labor, contributes to the popu-
lousness of a country. Feb. 24
44. Mr Reid.—Whether moral character consists in affections,
wherein the will is not concerned; or in fixed habitual and constant pur-
poses. April 15.
45. Mr Gordon.—Whether slavery be in all cases inconsistent with
good government. Nov. 24
46. Mr Gerard.—Whether there be any such affection in human
nature as universal benevolence. Dec. 8.
47. Mr Farquhar.—Whether in writing history it be proper to mix
moral and political reflexions or to draw characters. Dec. 8.
48. Whence does man derive the authority which he assumes over
the brutes, and how far does this authority extend? Mr Beattie. Dec. 22,
1761.
49. What are the best expedients for preventing an extravagant rise
of servants’ wages, and for obliging them to bestow their labor where
agriculture and manufactures require it. Jan. 12, 1762. Occasional ques-
tion.
50. Doctor Gregorie.—What are the good and bad effects of the
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like? Feb. 9.
51. Doctor Skene.—Whether the determination by unanimity or a
majority injuries is most equitable. March 9.
52. Doctor Campbell.—How far human laws can justly make alter-
ations on what seems to be founded on the principles of the law of na-
ture. March 23.
53, Mr Stewart.—Whether human laws be binding on the con-
sciences of men. April 16.
54. Mr Reid.—Whether by the encouragement of proper laws the
number of births in Great Britain might not be nearly doubled or at least
greatly increased. June 8.
55. Mr Thomas Gordon.—Whether the current coin of the nation
ought not to be debased by alloy or raised in its value, so as there shall
be no profit made by exporting it. Dec. 14.
56. Doctor Gerard.—Whether it be best that courts of law and courts
of equity were different, or that the same court had the power of deter-
mining either according to law or equity as circumstances require. Feb.
22, 1763.
57. Mr Farquhar—Whether justice is most effectually promoted in
civil and criminal courts where the judges are numerous or where they
are few. March 22.
58. Mr Beattie.—What are the advantages and disadvantages of an
extensive commerce? March 22.
59. Dr. Gregory.—Whether the art of medicine, as it has been prac-
tised, has contributed to the advantage of mankind. July 12.
60. Dr. Skene.—Whether in the same person opposite passions and
affections, such as love and hatred, resentment of injuries and benefits,
always subsist in an equal degree of strength. Oct. 10.
61. Dr. Campbell.—Whether any animals besides men and domes-
tic animals are liable to diseases, the decay of nature and accidental
hurts excepted; and if they are not, whether there is any thing in the
domestic life which can account for such diseases as men and domestic
animals are obnoxious to. May 10.
62. Mr Stewart.—Whether or not there be a real foundation for the
distinction betwixt precepts or counsels in matters of morality. Dec. 13.
63. Dr. Reid.—Whether every action deserving moral approbation
must be done from a persuasion of its being morally good. Nov. 22,
1763.
64. Mr Thomas Gordon.—How far the profession of a soldier of436/James McCosh
fortune is defensible in foro conscientiae. Jan. 24, 1764.
65. Dr. Gerard.—Whether eloquence be useful or pernicious. Feb.
28, 1764
66. Mr Farquhar.—What is the origin of the blacks? March 13,
1764.
67. Mr Beattie.—What is that quality in objects that makes them
provoke laughter? March 27
68. Dr. George Skene.—Whether are men become degenerate in
point of size and strength, or has the modern method of living increased
the number of diseases or altered their nature? April 9.
69. Mr William Ogilvy.—Whether curiosity be not the most power-
ful motive to study in the mind of youth and that which acts most uni-
formly. Nov. 27
70. Dr. Gregory.—What are the distinguishing characteristics of
wit and humor? May 8.
71. Dr. David Skene.—Whether brutes have souls , or, if they have,
wherein do they differ from the human? Nov. 15
72. Dr. Campbell.—Whether the manner of living of parents af-
fects the genius or intellectual abilities of the children Jan. 22, 1765.
73. Mr Stuart.—Whether the idea of an infinitely perfect Being be
a good argument for his existence. June 11, 1765.
74. Dr. Reid.—Wherein does the nature of a promise consist, and
whence does its obligation arise? March 12, 1765.
75. Mr Thomas Gordon.—Whether there is any degeneracy of ge-
nius in the moderns. March 26, 1765.
76. Dr. Gerard.—Whether children do not take more after the mother
than the father, and if they do, what are the causes of it? Aug. 13, 1765.
77. Mr Farquhar.—Whether would the end of religion be most ef-
fectually promoted by a regular civil establishment for the support of
the clergy, or by leaving their support to the voluntary contributions of
the people? Nov. 12.
78. What is the difference between common sense and reason? Dec.
10, 1765.
79 Dr. George Skene.—Is light a body whose particles are thrown
off with great velocity from the luminous body, or is it a tremulous
motion excited and propagated through a subtle medium analogous to
the tremors of flies which occasion sound? Dec. 9, 1766.
80. Mr William Ogilvie.—Suppose a legislator were to form an
establishment of clergy, on what principles ought he to proceed in orderThe Scottish Philosophy/437
to render it most effectual for promoting religion and morality without
favoring superstition? Nov. 11, 1766.
81. Mr Dunbar.—Whether the considerations of good policy may
not some. times justify the laying of a restraint upon population in a
state.
82. Dr. David Skene.—What are the advantages which mankind
peculiarly derive from the use of speech? March 13, 1766.
83. Dr. Campbel.—Whether it is possible that the language of any
people should continue invariably the same, and if not, from what causes
the variations arise. Oct. 13, 1766.
84. Mr Thomas Gordon.—Whether in science it ought to be an aim
to increase or to diminish the number of first principles. June 10, 1766.
85. Dr. Gerard.—Whether any form of government can be perpetual.
Dec. 9, 1766.
86. Mr Farquhar.—Whether the observation of the unities of time
and place are essentially requisite to the perfection of dramatic perfor-
mances. Jan. 27, 1767.
87. Mr Beattie.—Whether the different opinions and different prac-
tices which prevail in different nations be an objection to the universal-
ity of the virtuous sentiment. Feb. 24, 1767.
88. Dr. George Skene.—Whether the opportunities of acquiring a
learned education may not be too much in the power of the commonalty
either for the advancement of learning or the good of the state.
89. Mr Ogilvy.—How does it appear to be equitable that the sub-
jects of the state should be taxed in proportion to their respective for-
tunes and not equally over head or by any other rule? March 24, 1767.
90. Mr Trail.—In what sense may virtue be said to consist in acting
agree. ably to nature, and vice in deviating from it?
91. Dr. David Skene.—If mankind are considered in respect of rank
and fortune, in what class may we expect to find the virtuous principle
most prevalent? June 9, 1767.
92. Dr. Campbel.—Whether the Greek language remained invari-
ably the same so long as is commonly thought, and to what causes the
duration which it had ought to be ascribed. Nov. 10, 1767.
93. Mr Gordon.—What is the province and use of metaphysics?
Dec. 8, 1767.
94. Dr. Gerard.—Whether poetry can be justly reckoned an imita-
tive art; and, if it can, in what respects? Jan. 26, 1768.
95. Mr Farquhar.—Whether the maintaining an esoteric and exo-438/James McCosh
teric doctrine, as was practised by the ancients, is reconcilable to the
principles of virtue.
96. Mr Beattie.—Whether that superiority of understanding by which
the inhabitants of Europe and of the countries immediately adjoining
imagine them. selves to be distinguished may not easily be accounted
for without supposing the rest of mankind of an inferior species.
97. Dr. George Skene.—Whether the aim of a public teacher ought
to be to adapt his instructions to the capacities of the duller part of his
audience or to forward the ingenious.
98. Mr Ogilvie.—What is that in the manners of any nation which
exhibits it justly to the appellations of civilized or barbarous?
99. Mr Dunbar.—What are the characteristics of polished language?
and how is the comparative excellency of different languages to be esti-
mated?
100. Mr Trail.—How far may the inequalities of astronomical re-
fraction be remedied by the thermometer and barometer?
101. Dr. David Skene.—Whether the late proceedings with respect
to a favorite of the mob be an evidence of the corruption or of the im-
provement of our constitution.
102. Principal Campbel.—What is the proper notion of civil lib-
erty? Oct. 24, 1769.
103. Mr Gordon.—How far the facts relating to the burning of the
Roman ships in the harbor of Syracuse be reconcilable to the laws of
reflection and refraction of light. Nov. 1769.
104. Dr. Gerard.—Whether any account can be given of the causes
why great geniuses have arisen at the periods which have been most
remarkable for them, and why they have frequently arisen in clusters.
Dec. 12, 1769.
105. Mr Beattie.—Whether the use of translations can ever super-
sede the necessity of studying the Greek and Roman authors in the origi-
nal languages. May 8, 1770.
106. Dr. George Skene.—What is the difference between pressure
and momentum; and how are they to be compared? Nov. 27, 1770.
107. Mr Ogilvy.—Whether there may be any reason to believe that
the friendships of this life may continue after death.
108. Mr Dunbar.—Whether the increasing the number of British
peers tends to enlarge or diminish the power of the crown. March 27,
1770.
109. Mr Trail.—What are the desiderata in mathematics? June 12,The Scottish Philosophy/439
1770.
110. Occasional question proposed by Mr Beattie.—Whether it be
not for the advantage of mankind as moral beings that the evidence of a
future state is rather a high probability than an absolute certainty. Oct.
9, 1769.
111. Dr. David Skene.—What are the advantages and disadvan-
tages arising from the different arrangements of words which obtain in
the antient and modern languages?
112. Principal Campbel.—What is the best method of teaching a
foreign or dead language?
113. Mr Gordon.—How are vis inertae and weight to be distin-
guished, and in what do they agree?
114. Dr. Gerard.—Whether national characters depend upon physical
or moral causes, or whether they are influenced by both. Feb. 26, 1771.
115. Mr Beattie.—Does it imply any absurdity or any thing incon-
sistent with the divine perfections to suppose that evil, both physical
and moral, must be permitted to take place in a state of moral proba-
tion? March 26, 1771.
116. Dr. George Skene.
117. Mr Ogilvy.—Is there any injustice done to an impressed man,
when he is punished according to the articles of war? March 12, 1771.
118. Mr Dunbar.—How are the proceedings of instinct to be distin-
guished from reason or sagacity in animals? Feb. 11, 1772.
119. Mr Trail.—What is the cause of the color of the heavenly bod-
ies? Feb. 25, 1772.
111. Dr Campbel.—What are the advantages and disadvantages
arising from the different arrangements of words which obtain in the
ancient and modern languages?
120. Mr Gordon.—How far is an expensive taste of living con-
nected with corruption of manners and the ruin of a nation?
121. Dr. Gerard.—What are the ways in which watering operates
in improving land? March 24, 1772.
122. Dr. Beattie.—How far is versification essential to poetry?
123. Dr. George Skene.
124. Mr Ogilvy.—By what circumstances has slavery been so mod-
erated as to become supportable to so many nations of mankind?
125. Dr. Dunbar.
126. Mr Trail.—Does Dr. Halley’s theory of evaporation sufficiently
account for the constant influx into the Mediterranean at the Straits of440/James McCosh
Gibraltar?
ART. III. MSS. Papers by Dr. Reid, text me by Francis Edmund, Esq.,
Aberdeen.
I. Some Observations on the modern System of Materialism. This
paper is in no fewer than five forms, showing what pains he took with it.
One or two of the forms were notes or preparations, the other three fully
written out as if to be read before a society.
By the modern system of materialism he means that advanced by Dr
Priestley in his “Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit,” 1777, and
“Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical
Necessity,” 1777. The paper is of a thorough and searching character,
distinguished for acuteness beyond almost any of the published writings
of Reid, and written with great point and naivete. It looks as if designed
for publication. Chap. I, Of the Connection of this System with other
philosophical Opinions. Here he describes the views entertained of sub-
stance by eminent men, criticising ably the defective views of Locke.
Chap. II, Of Newton’s Rules of philosophizing, showing that he had
profoundly studied Newton. He gives fair explanations of Newton’s rules.
He shows that Priestley does not follow these rules. Chap. III, Of the
Solidity or Impenetrability of Matter, showing there is an ambiguity in
the meaning of the word solidity, and that Priestley has not succeeded in
showing that matter is not solid or impenetrable. Chap. IV, Of the Iner-
tia of Matter, showing that Priestley does not follow Newton. The whole
is the result of much reading and reflection.
II Miscellaneous Reflections on Priestley’s account of Hartley’s
Theory of the Human Mind. He shows that Hartley’s views were un-
founded hypotheses, but speaks with great fondness and respect of
Hartley. He is very severe upon Priestley’s employment of Hartley’s
theories, particularly upon his attempt to explain every mental faculty
by association. He refers to Aristotle’s views of association. He shows
that association cannot account for memory, which was explained by
the vividness of the ideas. “Every man knows what memory is, and
every man knows what is meant by vividness of ideas or conceptions,
and their power of suggesting one another; and when we know and un-
derstand what each of these things is we can be at no loss to know
whether they are one and the same. Let every man judge for himself
whether memory is a certain degree of vividness in ideas, and of a cer-
tain degree of strength in their power of suggesting one another. To meThe Scottish Philosophy/441
they appear to be things quite of a different nature; and I could as easily
believe that a hat is a pair of shoes as that memory is a certain degree of
vividness in ideas and of strength in their association.” “A malefactor
that is going to be hanged has a cluster of very vivid ideas, and very
strongly associated, of what he is about to suffer, but it is not the object
of remembrance but of foresight;” or, “It appears evident, therefore,
that something more than association of ideas is required to produce
memory, and consequently that association is not of itself sufficient to
explain or account for memory.” He shows that association cannot ac-
count for judgment; “for if there is a power in the mind of comparing
ideas and of perceiving certain relations between them, such as those of
universal concurrence and perfect coincidence, this power is not that of
association; for it is evident that ideas may be associated with any de-
gree of strength without being compared, without perception of any re-
lation between them.” He shows in much the same way that association
cannot account for the passions and volition. He shows in the same
paper that Priestley’s attempt to get Locke’s ideas of reflection from
sensation utterly fails. Priestley had said, “got by abstraction.” “We
would be glad to be informed by Dr Priestley whether a man, when he
thinks, is not conscious of his thoughts? Whether he has not the power
of reflecting upon his own thoughts and making them an object of
thought,” etc.
III. On Liberty or Necessity. “The liberty of the will is a phrase
similar to that of the liberty of speech. The last signifies not a power
inherent in speech, but a power in the man to speak this or that. In like
manner, the liberty of the will signifies not a power inherent in the will,
but a power in man to will this or that.” “This power is given by his
Maker; and, at his pleasure whose gift it is, it may be enlarged or dimin-
ished, continued or withdrawn. No power in the creature can be inde-
pendent of the Creator. The hook is in its nose; he can give it line as far
as he sees fit, and when he pleases can restrain it or turn it whither
soever he will. Let this be always understood when we ascribe liberty to
man or to any created being. Supposing it therefore to be true that man
is a free agent, it may be true at the same time that his liberty may be
impugned or lost by disorder of body or of mind, as in melancholy or in
madness; it may be impaired or lost by vicious habits; it may in particu-
lar cases be restrained by divine interposition.” He explains cause and
effect, native and active power, liberty and necessity, standing up for
efficient cause. In a fragmentary paper upon the same subject, perhaps442/James McCosh
a continuation: “I grant that all rational beings are influenced and ought
to be influenced by motives. But the relation between a motive and the
action is of a very different nature from the relation between an efficient
cause and its effect. An efficient cause must be a being that exists and
has power to produce the effect. A motive is not a thing that exists. It is
only a thing conceived in the mind of the agent, and is what the schoolmen
called an ens rationis, and therefore cannot possibly be the efficient
cause of any thing. It may influence to action, but it cannot act. It is like
advice or persuasion, which may have an influence of the same kind
with that of motives; but they leave the man still at liberty and indeed
suppose liberty. For in vain is advice given if the person be not at liberty
either to follow or reject it. In like manner, motives suppose liberty in
the agent, otherwise they have no influence at all.”
IV. Of Constitution. Apparently a very old paper, not written with
care for the press. “Everything that is made must have some constitu-
tion,—some fabric, make, or nature,—from which all its qualities, ap-
pearances’ powers, and operations do result” “It is one thing to say such
a truth depends upon my constitution; it is another thing to say that my
perception of that truth depends on my constitution, and these two things
ought most carefully to be distinguished.” “My perception of every self-
evident truth depends upon my constitution, and is the immediate effect
of my constitution, and of that truth being presented to my mind. As
soon as this truth is understood that two and two make four, I immedi-
ately assent to it, because God has given me the faculty of discerning
immediately its truth, and if I had not this faculty I would not perceive
this truth; but it would be a true proposition still, although I did not
perceive its truth. The truth itself therefore does not depend upon my
constitution, for it was a truth before I had an existence, and will be a
truth, although I were annihilate; but my perception of it evidently de-
pends upon my constitution, and particularly upon my having as a part
of my constitution that faculty (whether you call it reason or common
sense) by which I perceive or discover this truth.” “If it should farther
be inquired how far the truth of self-evident propositions depends on the
constitution of the being that perceives them, the answer to this question
is no less easy and obvious. As every truth expresses some attribute of
a thing, or some relation between two or more things, the truth depends
on the nature of the thing whose attribute is expressed. The truth of this
proposition, that a lion is a ravenous beast, depends upon the constitu-
tion of a lion, and upon nothing else. The truth of this proposition, thatThe Scottish Philosophy/443
the sun is greater than the moon, depends upon the magnitude of the sun
and moon, and upon nothing else.” In like manner as to right and wrong.
“Although the rectitude or depravity has a real existence in the agent in
this case, yet it cannot be discerned by a spectator who has not the
faculty of discerning objects of this kind.” “Why do I believe first prin-
ciples?” “One philosopher says, Because I am so constituted that I must
believe them. This, say some, is the only possible reason that can be
given for the belief of first principles. But, say others, this is a very bad
reason; it makes truth a vague thing which depends on constitution. Is
not this the ancient sceptical system of Heraclitus, that man is the mea-
sure of truth, that what is true to one man may be false to another? How
shall we judge of this controversy? Answer, This question admits of two
meanings. 1. For what reason do you believe first principles? 2. To what
cause is your belief of first principles to be ascribed?” “To first, evi-
dence is the sole and ultimate ground of belief, and self-evidence is the
strongest possible ground of belief, and he who desires a reason for
believing what is self-evident knows not what he means.” To the second
the answer is not so satisfactory. It is “that belief is a simple and origi-
nal operation of the mind which always accompanies a thing we call
evidence.” “If it should be asked, what this evidence is which so imperi-
ously commands belief, I confess I cannot define it.” “If it should far-
ther be asked, what is the cause of our perceiving evidence in first prin-
ciples, to this I can give no other answer but that God has given us the
faculty of judgment or common sense.’ The paper closes thus: “Q. Is
there not a difference between the evidence of some first principles and
others? A. There are various differences perhaps. This seems to be one,
that, in some first principles, the predicate of the proposition is evi-
dently contained in the subject: it is in this, two and three are equal to
five; a man has flesh and blood. In these and the like self-evident prin-
ciples, the subject includes the predicate in the very notion of it. There
are other first principles in which the predicate is not contained in the
notion of the subject; as, where we affirm that a thing which begins to
exist must have a cause. Here the beginning of existence and causation
are really different notions, nor does the first include the last. Again,
when I affirm that the body which I see and feel really exists, existence
is not included in the notion of a body. I can have the notion of it as
distinct when it is annihilate. The truth of principles of the first kind is
only perceiving some part of the definition of a thing to belong to it, and
such propositions are indeed of very little use: they may justly, as Mr444/James McCosh
Locke observes, be called trifling propositions. One general maxim may
include all first principles of this kind; viz., Whatever is contained in the
definition of a thing may be predicated of it. But in reality the definition
sufficiently supplies the place of such axioms. That the sides of a square
are equal, that all the radii of a circle are equal, these do not deserve the
name of axioms; for they are included in the definitions of a square and
of a circle. Of the same kind are these propositions that an effect must
have a cause, that a son must have a father. There is nothing affirmed in
such propositions but what is contained in the definition or in the notion
of the terms. There are other first principles wherein the predicate is not
contained in the definition or notion of the subject. Of this kind is every
proposition which affirms the real existence of any thing. Existence is
not included in the notion of any thing. I”—here the paper abruptly
closes. The paper is the dimmest and yellowest of all: looks old. Query:
when written? The whole paper 11 pages.
V. On the Axioms of Euclid. “It seems no man pretends to define
sum or difference, or what it is to be greater or less. There are therefore
some terms that frequently enter into mathematical reasoning, so simple
as not to admit of mathematical definition. The mathematical axioms
ought to be employed about these and only about these.”
VI. On the Muscular Motion in the Human Body. A paper worthy
of constituting a chapter in “Paley’s Natural Theology,” showing a thor-
ough knowledge of mechanical principles, and of the physiology of his
time.
VII. Some Thoughts on the Utopian System. In this paper he seems
to amuse himself with describing the advantages of a community with-
out private property.
VIII. An Essay on Quantity. Royal Society of London, Oct., 1748,
and published in works.—“P. S. When this essay was wrote in 1748, I
knew so little of the history of the controversy about the force of moving
bodies, as to think that the British mathematicians only opposed the
notion of Leibnitz, and that all the foreign mathematicians adopted it.
The fact is, the British and French are of one side; the Germans, Dutch,
and Italians of the other. I find likewise that Desaguliers, in the second
volume of his course of ‘Experimental Philosophy,’ published in 1744,
is of the opinion that the parties in dispute put different meanings upon
the word force, and that in reality both are in the right when well under-
stood.”The Scottish Philosophy/445
Notes
1. Mr Buckle, in his “History of Civilization,” vol. ii., professes a deep
acquaintance with the Scottish metaphysicians of last Century, who
are represented by him as proceeding in the deductive, and not in the
inductive, method. He adds, that in Scotland “men have always been
deductive.” But Mr B. was never able to understand the difference
between the method of deduction on the one hand, and the method of
induction with consciousness as the agent of observation, on the other:
the former derives consequences by reasoning from principles, the
latter reaches principles by internal observation. That his whole views
on this subject were confused is evident, from the circumstance that
he represents women as proceeding (like Scotchmen) by deduction!
2. See “Considerations on Patronage, by Francis Hutcheson,” 1735.
3. Mr Buckle is reported to have expressed, in his dying days, his regret
that he could not see moral causes operating in the promotion of
civilization. Of course intellectual power must always be the imme-
diate agent in producing civilization; but did it never occur to Mr
Buckle to ask what stirred up the intellectual power in a country so
unfavorably situated as Scotland? It is all true that steam power is
the main agent in producing manufactures in our country; but how
contracted would be the vision of one who can see only the steam
power, and not the intellectual power which called the steam into
operation! Equally narrow is the view of the man who discerns the
intellectual power which effected the peculiar civilization of Scot-
land, but cannot discover the moral power which awoke the intelli-
gence. It should be added, that just as the steam power, in vented by
intellectual skill, may be devoted to very unintellectual uses, so the
intelligence aroused by moral or religious causes may be turned (as
Scotland shows) to very immoral and irreligious ends.
4. There is a copy in the Edinburgh University Library.
5. The reader curious on this subject will find ample information in
“Les Ecossais en France,” by Michel.
6. Letters to a student at the University.
7. It was owing, I doubt not, to the influence, direct or indirect, of
Shaftesbury that the phrase “common sense” came to be so much
used by the Scottish School.
8. The intelligent reader will see how much indebted Bishop Butler was
to Shaftesbury, for the views propounded in his “Sermons on Human
Nature.” Shaftesbury, before Butler, had spoken of human nature as446/James McCosh
a “constitution,” and had shown that to live according to nature im-
plies a respect to the conscience. He complains of those who speak
much of nature, without explaining its meaning (“Wit and Humor,”
iii. 2). He had divided our affections into personal and public and the
moral power, and represented that power as a principle of reflection.
Butler goes beyond Shaftesbury in showing that our personal affec-
tions are not in themselves selfish, and that the moral faculty is not
only in our soul, but claims supremacy there. Butler declines to say
whether the moral faculty is a a sense, or what else; and he will not
say that moral good consists in benevolence.
9. Stewart was not “able to discover the date of the first edition,” and
others have been as unsuccessful. It is criticised in Jackson’s “Dis-
sertation on Matter and Spirit,” 1735, and referred to in “Bibliothque
Raisonn e des ouvrages des Savans,” for April, May, and June, 1735.
But the question is settled by its appearing (as a friend has shown us)
in the “Gentleman’s Magazine,” in the register of books published
October, 1733
10. “Account of the Life, Writings, and Character of Francis Hutcheson,”
by William Leechman, D.D., prefixed to Hutcheson’s “Moral Phi-
losophy;” Carlyle’s “Autobiography;” MSS. Letters from Hutcheson
to Dr Drennan, etc.
11. Sir James Mackintosh says in his “Dissertation:” “The place of
Hutcheson’s birth is not mentioned in any account known to me. Ire-
land may be truly said to be incuriosa suorum.” Had Sir James made
inquiries in the likely quarter, he would have found the place of his
birth and the leading incidents of his life mentioned in an article signed
“M.” in the “Belfast Magazine” (for August, 1813), edited by Dr
Drennan, a man of superior literary ability, and son of the Rev. Tho-
mas Drennan, one of Hutcheson’s most intimate friends.
12. “His father, laboring under a slight rheumatic affection, deputed
him to preach in his place on a cold and rainy sabbath. About two
hours after Francis had left Ballyrea, the rain abated and the sun
shone forth, the day became serene and warm, and Mr Hutcheson,
feeling anxious to collect the opinions of his congregation on the merits
of his favorite son, proceeded directly to the city. But how was he
astonished and chagrined when he met almost the whole of his flock
coming from the meeting-house, with strong marks of disappoint-
ment and disgust visible in their countenance. One of the elders, a
native of Scotland, addressed the surprised and mortified father thus:The Scottish Philosophy/447
‘We a’ feel muckle wae for your mishap, reverend sit; but it canna be
concealed. Your silly loon Frank has fashed a’ the congregation wi’
his idle cackle; for he has been babbling this oor about a gude and
benevolent God, and that the sauls o’ the heathens themsels will gang
to heeven, if they follow the light of their own consciences. Not a
word does the daft boy ken, speer, nor say, about the gude auld com-
fortable doctrine of election, reprobation, original sin, and faith. Hoot,
mon, awa’ wi’ sic a fellow!’” The only members who waited for the
end of the sermon were Mr Johnson of Knappa, Mr M’Geough, and
the clerk. (Stuart’s “History of Armagh.”) This story may be made
somewhat more pointed in the telling, but is, we have no doubt, sub-
stantially correct. It will be remembered that Professor Simson held
similar views in regard to the heathen; and, in the Introduction to the
Translation of Antoninus by Hutcheson and Moor, the authors main-
tain: “‘Tis but a late doctrine in the Christian church that the grace of
God and all divine influences were confined to such as knew the Chris-
tian history, and were by profession in the Christian church.”
13. Wodrow’s “Analecta.”
14. The valuable letters of Hutcheson have been kindly placed at the
disposal of the author of this work by Dr Drennan, grandson of the
Rev. Thomas Drennan, and have been used in this Memoir.
15. There is evidently an analogous (not identical) movement going on
in Scot land at this present time. There is an understood combination
of persons in and beyond the universities, laboring in reviews, in
books, and from the pulpits “to put a new face upon theology in
Scotland,” just as Hutcheson and Lechman did.
16. MS. letter to Rev. T. Steward, minister at St. Edmundsbury, in pos-
session of Mr Reid in Londonderry.
17. There is a curious book, “An Introduction towards an Essay on the
Origin of the Passions, in which it is endeavored to be shown how
they are all acquired, and that they are no other than Associations of
Ideas of our own making, or what we learn of others,” London, printer
for R. Dodsley, at Tully’s Head in Pall Mall, and sold by T. Cooper,
at the Globe in Paternoster Row, 1741. It is a mere fragment of thirty-
two pages. The author says that the arguments made use of by Locke
in order to prove that there are no innate ideas will, I think, hold fully
as strong against all implanted appetites, or whatsoever “actions which
we style moral or immoral, virtuous or vicious, are approved and
disapproved, not by nat ure and constitution, but by habit and asso-448/James McCosh
ciation.”
18. There is a work, “An Examination of the Scheme of Morality ad-
vanced by Dr Hutcheson, late Professor of Morality in the University
of Glasgow,” 1759, in which the author criticises Hutcheson’s whole
doctrine of senses, instincts, affections; and objects to his attempts to
reduce all virtue and religion to benevolence or goodgwill to others,
and also to his doctrine of moral sense as a faculty.
19. “Memorials of Alexander Moncrieff and James Fisher,” by Dr Young
and Dr Brown.
20. Parish records of Alloa in Register Office, Edinburga; “Catalogue
of Graduates in Edinburgh,” edited by Laing (Bannatyne Club); “Pre-
sentation Book” of Marischal College, Aberdeen.
21. In the Preface to his “Moral Philosophy,” he refers to a certain poet,
“universally confessed to have shown a most extraordinary genius
for descriptive poetry in some of his works, and in all of them a heart
deeply impregnated with the warmest love of virtue and mankind,” as
likely from friendship to cast his eye on that Preface; from which we
may argue that he had contracted a friendship with James Thomson.
22. I cannot find that this work was published till 1763, the date of the
copy in W. S. Library, Edinburgh. In 1740, he published a transla-
tion of “Vertot, Three Dissertations.”
23. This was Thomas Rundle (born 1686, died 1743). Strong objections
were taken to his getting the see of Gloucester, and so he went to
Derry, when Thomson writes of him in a poem to the memory of
Talbot:
“Though from native sunshine driven,
Driven from your friends, the sunshine of the soul,
By slanderous zeal and politics’ infern,
Jealous of worth.”
In these times, men were sent to Ireland who would not be tolerated
in the Church of England. Pope says of him: “Rundle has a heart;”
and Swift:
“Rundle a bishop, well he may,
He’s still a Christian more than they.”
He was the author of “Letters to the late Mrs Barbara Landis,” in
which he speaks in favor of theatres, gives a high place to reason,
says a word in behalf of Chubb, praises Shaftesbury, though he re-The Scottish Philosophy/449
grets his opposition to Christianity. He says of those who would de-
stroy the foundation of virtue: “That they turn, as the elephants did of
old, and trample down those that brought them to the war.” The fol-
lowing has, Often been uttered since: “Christianity is so amiable in
itself, that what Plato says of virtue is true of it, that if it is beheld in
its native charms every man would be in love with it.”
24. See “London Magazine,” for that year.
25. It does seem rather strange that Reid should nowhere have acknowl-
edged what he owed to Turnbull.
26. “Preceptor,” vol. ii., 1748; Darling’s “Cyclopaedia;” Mackie’s “In-
dex Funeregrius;” Kennedy’s “Annals of Aberdeen.”
27. “Scottish Register,” January, February, March, 1794.
28. “Scot’s Magazine,” August, 1841; Somerville’s “Life and Times.”
29. “Scot’s Magazine,” 1747, 1749; Chambers’s “Biographical Dictio-
nary.”
30. The representative book of the age then passing away was “Natural
Religion insufficient, and Revealed Necessary to Man’s Happiness
in his Present State “by the late Rev. Thomas Halyburton, professor
of divinity in the University of St. Andrews (born 1674, died 1712).
It is a clearly written, respectably learned work, and establishes its
point. It was superseded by the deeper discussions raised by Hume.
(“Life and Writings,” by Burns.)
31. The author of this work has been aided in his researches on this
subject by the great kindness of the Rev. Alexander Christison, clerk
to the Presbytery of Chirnside.
32. “My own Life,” by David Hume; “Life and Correspondence of David
Hume,” by John Hill Burton, etc.
33. For some years past it has been well known in literary circles in
Edinburgh, that there was a scandal about David Hume in his younger
years. Having been kindly allowed to look into the ecclesiastical
records which bear upon it, I find that there was a charge brought,
but no evidence to support it. A woman did, March 5, 1734, charge
“Mr David Home, brother to Ninewells, as being the father of her
child.” But this woman had previously had three illegitimate chil-
dren; she had refused to say who was the father of her child when
David Hume was in the country, though it was known he was leav-
ing, and she brought the charge after he was gone. The Presbytery of
Chirnside, when the case was brought before them, rebuked the woman
for her conduct, and there is no other record of the matter. It is a450/James McCosh
curious circumstance that this incident should have happened at the
time when the youth was leaving his home in so singular a frame of
mind.
34. “Memoirs of R. and J. A. Haldane,” chap. xxv.
35. J.S. Mill labors to derive all our ideas and convictions from sensa-
tions. He is to be met by showing that we never have a sensation
without knowing a self as sentient.
36. Mr Mill is in difficulties at this point, and avows it in a foot-note, p.
174: Our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate; no
reason can be given for it which does not presuppose the belief, and
assume it to be well grounded.” The full facts of the recognitive power
of memory are not embraced in this brief enunciation, but there is
much stated, and more implied; he should have inquired how much is
involved, and he would have seen that there is truth admitted fatal to
his system. He should also have shown on what ground he proclaims
this belief to be “evidently ultimate,” and then we might have shown
that on the same ground, that is self-evidence, we are entitled to call
in the other ultimate beliefs.
37. J.S. Mill’s treatment of space and time is superficial. He brings in
time quietly without noticing it, or giving any account of it. He does
not see that the idea of it in the concrete is involved in memory; we
remember the event as happening in time past. He derives our idea of
space from that of the time occupied by our muscular sensations:
“When we say that there is a space between A and B, we mean that
some amount of these muscular sensations must intervene.” “Resist-
ing points” are said to be “at different distances from one another,
because the series of intervening muscular sensations is longer in
some cases than in others.” (pp. 228, 229). He thus avowedly makes,
p. 227, an “identification” of length in time and length in space “as
one;” whereas our consciousness declares them to be as different as it
is possible for ideas to be. The hypothesis on which he and Professor
Bain build their whole theory of the origin of our idea of extension,
viz., the sensations of our muscles, is doubted by some. The conclu-
sion of F.H. Weber, from numerous and careful observations, is: “Of
the Voluntary motion of our limbs, we know originally nothing. We
do not perceive the motion of our muscles by their own sensations,
but attain a knowledge of them only when perceived by another sense.”
(see Abbot on “Sight and Touch,” p. 71).
38. J. S. Mill has made a most unwarrantable application of the laws ofThe Scottish Philosophy/451
association, in accounting for the formation of our higher ideas. He
labors to derive all our ideas from sensation through association. But
sensations—say of sounds, smells, colors, and forms, or of pleasure
and pain—can never be any thing else than sensations,—that is sounds,
smells, colors, forms, pleasures or pains,—and never can of them-
selves yield such ideas as those of space and time, cause and effect,
moral good and moral obligation. But then he gives to association a
sort of chemical power, by which it changes a series of successive or
contemporaneous ideas into something different from any of the ideas,
just as oxygen and hydrogen by their union form a third substance,
water. He is to be met here by showing that the laws of the associa-
tion are merely the laws of the succession of our ideas, and they do
not generate a new idea. Repeated association may quicken the flow
of our ideas, and make several, as it were, coalesce into one, or it
may weaken some and intensify others, but it cannot yield a new
element. Even on the supposition that there is (which there is not) a
chemical power in association to transmute one thing into another,
this would be a new and different capacity, not in the sensations and
associations, but superinduced upon them. Mr Mill’s professed evo-
lution of our higher ideas out of sensation by association, is a mere
jugglery, in which he changes the elements without perceiving it, and
overlooks the peculiarities of the composites he would explain.
He has been guilty of an equal error in very much overlooking
the relations which the mind of man can discover; and, so far as he
does notice them, in giving a very inadequate account of them. In this
respect he is far behind Hume, who, we have seen, gives a very com-
prehensive summary of them. So far as Mr Mill treats of them, he
(followed by Professor Bain) seems to give the mind no other power
of comparison than that of observing resemblances and differences.
Nor is this his worst error. He confounds the judgments of the mind
with associations, and thus endeavors, in a plausible but superficial
way to account for that conviction of necessity which is appealed to
as a test of fundamental truth. “If we find it,” he says, “impossible by
any trial to separate two ideas, we have all the feeling of necessity the
mind is capable of.” (p. 264). Now there is here the confounding of
two things that are very different, the association of two ideas, so that
the one always calls up the other, with the judgment which declares
that two things are necessarily related. The letter A suggests the let-
ter B; this is one mental phenomenon: we decide that two plus two452/James McCosh
makes four, and that it cannot be otherwise; this is an entirely differ-
ent phenomenon. Now it is this necessity of judgment, and not the
invariable association, that is the test of first truths. When we thus
show that association cannot produce a new idea, and that judgment,
especially necessary judgments, are something different from asso-
ciations, we deprive Mr Mill’s theory of the plausibility which has so
deceived the London critics bred at the English universities,—where,
I may take the liberty of saying, they would be very much the better
of instruction in a sound and sober philosophy.
39. Here again, from like premises, J.S. Mill has arrived at much the
same conclusions. Mind, according to him, is “a series of feelings,”
with “a belief of the permanent possibility of the feelings.” He is to
be met by showing that in every conscious act we know self as exist-
ing; that when we remember, we remember self as in some state; and
that, on comparing the former self with the present, we declare them
to be the same. This implies more than a mere series of feelings, or a
belief (he does not well know what to make of this belief) in possibili-
ties; it implies a self existing and feeling, now and in time past. Again:
“Matter may be defined the permanent possibility of sensation.” He
is to be met here by showing that we apprehend matter as an exist-
ence external and extended, and that we cannot get this idea of exten-
sion from mere sensations which are not extended. As to the contra-
diction between the senses and the reason, which Hume maintains,
Mr Mill makes the reason and senses say the same thing, that we can
know nothing whatever of matter except as the “possibility of sensa-
tion,” and that it “may be but a mode in which the mind represents to
itself the possible modifications of the Ego” (p. 189), which Ego is
but a series of feelings. This conclusion is quite as blank as that
reached by Hume.
40. Mr Mill has adopted Hume’s doctrine of causation with a few modi-
fications. The question is: Has he left to himself or to his followers an
argument for the divine existence? He advises the defenders of theism
to stick by the argument from design, but does not say that it has
convinced himself. The advice is a sound one; we should not give up
the argument from design because of the objections of Kant, which
derive their force from the errors of his philosophy. Mr Mill says,
that we can “find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one of the
many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the uni-
verse, events may succeed one another at random, without any fixedThe Scottish Philosophy/453
law” (“Logic,” b. iii. c. 21). I should like to see an attempt made to
construct an argument for the divine existence by those who accept
this view. Mr Mill shows that our belief in the uniformity of nature is
the result of experience. But the uniformity of nature is one thing and
causation is a different thing. He should be met by showing that we
have a necessary conviction that every thing that begins to be has a
cause, and that he has utterly failed in deriving this conviction from
sensations and associations.
41. In his “Utilitarianism,” Mr Mill has endeavored to defend the theory
from the objections commonly taken to it. But he has utterly failed in
his attempt to derive our idea and conviction of moral good from
mere sensations and associations of sensation.
42. “Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith,” by Dugald
Stewart; “Life and Writings of Adam Smith,” anonymous, but un-
derstood to be, by J. R. M’Culloch; “Literary and Characteristical
Lives,” by William Smellie, etc.
43. “Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Hon. Henry Home, of
Kames,” by Alex. Fraser Tytler, Lord Woodhouselee, 2 vols., 1807.
44. There appeared “Some late Opinions concerning the Foundation of
Morality examined, in a Letter to a Friend,” London, 1753. The au-
thor says of Home: His merit is great, were it only in stating so clearly
the sentiment of duty or moral obligation, and distinguishing it from
the sentiment of simple moral obligation.” The peculiarity of this
sentiment, as expressed by the words “ought” and ,should,” our au-
thor distinctly explains, and shows how it is “to be distinguished
from simple approbation by the sanction of self-condemnation or re-
morse.” He says of Hume, that it is “his error from the beginning to
the end to haye overlooked the innate feelings of duty,—that author-
ity which conscience carries in itself, prescribing certain virtues as a
law or rule upon which alone morality can be founded and ascer-
tained.” “Mr Hutcheson led the way, by resolving all the several vir-
tues into benevolence, as our author has done into utility, which, in
his sense of it, is much the same.”
45. It is said that Home has been confuted by “the smart and sensible
author of the ‘Estimate of the Profit and Loss of Religion,’ and in the
modest and elegant ‘Delineation of Morality’ (Balfour). Two other
authors have distinguished themselves against the particular parts of
the scheme; viz., Rev. Mr Adams, a clergyman of the Church of En-
gland, in his answer to the ‘Essay on Miracles,’ and Dr John Stewart454/James McCosh
in his very masterly reply to the ‘Essay of Motion.’”
46. It is proper to state that in his third edition (1779) Home says, on
farther reflection he has modified some of his opinions. He gives up
the position that “some of our moral feelings and emotions must be
founded on a delusion.” He now asserts that the notion we have of
being able to act against motives “is suggested by the irregular influ-
ence of passion, and that we never have it in our cool moments; con-
sequently it is not a delusion of nature, but of passion only.” He
thinks that he thus escapes the position that virtue in any measure;
rests on the foundation of any natural feelings being a delusion. But,
in avoiding one difficulty, he only falls into another; for it is in our
moments of cool reflection that we adhere most resolutely to the con-
viction that we have an essential freedom.
47. MS. “Life of Witherspoon,” by Ashbel Green (formerly President
of Princeton College), in the Library of the New Jersey Historical
Society MS. “Life of Witherspoon.” in a History of the College, by
Ex-President Maclean, who has kindly allowed me to use it. “Fu-
neral Sermon,” by Rev. Dr Rodgers, of New York, in edition of
Witherspoon’s “Works,” Philadelphia, 1800.
48. The genealogy seems to have been:—John Knox; Mrs Welch; her
daughter married to Mr Witherspoon; Rev. James Witherspoon, their
son: Rev. John Witherspoon.
49. “Princeton College during the Eighteenth Century” by Samuel D.
Alexander.
50. Stanhope Smith’s “Lectures on Moral and Political Philosophy.”
Stanhope Smith was the author of an “Essay on the Causes of the
Variety of Complexion and Figure of the Human Species.” He holds
by the unity of the race, and accounts for the diversities by natural
causes. It was first published, 1787, and ran through several edi-
tions.
51. I may mention, as belonging to the same age, “An Essay on Virtue
and Harmony, wherein a Reconciliation of the Various Accounts of
Moral Obligation is attempted,” by William Jameson, M.A. minister
of Rerick, 1749. He shows that man is endowed with various senses,
but especially with a moral sense; and, “as several parts or strains of
music and different musical instruments do compose a concert, so the
various sorts of beauty, order, proportion, and harmony in the veg-
etable kingdom, in the animal, and in the intellectual system, consti-
tute one universal harmony or concert: in that grand concert, everyThe Scottish Philosophy/455
man is bound to perform his part in a proper key, as it were, or in just
consonance with the whole which can only be done by the order and
harmony of his affections, and the beauty and regularity of his ac-
tions.” The scepticism of Hume cast aside these inquiries into senses
and tastes, and led to the profounder philosophy of Reid.
52. “Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid,” by Dugald
Stewart; “The Works of Thomas Reid,” by Sir William Hamilton;
MS. letters in possession of the late Alexander Thomson of Banchory
(used by Hamilton); Papers of Dr Reid in possession of Francis
Edmond of Aberdeen.
53. One version is, that Tillotson had preached from Clarke, and that, in
consequence, one of Clarke’s sermons had been published among
Tillotson’s sermons, and that Reid had taken the sermon from Clarke,
while the lady had read it in Tillotson. I have not found any confirma-
tion of this.
54. In possession of Francis Edmond.
55. MS. notes furnished me by Thomson of Banchory.
56. MS. letters possessed by Thomson of Banchory.
57. MS. papers of Dr Reid, in possession of Francis Edmond, Esq.
58. Life of Dr McKinlay of Kilmarnock, prefixed to a volume of his
“Sermons.”
59. MS. papers in possession of Francis Edmond.
60. “An Examination of Dr. Reid’s ‘Inquiry into the Human Mind, on
the Principles of Common Sense,’ Dr Beattie’s ‘Essay on the Nature
and Immutability of Truth,’ and Dr Oswald’s ‘Appeal to Common
Sense in Behalf of Religion,’” by Joseph Priestley, 1774. Reid’s work
appears to him “an ingenious piece of sophistry.” He wonders that
none of the Scottish writers (except Beattie) refer to Hartley. “Some-
thing was done in this field by Descartes, very much by Mr Locke,
but most of all by Dr. Hartley, who has thrown more useful light on
the theory of the mind than Newton did upon the theory of the natural
world.” “The evidence that any two properties are necessarily united
is the constant observation of their union.” Propositions and reason-
ing” are in fact nothing more than cases of association of ideas.”
“There are many opinions which we know to be acquired, and even
founded on prejudice and mistake, which, however, the fullest cor-
rection that they are void of all real foundation cannot erase from the
mind; the groundless belief and expectation founded upon it being so
closely connected with the idea of certain circumstances, that no mental456/James McCosh
power of which we are possessed can separate them: “and he gives,
as an example, our fear of ghosts. We see the commencement of the
feud which culminated in John Stuart Mill’s “Examination of
Hamilton’s Philosophy.” But Priestley, like Mill, is obliged, uncon-
sciously and surreptitiously, to call in first truths. “No man ever de-
nied that there are self-evident truths, and that these must be assumed
as the foundation of all our reasoning.” “I never met with any person
who did not acknowledge this.” It is curious to find him saying that
they “recommend particular positions as axioms, not as being founded
on the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas,
which is the great doctrine of Mr Locke, and which makes truth de-
pend upon the necessary nature of things, to be absolutely unchange-
able and everlasting; but merely some unaccountable instinctive per-
suasions depending on the arbitrary constitution of our natures.”
61. The translator of Buffier (1780) charges Reid with plagiarism. Dugald
Stewart defends him (“Elements,” vol. ii., pp. 63, 64); as does also
Hamilton (Reid’s “Collected Works,” p. 789), who shows that Reid
“only became acquainted with the treatise of Buffier after the publi-
cation of his own ‘Inquiry;’ for in his ‘Account of Aristotle’s Logic,’
written and published some ten years subsequently to that work, he
says, ‘I have lately met with a very judicious treatise, written by
Father Buffier.’”
62. In “Scot’s Magazine,” February, 1847, was advertised “The Impar-
tial Philosopher, or the Philosophy of Common Sense,” by the Mar-
quis d’Argens, in two volumes, 6s.
63. In possession of Francis Edmond
64. Original minutes of the Society, kindly lent me by Francis Edmond;
“Biographical Sketch of David Skene, M.D,” by Alexander Thomson
of Banchory.
65. “An Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. Beattie,” by Sir Will-
iam Forbes.
66. This portrait was lately in possession of the Misses Glennie, his
grandnieces, in Aberdeen. A print of it is to be found in a few copies
of Forbes’ “Life of Beattie.”
67. The father published “Miscellanies,” by James Hay Beattie, A.M.,
in two volumes, 1799. There are some verses worth preserving:
“And how Milton has glands in his brain
That secreted the ‘Paradise lost.”’
68. Life, by Rev. Dr Keith. MS. Papers in possession of AndrewThe Scottish Philosophy/457
Farquharson of Whitehouse, kindly lent me.
69. This may be the most appropriate place for referring to Ogilvie’s
“Philosophical and Critical Observations on the Nature, Character,
and Various Species of Composition,” 1774. The author was born
1737, became minister of Midmar in Aberdeenshire, and died in 1814.
He was a miscellaneous writer in poetry and prose. In “The Theol-
ogy of Plato compared with the Principles of Oriental and Grecian
Philosophy,” he treats of topics not usually discussed by the Scottish
metaphysicians.
70. Article, James Burnett, in the “Edinburgh Encyclopedia.”
71. This letter is in possession of the family at Monboddo.
72. Biographical Sketch of Adam Ferguson, LLD., F.R.S.E., Professor
of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, by John Small,
M.A., Librarian to the University. Read before the Philosophical
Society of Edinburgh, April 18, 1864.
73. Life, by Lord Woodhouselee, prefixed to his “Works” in four vol-
umes; “Literary and Characteristical Lives,” by William Smellie.
74. Not a few of the Edinburgh lawyers wrote philosophical treatises.
Thus, “Essays, Moral and Divine,” by Sir William Anstruther, of
Anstruther, one of the Senators of the College of Justice, 1701. He
treats of atheism. providence, learning and religion, trifling studies,
stage-plays and romances, incantation, Jesus Christ, and redemption
of mankind. He opposes Locke with some ability, and shows that the
idea of a Perfect Being is simple and innate, imprinted on our minds
by God in our creation. Then in Sir George Mackenzie’s (the bloody
Mackenzie) “Works,” two vols. folio, 1716, we have an essay on
happiness. He shows that nothing without us, not even philosophy,
can make us happy, that religion alone can do so. He treats of athe-
ism, of moral gallantry, of the moral history of frugality. He begins
with an address to fanatics. He would act the religious stoic, and
holds that solitude is to be preferred to public employment. We have
also, “Some Thoughts concerning Religion, Natural and Revealed,
with Reflections on the Sources of Incredulity with regard to Reli-
gion,” by Rt. Hon. Duncan Forbes, of Culloden, 1750
75. Having, in my boyish days, often “kissed the cup to pass it by,”
among those who had drunk and been drunk with Burns, I am pre-
pared to believe this: but I have to add, that though the sense and
humor were strong and shrewd they were often coarse and sensual.
Burns was reared in an age in which the uncompromising religion of458/James McCosh
the covenant was giving way, in the south-west of Scotland, to the
milder religion or irreligion of the moderate type. He owed much to
the sincere devoutness of his father; but, in spite of all that the liter-
ary admirers of Burns may say to the contrary, I am not sure that it
was for the benefit of the son that the father, brought up in the more
latitudinarian east coast of Scotland, attached himself to the New-
Light party, as the youth was thereby thrown among those who had
no depth of piety, and who rather rejoiced in the ebullitions against
religion which he uttered in moments of passion, which he never meant
to publish, and over which he lamented in his declining life. Burns
ever held firmly by the great truths of natural religion, and had a
profound reverence for the Bible, to which he turned fondly in his
latter days: he seems often, always in times of impulse, to have prayed,
and would rise from his prayers to write to Clarinda: “I have just
been before the throne of my God, Clarinda; according to my asso-
ciation of ideas observe the Scotch metaphysics; my sentiments of
love and friendship, I next devote myself to you.” He declared, in the
presence of the elegant Dr Blair, that his favorite preacher in Edinburgh
was the evangelical Dr Walker. Burns lived in the age in which, con-
temporaneous with the declining piety, the two great vices of Scot-
land, intemperance and illicit intercourse of young men and women,
descended to the common people. The evangelical ministers had not
the courage to check in the bud the rising intemperance, and, in the
second age of moderatism, many of the moderate clergy became the
victims of it. The dwellings of the Scottish peasantry were wretched;
and courtship among the young people was concealed as if it were a
crime, and driven out of the house into places of darkness, the sum-
mons to which is indicated in the line, “Whistle, and I’ll come to you,
my lad.” The consequence was, coarse tastes among the small farm-
ers’ and cotters’ daughters and servant girls, which neither the
evangelicals nor the moral philosophers or clergy bred by them sought
to refine. Cromek, speaking of Burns’s visit to Edinburgh, says: “But
a refined and accomplished woman was a thing almost new to him,
and of which he had formed but a very inadequate idea.” The evil
was not lessened, but rather fomented, by the coarse mode of public
ecclesiastical discipline which greatly chafed Burns when applied to
him. I am convinced that the conduct and poetry of Burns helped
greatly to foster the national vices. I speak what I know, as my boyish
days were spent in the land of Burns, and I met with old men whoThe Scottish Philosophy/459
knew Burns and the state of society in which he lived.
76. I’ve sent you here, by Johnie Simson,
Twa sage philosophers to glimpse on:
Smith wi’ his sympathetic feeling,
And Reid to common sense appealing.
Philosophers have fought and wrangled,
And mickle Greek and Latin mangled,
Till, wi’ their logic-jargon tired
And in the depth of science mired,
To common sense they now appeal,
That wives and wabsters see and feel.
It is curious to find Burns referring to the philosophy of Spinoza.
77. In Stewart’s class he wrote an essay on the “Manners and Customs
of the Northern Nations,” and the professor said, “the author of this
paper shows much knowledge of his subject, and a great taste for
such researches.” Scott became, before the close of the session, a
frequent visitor in Mr Stewart’s family, and an affectionate inter-
course was maintained between them through their after lives.
(Lockhart’s “Life of Scott”)
78. In “Dissertatio Philosophica Inauguralis de Analogia et Philosophia
Prima,” Feb. 23, 1739, Professor Cleghorn says: “Idea innata nulla
est. Aptitudo qumdam innata menti inest qua ad ideas hasce, vulgo
innatas dictas? percipiendas approbandasque, quandocumque se
obtulerit necessario dirigetur.”
79. I have employed more time than I would like to tell any one, in
searching after the Scottish ancestry of Kant, but without success. I
find that the name Cant was not uncommon in Forfarshire in last
century: it occurs on the tombstones in a number of churchyards. In
a map of a piece of ground at the north end of Brechin, there is men-
tion of its belonging successively to George Cant and Alexander Cant.
There was a James Cant, weaver in Brechin, admitted to the guild in
1779. I have seen a deed in which George Scott sells, in 1799, to John
Cant, tanner in Brechin, a piece of property on the east side of High
Street. It had been bought in 1796 by the two, in a contract of
copartnery for carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling
of leather. As leather and saddlery are connected, I have at times
favored the idea that Kant, the saddler, may have been descended
from the same Cants as John Cant, the tanner, who it is understood
came from Montrose to Brechin. It is proper to state that I have been
assisted in these researches by D.D. Black, Esq., town clerk, Brechin.460/James McCosh
80. “The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, edited by Sir William
Hamilton, Bart., with a Memoir of Dugald Stewart, by John Veitch.”
81. It is an interesting circumstance that, perhaps, the fairest estimate
which we have of Bacon and the inductive system is by a German,
Kuno Fischer, in the “Francis Bacon of Verulam” (translated by
Oxenford). He errs, however, after the usual German mode of theo-
rizing, in connecting Bacon with such men as Hobbes and Hume, the
former of whom never professed to follow the Baconian method, and
the latter of whom formed a very low estimate of Bacon, and has
been most effectively met by Reid and Stewart, who professedly and
really adopted the inductive system. This has been shown by Remusat,
in his pleasantively written and judicious work, “Bacon: Sa Vie, son
Temps, sa Philosophie” where there is a just estimate of Bacon’s
general philosophy, and some good remarks on the metaphysical points
involved in induction.
82. The intellectual side has been brought out to view by Henry Rogers,
Professor Bowen of Harvard, and Professor Webb of Dublin.
83. “Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Brown, M.D.” (1825),
by David Welsh. Shorter Memoir by same prefixed to Brown’s “Lec-
tures.”
84. “Life of Francis Jeffrey,” by Lord Cockburn.
85. I am afraid we cannot claim Sydney Smith (born 1771, died 1845)
as one of the Scotch metaphysicians as he was not a Scotchman: he
merely resided for a time in Edinburgh. But his “Lectures on Moral
Philosophy,” delivered in London, 1804–6, and published in a vol-
ume (1850), is drawn from the Scottish philosophy, especially from
Stewart, and is a remarkably clear, lively, and judicious work.
86. Thus of Wordsworth’s “Excursion” Jeffrey says: “This will never
do.” “It is longer, weaker, and tamer than any of Mr Wordsworth’s
other productions.” Of Goethe’s “Wilhelm Meister” he says: “To us
it certainly appears, after the most deliberate consideration, to be
eminently absurd, puerile, incongruous, vulgar, and affected; and,
though redeemed by considerable powers of invention and some traits
of vivacity, to be so far from perfection as to be almost from begin-
ning to end one flagrant offence against every principle of taste and
every rule of composition.” How different the estimate formed by
Thomas Carlyle of the second period of the Edinburgh Review! The
late Lord Ashburton shortly after the decease of his lady, who was a
great admirer of Carlyle, did the author of this work the honor ofThe Scottish Philosophy/461
applying to him to explain what Carlyle could mean by an advice
which he gave. “I inquired of him,” said his Lordship, “what I could
do to form my character, and make myself what I ought to be. ‘Read
“Wilheim Meister,”’ said he. So I read ‘Wilhelm Meister’ and went
back to my counsellor, saying that I had read the book and admired
it, but could not discover any thing in it fitted to accomplish the end
I have in view. ‘Read “Wilhelm Meister,”’ said the great man, ‘a
second time.’ Now I have read it a second time without getting what
I wish. I now come to you to see if you can tell me what Carlyle can
mean.” I told him he must go to the oracle himself to find out what he
meant: but I added that I believed that neither Goethe nor Carlyle,
though eminent literary geniuses, knew of, or could direct him to,
what might effect the good end his Lordship had in view.
87. “Memoirs of the Life of the Right Honorable Sir James Mackin-
tosh,” edited by his son, Robert James Mackintosh.
88. The Life and Times of Henry Lord Brougham, written by himself.
89. He was to be received at Brechin in the parish church. He separated
from those who were to conduct him, and came to the door in tartan
trews, and was refused entrance by an old sergeant who had charge
of the admission. “Do not you know,” thundered his lordship, “that in
order of mine could hang you on that lamp-post? “To which the ser-
geant replied that he knew nothing as to what the person addressing
him could do, but he knew that it was his duty not to allow any one to
enter at that door without an express order.
90. Laetitia autem et libido in bunorum opinione versatur, etc.
91. “Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy, by the late John Young, with a
Memoir of the Author, edited by William Cairns.”
92. “Autobiography by John Stuart Mill;” “Personal Life of George
Grote,” by Mrs. Grote; etc.
93. I had this from a son of Dr. Foote, Archibald Foote, Esq.,—manu-
facturer, Montrose, to whom John Stuart Mill applied to get informa-
tion about his father, who does not seem to have been very communi-
cative to his family about his parentage or younger years.
94. It is said that he published two sermons under the name of James
Miln or Milne.
95. I had this from the late John Pim, of Belfast, who was at the place at
the time. I would not have referred to it had the suicide been the result
of a mental derangement: it was the logical consequence of the philo-
sophic training.462/James McCosh
96. “Recollections of Rev. John Ballantyne,” an address delivered at a
soirée on opening the new United Presbyterian Church, Stonehaven,
by Rev. John Longmuir, Aberdeen, 1862.
97. “Memoir of Thomas Chalmers,” by William Hanna.
98. In fact, “Daft Tam Chalmers” was a phrase applied to him by those
who could not discern his greatness in the bud.
99. “Memoir of Dr. Welsh,” by Alexander Dunlop, Esq., prefixed to
Sermons.
100. “Christopher North. A Memoir of John Wilson, by his daughter,
Mrs Gordon.”
101. Article by Thomas Spencer Baynes in “Edinburgh Essays” by
members of the University of Edinburgh; “Memoir of Sir William
Hamilton” by John Veitch.
102. In this letter, and in of those that follow, them is a great deal said
about a young man named Robert Haliday, who is studying at
Glasgow, and about whom Hutcheson is very anxious.